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Abstrac t
Starting From Scratch: St. John 's, New foundland as a Case Study in
Seco nd World War Naval Base Developm en t
Contrary to popular belief, St. John' s, New foundland, rather than Halifax,
Nova Scotia, was Canada's major convoy escort base during World War II. This is
significant for a number of reasons. Chief among them is that Newfoundland was a
separate domini on, and the base - commissioned HMCS Aval on - was built and
operated by the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) but owned by the British Admiralty.
Furthermore, the RCN managed to create a major naval facility in the heart of a
capital city with a civilian population of 40,000 when Amer ican and Canadian army
forces already occupied most of the available vacant land .
Historians have sugges ted that the establishment of the Newfoundland Escort
Force in May 1941 was a milestone in Canadian naval history and that its creation
elevated the RCN into a major combatant. They argue that the importance of the
naval base can hardly be exaggerated and that it was actua lly the key to the western
defence system. Yet relatively little has been written on how this base arose from
what originally was merely a defended harbour.
While much has appeared on the ships and men involved in the Battle of the
Atlantic, the various bases from which they operated have received scant attention.
This is a significant oversight because how the forces fared at sea was often bound up
inextricably with the operation of the facilities ashore. This was especially so for the
RCN due to its rapid expansion during the war. Its defence of the convoys was a
direct reflection of the efficiency, maintenance and trainin g capabi lities of the shore
establishments. For the Newfoundl and Escort Force/Mid-Ocea n Escort Force this was
HMCS Avalon located at St. John ' s, New foundland. Yet both contemporarie s and
histori ans rememb er the presence of the US army more than the RCN despite the fact
that thousands of sailors and hundreds of warships were stationed in St. John's during
the war. This may be due to the longevity of the American presence in Newfo undland
and the haste with which the Canadian facilities were dismantled at the end of the
hostilit ies. Or perhaps it is a hangover from Newfo undland' s still contentious decision
to join Canada in 1949. The story of how St. John ' s evo lved from a defended harbour
to a major Allied escort base makes a significant cont ributi on to Canadian,
Newfoundl and and naval historiograph y.
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Introduction
Sta r ting from Scratch: St. John 's, New foundland as a Case Study in
Second World w» Naval Base Developm ent
Contrary to popu lar belief, St. John' s, ewfound land - not Halifax, Nova Scotia
- was Canada 's major convoy escort base dur ing World War II. Indeed , the myth that
Halifax- based warships esco rted the vital convoys across the Atlantic is constantly
repeated.I That it was St. John' s and not Halifax is significant for a number of reasons .
Chief among them is that Newfoundland was a separate dom inion at the time, and the
base - commissioned HMCS Avalon - was built and operated by the Royal Canadian
Navy (RCN) but actually owned by the British Admiralty. Further, the RCN managed
to crea te such a major naval facility in the heart of a capita l city with a civilian
population of 40,000 at a time when American and Canadian Army forces already
occupied most of the available vacant land .
This thesis has two goals. The first is to chronicl e the development ofS t. John 's
from merely a poorly defended port in Septemb er 1939 into Canada's main trans-
Atlantic escort base, with part icular attention to the crucial May 194 1/May 1943 period.
Second, the RCN confronted many challenges both at sea and ashore duri ng the Battle
of the Atlantic. Many of those have been well documented by such noted Canadian
historians as Marc Milner, Michael Hadley, David Zimmerman and Richard Mayne?
'Will iam D. Naftel, Halifax at War: Searchlights, Squadrons and Submarines, 1939-1945
(Halifax: Fonna cPublishing, 2008), 71.
2Marc Milner, North Atlantic Run: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle/or the Convoys.
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), Michael L. Hadley, V-Boats against Canada: German
Submarines in Canadian Waters (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985), The Great Naval
Battle of Ottawa: How Admirals, Scientists, and Politicians Impeded the Development 0/ High
Technology in Canada 's Wartime Navy (Toronto: University of Toro nto Press, 1989), Richard O.
Mayne , Betrayed: Scandal, Politics, and Canadian Naval Leadership (Vancouver: USC Press, 2006).
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Similarly , the RCN faced many obstacles in developin g liM CS Avalon including
ulterior motives, oppos ing interests and conflicting personalities. Often, the forces that
dictated the deve lopment and operation of the base at St. .Iohn ' s were completely out of
the contro l of the Flag Offic er, Newfoundland Force (FONF) or even Naval Service
Headqu arters (NS HQ). This thesis demonstrates that I-IMCS Avalon, nevertheless,
accomplished all it was designed to do. It asse rted Canada's special interest in
Newfoundland whil e at the same time highlighting the country' s contr ibution to the
Allied war effor t. The RCN accomplished this despite inter-governm ental tensions, a
convo luted comm and structure, labour difficulties, enemy action, and even the weather.
Even more important , the RCN and HMCS Avalon facilitated the safe and timely
arrival of ove r 25 ,000 ships in the United Kingdom and in the words of Admiral Sir
Percy Noble, C-in-C, Northwes t Approaches, "solved the problem of the Atlantic
convoys."? This study explains how the challenges were met and overcome by the
various parties, and demonstrates that despite these difficult ies, HMCS Avalon was
ultimately a fully funct ioning, reasonably efficie nt, wartime naval faci lity of strategic
importance.
Marc Milner suggests that "the establishment of the New foundland Escort Force
(NEF) in May 194 1 was a mile stone in Canadian naval history.?' Michael Hadley
points out that the creation of the NEF elevated the RCN from a min or role in coas tal
lMarc M ilne r, Canada's Navy: The First Century (Toro nto: University of Toronto Press, 1999),
92.
4Jbid., 89-90.
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defence to a major part icipant in ocean operat ions.?The RCN 's two offic ial historian s,
Gilbert Tucker and Joseph Schull, argue respectively that the import ance ofSt. John ' s
as a naval base "can hardly be exaggerated" and was actually "the key to the western
defence system. ?" Yet relative ly little has been writte n on how an escort base of
strate gic importance arose from what orig inally was merely a defended harbour. This is
really not surpris ing. While much has appeared on the ships and men invo lved in the
Battle of the Atlantic, the various bases from which they operated have received scant
attention. Even in St. John ' s, both the historiograph y and popular consciousness
rememb er the presence oft he American army more so than the RCN, despite the fact
that thousands of sailors and hundreds of warships were stationed there during the war. '
This may be due to the longevity of the American residency in Newfoundl and and the
haste with which the Canadian facilities were dismantled at the end of hostilities. Or
perhaps it is a lingering hangover from New foundland's still contentious dec ision to
join Canada in 1949.8 Regardl ess, an in-depth study of the evo lution ofSt. John 's from
SHadley, U-Boats against Canada, 29.
6Gilbert Tucke r, The Naval Service of Canada, (2 vo ls., Ottawa : King ' s Printer , 1952) , 11, 203;
and Joseph Schu ll, Far Distant Ships : An Official Account ofCanadian Naval Operations in World War
II (Ottawa: Edmo nd Cloutier, 1950 ; 2"ded., Toronto: Stodd art Publish ing, 1987), 68.
71n hishistory o f St. John 's, Paul O'Neill devoted oneanda hal fp ages to the America n army
presence in the city whil e ass igning less than two paragraphs to all three Canad ian services. See Paul
O 'Ne ill, The Oldest City: The Story a/S t. John 's, Newfoundland (Erin, ON: Press Porcepic, 1975), 110-
112. Similarl y, Kevin Major alloca ted only three paragraph s to the Ca nadian occ upation compared to
almost five pages about the Americ ans. Indeed, Major contend s that the Am ericans made a more lastin g
impr ession on the resident s of St. John ' s than either the Ca nadians or the British . See Kevin Major, As
Near to Heaven by Sea: A History ofNewfoundland and Labrador (Toronto: Penguin Books, 200 1), 371-
377 . Former St. John ' s Fire Co mmissioner John Cardo lis has written two book s on the American tenure
in New foundland and Labrador. See John N. Cardo lis,A Friendly Invasion: The Am erican Military in
Newfoundland, 1940-1990 (S t. John 's: Breakwater Books, 1990); and Ca rdolis, A Friendly Invasion II : A
Personal Touch (S t. John 's, NL : Crea tive Publishers, 1993).
SThe most recent mater ial on Newfou nd land's decision to joi n Canada in 1949 is found in Sean
T. Cadi ga n, Newf ound land and Labr ador: A History (Toro nto: Univer sity of Toronto Press, 2009 ), 235-
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a defended harbour - similar to hundreds of others in the North At lantic - to a major
Allied escort base not only makes an important contribution to the Canadian and
New foundland historiography but also our understandin g of Allied naval base
developm ent durin g the Second World War.
The creation of the NEF at S1. John' s in May 1941 faci litated the continuous
escor t of Britain ' s vital convoys across the Atlantic Ocean . Previously, convoys had
been esco rted by Halifax- or Sydney-based warships only as far as the Western Ocean
Meetin g Point (WESTOMP) northeast of the Grand Banks. Past this point , until they
met their Royal Navy (RN) protectors at the Eastern Ocean Meeting Point (EASTOMP)
ju st south of Iceland , convoys were basically on their own . As a result of the
establishment of HMCS Avalon, the name given to the base at St. John' s," convoys
were escorted to the Mid-Oce an Meeting Point (MOMP) southwest ofIceland , where
they were picked up by ships of the British Western Approaches Command (WAC)
based in Liverpool. From the Canadian perspective , the establishment of an RCN escort
base at St. John 's enabled Canada to assert its presenc e on the international scene,
forcing the Unit ed States and Britain to recogni ze its import ant contribution to the war
effort. Equally significant, it allowed Canada to press its nation al interest in
240. Jeff Webb devot ed an entire chapter on the broadcast debates in his recent book on the Broadcasting
Corporation of Newfoundland . See Jeff A. Webb, The Voice of Newfoundland: A Social History of the
Broadcas ting Corporation of Newfo undland, 1939-1949 (Toronto: Univers ity of Toronto Press, 2008),
142-169. The standard work on the Commission of Government years and the debate surrounding
Newfoundland's entry into confederation with Canada is Peter Neary, Newfoundland in the North
Atlantic World, 1929-1949 (Montreal: McGill-Queen' s University Press, 1988; 2nd ed., Montreal:
McGill-Queen ' s University Press, 1996), especially 278-345 .
9lt is actua lly the barracks complex that is commissioned, not the base itself. However, for the
purpose ofthis study the entire naval base will be referenced as HMCS Avalon. This will also be the case
for all other Canadian naval faciliti es discussed. Consequently, HMCS Stadacona refers to the whole
Hali fax naval base rather than ju st the barracks compl ex.
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Newfo und land. As the Ame rican presence in Newfo undland grew, thanks to the 1940
"des troyers for bases" deal givi ng the United States the right to estab lish bases on
Brit ish-controlled tcrritory.l" Canada beca me anxious that it might find an Amer ican
protectorate 0 11its fron t door step by war's end. Co nseq uent ly, the estab lishment of the
NEF was as importa nt to Cana da po litica lly as it was to the prosec utio n of the war in
the At lantic .
Why HM CS Avalon was established is adequa tely addresse d in the literatur e, II
but how this was done is not. Indeed, how any North Atlanti c base - Allied or Ax is -
was put in place and operated has not been wide ly explore d. 12 Most often historians
IOSteve n High, Base Colonies in the Western Hemisph ere, 1940-1967 (New York: Palgrave
Macmill an, 2009), 17-42; Neary, Newfound land in the North Atlantic World, 135-153; David
MacKenzie, "A No rth American Outpost: The American Military in Newfoundland, 1941-1945," War&
Society, XXII , No .2 (October 2004), 51-74: Peter Neary, "Newfoundland and the Anglo-American
Leased Bases Agreement of27 March 1941," Canadian Historical Review , LXVII , No.4 (1986) , 49 1-
5 19; Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman and Byron Fairchild. Guardin g the United States and Its Outposts
(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1964; reprint, Washington, DC: US
Gove rnment Printin g Office , 2000), 354-408; and Philip Goodhart, Fifty Ships that Saved the World: The
Foundatio n ofthe Anglo-American Alliance (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1965).
IIW.A.B. Douglas, et al ., No Higher Purpos e: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Navy
in the Second World War, 1939- 1943 (St. Catharines : Vanwell Publishing, 2002), II, Part I, 183-189;
Marc Milner, North Atlantic Run: The Royal Canadia n Navy and the Battlefor the Convoys (Toronto :
University of To ronto Press, (985), 32-34; Tucker, Nava l Serv ice of Canada , II, 186-208; and Schull,
FarDistantShips ,65-69.
12Wha t has been published on the various Allied and Axis bases has been preoccupied with U-
Boat bunkers on the German side and ope rations on the Allied side. Steven High recently ed ited a social
history ofwartim eSt.John's and also examinedthe social impact, especially in Newfoundland,of the
American bases leased from the British in the Western Hemisphere durin g WWII. Brian Tennyson and
Roger Sarty have perhaps most c losely examined Allied navalbase development in their work on Sydney,
Cape Breton, although that base was mostly a convoy assembly point and local esco rt base during the
Second World War. See I ligh (ed.), Occupied Sf.John' s: A Social //is tory of a City at War, 1939-1945
(Montreal: McGi ll-Queen's Univ ersity Press, 2010); and High, Base Colonies. See also Jak P. Mallmann
Showell, //itl er 's U'-Boat Bases (Stroud : Sulton Press, 2007) ; Gordon Williamson, UiBoa t Bases and
Bunkers, 1941-45 (Oxfo rd: Osprey Publishing, 2003); Randolf Bradham, Hitler 's V-B oat Fortresses
(Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 2003) ; Stetson, Enge lman and Fairchild , Guarding the United Stat es and
Its Outposts; Brian Tennyso n and Roger Sarty, Guardian of the Gulf: Sydn ey, Cape Breton, and the
Atlanti c Wars (Toro nto: Univers ity of Toro nto Press, 2000); and Roger Sarty, The Maritim e Def ence of
Canada (Toro nto : Canadian Inst itute of Strategic Studies, 1996).
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simply state it as a f ait accompli - wharves were built, oil tanks installed, ships
repaired, etc. - without any explanation of how this occurre d. Question s as to how the
land for the wharves was procured , how long it took for the oil tanks to be fabricated
and what was used in the meantime, or how ships were repaired and by whom have
seldom been posed and even less frequent ly answered . All the myriad detai ls of how
something was accomplished are conspicuous by their absence in the literature. This is
impor tant beca use how the forces fared at sea was often bound up inextricably with the
creation and operatio n of the facilities ashore. This was especia lly so for the RCN as a
result of its tremendo us expa nsion during the war years. Its perfo rma nce in defen ce of
the convoy network was a direct reflection of the efficie ncy, maintenance and training
capabi lities of the shore estab lishments . This was certainly the case with lI MCS
Avalon; thus, it is odd that Canadian historians tend genera lly to describe the facilities
at St. John ' s in disparaging term s. They sugges t that the por t "had little to offer the
Escor t Force ,,13and that the base had the appearance of a "trave lling tent show" with
the naval staff wor king out of rooms at the Newfo undland Hotel and warships tied up at
"rickety South Side wharves.,,14Even Marc Milner, who has worke d hard to dispel the
RCN 's "sheepdog navy" persona, perpetuates the impressio n that HMCS Avalon was a
"seat ofthe pants" opera tion.ISIt almost seems as if these historians, consciously or not,
I3Tony German, The Sea is at Our Gates: The History 0/ the Canadian Navy (Toronto :
McClelland and Stewart, 1990),93 .
"J ames B. Lamb, The Corvette Navy: True Stories / rom Canada 's Atlantic War (Toro nto:
Macmi llan of Canada, 1977; 2"ded., Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 2000), 9 1; and Lamb, On the
Triangle Run (Toronto : Macmillan of Canada, 1986), 13. See also Bernar d Ransom, "Canada's
' Newfyjohn' Tenancy : The Roya l Canadian Navy in 51.John ' s, 1941-1945 ," Acadiensis, XXIII, No. 2
(Spr ing 1994),pp.58-81.
15Milner, North Atlantic Run, 43 and 2 15.
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are presenting the base as a mitigating factor in the RCN's performance in the first
years of the Battle of the Atlantic. While the RCN did have to rely heavily on the
available facilities at St. John's in the first year, by the summer of 1942, the Flag
Officer, New foundland Force had moved into the new combined RCN/RCAF
administration building, the RCN hospital was fully operational, as were the RCN
Dockyard and barracks, and the wharfing along the South Side was up to naval
standards. I-IMCS Avalon was born out of crisis, and FONF was continually forced to
play catch-up by the ever-changing war at sea and decisions made in Argentia, Ottawa,
Washington and London, often without any consultation. Regardless, despite
tremendous challenges, I-IMCS Avalon was a reasonably efficient, well-run operation,
not the ad hoc arrangement suggested by the literature.
Establishing and developing HMCS Avalon was certainly problematic, and there
were many complication s to its evolution and operation. For one, three separate
governments were involved: Great Britain, Canada and Newfoundland. The Newfound-
land government was very suspicious of the Canadians, and not without reason.l"
Moreover, both preferred to bypass each other and to deal directly with the British.
Furthermore, the base was built in a relatively small harbour with limited facilities that
were already fully utilized and congested with mercantile interests. The procurement of
this prime waterfront land tended to be convoluted and involved the co-operation of all
three governments and the landowners themselves, who for the most part, just wanted
16From 1934 to 1949, Newfound land was governed by a Commission of six London-appointed
bureaucrats, three British and three Newfoundlanders, headed by the Governor. There had been tensions
between Newfo llndlanda ndCa nadao ver tradea nd fishing rights dating backto the nineteenthcen tllry.
The Canadians exacerbated these by making contingency plans for Newfou nd land with the Americans in
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to be left alone, war or no war. In many cases, facilities were rented for $l!year plus
improvements and shared with the owners. How did this work? In add ition, almost all
materials and most of the skilled labour requ ired to build the base' s facilities -
barrac ks, administration buildings, dockyard, hospital, wireless stations, etc. - were
imported from Canada or the United States through U-boat-infested waters. How was
this accomplished? How was the necessary personnel housed, fed and entertained? It
was really qu ite an accomplishment on all levels that the base was buil t. That it also
functioned in a reasonably efficient manner and allowed the RCN - notwithstanding the
criticisms levelled at it - to hold the line durin g the darkest days of the Battle of the
Atlantic is a tru ly remark able story.
My thesis explores how HMCS Avalon was established and how it operated,
and it examines the many challenges it faced both at sea and ashore durin g the Second
World War. From Library and Archives Canada (LA RC), I examined the Flag Officer,
Newfo undland Force files and relied heavily on the monthl y reports of the various
levels of the Newfo undland Command of the Royal Canadian Navy , from the Flag
Offic er Commanding to the Naval Chaplain, and all points in between. At The National
Archives (TN A) in London , I examined Admiralt y, Dominion Office, Prime Minister' s
Office , War Offic e, and Cabinet document s to understand how the Brit ish viewed the
import ance and developm ent of HMCS Avalon as well as their handlin g of the
negotiation s with the Canadian and Newfoundl and governments. Document s clearly
indicate mistru st betwe en the latter two parties and the Admi ralty ' s frustration at the
1940 without consu lting the Newfound land government. See Cad igan, Newfo undland and Labrador,
209-23 4. See a lso Webb , Voice of Newfoundland;and Neary, Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World.
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delays that ensued, as well as their attempts to appease both and get the project started.
Many issues seem to have been settled through direct contac t between the Domin ions
Office and Gove rnor Humphrey Walwyn and included such important matters as land
ownership, defe nce of the island, compensation for those displaced by military
installations and the supply of skilled labour. The Domini ons Office files were
particularly valuable because they contained Governor Walwyn ' s quarterly reports. In
these reports, he recounts the military situation in Newfoundland, part icularly St.
John 's, and also offers insights into personality conflicts, volunteer efforts, views held
by the St. John ' s elite, difficulti es enco untered and overco me, and general impressions
of life in the co lony. The Publ ic Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador (PANL)
provided New foundland Commission of Govern ment files which revealed how the
Commission viewed the establishment of the base and interacted with the Canadian
Gove rnment and military. Of special importance were the Department of Justice and
Defence files as Commissioner L.E. Emerson was the comm issioner most evolved with
civil defence and the various armed forces. Unfortunately, there is not much
documentation of fonna l communication between commissioners, particularly Emerson
and Sir Wilfrid Woods, the Commissioners of Public Utilities, even though the Minutes
of the Meetings of the Commission of Government were examined. Unfortunately,
these docum ents only report decisions made, legislation passed , and record
correspondence requir ed or exchanged. I also examin ed the City of St. John 's archives,
but unfortun ately most of the files from the war period have been destroyed. I found
one file, however, which dealt with the tensions between the city administration and the
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various military command s ove r taxes, fees and dama ge to roads caused by military
vehicles and traffic. Both the American and Canadian Government s felt they were
exempt from any property taxes and/or fees and accepted no liabi lity for the dama ge to
the loca l road system . In the end, both offered lump-sum payments to help defray the
cost of road repair s. The St. John's Evening Telegram for the years 1939 to 1945 was
also examined. Although the Newfo undland Govern ment imposed strict censorship on
local milit ary news (someth ing the Telegram's editor criticized on a num ber of
occas ions) , newspaper articles revealed the attitudes of the local population towards the
occupying forces, thc difficulties encountered as a result of measures such as the
blackout and rationin g, social and recreational activities and interactions between the
people of St. John ' s and the various forces, and outside views of Newfoundland and its
importance to the war effo rt.
Even afte r the subjec t of the ownership oft he base was agreed, the difficulties in
actually buildin g it seemed insurmountable. Unlike the America ns, who developed their
facilities in uni nhabited or sparsely populated areas , the RCN attempted to construct a
major naval facility in the middle of a densely populated urban centre. Most of the
skilled labour , buildin g materials and equipm ent had to be imported, although
opera tions had to begin immediately. Consequently, the RCN initially relied heavily on
the popul ation and faciliti es of St. John ' s. That both were already seve rely taxed by the
Canadian and American presence did not seem to concern Naval Services Headquarters
(NSHQ) in Ottawa . Regardless, relations and co-op erati on between the various forces,
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governments and the local population were in general remarkably smooth. Unlike
Halifax, there were no VE Day riots in St. John's at war's end.
Wars tend to follow a seasonal cycle. Offensives generally start in the spring,
and hostilities take a hiatus during the winter, recommencing with the onset of fine
weather the following spring. Despite being a global conflict, the Second World War
and the Battle of the Atlantic followed a similar model. The"Phony War" ended in May
1940 with the invasion and defeat of France and the LowCountries, giving U-boat chief
Admiral Karl Donitz bases on the French Atlantic coast. As a result, full end-to-end
convoy escort commenced in June 1941 to counter the subsequent westward expansion
of the U-boat war. With the American entry into the war in December 1941, Donitz
pulled his forces out of the mid-Atlantic and assigned them to the poorly defended
eastern seaboard of the United Statesand the Caribbean.The United StatesNavy(USN)
finally halted the resulting haemorrhage of shipping (with unacknowledged help from
the RCN)17 by June 1942, and the U-boats once more moved back into the mid-
Atlantic. It was here that the "clash of titans," so to speak, took place in the winter of
1943, resulting in the strategic defeat of the U-boats that May. With the U-boat threat
now contained, the Allies were able to increase the build-up of forces and supplies in
Britain, and in June 1944, American, British and Canadian forces assaulted Fortress
Europe. The resulting defeat of German forces in Normandy compelled Donitz to
abandon his French Atlantic bases and retreat to Norway. Ultimately, the Battle of the
Atlantic ended with the war in Europe in May 1945.
17Marc Mi lner, " RoyalCa nadian Navy Participation in the Battle of the Atlantic Crisis of 1943,"
in James A. Bouti lier (ed .), The RCN in Retrospect, 1910-1968 (Vancouv er : Univ ersity of British
Columbia Press, 1982) , 166-167.
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As operations and the development of IIMCS Avalon reflected events at sea, it
seemed only logical for the chronology of my thesis to follow the same May/June axis.
Chapter I begins with a brief account of the creation of the RCN and its early years .
This is followe d by a review of the relevant literature published on the RCN over the
past twenty-five years, including the earlier official histories. Chapter 2 sets the context
of my thesis, examining Newfoundland' s early history as well as the war years, plus the
main players in the Battle oft he Atlantic. Following the chronology mentioned earlier,
Chapter 3 deals with St. John ' s at the start of hostilities in September 1939 and the
New foundland government's attempts to acquir e some means of defence from both the
British and Canadian governments. It also examin es the arrival of the Americans in
Newfoundland as part of the Anglo-American "destroyers for bases" deal and the
appearance of the RCN in May 1941. The main comp onent of Chapter 4 is the actual
establishment ofHMCS Ava lon. Escort operations started even before Admiral Murray,
the Commodore Commanding, New foundland Force (CCN F), arrived in June 1941.
How this was done even before the first nail for the base was hamm ered was an
amazing accomplishment in itself. This chapter also examines the Amer ican entry into
the war in Decemb er 1941 and the start of U'-boat operations in Canadian and American
waters in the wint er of 1942. Chapter 5 deals with what many historians consider the
critica l year ofthe Battle of the Atlantic. With the Americans in contro l of their eastern
seaboard by sprin g 1942 and the establi shment of escorted convo ys in the Caribbean,
the Ll-boats moved back in the No rth Atlantic by the fall of 1942 in greater numbers
than ever before. They exac ted tremendous losses on the Allies, especia lly against
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RCN-escorted convoys . While acknowledging that the RCN had sustained the majority
of U-boat attacks but at the same time blaming poor leadership and tra ining for the
losses, the Admiralty pulled the RCN out of the Nor th Atlantic for retraining and
modernization . Consequently, Canadian forces did not substantially part icipate in the
strateg ic defeat of the U-boats in May 1943. Regardless, the U-boats were still a threat
and convoys still had to be escorted. The RCN accepted more and more responsibility
as British and Amer ican forces were concentrated elsewhere. Chapter 6 exami nes the
last two years of the Atlantic war. Ship repair became critical during this period as both
naval and merchant shipping overwhelmed ava ilable facilitie s. The Canadian
government had been derelict in concentrating all its vessel repair facilities in central
Canada whil e ignoring those on the east coast until the ship repair problem had reached
cris is proportions. Unfortunately, by then, most of the local skilled labour had moved to
the larger cent res or joined the military, and shipyards and assoc iated industries needed
time to restart and retool.l" Nevert heless, repair capaci ty at St. John ' s was expanded
and improved by the acquisi tion of a floating drydock and the development of an
overflow faci lity at Bay Bulls, and HMCS Avalon did its best to meet the demand. In
fact, activities at the base settled into an almost peacetim e routine. Convoys were still
escorted, and men and ships trained, but other than the very real threat of lone wolf
attacks in coastal waters, the days of the epic convoy battles were over.
Ultimately, the Battle of the Atlantic ended with Germany' s defeat. That it was
won by the Allied side was due in no small measure to the RCN and its base at St.
18Ernes t R. Forbes, "Consolidating Disparity: The Maritimes and the Industrialization of Canada
dur ing the Seco nd World War," Acadiensis , XV, No.2 (Spring 198 6), 3-27 . See also Michael Whitb y,
John's, Newfoundland. That the contribution of the latter has remained relatively
unknown is a serious gap in the wartime history of the RCN. This thesis attempts to
rectify this omission in two ways. The first is to chronicle how St. John's developed
from merely a defended harbour into a major naval base in the space of only a couple of
years. When the RCN arrived in May 1941, the port had only "the leanest of facilities"
to offer the newly formed NEF.19 However, by the time Hitler's U-boats surfaced and
raised their black flags of surrender in May 1945, over 500 warships and thousands of
naval personnel had passed through St. John's. Overall, these forces were well served
by HMCS Avalon, but not without difficulty. The evolving war in the Atlantic and
decisions made in Argentia, Ottawa, Washington and London all impacted the
development and operation of HMCS Avalon. This thesis also demonstrates that the
base at St. John's accomplished all that it set out to do. The establishment of the base
asserted Canada's special interest in Newfoundland whileat the same time highlighting
the country's contribution to the war effort. Further, the RCN accomplished this despite
tensions between the various governments, a convoluted command structure, labour
difficulties, enemy action and even the weather. As well, the RCN's success in keeping
the trans-Atlantic lines of communication open during the Second World War cannot be
determined by the number of U-boats sunk but rather by the safe and timely arrival of
the thousands of merchant ships safely convoyed across the North Atlantic by St.
John's-based escorts. Consequently, if the RCN solved the problem of the convoys,
then HMCS Ava lon was instrumental in making this possible.
" lnstruments of Security : The Royal Canadian Navy 's Procurement ofthe Tribal-Class Destroyers, 1938-
1943," The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du nord, II, No.3 (July 1992), 1- 15.
19Tony German, The Sea is at Our Gates: The History of the Canadian Navy (Toronto:
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Chapter 1
Literature Review
When the idea that Canada might form its own navy surfaced in the early
part of the twent ieth centur y, few voices dissented. American poaching in Canadian
waters, a rising sense of nationalism, loyalty to the Empire and, more immediately,
the Anglo-Ge rman naval arms race all pointed to the need for Canada to have its
own navy. Recognizing the looming German threat, in 1909 Conservative MP Sir
George Foster submitted a resolution calling for immediate financial support for the
Roya l Navy (RN) . Liberal Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier accepted this idea in
principle but amended it to propose that Canada build its own navy.' The motion
passed unanimously because all parti es, and most Canadians, supported the idea.
Initially, most agreed that Canada should retain contro l of its naval forces, but as the
naval crisis esca lated fissures started to appear. The Admiralty in London was
unenthu sed with the idea of the dominions having their own navies, and supported
instead the notion of "one empire, one navy." The Canadian Conservative Party
under Sir Robert Borden proposed that Canada follow New Zea land and offer
interim financia l support to the RN while agreeing that any Canadian naval force
would automatically come under the control of the Admiralty in time of crisis.
French-Canadian Liberals in Quebec under Henri Bourassa could not countenance
this, and even Borden' s own Quebec wing protested the granting of any subsidy to
the RN. Laurier remained steadfast that there would be no financial subsidy and that
a Canadian navy would remain under the control of the Canadian government. In
'Richard A. Preston, Canada and "Imperial Def ense" A Study of the Origins of the British
Commonwealth 's Defense Organization, 1867-1919 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1967),
389 .
1910, the Nava l Service Act created the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN).
Unfortunately, the dissension created by the debate ove r this bill , combined with
subsequent events, contr ibuted to a lack of any clear long-term naval policy,
something that would dog the RCN well into the Second World War. Consequently,
as the RCN 's perform ance durin g the Battle of the Atlantic was predicated on what
happened dur ing the 19 10- 1939 period, a review of that history is in order.
While most histories date the creation of the RCN to the Naval Serv ice Act
of 1910, its roots actually started the mid-1800s when the Imperial Navy was
unable, or unwillin g, to prevent American poaching on Canadian fishing grounds. In
view of this, the Canadian government created the Marine Police with a force of six
schooners in 1870. They disbanded it a year later at the signing of the Treaty of
Washin gton , which supposedly settled all disputes between Great Britain and the
United States . The US abrogation of the treaty in 1885, aga in forced Canada to
protect its fishing rights in the absence of action from the mother country. Canada
negotiated a new agree ment with the US but it was never ratified by the US Senate.
While the agree ment did form the basis for Canadian-American fisher ies relations
on the east coast for the next several decades, the Fisher ies Patrol Service (FPS)
became a permanent force under the Department of Marine and Fisheries. The
Department of Marine and Fisheries was responsible for far more than just fisheries
protection , with duties ranging from installin g and maint ainin g beacons, buoys and
lighth ouses to the establishment, regulation and maintenance of marine and
seamen' s hospitals. In 1904, the government added to this load by making the
department respo nsible for the St. Lawrence ship channel and for exerc ising
sovereignty over the Cana dian Arc tic . To accomp lish these duties, as well as to
mee t the depar tment' s myriad other maritime respon sibi lities , the minister in charge,
Raymond Prefontain e, had at his dispo sal eight armed cruis ers, six icebreakers and
some eightee n other vesse ls in excess of eigh ty feet?
In the mea ntime , Germany arose as a challenge to the RN. Kaiser Wilhelm II
yea rned to be one of the leadin g figures in Europe and, taking a cue from his
English cousins, he believed that a modern naval force was ju st the thing to make
eve rybody sit up and take notice. Th is was j ust one more challenge that faced the
Admiralty in London . Britain still worri ed about its trad itional enemies, France and
Russia , and now a new giant was awakening in the east - Jap an . At the 1902
Imperial Co nference in London , which was attended by all the dominion leaders, the
Admiralty point ed out the respon sibiliti es of the dominions in protecting the empire.
The Briti sh felt that the best way to do this was throu gh direct subs idies to the RN
and the ass ignment of mil itary unit s to Imperial defence. Prim e Mini ster Lauri er
reje cted this sugges tion but did offer to assum e more responsib ility for coastal
defence in ord er to free up those imperial forces then posted in Canada.3 One
sugges tion was to conve rt the FPS into a bona fide naval force .
After a couple of false starts, the new FPS appeared in 1904 with two new
patrol vessels , the heavily armed CGS Canada and the unarmed CGS Vigilant.
2Marc Milner, Canada 's Navy: The First Century (Toront o: University of Toront o Press,
1999), 7-11. See a lso Nigel Brodeur, "L.P. Brodeur and the Origins of the Royal Canadian Navy," in
James A. Boutil ier (ed.), The RCN in Retrospect, 1910-1968 (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 1982.), 15-17.
3Graeme R. Twee d ie, "The Roots of the Royal Canadian Navy: Sovere ignty versus
Nationalism, 18 12- 1910," in Michael L Hadley, Rob Huebert and Fred W. Crickard (eds .), A
Nation 's Navy: In Quest 01a Canadian Naval Identity (Montreal: McGill-Queen ' s University Press,
1996), 97-98.
Crew s wore naval-style uniforms and underw ent nava l trai ning. At the same time,
Admiral Sir John "Jackie" Fisher becarne the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty.
Fisher felt that the most immedi ate threat to the Empire came from Europe ,
particu larly from Germany, which was bui lding dreadnought batt leships faster than
the Admiralty would have liked. To concentrate Briti sh assets on the most
imm ediate threa t while retaining "adequate" forces in other strategic areas, such as
the Medite rranea n and East As ia, Fisher introduced far-reac hing reform s. These
included disband ing the Pacifi c squadro n based at Esquima lt, British Co lumbia, and
relocatin g the Halifa x-based Ameri can squadron back to the UK. The Canadian
governme nt took over the bases at Esquima lt and Halifax and mann ed them with
memb ers of the Ca nad ian mi litia.
At the 1907 confere nce, the Admiralty still pushed the domini ons to provide
fund s to build Dreadn ought -class battl eship s as their contributions to the defence of
the empire. Minister of Marin e and Fisheries Louis-Phi lippe Brod eur bristled at the
lack of recogniti on accor ded to Canada's cont ributi on to Imperial defence.4 Brodeur
point ed out that Canada's ass umption of its own coas tal defence and assoc iated
commitments, and its acceptance of responsibilit y for the form er RN bases at
Esquima lt and Hali fax, were both tangible and valuable contributions to the defence
of the empire. First Lord of the Admiralty Lord Tweedrnouth subsequently issued
"Siobhan J. McNa ught, "The Rise of Proto-Nationalism: Sir Wilfred Laurie r and the
Founding of the Nava l Servic e of Canada, 1902-19 10," in Hadley, Huebert and Crickar d (cds.), A
Nation's Navy , 106.
an apo logy of sorts and grudgin gly concede d the value of the local squadrons.i Th is
concili ator y attitud e, how ever, soo n changed.
In March 1909 , the Imperial governme nt warn ed that the RN ' s superiority
over the German navy was narro wing and advocated more naval spending. The
Conservative oppos ition eve n more alarmist, claimed that even with an increase in
expendi tures, the Ge rmany navy would actually outrank the RN by one modern
battl eship by 1912. A month later the Briti sh government invited representati ves
from all the dominions to Britain for a conferenc e on dominion relation s and the
defence of the emp ire . Upon arriva l, the Canadian de lega tion - which included the
Minister of Militia and Defe nce, Sir Frede rick Borde n; the Min ister of Marin e and
Fisheries , Loui s-Phil ippe Brodeur; the Chief of the Gen eral Staf f, Maj or-G ener al Sir
Percy Lake ; and Adm ira l Charles E Kingsmill , the Director of Marin e Servic es -
was greeted by a comp lete turnaround in Admiralty policy. The Admiralty now
wanted the dominions to raise not only local squadro ns, so grudging ly sanctioned
ju st two yea rs earlier, but also full-fl edged navies co mplete with battle-cruisers,
cruiser s, destroyers and submarines. Londo n was not on ly concerned with the threa t
in Briti sh home waters but also with the potential menace presented by Japan, which
was filling the void left by the decrea se in Britis h forces in East Asia . Where the
Admiralty was previo usly unwi lling to grant the dominions greater autonomy in
defence, Londo n now dee med it desirable. Aust ra lia, which was most endange red
by the new Japanese threat , procee ded immediately wi th the Admira lty plan; New
Zea land , Au stral ia ' s diminuti ve neighbour , cho se to provide the cost of one
dreadnought for the RN; and Canada agreed to an increase in naval forces of four
cruisers and six destroyers ."
Immediately upon arriving back in the country, the gove rnment of Sir
Wilfred Lauri er dra fted legislation to create a Canadian Nava l Service. When the
government introduced the bill in January 19 10, however, the Leader of the
Opposit ion, Robert Borden, objec ted since it failed to provide emergency aid in the
event that war broke out before the ships were fully operational. He pressed the
government for an interim subsidy to Britain to cover the cos t of two dreadnoughts.
Borden also complained that the gove rnment's legislation did not allow for
sufficiently close integration with the RN. Canadian forces would be placed under
Briti sh contro l by the Canadian government only if the gove rnment itself
determin ed that the security of Great Britain was actually threatened. Borden
believed that Canadian forces should automatica lly pass to the Admira lty in the
event of a crisis because of the speed at which such an emerg ency might occur.
Prime Mini ster Laurier and his mini sters held firm, howeve r, and the Nava l Serv ice
Bill was passed 111 to 70 on May 4, 1910 .7 Canada finally had its navy.
The "Act Respectin g the Nava l Service of Canada" created the Department
of Nava l Service which also took over the Department of Marine and Fisheries all
under its form er mini ster Louis-Philipp e Brodeur . The bill called for a naval reserve
and volunte er reserve, naval college and the acquisition of two obsolescent British
cruisers, later named lIM eS Niobe and IIM CS Rainb ow, for trainin g personnel. The
Canadian Govern ment also opened negotiations with British shipbuilding firms to
6/bid ., 106- 108.
7/bid., 108.
establish facilities in Canada to build the proposed fleet of cruisers and destroyers.
But this promising start soon came to nought as the Laurier government fell the
following year, in part as a result of French-Canadian fears that a Canadian navy
would eventua lly be drawn into the various conflicts in which Britain became
embroiled throughout the world. Ultimately, English Canada felt that the country
was not doing enough for imperial defence, while French Canada felt that it was
doing too much. The new Prime Minister, Robert Borden, failed in his attempt to
provide a $35 -million subsidy to Britain for battleship construction, and although he
did not revo ke the Nava l Services Act as promised durin g the election, he did let the
two cruisers obtained from RN fall into disrepair alongside at Esquimalt and
Halifax. When war broke our in August 1914, the RCN consisted of two derelict
cruisers without enou gh personn el to man them.
Considering the RCN's dismal showing in World War I , and its near
extinction in the ensuing decades, it is small wonder that little has been written on
Canada's navy during this period . The first real accounting of the pre-Second World
War Canadian navy appeared in the first volume of Gilbert Tucker ' s 1952 work,
The Naval Service ofCanada. Gilbert argued that one of the chief stumbling blocks
to imperial defence was the issue of central control of domin ion forces. Nava l
defence of the emp ire could not be decided solely, or as Gilbert stressed, not even
mainly, on naval strategy and organization. He suggested that the determinin g factor
was actually the attitude of the self-governing dominions, includin g Canada. Each
could decide whether it wanted to contribute to the RN, create its own navy or do
nothing at al1.8 Canada had actually tried to do all three.
Marc Milner has suggested that Tucker said all that was needed about this
"colourless period" in the history of the RCN.9 On the other hand , some historians
have grumbled about the scholarship of The Naval Service of Canada. Nige l
Brodeur , for example, complained that Tuc ker attributed statements to Louis-
Phil ippe Brodeur that did not reflect what he actually said at the Imperial
Conference of 1909,10 and Michael Hadley and Roger Sarty have accused Tucker of
not consulting unpubli shed German sources and of giving only "cursory treatment"
to the RCN 's anti-submarine effor ts in 1918 .11 P. Willet Broc k has charged that
Tucker erroneo usly stated that Commander Nixon was the first Commandant of the
Royal Naval College of Canada whereas it was actually Commander Edward H.
Martin with Nixon as his First Lieutenant.12 Regardless, The Naval Service of
Canada remained the state of the art for the next three decades. Aside from a few
passages in Donald Goods peed' s The Armed Forces of Canada, 1867-1967 and
James Eayrs 's In Def ence of Canada, 13 it was not until James Bout ilier organized a
8Gilbert Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada (2 vols., Otta wa: King' s Printer, 1952), l, 78.
9Marc Miln er, "The Historiography of the Canadian Navy : The State of the Art ," in Hadley,
Huebert and Crickard (eds .), A Nation's Navy, 28.
IOBrodeur, " L.P. Brod eur, " 26 .
"Mi chael Hadley and Roger Sarty, Tin Pots and Pirate Ships: Canadian Naval Forces and
German Sea Raiders 1880-1918 (Mo ntreal: McGill -Queen ' s University Press, 1991), ix.
12p . Will et Brock , "Co mmander E.A.E. Nixon and the Royal Co llege of Canada," in
Bouti lier (ed.), RCN in Retrospect, 36.
I3 Donald Goo dspeed (cd.), The Armed Forces of Canada, 1867-1967: A Century of
Achievement (O ttawa: Queen's Printer, 1967); and James Eayrs , In Defence of Canada (3 vo ls.,
Toront o: Unive rs ity of Toro nto, 1965).
naval history conference at Roya l Roads Military College in Victoria, BC, that the
topic of the origins and early years of the RCN was exhumed. The RCN in
Retrosp ect, 191 0-1985, the volume resulting from that conference, contained essays
by both scholars and former senior RCN officers. Severa l exa mined the
circumstances surrounding the formation and fortunes of the RCN in the years
before the Second World War.
One of Tuck er' s cr itics, Nigel Brodeur, examined "L.P. Brodeur and the
Origins of the Royal Canadian Navy ." Louis Philippe Brodeur was Canada 's first
Min ister of the Nava l Service, serving from June 1910 to August 1914. Since 1906,
however, as Minister of Marine and Fisheries - the department amalgamated with
the Departm ent of Nava l Serv ice in 1910 - Brodeur was involved in the
milit arization of the FPS and attended a number of Imperial conferences on defence.
He directed the transform ation of the FPS into the RCN . Nigel Brodeur sugges ted
that the Naval Service Act of 1910 was not really the beginnin g of the RCN but
rather "the end of the beginnin g." He contended that the FPS was the forerunner of
the RCN and that the Nava l Act really ju st made it Canada's official navy. Brodeur
suggested three contentious issues could have led to the RCN being stillborn in
1910 - the flag, jurisdiction, and bilingualism. He contended that it was unfortunate
that the efforts towards a distinctive ensign, greater autonomy from the RN, and a
partial form of bilingualism did not succeed, as the impression was created that the
RCN was more British than Canadian, preventing more national support for the
navy from developing.l"
14Brodeur, "L.P. Brodeur," 14-15 and3 !.
A truly Canadian navy was what Laur ier intended in 1910 , and the jewel of
the Nava l Service Act was the creation of the Royal Naval College of Canada
(RNCC). Previously, Canadians interested in beco ming naval office rs were trained
in Britain and became officers in the Royal Navy. With the creation o f the RCN, the
Laurier gove rnment wanted its officers to be trained at home. Cadets still spent a
year with the RN training squadron, but at least their initial trainin g was Canadian.
This was left in the hands of Commander Edward Atcherly Eckersa ll Nixon, RCN.
P. Willet Brock was a cadet at RNCC under Nixo n from 1917 to 1920 and enjoyed a
long career with the RN unt il retiring as a Rear Admiral in 1957. Brock' s
contribution to The RCN in Retrospect was more the remini scence of a former pupil
than a scholarly examination of the College ' s short caree r (19 10-1922). All the
same, he did contribute some insight into the routine and curriculum of the college,
as well as the personalities there durin g his term. In the absence of an offic ial
history of the RNCC, and only the bare essentials presented in Tucker ' s Volume 1,
Brock ' s essay gave at least some detail about the training undertaken by what would
be the RCN 's professional officer corps in World War 11.15
In "The Road to Washington: Canada and Empire Nava l Defence 19 18-
1921," Barry Hunt contended that a common Empire-Commonwealth foreign policy
was impossible from the start. He argued that this was not as a result of the various
domini ons' quest for status within the Commonwea lth but more due to the need for
closer Imperial relation s with the United States . By the end of the war, tensions
were high between Britain and the US over such things as blockades , neutrals '
rights durin g wartime, and the Ame rican ambition to build a navy "second to none."
15Brock, "Co mmander E.A.E. Nixon," 33-43.
Canada was instrumental in casin g these tensions, finall y culminating in the
Wash ington Nava l Treaty which set the limit s for the world 's largest fleet s. Hunt
sugges ted that this treaty actua lly increased the need for an Imperial Fleet , or at least
for the centra lization of plannin g and operational control. Instead, Canada used it as
an excuse to reduce its post -war force to two destro yers and a few trawler s.l "
In order to cover what it consid ered to be its main theatre - Europea n water s
- the RN had to denude its Pacific Ocea n asse ts, leaving j ust a toke n force at Hong
Kong. This situa tion led the Admira lty to decide to press once aga in for a "unified,
centrally direct ed, and highly mobil e imperial navy." This proposal was nothing
new, but as Borden percepti vely observed after the 1909 Imperial Defence
Conference, such co-o peration entitled the contributing dominions to a voice in
draftin g the Empire's foreign policy. Hunt also exa mined the Jelli coe Nava l
Mission 1? and its recomm endations as well as the negotiations and various schemes
put forward between the end of the war and the early 1920s, co ncluding with the
Washin gton Naval Lim itat ions Treaty, or the Five -Powe r-Pac t, in 1922. Hunt' s
assess ment that Japan won most of the adva ntages at the Washi ngton confe rence
see ms to ignore the fact that the Japanese viewed the final treaty as a "Ca dillac,
Cadillac, Dodge" deal in favo ur of the US and Britain , and ultim atel y repudi ated it
in 1936.18 Regardl ess, Hunt is doubtl ess correct that the Ca nadian gove rnmen t chose
16I3arry D. Hunt , "The Road to Washin gton : Canada and Empire Nava l Defence, 1918-
1921 ," in I3outilier (ed .), RCN in Retrospect, 44-6 1.
'7Shortly afte r World War I, Ad mira l of the Fleet Visco unt Jelli coe of Sca pa travelled to the
var ious dom inion s to investigate and advi se on how they could orga nize their nava l forces to both
protec t local interests and he lp defen d the Empire. See ibid., 49-52.
18For an in-de pth examin ation of the Washin gton Treaty and its afiermath , see Stephen W.
Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, Vol. I: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-
to look at the treaty' s provi sions not as a means of strengthening Imperial defence
but as an excuse to further eviscerate the RCN. 19
Hugh Pullen also examined what have been called "the starvation years" of
the RCN . While the Washington Confer ence was underway, the Conservative
government of Arthur Meighen fell to Libera l William Lyon Macken zie King . King
had little affection for militar y matters, and in the absence of popu lar support for
nat iona l defenc e, he used the Washington Naval Disarm ament Treaty as a pretext to
slash naval expenditure from $2.5 to $1.5 million . The Roya l Nava l Colle ge of
Canada was closed and the RCN reduced to 402 officers and men as of July 1922.
By 1928 , the RCN consisted of only three ships on each coas t. This was a long,
difficult period for the RCN. Pullen examined these lean years and discussed in
great detail perhaps the sav ing grace for the RCN - the naval reserves . Faced with
near extinction, senior office rs at Nava l Service Headquarters (NS HQ) in Ottawa
realized that something needed to be done to bring the navy into the public doma in.
The answe r was the estab lishment of the Royal Canadian Nava l Reserve (RCNR)
and the Royal Canadian Nava l Volunteer Reserve (RCNV R). Not only did this
measure promote the navy in areas far from the sea such as the Prairies but it also
helped in nationalist Quebec. While the reserves did provide the RCN with a cadre
of some 3700 office rs and ratings by the start of the Seco nd World War, Pullen ' s
asse rtion that this constituted "an effective fighting force" is a bit of an
overstatement. By the time Canada officially declared war on 10 September 1939,
1929 (Londo n: Co llins, 1968), 300-355 . See a lso Samue l Eliot Mor ison, History oj United States
Naval Operations in World War 11. Vo1.3: The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942 (Boston:
Lillie, Brow n and Co ., 1948; reprint, Urbana: Univer sity of Illinois Press, 2002), 8-10.
19Hunt, "Roa d to Washington," 49-52.
and these forces were mobilized, the country's supply of trained naval personnel
wasexhausted? O
James Knox's essay, "An Engineer' s Outline of RCN History : Part I,"
examined the history of the RCN using the chronology of ship acquisition. Most
histories look at the events and personalities that created and sustained the RCN
before World War II and mention specific ships as they relate to these events and
people. Captain Knox, on the other hand, examined the RCN through its ships.
Knox traced the RCN from the cruisers Niobe and Rainbow through World War I.
li e then looked at the inter-war years, when the acquisition of the first made-to-
order Canadian destroyers, Saguenay and Skeena, took place, through the
tremendous expansion during World War II and into the immediate post-war period
when Canada operated its first fleet aircraft carrier and constructed its first warship
built to North American standards, I-1MCS Labrador . As with many histories of the
RCN, Knox' s review gave little attention to the first couple of decades subsequent
to the Naval Service Act, and he expended most of his effort on the RCN after 1930.
Consequently, this essay really does not shed much new light on the foundations of
the RCN beyond that which had already been published."
On balance, The RCN in Retrospect was hardly a scholarly tour-de-force,
and in fact many of the essays relied heavily on Tucker's The Naval Service of
Canada, which in itself was t1awed. Regardless, because the literature is so limited
in this area the collection does add to the RCN's pre-Second World War
2°Hugh Francis Pullen, "T he Royal Canadian Navy betw een the Wars, 1922-39," in
Bouti lier (ed .), RCN in Retrospect, 63.
2110hn H.W. Knox , "An Engineer ' s Outline ofRCN History: Part I," in Boutili er (ed.), RCN
in Retrospect, 96- 116.
historiography. Two of the articles, "The Road to Washin gton: Canada and Empire
Naval Defenc e 1918-1921" and "L.P. Brodeur and the Orig ins of the Royal
Canadian Navy," utilized unpu blished archiva l sources, but overa ll, The RCN in
Retrospect "marked a watershed in RCN historiography.rf Thi s became very
evident six yea rs later with the publication of the collection of essays edited by Alec
Douglas, The RCN in Transition, 1910-1985.23
The RCN in Transition resulted from a 1985 confe rence organized by
Douglas at the Directorate of History and Heritage, Depart ment of National
Defence, to mark the seventy-fifth anniversary of the founding of the RCN. Douglas
invited mainl y academic contributors, and the resulting publi cation contained the
first serious scholarship on the early RCN since Tucker. The first of these essays
was Paul Kennedy ' s "Naval Mastery: The Canadian Context"
While dealing with the full history of the RCN to 1985, Kennedy devoted
considerable discussion to the pre-World War II per iod. He suggeste d that then - as
now - the level of Canadian sea power was determin ed more by external than by
internal forces. The establishment of the RCN in 19 10 was clearly an example of
this premise since it stemmed from concerns about the naval arms race between
Brita in and Germ any rather than from any real threat to Canada itsel f. The United
States posed about the only real menace to Canadian sovere ignty, at least from the
British perspective, and Britain decided long before that a war with the US was
unwinnable. Canadians perceived no such threat, and most felt that they lived in a
22Milner, "Historiography."
23W.A.B. Douglas (ed .), The RCN in Transition, / 9/ 0-/ 985 (Vancouver: University of
British Columbia Press, 1988) .
" fi reproo f house, far from flamm ab le mat erials." By the 1930s, this situa tion
chan ged wit h the rise of Fasci st Germ any and Italy and the expansionist adventures
of Japan. While the gove rnme nt of Mackenzie Kin g did not seriously co nside r the
like lihood of an attack on Canada by any of these nations, it did recogni ze "a sel f-
evident nat ional duty " to com e to the aid of the moth er count ry in the eve nt of war.
As a result , especially aft er the 1938 Muni ch Cris is, Ca nada built up its dest royer
forc e to squadro n st rengt h wit h the addition ofl-IMCS s Ottawa, Restigouche, Fraser
and St. Laurent, increase d defence estima tes, and agree d to be a haven for British
war production and the locati on of the Briti sh Ai r Tra ini ng Prograrn .f"
Kenn edy correc tly argued that naval mastery canno t be prop erl y und erstood
so lely by exa mining naval opera tions . He contended tha t it was imp or tan t to
consider the geographica l, econo mic, techni cal and soc io- po litica l cont exts within
which navies opera te. He op ines that although Cana da was born out of sea power , it
was the least threaten ed of all the dominio ns . Kenn edy con tended tha t up to the
Second World War, if Ca nada needed to parti cipate in the defe nce of the Empire, its
reso urces would prob abl y have been better spe nt on mun ition s pro duction and the
army, not on the navy .25 In drawin g these conclusio ns, Kenn edy see med to ignore
the realit y of the RCN durin g World War I. By providin g pro tec tio n in hom e waters
- especially when U-boa ts made their forays in 1918 - the RCN released British
forc es that would otherwise have had to be depl oyed. Brit ain could not spare these
asset s, and the RCN dealt with the threat adequately, if not spectacularly . Kennedy
24Paul Kennedy, "Naval Mastery : The Canadian Context," in Dou glas (ed.), RCN in
Transit ion , 15-33 .
251bid., 32.
agreed that Canada took a major role in the mastery of the seas during World War
II. But, he argued, this again was not in the active defence of Canada but as a result
of external pressure. One can argue this point, as originally Prime Minister
Mackenzie King was very reluctant to release Canada's destroyer fleet for duty
outside Canadian wate rs . It took the personal intervention of Winston Churchill to
convince King that Canada ' s first line of defence was the English Channel.
Furthermore, as Marc Milner has shown, there was more to the establishment of the
Newfo undland Escort Force (NE F) during World War II than just the preservation
of the trans-Atlantic lines ofco mmunication.26
When the RCN was created, the RN was the greatest navy in the world,
although its margin of superior ity was narrowing. Why then would Canada choose
to form its own navy? Barry Gough has suggested that the reason was not j ust a
desire for autonomy but also an acceptance of new obligatio ns in international
affairs. He cor rectly argued that the Naval Service Act was a significant step in the
country 's quest for status within the Empire and was not so much a search for
independence from Brita in as an act of co-operatio n with the Admira lty on Canada's
own terms. Goug h rightl y concluded that the end of Pax Britannica and the origins
of the RCN resulted from the same set of circumstances . Canada, like all the
domini ons, formed part and parcel of the mi litary and nava l reorganization that
closed the era when "Britannia rule[d] the waves." The new international reality
should have forced Canada to accept more responsibility for its own defence, but
26Milner, Canada's Navy , 93.
success ive governments cou ld not develop a naval policy that was acceptable to all
parties? 7
Roger Salty looked at the RCN's World War I experience in "Hard Luck
Flotilla: The RCN's Atlantic Coas t Patro l, 1914_18.,,28 Even though British and
Canadian naval officers pressed the Canadian gove rnment in the years before the
Grea t War to establish an appropriate naval orga nizat ion on the east coast, when
three large U-boats encroac hed into Canadian waters in 1918 there was very little
the RCN could do. Sarty laid the blame solidly at the feet of the Borden government
and noted the irony that even while Borden was insisting on national control over
the Canadian army in Europe, the security of Canada 's own waters was dependent
on whateve r meagre resources Britain and the United States could provide.
Regardle ss, Canada 's motl ey collect ion of trawlers, submarine chasers and torpedo
boats provided escorts to the many convoys organized to counter this threat. Though
the few encounters that the RCN ships did have with the enemy were less than
satisfactory.i" submarine casualties were kept to a min imum . Sarty contende d that
the RCN' s contribution to the war effort should not be based solely on the success
of these local convoys but also that, despite the RCN 's unpreparedness, the
Admi ralty did not have to divert any major forces from the crucia l waters around the
UK to prot ect Canada ' s east coast.
27Barry Morton Gough, "The End of Pax Britannica and the Orig ins of the Royal Canad ian
Navy : Shift ing Stra tegic Demands of an Empire at Sea," in Douglas (ed.),RCN in Transition, 90.
28Roger Sarty, "Hard Luck Flotilla: The RCN's Atlantic Coast Patrol, 1914- 18," in Douglas
(ed.),RCN inTransition, 103-125.
29[n the one instance when an RCN vessel had the opportunity to attack a surfaced U-boat, it
retreatedrather than engagethe submarine.[n all faimess to the ship' s commanding office r, attacki ng
the U-boat would have most definitely been a suicide mission.
Unlike those essay s on the pre-Wo rld War Il RCN that appeared in The RCN
in Retrospect six years before, these three essays, like almost all of those in The
RCN in Transition, were wr itten by profess ional histor ians. This indicate s ju st how
far the study of Canadian naval history advanced in the few short years betwee n the
appeara nces of the two publications. Scholars were undertaking more researc h on
the RCN, and even the early days were being given added consideratio n. Th is trend
continu ed, and soon would culminate in the most comprehens ive history of the early
RCN since The Naval Service a/Canada.
In 1991, Michael Hadley and Roger Sarty publi shed Tin Pots and Pirate
Ships: Canadian Naval Forces and German Sea Raiders, 1880-1918.30 In the
preface, Hadl ey and Sarty confessed that the book was really the result of their
research into the RCN 's operations in the Second World War. But they correctly
jud ged that in order to under stand the RCN durin g that period it was necessary to
examine it during World War I. Ironicall y, the impre ssion that permeates this
monograph is one of deja VII . The same difficulti es that plagued the RCN durin g the
Battle of the Atlantic were present during the Great War, and for the same reasons.
When World War I erupted , the RCN, despite the promi ses of the Naval Service
Act , consisted of only two derelict cruiser s and 350 men . The years subsequent to
the Act were filled with political vacillation and back-tr ackin g with the result that
Canada had no defence s for its own territorial waters . When a lone V-boat sank six
ships off Massachusett s in October 1916, initiatin g a U-boat scare, the RCN had to
scrambl e to come up with enough resource s to provid e protection for local shipping.
While this prompted the government to undert ake a naval buildin g program, few of
30Hadley and Sarty , Tin Pots and Pirate Ships.
these vesse ls were in commi ssion when U-boats did strike in 1918. Then , as during
World War II , there were complaints and recrimin ations over how little the navy
was doin g to protect Canada's coasts and absolutely no recognition for what they
had accomp lished despite the lack of support and resourc es from the government.
One would have thought that the Canadi an government might have learned
some lessons from the experience of the First World War. Canada needed a navy,
and the navy needed to be supporte d in peacetime to be ab le to defen d the country in
war time. Regardless, when Canada decla red war on Germany in September 1939,
the RCN was in only marginally better shape that it had been twenty-five years
previously. l-Iadley and Sarty made this very clear in this first in-depth and truly
critical examination of the RCN from its incept ion to the end of World War 1.The
authors, one of whom is fluent in German, used unpubli shed German sources both
to illustrate the Kaiser ' s infatuation with seapowe r and to explore Germany's
designs on No rth America, which included a survey of Canadia n coastal defences.
Although the Kaiser was an adherent of Mahan's theory of sea power , the German
nava l staff apprec iated the benefit of "c ruiser warfare" by which fast, heavily armed
warships interdicted maritim e trade and harassed enemy shore installations. With
the Canadian gove rnment's preoccupation with economy before the war, and the
provi sionin g of the Canadian Corps durin g the war, Canada's maritim e defences
were totally inad equat e. Unfortunately, the same would be true a quarter-century
later. Some of the reasons for this were addressed in the next collection of essays to
appear on Canadian naval history .
A Nation 's Navy: In Quest of a Canadian Naval Identity" resulted from the
1993 Fleet Historical Conference held in October of that year. Published in 1996, it
conta ined a numb er of articles on the pre-Second World War RCN, starting with
William Glove r' s "The RCN: Royal Colonial or Roya l Canadian Navy?" Glover
suggested that the prob lems of national policy and national identity were
inextricab ly linked and had been so ever since the creation of the RCN. He rightly
contended that the pract ical need for a navy was cloud ed from the beginn ing by
partisan politics over Canada's relationship with Britai n. The Laurier government
wanted to evolve the FPS into a force to protect Canada ' s shores, thus relieving the
RN of that respo nsibility, while the Conservative oppo sition looked to integrating
any force Canada deve loped into the Royal Navy. The latter position offended
French Canadians who recognized the need for coastal defence but were against any
sort of British contro l. Glover contended that after he became Prime Minister,
Borden realized that Canada 's naval development could have "proceeded smoothly
and with little or none of the exc itement or criticism" had it been introduced ten
years before.32 This sentiment was a far cry from Borden' s view durin g the 1910
naval debate where he was firmly behind imperial control of the RCN.33 However,
in an ironic turn of events, Borden did accomplish his goals of 1910.
By starving the nascent RCN of funds, Borde n instigated the formation of
naval reserve units which was, as Glove r pointed out, a two-edged sword. While the
reserve uni ts promo ted the RCN in the public domain, especially in areas such as
31Hadley, Huebert and Crickard (eds.), A Nation 's Navy.
32Sir Robert Borden, as quoted in William Glover, "The RCN: Royal Colonial or Royal
Canadian Navy ?" in Hadley, Huebert and Crickard (eds.),A Nation 's Navy, 74.
33/bid., 7 1-90 .
the Prairies and Quebec, it a lso meant that the regular force was trained in Britain .
With these close ties to the RN - all of the senior officers at NS I-IQ in Ottawa
during World War II had served with the RN - it is no wonder that the Canadian
navy was seen as more British than Canadian, which made the quest for autonomy
that mueh more difficult. This colonial/imperial relationship surv ived within naval
eircles long after it had disappeared from the national scene, something that became
evident in 1949 when mutin ies occurred on two Canadian naval vessels. Glover
concluded that because naval policy was developed in a vacuum without due
consideration to Canada 's "national politic al life," the RCN really was a colonial
rather than Canadian navy."
While Glover's point is well taken, and was certainly ev ident at NSI-IQ
durin g the Second World War, it is also true that many senior office rs, such as
DeWolf, Brodeur , Prentic e and Murray, continually fought for Canadian naval
autonomy throughout the war. Indeed, it is difficult to think that the RCN,
comprised almos t entirely of reserves in both the First and Seco nd World Wars,
could be seen as anything other than uniquely Canadian. Furthermore, given the
derision Canadian naval offic ers endured from their Royal Navy brethren durin g the
Second World War, it is unlikel y that any colonial attitude could have remained
within the Re N.
Nation alism was also the topic of Graeme Tweedie ' s "The Roots of the
Royal Canadian Navy: Sovereignty versus Nationalism, 1812-1910." Tweed ie
claimed that to und erstand the controve rsy surrounding the establishment of the
RCN in 1910, it is necessary to understand Canada' s tradi tional concerns over
maritime soverei gnty. To accomplish this, Tweedie looked at both the local
concern s of the Maritim e Provinces as well as Canada's growing obligation to
contribute to imperial defenc e. The RCN was the stepchild of the FPS, which in turn
was born out of the need to protect the east coast fishery from American interlopers.
Initially this was the respon sibi lity of the individua l colonie s, as Britain seemed
unwi lling to enforce the vario us Ang lo-Amer ican fisherie s treaties. With
Confederat ion this became a federal responsibil ity, and thus the FPS was created .
The Departm ent of Fisheries and Marine was formed under Peter Mitc hell in 1869
and from then unt il the Nava l Service Aet the department was responsible for all
maritime matters, includin g fisheries patrols.3s
Twee die also looked at Canada's international marit ime commitments,
reviewing the debate of the 1880s over a naval force on the Grea t Lakes to defend
agai nst an American invasion and the naval race of the early twentieth century . He
argued that the FPS was such an obvio us element of sove reignty that there was no
argument ove r its formation and maintenance. The RCN, however, only promised
entanglement in ove rseas disputes that most Canadians thought were no concerns of
theirs. With the only direct threat being the United States, and with that threat
diminishin g every year, it was hard to argue the need for a navy to nationalists,
espec ially in Quebec. Twee die contended that this division was why the RCN was
almo st scuttled from the beginnin g whereas the FPS had continued to grow
unencumbered through the previous half ceutury."
35Tweedie, "Roots of the Roya l Canadian Navy , 91- 10 I.
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Siobahn McNaught advanced a slightly different view in "The Rise of Proto-
nationali sm: Sir Wilfred Laurier and the Foundin g of the Naval Service of Canada,
1902-1910. ,,37 McNau ght contended that there were conflicting sentiments at work
in Canada durin g the first part of the last century. One was a strong loyalt y towards
the "Mother Country," whi le the other was a growing sense of Canadian nationali sm
and a wish to exert Canada's influence in both external and defence policies.
McNa ught reviewe d the political deve lopments from the time that the Canadian
government expressed its wish to form its own navy at the Colonial Conference of
1902 to the passage of the Naval Service Act and the found ing of the RCN eight
years later. She sugges ted that the chief impedim ent to Canada 's own navy was the
conflict of nat ional sentiment mentioned prev iously. Whereas all parties recog nized
and welcomed some form of navy, the size and employment of that navy was the
problem. Loya lty to Britain orda ined that any navy wou ld be a part of the RN in the
event of a crisis. This was too much for those who felt that Canada 's navy shou ld
protect Canadian territory rather than being sent to far-flung waters on Britain' s
business while the dominion was left unprotected. Ass urances that the RN could
quickly send a force to protect Canada's shores did not allay fears that, given the
choice between defendin g Canada and defending itself, Britain would choose to
keep its forces close to home. McNaught nevertheless pointed out that, although
Canada's fightin g fleet was insigni ficant , by the beginnin g of World War I the RCN
controll ed a large portion of the country's maritime reso urces , including a coasta l
radio sys tem, naval bases on each coast and the fisher ies protecti on and
hydrographical fleets. Consequently, despite the recriminations and criticism s after
37McNaught, "Rise of Proto-nationalism," 102- 111.
the war, dur ing the First World War the RCN was able both to ass ist the RN in the
protection of the Empire and to offer protection to Canada's maritime interests at
the same time. McNaught maintains that rather than being a divisive factor in the
nation ' s history, the Nava l Service Act was actually "an effec tive embodiment of
both loyalty to the Empire and aspiratio ns of nationhood.,,38 This is a bold statement
considering that the debat e over this bill became an issue dur ing the 19 11 Federal
Election, and almost proved to be Rober t Borden ' s undoing as well. As it turned
out, further expansion of the FPS, Laurier ' s original intention, may have been more
productive and less divisive for the country.
Barry Gou gh and Roger Sarty combin ed forces to examine the defence of
Atlantic Canada in "Sailors and Soldiers: The Royal Navy, the Canadian Forces,
and the Defenc e of Atlantic Canada, 1890-1918." The two argued that during the
first part of the last centu ry, the RCN "found its identity" by working in close co-
operation with the Canadian army to protect the ports and shores of Atlantic
Canada . They suggested that the scale of this task, and the co-depend ence that
developed as a result , has not been properly unde rstood, nor has its contr ibution to
the RN 's strategic responsibil ities for the security of the northwest Atlantic.
However, they maintained that this very co-operation produc ed tensions which in
the end strengthened the count ry' s resolve to develop its own self-sufficient
maritimeforces.39
38/bid.
39Barry Gough and Roger Sarty, "Sailors and Soldiers: The Royal Navy, the Canadian
Forces, and the Defence of Atlantic Canada, 1890-1918," in Hadley, Huebert and Crickard (eds.), A
Nalion'sNavy, 112-130.
Gou gh and Sart y asserted that Hali fax , with its magnifi cent harb ou r, naval
base , and fortr ess, was the pivo t upon which Brit ain ' s Atlantic stra tegy revolved.
Ha lifax wa s the key to both Brita in' s stra teg ic positi on in No rth Am erica and
Canada's secur ity . This became evident durin g World War I wh en, for the first time
in almo st a century, hostile forces in the form of German U-boa ts directl y threatened
Canada. Th is threat not on ly deve loped rapid ly but also entan g led Canada in the
del icate qu estion of sovereignty with respect to Britai n and the United State s. Thu s,
Ca nadian defence plannin g had to exa mine the possi bi lity that Canada might find
itsel f standing alone alongside either the US or Brit ain in a conflic t in which one
rem ained neut ral. As a result , the Ca nadian Nava l Staff develop ed clear lines of
authority with the Admira lty in rega rd to Canada's sea fron tiers. The resul t wa s that
when wa r agai n plun ged the wo rld into conflic t, Ca nada immedia tely ins tiga ted a
massive shipbui lding program to produc e the large num ber of coas tal escort craft
the naval staff consi dere d necessary to protect Canadian waters. The fact that these
vesse ls wo uld ac tua lly be used to defend Br itain ' s vita l sea lines of communication
across the Atla nt ic could not have been foreseen .4o
Roger Sa rty took a more comprehensive look at Canada's maritime defence
in his 1996 co llec tion The Maritime Def ence of Canada4 1 Sarty conten ded that
Bord en , rath er than bein g the divisive force in the nava l debate, actua lly tried to
rebuild con sensus by revi vin g earl ier Lib eral incenti ves that his part y had su ppo rted
du ring the Laurier period. In addition, Sar ty rightly argued that the po litica l
4°lbid.
4IRoger Sarty (ed .), The Maritime Def ence of Canada (Toronto: Canadian Institute of
Strategic Studie s, 1996).
controv ersies of that period overshadowed the actual accompli shm ents of the RCN
in creating a coasta l defence scheme.42
Certain ly one of the major political controversies of the First World War, at
least on the home front, grew out of the Halifax Explosion in Decembe r 1917. John
Griffith Armstrong' s The Halifax Explosion and the Royal Canadian Navy: Inquiry
and Intrigue was the first real ly scholarly examination of the tragedy and its affect
on the RCN.43 Armstrong properly argued that while the action s of some of its
office rs were less that sterling, the RCN was unfairly blamed for the disaster and
that this stain ove rshadowe d any accomplishments that the force achieved both
dur ing and after the war. Indeed, Armstrong contended that the Halifax riots on VE
Day actually had their roots in the animosity betwee n the navy and resident s that
had been fester ing since December 1917.44
The Halifax Explosio n and the RCN 's tarnis hed reputation certainly carried
over into the interwar years. In fact, durin g the early 1930s the Chief of Defence
Staff suggested that the navy be sacrificed so that additional funds could be
channelled to the army and air force. Fortunately, this did not happen, and in the
1930s the RCN's fortun es actually improved somew hat. Two articles of part icular
interest on this period are "In Defence of Home Waters : Doctrine and Trainin g in
the Canadian Navy dur ing the 1930s" by Michael Whitby and "Kingsmill's
Cruisers: The Cruiser Tradition in the Early Royal Canadian Navy " by Kenneth P.
Hansen .
42Ibid., 1-30.
43John Griffith Armstrong, The Halifax Explosion and the Royal Canadian Navy: Inquiry
and Intrigue (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002).
44Ibid., 209.
In " In Defence of Home Waters" Whitb y argued that the RCN was well
trained when the Second World War began but it was the wrong kind of training for
the war that was eventually fought. Nava l wisdom at the time was that any war at
sea would consist of a Jutland-style clash of battle fleets with the victor attaining sea
supremacy by destroying or severely crippling the enemy fleet. As a result,
Canada's navy, consisting solely of destroyers, trained with the RN as part of its
battle fleet. All the same, NS HQ did anticipate that in the event of war Canada's
coasts would be vulnerable and, as demonstrated by the events of World War I, help
could not be expected from the RN in case of attack. Consequently, the RCN also
considered tactics to defend the east and west coasts. Unfortunately, these exercises
presupp osed that any attacks on the coasts would be perpetrated by surface raiders -
cruisers or AM Cs (Armed Merchant Cruisers) - rather than by submarines. The
RCN believed that the threat from U-boats had been nullifi ed by ASDIC,45 even
though the Re N had only four ASDI C-equipp ed warships and only two officers
who had received ASDIC trainin g in the early I920s . Furth ermo re, whereas most
exercises includ ed anti-submarine practice s, they consisted of little more than
droppin g depth -charges on a stationary surface target, not detectin g and attacking a
submerged submarine. As a result, when thrown into the escort/a nti-submarine role,
the RCN was unprepar ed. Whitby pointed out that critics continually point to this
lack of trainin g and doctrine as the reason for the RCN 's difficulti es during the
Battle of the Atl antic . On the other hand, he rightly countered that these criticisms
45ASDI C was developed and named by the Brit ish Ant i-Submarine Detection Committee
after the First World War. Now know n as SONAR, the sys tem used sound pulses to detect
subme rged subma rines . The British felt that it was effective e ighty percent of the time, andeven the
Canadian Chief of Nava l Staff (CNS) felt that it nullified the submarine threat. See Chap ter II.
were writt en after the fact with the benefit of hindsight. He suggested that no one
could have predicted the role that the RCN would play in main tain ing the trans-
Atlantic lines of communication.46 It is reasonable to wonder, however, how far this
was true. Certainly, even with the supposed effec tivenes s of ASDlC, prudence
would have sugges ted more traini ng in the area of anti-submar ine war fare. Even as
screens for a battle fleet, Canadian destroyers were likely to be responsible for
protecting the fleet from U_boats.47
In his article "Kingsmill' s Cruisers," Kenneth Hansen argued that not only
were Canadian plans for the defence of home waters flawed, so too was the choice
of warships. He sugges ted that cruisers were better suited than destroyers for coas tal
and trade protection and that the RCN actually has always had a "cruiser tradition."
Indeed, the FPS consisted of a numb er of small cruisers; Canada ' s first two naval
vesse ls were former RN cruisers; and Canada operated the cruiser HMCS Uganda
durin g the later part of World War II. In fact, other than their endurance, the RCN's
wartime Tribal-class destroyers had many of the characteristics of small cruisers.
Hansen sugges ted that politicians and historians have "an almost emotional
reaction" to the sugges tion that large warships be a part of the RCN's fleet. And yet,
he argued, certain crui ser characteristics have been shown to be essential to the
countr y ' s nava l requirements. Whereas critics dismiss such attributes as armament,
armour and speed as unnecessary for Canada 's coastal and trade protection role,
they neglect to examine other cruiser features, such as endurance, sea -keeping and
" Mlchae! Whitby, " In Defence of Home Waters: Doctrine and Tra ining in the Canadian
Navy durin g the 1930s," Mariner 's Mirror, LXXV II, No . 2 (May 1991), 167- 177.
47During World War I, V-9 sank three RN armoured cru isers by torpedo in the space of one
hour with the loss of sixty-two officers and 1397 men. See V.E. Tarrant, The V-Boat Offensive,
/ 9 / 4- / 945 (Annapolis: Nava l Institute Press, 1989), 10.
staff accommodations, which are, in the Canadian context, the warship 's other
important trait s. All one has to do is look at the Canadia n experience durin g World
War II to sec the shortcomi ngs of the RCN 's destroyer fleet. Fuel concerns oft en
forced RCN shor t-endurance destroyers to leave an endangere d convoy at a vital
moment. Again , it seems that politics and lack of foresight played a more important
role in naval planning in the first part of the century than doctrin e and the decision
to procure the right types of ships."
As has been discussed, the crea tion of the RCN was steeped in controver sy
from the beginnin g. The Liberals under Sir Wilfred Lauri er proposed a navy
powerful enough to operate with the RN but firmly under the contro l of the
Canadian gove rnment. The Conserva tive oppos ition led by Borden agreed in
principle but held firm that it should operate under Admiralty jurisdic tion. Neither
proposition appease d nationalist clements which felt that Canada's navy should be
coas tal in nature and not be subject to the whim s of Great Britain. The result was
that whi le the RCN was formed in 1910 by the Nava l Servic e Act , a clear Canadian
naval policy was never articulated. When war came to Canadian shores in August
1918, and Canada's maritim e trade was directly threatened, the RCN did not have
the wherew itha l to defend it. Unfortunately, bad press and eco nomic restrictions
after the war continued to keep the RCN in limbo until , a mere twenty years after
"The War to End All Wars," the threat loomed on the horizon once more.
48Kenneth P. Hansen, "Kin gsmill ' s Cruisers : The Cruiser Tradition in the Early Royal
Canadian Navy ," The Northern MarinerlLe Marin du nord, XIlt , No . 1 (January 2003), 37-52,
arguesthat sloopsorcullerswouldhavebeen an evenbellcrchoicethan the Trib als durin g the Bailie
of the Atlant ic. See also Hansen, "The Superior-Simple Ship Fleet Construct," Canadian Naval
RevielV,IIt,No. 2(Summer2007),4-7.
The Battle of the Atlantic was really the apex of the RCN, and consequentl y
a review of some of the major works concernin g that six-ye ar campai gn is
warranted . Most of these works were produced , not surprisingly, by historians of the
two major Allied partic ipants - Britain and the United States. Interestingly enough,
they usually include the exp loits of the other ' s navy, but treat the RCN's
contribution to the Batt le almost as a side line, regard less of the RCN 's numeric al
contribution to the effort. The British accou nts, while magna nimo usly
acknowledging that the RCN was an important partner in the battle against the U-
boats, generally give the impression that the RCN's sole contribution was its
dramatic expan sion offset by the resultin g difficulti es. One acco unt in particular,
from form er RN escort commander Captain Donald Macintyre, is absolutely
scathing in its cr iticisms of the RCN, sugges ting that Canada should have just
swallowed its national pride and passed its ships and men over to the RN.49
American accounts arc generally more sympathetic, probably because the United
States Navy (USN) experienced its own difficult ies early in the Atlantic war, and
American histori ans could understand the RCN's quest for autonomy. No netheless,
American scholars still tend to include Canadian operations with the RN.
The two major, and most often referenced, acco unts of the Battle of the
Atlantic are Stephen Roskill ' s multi-volume official history of the RN durin g the
Second World War and Samu el Eliot Mori son ' s official history of the USN during
the same period . Both accounts tend to gloss over the RCN 's contribution to the
Battle of the Atlantic, although Mori son did offer the opinion that the RCN was a
4900 nald Macinty re, V-Boat Killer: Fighting the Usboats in the Battle of the Atlantic
(London : Weide nfelda ndN icolson ,1956),78-8 1.
"gallant and effici ent" ally. Indeed, he contended that the USN did not enter the fray
with a "feel ing of sustain ing a faltering fighter or suppor ting a dying causc.,,50
Roskill was not openly critical of the RCN, but he did repea t the British con tention
that training was the most important factor in winning the battle aga inst the Ll-boats
rather than numbers or modernity." This was a major difference in opinion between
the Admira lty and NSHQ, which quite rightly felt that any escort was better than
none, and that eve n a half-trained ship on escort inhibit ed If-boat attacks.
Consequently, rather than hold back the steady stream of new corvettes unt il their
crews were fully trained , and thus leave the vital convoys with inadequate
protection, NSHQ corre ctly put them on operations. The Admiralty blamed this lack
of trainin g and poor leadership for the high loss rates assoc iated with RCN-escorted
convoys, while ignoring all other factors includ ing the Ultra blackout and, as we
now know, the German incursion into British convoy codes.. Roskill, for examp le,
offered the example of HMS Viscount as evidence that trainin g was paramount
regardless of the age of the vesse l. Visco unt enjoyed considerable success in the
Atlantic at part of the B-6 force even though it dated back to the Great War.
However, as Marc Miln er points out, the age of the hull was immaterial as Viscount
50Samuei Eliot Morison, The History of the United States Naval Operations in World War
// . Volume I: The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943 (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1947; reprint, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 12- 13 and 72. See also Morison,
The History of the United States Naval Operations in World War // . Volume X The Battle Won, May
1943- May 1945 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1957; reprint, Urbana: Univers ity of Illinois
Press, 2002). Morison also produced a condensed version of his history in the I960s. See Samuel
Eliot Morr ison , The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World
War (Boston: Littl e, Brow n and Company, 1963; reprint, Annapolis: Nasal Institute Press, 2007) .
51Stephen W. Roski ll, The War at Sea 1939-1945. Volume // : The Period of Balance
(London: HMSO , 1956; repri nt, Uckfield: Naval and Military Press, 2004), 356-357 .
had been fully modern ized and equipped with the latest techno logy.V It is also
interesting that the British took up NSHQ's argument to counter the contention by
USN Ad mira l Ernest 1. King that an inadeq uate esco rt was worse than no escort.
Desp ite the shipping losses along the US eastern sea board , the Americans refused to
establish convoys. British First Sea Lord Admiral Pound tried to persuade King in
March 1942 that even a convoy with weak escorts was preferable.53 Also of interest
is that Roskill contended that the winter of 1943 was when the Allies came closest
to losing the Battl e of the Atlanti c." This assertion is disputed by many historians,
but what makes it most telling is that this was the period when the RCN had been
remove d from the battl e for trainin g, and the terribl e losses suffered were against the
supposedly bett er trained and equipped RN- and USN- escorted convoys. Indeed,
the monthl y report s of the Flag Officer New foundland (FONF) for this period reveal
that the Ame rican and Briti sh groups suffered the same sort of diffic ulties
enco untere d by the RCN - breakd owns, delays, group substitutions, and short
turn around s, to name but a few - with similar results.f
One further interesting point is that neither Roskill nor Mo rison mentioned
the removal of the RCN from the Atlantic dur ing the winter of 1943. As both the
RN and USN had to take up the slack, and did so with disastrou s result s, this seems
to be an omi ssion of convenience , at least on Roskill ' s part. It would be hard for the
52Marc Milner, "Squaring Some of the Corners: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Pattern
of the At lant ic War," in Timothy J. Runyan and Jan M. Copes (cds.), To Die Gallantly: The Battle 01
the Atlantic (Bo ulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 132, note 29.
53Rosk ill, War at Sea, / 93 9- / 945, 11, 97 .
54/b id., 11, 367-368.
55U brary and Archives Canada (LAC), Record Group (RG) 24, Flag Officer Newfou ndland
(FONF), Vol. 11,505, FONF, monthly reports, February and March 1943.
Admira lty to blame the RCN's convoy losses to poor trainin g and leadership, on the
one hand, and then supposedly almost lose the Batt le of the Atlantic thems elves on
the other.
More recen t Brit ish and Ame rican texts follow a similar pattern . Andrew
Williams ' The Battle ofthe Atlantic, a volume that accompanied the BBC television
series of the same name, devoted a mere two sentences to the RCN 's "extraordinary
cont ribution" to the bat tle.i '' Interestingly enough, though, he did make the point
that while the Adm iralty was often quick to criticize RCN and USN perform ance
(the latter more diplomatica lly than the former) , "cata strop hic security failures
within the Admiralty" were also much to blame for convoy losses. Germa n
intelligence had broken the Admiralty' s Nava l Cipher 3, used by all convoy escort s,
and Williams contended that by the middle of 1942 (when RCN-escorted convoy s
started suffe ring their worse losses) the Germans were reading upwards of eighty
percent of Cipher 3 messages. Indeed, British intelligence sugges ted that this breach
almost cos t the Allies the Battle of the Atlantic.V
Clay Blair' s two-volume history of the Battle of the Atlantic is probab ly the
most notable recent work by an American historian .58 Even though lacking in
citations, Blair cannot bc faulted for the thoroughn ess of his researc h, and his
bibliogra phy (contained in Volume II) was quite extensive. Blair noted the RN's
56Andrew Willia ms, The Battle of the Atlantic: The Alli es ' Subm arine Fight against Hitler 's
Gray Wolves of the Sea (Lo ndon: BBC Worldw ide, 2002), 287.
57Great Brita in, Na tiona l Arc hives (TNA/PRO), Ad miralty (ADM) 223/505, Report on
Penetration of British Code s and Ciphers; and ADM 1/3008 1, Chart/Report Showin g Extent of
Germ an Penetration of Nava l Codes and Ciphers, as cited in Williams, Battle ofthe Atlantic , 186.
58Clay Blair, Hitler 's U-Boat War: The Hunters, 1939-1942 (New York : Random House,
1996); and Blair , Hitler 's V-B oat War: The Hunted, 1942-1945 (New York : Random House, 1998).
inclination to unfairly criticize "and ridicule" the RCN, and he was also one of the
growing number of historians to dispute Roskill' s clai m that the Allies came close
to losing the Battle of the Atlantic in 1943.59
This being the case, two add itiona l volumes should be introduced - Jurgen
Rohwer ' s The Critical Convoy Battles of March 1943 and David Syrett' s The
Defeat of the German V_Boats.6o These two works compliment each other since
Rohwer dealt solely with March 1943 while Syrett examined the remainder of the
year but with particular attention to the April-May period . Rohwer explored the
techn ical and tactical reasons on both sides of the equation as to why March 1943
was such a critical month for the Allies. His conclu sions were especially interesting
in light of the RCN's absence from the fray. He suggested that an examination of
convoy opera tions from late 1942 to March 1943 showed just how quickl y the
normal discipl ine of an escort group was upset after the start of an attack." This
reference pertained equally to the American and British groups as well as Canadian,
as only one RCN group (C3) escorted one convoy (ON 172), without loss, in
March.62 Furthermore, Rohwer attributed the wea kness of the escort groups durin g
this period to "an unusually large numb er of escor ts being in the yards for repair"
rather than the fact that the RCN, which up to its reassignment represented forty-
s9B1air, Hitler 's The Hunters, 510-5 12; and Blair , The Hunted, 164-169.
60JUrgen Rohwer , The Critical Convoy Battles of March 1943: The Battle fo r HX
2291SC 122 (Lo ndo n: Ian Allan, 1977); and David Syrett , The Def eat of the German U-Boats: The
Battle of the Atlantic (Co lumbia: University of South Ca rolina Press, 1994.)
61Rohwer, Critical Convoy Battles, 200.
621bid., 38-49. See also Arn old Hague, The Allied Convoy System, 1939-1945: Its Organization,
Def ence and Operation (St. Catharines : Vanwell Publishin g, 2000) 159.
eight percent of the esco rt forces, had been taken out of the North Atlantic.v'
Overa ll, however, he j udged that the decid ing facto r in the success or failure of the
major convoy battle from June 1942 to May 1943 was High Frequency Direction
Finding (l-IF/DF , or Huff Duf f).64 Starting in the years immediately precedin g the
start of the war, the Allies ringed the North Atlantic (including Cape Spear,
Newfoundland, the most easterly point on the North American continent) with
I-IF/OF stations which would pick up V-boat transmissions. By triangulating these
transmissions between three or more stations, naval authorities could determine the
location of the sender. If it was established that a convoy was in danger, it could be
re-routed to avoid contact. As the war progressed , HF/D F sets became more
compact and were installed on convoy escor ts. This enabled the Senior Officer,
Escort (SOE) to pinpoint the location of a shadowi ng U-boat and to send a warship
to "run down the track" of the Ll-boat and force it to submerge or, if a wolfpack was
gathering, to alter course and/or send escorts to break up the pack. Rohwer 's
asse rtion of Huff Duff s importance - even over Allied incursions into German
naval codes durin g this period'" - tends to add substance to NS HQ 's claim that it
was inadequate equipment rather than poor training and leadership that was at the
root of the RCN 's convoy diffi culti es.
David Syrett' s The Def eat of the German U-Boats takes up where Rohwer
leaves off, although his conclusion was somewhat at odds with Rohwer ' s. Syrett
argued that it was the combin ation of both materiel and intelligence, including
6J/bid., 187.
64/bid., 198.
65/bid., 195.
Enigma decrypts, which made the difference in the winter of 1943.66 Thanks to a
number of intellige nce coups, the Governme nt Code and Cipher Schoo l at l3letchley
Park, j ust outs ide London, had been able to read, at least intermittently, German
messages genera ted by the top secret naval Enigma machin e since mid-1941. This
informatio n, when combine d with other signa ls intelligence (SigInt), including Huff
Duff, gave the Operatio nal Intell igence Rooms in London, Washin gton and Ottawa
clear warning when a wolfpack was gathering arou nd a convoy . Starti ng with April
1943, Syrett used all of this intelligence material to explain how the Allies were ab le
to achieve victory over the U-boats in May 1943, having suppose dly come so close
to defeat a mere two month s before. He concluded that the Alli ed forces both out-
fought and out-thought their German foes.67 Whereas German success was
measured in ships sunk, Allied success was meas ured in the "safe and timely
arrival" of the convoys.f" Consequently, through the judi cious use of SigInt, the
Allies were able to divert threatened convoys from Ll-boat concentrations, or
reinforce the escort with support groups if this was not possible , while using the
same intelligence to attack these concentr ations with Hunter Killer groups and
aircraft.69 The RCN did not participate in the disaster in March or the victory in May
1943, but it had return ed to the Atlantic theatre by then and accepted more and more
66Syrett, Defeat of the German V-Boa ts, xi.
67Ibid., 259.
68 This philosophy was supposed to be the all-important tenant ofescort forces and, early in
the war, RCN forces were criticized for leaving convoy s unprotected while incontact with a U-boat.
However, the rea lity was tha t more awards were bestowed for sink ing Uboats than successfully
shepherding a convoy to port .
69 Siglnt was particu larly important durin g the early days of the NEF as the Admir alty was
able to divert the newly formed escort groups around know Uboat concentrations.
responsibilities for convoy defence as the RN and USN went on the offensive
against the U-boats.
As has been previou sly mentioned, the first substantive history of the Royal
Canadia n Navy was Gilbert Tucker' s The Naval Service of Canada, publi shed in
1952. This was the first real attempt to set down the history of the RCN from its
inception in 1910 up to the end of World War II. Initially planned as a three -volume
set, only two were compl eted. Volume I examined the formation of the RCN in
1910, its activities durin g the Great War and its hit-and-miss developm ent in the
years precedin g World War II. Volume II looked at "Activities on Shor e durin g The
Second World War," as Tucker examined ship procurem ent , mannin g and training,
the prot ection of merch ant shipping and trade, and the establishment of bases,
including the base in St. John 's, durin g the Second World War. He contended that
St. John 's ' importan ce as a naval base "can hardly be exagge rated.v'? Tucker was
supposed to have written the third volum e of this series on the operational aspec ts of
the RCN but felt that to do so he requir ed access to all the documents.
Unfortunately, the Naval Staff and the Mini ster of Defence, Brooke Claxton, did not
want a scholarly examination that might reveal less flatterin g aspect s of the RCN's
wartime experience. What was needed , they believed, was a popular history that
would prom ote the navy in the public eye ." Joseph Schull ' s Far Distant Ships was
theresult. 72
7°Tucker, Naval Service a/Canada , II, 203.
71Michael Hadley, "T he Popular Image of the Canadia n Navy ," in Hadley, Huebert and
Crickard (cds.), A Nation's Navy, 48.
72Joseph Schull , Far Distant Ships: An Official Account a/Canadian Naval Operations in
World War II (Ottawa : Edmond Cloutier, 1950; 2"ded., Toronto : Stoddart Publishing, 1987).
Appeari ng two years before The Naval Service a/Canada, and based mainl y
on anecdo tal material and those documents that were ava ilable, Schull's work, as
Marc Milner has noted , tended to be " long on colour and short on analysis or
context.,,73 Neve rthe less, he recognized that the real measu re of the RCN's
contribution to the Battle of the At lantic was the sa fe arriva l of more than 25,000
merchant ships carry ing over 180 million tons of mater ial to the United Kingdom. l"
Schull suggested that St. John ' s was "the key to the western defe nse sys tem.,,75
Another early work that investigated Canada' s wartime naval experience in
Newfoundland was CP. Stacey's Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies 0/
Canada, 1939 -1945. An a ll-encompassing stud y of Canada's war effort, Arms, Men
and Governments also exa mined in detail Canada ' s milita ry activi ties and
difficulties in Newfoundland. Stacey sugges ted that for a numb er of reasons
New foundland's "military importance to Canada was obvious.,,76 The author
analyzed not only the defenc e of New foundland but also mili tary relationship s and
juri sdictional probl em s between Canada and its closest allies - the United States and
Great Britain - both of which had considerable strate gic and financial interests in
Newfoundland. Stac ey ' s official history of the Canadian Army durin g the Second
73Milner, "Historiography," 28.
74Schull, Far Distant Ships, 430.
75Ibid., 68.
76C.p. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, / 939-/ 945
(Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1970), 92.
World War is an exce llent companion to Arms, Men and Governments and includes
a sec tion on the Canadian army in Newfoundland.77
One more study that is beneficial to the exa mination of the NEF is W.A.B.
Douglas ' The Creation of a National Air Force: The Official History of the Royal
Canadian Air Force Volume ll , published in 1986.78 Douglas sugges ted that
Canada 's con tribution to the air war dur ing the Second World War was actually
most substantial on this side of the Atlantic . Early in the war, the Canadian and
British governments established the British Commonwea lth Training Plan , which
tra ined large numb ers of both Canadian and Commonwealth airmen for duty
ove rseas. Fur thermore, as the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) was also charged
wi th the air defence of Canada, it developed a large I-lome War Establishment
(HWE) that also played a significant offe ns ive as well as defensive role in defeating
the Germans ' attempt to seve r the lines of cornmunicat ion. i" Indeed , it was both the
direct defence of Canada and protection of the vital No rth Atlantic convoy routes
that bro ught the RCAF to New foundland. The Newfo und land Commi ssion of
Gove rnme nt was anxious to have the RCAF stationed in New foundland. It felt that
77C.p. Stacey, Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific (Ottawa:
Queen' s Printer , 1956). Robert Kavanagh' s unpu blished MA thesis is another excellent and often
cited reference source on Force W, the Canadian Army force in Newfo undland. Kavanagh goes into
great detail on the defence arrangements in and around St. John ' s. See Robert Kavanagh, "W Force:
The Canadian Army and the Defence of Newfoundland in the Second World War" (Unpublished MA
thesis, Memor ial University of Newfoundland, 1995). Two other unpubli shed theses worth
consulting are Mark Koechl , "Sailors Ashore: A Comparative Analysis of Wartim e Recreational and
Leisure in Hali fax and St. John ' s" (Unpublished MA thesis, St. Mary ' s University , 2003); and
Heather Monica Murph y, "The Relationship Between Canadian Mil itary Personnel Stationed in St.
John ' s and the Civilian Popul ation between October 1940 and December 1942" (Unp ublished
Honours thesis, Memorial Univers ity of Newfoundland, (981).
78W.A. B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force: The Official History of the Royal
Canadian Air Force (2 vols., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986).
79/bid., I, ix-x.
if Ca nada had " full use and responsibility" of the airports on the island , it "would
take much more interest in maintain ing aerial reconn aissance of the whole coast of
Newfoundland," which the Commission felt was very important from a "defence
point of view."so Ultima tely, the RCAF was deep ly involved in Anti-Submar ine
Warfare and convoy prot ection dur ing World War II, and the most easterly air base
in North America was at Torbay, ju st north of St. John 's. Furthermore, even though
the RCAF and RCN had difficult ies getting past inter-service rivalries in Hali fax, in
Ne wfoundland these two arms of the Ca nadian milita ry were able to estab lish a
unifi ed comm and carlyon. This conso lidation helped precipit ate the removal of the
Argentia comm and from con voy operations, ultim ately leadin g to the formation of
the Ca nadian Northw est Atlantic command in 1943.s1
Aro und the same time that Douglas ' work appeared, two of the most
important books on the RCN were also publ ished. Michael Hadley ' s UiBoats
against Canada and Marc Miln er ' s North Atlantic Run were the first scholarly
monograph s on Ca nadian naval history produced by academica lly trained
professional naval histori ans. Both utilized the plethora of formerly classified
docum ents that had been release d in the yea rs since The Naval Service of Canada
and Far Distant Ships. s2The other contribution of both is their frank exa mination of
'OGovernor of Newfound land to Dominions Secretary in Paul Brid le (ed.), Documents on
Relations between Canada and Newfoundland (2 vo ls., Ottawa: Department of Externa l Affairs,
1974-1984),11, 73.
' IDouglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 11, 547.
82Milner, "Historiogra phy," 32.
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the problems , both in policy and deployment , experien ced by the RCN durin g
World War II.
Micha el Hadley dealt with the inshore war waged by the RCN against the
U-boats in Canada 's territoria l waters where German submarines roamed the seas
around Newfoundland and the Gulf of St. Lawrence with apparent impunity . Indeed
American forces, not Canadian, destroye d the three V-boats sunk in Canadian
inshore waters during the war. Whereas some historians looked at the inshore war as
another RCN defcat,8) Hadley examined just what the RCN was up against and
rightly concluded that it did the best it could with what it had. Vnfortunately, at the
time, and even today, attention was centred on the failur es rather than the
accomplishments of the RCN dur ing the two V-boat campaigns in Canadian waters .
While the sink ings were alarming, and in the case of the Caribou especially tragic ,
the fact is that relat ively little coasta l traffic was actually lost. Indeed, if the RCN
had managed to sink a V-boat or two, all would no doubt have been forgive n. That,
and not the actual losses, was really the failure of the RCN in its inshore war against
the V-boats. Hadley had the benefit of access to previously classified German war
diaries and directives at the Bundes-und Milit arachiv in Freiburg, Germany, as well
as to wartime German newspapers. Vltimately, Hadley felt that the creat ion of the
NEF elevated the RCN from a minor role in coastal defe nce to a major participant in
oceanic operation s."
Marc Miln er ' s North Atlantic Run really made an argument similar to
Hadley 's concerning the success of the RCN in the Battle of the Atlantic. He
83Milner, Canada 's Navy, 109.
84M ichael L. Hadley, Ui-Boats against Canada: German Submarines in Canadian Waters
(Kin gston : McGill-Qu een ' s Univer sity Press, 1985) ,29.
measured the RCN 's real contribution to the ultimat e defeat of the V-boats as the
"safe and timely arrival " of the all-important trans-Atlantic convo ys. As previously
menti oned , most Briti sh postwar account s of the Battle of the Atlantic either
dim inished or, as Donald Macintyre 's , were severely crit ical of the RCN's
compete nce during World War II. Milner rightly challenged this interpretation ,
demonstrating that although beset with myriad difficulties, the RCN "held the line"
dur ing the crucial 1941 -1943 per iod. This allowed the VSN and the RN breathing
space so that the former could concentrat e on haltin g the Japanese advance in the
Pacifi c, and the latter could upgrade its forces and form support groups that
ultim ately wrested the Atlantic back from the U-boats in May 1943. Milner
sugges ted that New foundland was the natural place from which to mount escort
operations in the Northwest Atlantic.85
Milner' s Canada's Navy: The First Century examined the entire history of
the Canadian Navy from its inception in 191O up to 1998, and not surprisingly, the
largest section dealt with World War II. Milner sugges ted that the creation of the
NEF at St. 101m' s was a "milestone" for the RCN because it represented the RCN's
" first significant ' foreign' operational responsibility.v'" Canada 's Navy combin ed
most of what had been written to that point on the RCN with some new research and
was thus a good general history of the RCN . His latest work , The Battle of the
Atlantic, is much the same. Broken down into four-to -six-month blocks, Milner
examined the material deficienci es experienced by the RCN and the difficulties
85Marc Mi lner, North Atlantic Run: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle for the
Convoys (Toro nto: Unive rsity of Toron to Press, 1985), 32.
86Milner, Canada's Navy, 90.
created as a result of the American assumption of juri sdiction over the Northwest
Atlantic . After mid- 1941, the RCN was in a difficult situation when it came to
comma nd, con trol and doctri ne. Even though Canada had the vast majority of escort
forces in the Northwest Atlantic, the Americans had overa ll command.
Neve rtheless , Milner sugges ted that the Americans, unlike the British, seemed to
recogn ize the unb earab le strain being placed on the RCN. He quoted the senior USN
officer in Iceland as warning that the ships of the NEF "arrive]d] tired out and their
DO [destroyers] barely j ust make it." Milner noted that in October 1941, corvettes
of the NEF were spending on average twenty-eight of thirty-one days at sea.87
In 1990 Tony German produced the first popul ar and comprehensive one-
volume history of the RCN and pointed out what a diffi cult task it was just to
establish the base at St. John ' s let alone operate it efficiently. In The Sea is at Our
Gates, German asserted that in 1941 "apart from its natur al shelter and the
friendship that New foundlanders always extend to men of the sea, [St. John ' s] had
little to offer the Escort Force." He sugges ted that, for what became a major naval
base almos t ove rnig ht, St. John ' s had the " leanest of facilities."gg This jud gement is
not surpris ing since St. John ' s was initially not meant to be anything other than a
temporary stag ing point until the Americans took over convoy dut ies upon their
entry into the war. Of cour se, this did not happen as planned , and the base in St.
John' s was forced to play catch-up , as was the RCN in general. The pullout of USN
forces from the Atlantic in December 1941 put an unbearabl e strain on the RCN,
87Marc Milner, The Battle of the Atlantic (St. Catharine's, ON: Vanwe ll Publishing, 2003),
88Tony German, The Sea is al Our Gales (Toro nto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990), 93.
and because almost four-fift hs of the RCN's ocea n escorts were in St. John 's, this
also overwhe lmed the repair facilities of HMCS A valon. Unfortunate ly, the facilities
at Halifax, and indeed those throughout the Maritimes , were simila rly overstretched.
By 1942, ship repair facilities on the cast coast of Canada were totally
overwhelmed and not only unab le to keep up with batt le and weat her dama ge to
merchan t and nava l vesse ls alike but, ju st as important, to refit and modernize the
latter. The RCN's equipment crisis came to a head in December 1942 when the
Admiralty reco mmended pullin g the RCN out of the North Atlantic and which
ultimately led to the removal of Admiral Percy Nelles as Chief of the Naval Staff
(CNS). Ernes t R. Forbes examined the roots of the repair crisis on the cast coast in
his excellent article "Co nsolidating Disparity: The Maritimes and the
Industrialization of Canada durin g the Second World War." Forbes sugges ted that in
their single-minded focus on strengthening Canada's indu str ial heartland , C.D.
Howe and the Departm ent of Muniti ons and Suppl y esse ntially ignored the potential
of the Maritim es and thus actually hindered Canada 's war effort, particularly in the
area of ship repair. Most of Canada's shipbuilding and repair facilities were located
in Quebec and Ontario, and they were fully occupied with naval and merchant ship
constructi on and were often unavailabl e for large periods of time due to ice
conditions or enemy activity. On the other hand , the facilities in the Atlantic
Provinces were not properly develop ed unti l the repair probl em became a crisis. He
correctly insisted that had the Federal government invested in Atlantic ship repair
facilities and related industries earlier, the repair and modern izat ion crisis could
have been ave rted.89
The lack of shipyard space for refi tting RCN esco rts was one reason why
the ships of the RCN lagged behind the RN in modern equipment. The other reason
was the avai labili ty of modern equipment. The material infer iority of Canadian
ships led to a showdow n between Naval Minister Angus Macdo nald and CNS
Nelles in 1943. In The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa, David Zimmerman blamed
lack of commun ication and co-ordination between the RCN and the National
Research Council (NRC) for the RCN's deficiencies in equipment, parti cularly
radar.9o Zimmerman expanded on this issue and the relationship between technology
and tact ics in an excellent chapter in The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939-1945, which
came out of the so"Anniversary International Nava l Conference on the battle that
was held in Liverpool. I-Ie correctly suggested that while the British blamed the
RCN's difficult ies on trainin g and the NSHQ blamed it on lack of equipme nt, it was
actually a combin ation of the twO.91 Lack of communication at all levels seem s to
have been behind a large part of the RCN's problems. There was a lack of
communication betwe en NSHQ and the NRC, between the Admira lty and NSI-IQ,
and even between NS I-IQ and the forces at sea. Richard O. Mayne ' s Betrayed:
89Emes t R. Forbes, "Consolidating Disparity: The Maritimes and the Industr ializat ion of
Canada durin g the Second World War," Acadiensis, XV, No. 2 (Spring 1986), 3-27. See also Forbes,
"C utting the Pie into Sma ller Pieces: Matching Grants and Relief in the Maritim e Provinces during
the 1930s," Acadiensis, XVII, No. 1 (Autumn 1987), 34-55.
90David Zimmerman, The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa: How Admirals, Scientists. and
Politicians Impeded the Development of High Technology in Canada's Wartime Navy (Toronto:
University of Toro nto Press, 1989.
91David Zimmerma n, "Technology and Tactics," in Stephen Howarth and Derek Law (eds .),
The Battle of the Atlantic 1939-1945: The so" Anniversary International Naval Confe rence
(Annapo lis: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 476-489 .
Scandal, Politics and Canadian Naval Leadership invest igated this lack of
communication betwe en NSHQ and the men at sea, and showed how the RCN's
command structure was circum vented by various offic ers to address the deficiencies
in equipment. Frustrated with the seeming indiffer ence at NS I-IQ - and in some
cases for personal gain - some RCN officer s went outside normal channel s to
rectify what they saw as incompctenee and ineffic iency at NS I-IQ. These actions
touched of f the firestorm between the Nava l Minister and the CNS which ultimately
led to the latter ' s remova l but did little to relieve the equipment situation.92
The most recent scholarship on the RCN is the two-part second volume of
the Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World
War. Part I, No Higher Pur p ose, covering the period 1939-1943, appeared in 2002,
and was followe d in 2007 by A Blue Water Navy, which covered the remainder.i"
Publ ished with the co-opera tion of the Departments of National Defence and Public
Works and Gove rnment Services, No Higher Purpose and A Blue Water Navy are
companions to the first official histories, which comprised Gi lbert Tucke r's The
Naval Service of Canada and Joseph Schull's Far Distant Ships. A collaborative
effo rt involving W.A.B. Douglas, Roger Sarty and Michael Whit by, with the
assistance of Robert H. Ca ldwe ll, William Johnson and Willi am G.P. Rawling, these
92Richard O. May ne, Betrayed: Scandal, Politics and Canadian Naval Leadership
(Vancou ver: U13C Press, 2006) .
93W.A. 13.Doug las, et al., No Iligher Purpose: The Ofjicial Operational History of the Royal
Canadian Navy in the Second World War 1939-1943, Vo lume II, Part I (St. Cat hari nes: Vanwe ll
Pub lishin g, 2002); and Dougla s, et al., A l3lue Water Navy: The Ofjicial Operational History of the
Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War 1943-1945, Vo lume II, Part 2 (St. Catharines:
Vanw eIlPublishing, 200 7).
two volum es synthesized all the aforementioned scholarly work with much new
research .
Canada' s senior naval officer s have received relatively little individ ual
attention in most of the literature . Other than Jame s Cameron ' s apo logetic Murray
the Martyred Admiral and Rear-Admiral Nelson Lay's Memoirs ofa Mariner, very
little has been writte n on the men who commanded Canada's nava l forces durin g
World War 11.94 Fortunately, this deficiency in the literature was rectified somewhat
in 2006 with the publication of The Admirals, edited by Michael Whitby, Richard H.
Gimblett and Peter Haydon. The result of the Sixth Marit ime Command Historical
Conference at Halifax in 2002, The Admirals includ ed essays on the careers of
Canada's three leadin g naval officers durin g the Seco nd World War. Roger Sarty
wrote a sympathetic acco unt of Percy Nelles' accomplishments and travails during
his tenur e as CNS and accurately concluded that, despite his ignominious remova l
as head of the RCN in 1944, Nelles actually accom plished all he was asked to do
under very difficult circumstances.f Marc Milner had a similar take on Admiral
Leonard Murray, FONF and after April 1943 the Commander-in-Chief, Canadia n
Northwes t Atlantic(C-in-C, CNA) . Like Nelles , Murray also left the RCN under a
cloud . He was held responsible for the Halifax V-E Day riots and, having been
refused a proper court marshal, retired into exile in England in 1946. Milner
94James M. Cameron, Murray the Martyred Admiral (Hantsport, NS : Lancelot Press, 1980);
and H. Ne lson Lay, Memoirs of a Mariner (Stittsv ille, ON: Cana da 's Wings, 1982). Ma rc Milner
laments that Lay , who filled a number of importa nt posts dur ing the Seco nd World War, missed an
opport unity to make a real contribution to Canadian naval scholarship by direc ting his memoirs more
towards his fam ily than the naval historian. See Milner, " Histo riog raphy,"3 1.
95Rog er Sarty , "Admiral Percy W. Nelles: Diligent Guard ian of the Vision ," in Michael
Whitb y, Richard H. Gimb lett and Peter Haydo n (eds.) , The Admir als: Canada 's Senior Naval
Leadership in the Twentieth Century (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2006) , 69-95.
prop erly argued that, regardless of his Oaws,96 Murray 's administrative skills, sea
smarts and conce rn for the men under his command made him the right man at the
righ t time for the crucial job of commanding the NE F/MOEF in 1941/1942 and
assuming the mantl e of C-in-C, CNA two yea rs later.97
Interestin gly, the comm on denominator, and indeed a major player in these
eve nts , was anot her of the RCN' s important Seco nd World War Senior Officers ,
Vice-A dmira l Geo rge C. "Je tty" Jones. Jones was a classmate of Murray's at the
Royal Nav al Co llege of Canada (RNCC) , Class of 1912, and Commanding Officer,
Atlantic Coas t (COAC) when Murra y was FONF . There already existed tremendous
rivalry and animos ity betwe en the two, and Jones' s habit of "poaching" Mur ray ' s
crews when NE F ships went to Hali fax for repairs or refit s exace rba ted the situation.
Furthermore, Jones as CN S refused Murra y his court marshal after the Hali fax riots,
resultin g in Murra y ' s resignation , thus finally eliminating Jones 's long-time
nemesis. Indeed , Jones actu ally owed his position as CNS in no small part to
subterfuge durin g the equipment crisis of the previous year which led to Nelle s
quietl y bein g sack ed. Rich ard Mayne has argued that Jone s' s reputation as a ruthless
and man ipulative careerist is deserved. On the other hand , he also point ed out that
this was the culture within the RCN at that time, and that Jones ju st played the game
better than most of his cont emp oraries. Mayne contended that Jones was both the
96Nelles did not give Murray a resoundin g endorsement even as he appoint ed him to be the
only Canadian commander of an Allied theatre of operations.
97Marc Milner, "Rear Admir al Leonard Warren Murray" Canada's Most Important
Operatio nal Commander," in Whitby, Gimb lett and Haydon (eds.), The Admirals, 97-123. Roger
Sarty also has wr itten an exce llent biograp hy of Murray entitled, " Rear-Admiral L.W..Murray and
the Batt le of the Atlantic: The Profes siona l Who Led Canada 's Citizen Sailors," in Bernd Hom and
Stephen Harris (cds.), Warrior Chieft: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders (Toronto :
DundurnPres, 2001),1 65-190.
best his generation of Canadian naval officers had to offer - ambitious and
industrious - and the worst: political and manipu lative . Ultimately, Jones did not
enjoy the fruits of his manoeuvrings for very long as he died of a heart attack a mere
two years into his tenure as CNS.98
All Canadian and many internati onal works on the Battle of the At lantic
point to the important place St. John ' s played in winning the Battle of the Atlantic.
However, the overall minima l treatment given HMCS Avalon perpetuat es the
impression that it was a "seat of the pants" facili ty rather than a fully functionin g
naval base operati ng under very difficult circumstances . Bernard Ransom attempted
to redress this view with his exce llent art icle "Canada 's 'Newfyjohn' Tenancy: The
Royal Canadia n Navy in St. John' s, 1941-1945." Ransom recou nted the
establishme nt of the RCN base in St. John' s, as well as the difficulties encount ered
in operat ing a front-line esco rt base. He also explored Canada's motives, which he
agreed were not altogether military in nature, for wanting to establish a secure
presence in Ne wfoundland. Ransom sugges ted that the establi shment of the RCN
base in "Newfyjo hn" was not only mil itarily motivated but also part of the Canadian
governme nt's strategy for absorbi ng Newfo undland into the "Canadian orbit. ,,99
My own "From Defended Harbour to Transat lantic Base" and "T irst Line
of Defence': The Establishment and Development of St. John' s Newfound land as
the Roya l Canadian Navy ' s Premier Naval Base in the Second World War" built on
Ransom's work with much new resea rch. In these articles I concluded that even
9'Richard O. Mayne , "Vive-Admiral George C. Jones: The Political Career if a Naval
Officer," in Whitb y, Gimblett and Haydon (eds .), The Admirals, 125-155.
99Bernard Ransom, "Canada' s 'Ne wryjohn ' Tenancy: The Royal Canadian Navy in St.
John ' s 194 1- 1945," Acadiensis, XXIlI, No . 2 (Spring 1994). 45-71.
though St. John ' s was only intended to be a defended harbour and a local escort
base, it eventually developed into one of the most important Allied naval bases of
the Second World War.100 While these three articles go a long way to illustrating the
difficulties encoun tered in establishing and operating liMeS Avalon, by virtue of
length they really only scratched the surface. This thesis expands on Canada's
motives in developing the base, explores the difficulties in do ing so, and argues that
if the RCN "so lved the problem of the Atlantic convoys" as suggested by Admiral
Sir Percy Noble, Cvin-C, Northwes t Approaches, then HMCS Avalon was
instrum ental in makin g it possible. l'"
Given I-IMCS Avalon's importance, and Newfoundland's strategic location,
it is not surprising that milit ary authorities had "denial plans" in place should
German forces attack St. John 's and threaten to captur e the port . President
Roosevelt had concerns about Newfoundland ' s vulnera bility as early as April 1941,
and the local US comm ander felt that a German attack on St. John ' s was imminent
afte r the Ger man declarat ion of war against the United States . Kerry Bagdley' s
article, "' Rigorous ly Applied in Practice:' A Scorched Earth Policy for Canada and
New foundland dur ing the Seco nd World War," caused something of a stir when it
was publi shed in 1998. Bagdley suggested that naval authorities developed a
scorched earth plan behind the backs of the Newfoundl and gove rnment that would
lOoPaul Collins, " From Defended Harbour to Transatlantic l3ase," In Steven High (ed.),
Occupied St. John 's: A Social History of a City at War, 1939-1945. (Montreal: McGill-Queen' s
University Press, 20 10), 8 1-109 ; and Collins, "' First Line of Defence:' The Establishment and
Developmen t of St. John ' s Newfoundland as the Royal Canadian Navy 's Premier Naval l3ase in the
Second World War," The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du nord, XV I, No. 3 (July 2006), 15-32.
101 Marc Milner, Canada 's Navy: The First Century (Toronto: Univers ity of Toro nto Press,
1999), 92 .
have left St. John 's in flames had the Germans attacked. 102 My recent "'Canada's
Plan to Torch St. John ' s' durin g the Second World War : Upper Canadi an Arrogance
or Tabloid Journ alism?" refuted this claim , arguin g that while senior naval officers
did develop a denial plan , it did so at the behest of the Newfound land government
and that there never was any intention to burn St. John' s.IO)
Canada's Second World War naval bases , and most Allied ones, have not
received much historical attention. What little that has been written has for the most
part been produ ced by amateur historians and contain the kind of flaws inherent in
this type of inexper t inves tigation. The exception to this genera lization was Brian
Tennyso n and Roger Sarty's examination of Sydney, Cape Breton , in Guardian of
the Gulf: Sydney, Cape Breton and the Atlantic Wars. I04 Until August 1942, Sydney
was the asse mbly port for the slow convoys that suffere d such casualties dur ing the
first half of the war. After these were relocated to New York, Sydney still retained
its importance as a local escor t base and assembly port for local convoys . In
addition, its repair facilities were greatly expa nded in an attempt to relieve the
pressure on the facilities at St. John ' s and Halifax. While Tennyso n and Sarty traced
Sydney's naval history back to the seventeenth century, a third of the text was
devoted to the Second World War. After years of neglect before the start of the war,
the RCN faced similar challenges in re-activating Sydney as a naval base as it did
when it came time to establish HMCS Avalon two years later. Indeed, Tennyson and
I02Keny Badgley, ' '' Rigorously Appl ied in Practice:' A Sco rched Earth Policy for Canada
and Newfou ndland during the Second World War," The Archivist, No. 446 (1998), 38-43 .
103Paul Co llins, ' '' Canada 's Plan to Torch St. John ' s' during the Secon d World War: Upper
Canadian Arroga nce or Tab loid Journalism?" Newfoundland Studies, XXIV, No.2 (2009), 26 1-270.
I04Brian Tennyson and Roger Sarty . Guardian of the Gulf: Sydney, Cape Breton. and the
Atlantic Wars (Toron to: University of Toro nto Press, 2000) .
Salty' s descripti on of what the newly appointed Naval Offic er in Charge (NOIC),
Commander Massey Goo lden, RN, found at Sydney in 1939 mirrored that of St.
John 's in 1941. The harbour was fully utilized by the ships and facilities of the
Dominion Stee l and Coa l Company (DOSCO) supplying Bell Island ore to the steel
mills of Cape Breton. Ship repair facilities consisted ofa small marine rai lway at the
Sydney Foundry , the North Sydney Mine Railway, and the Atlantic Spring and
Machin e Shop which could only handle minor repair work . lOS Commander Goo lden
also encountered the same sort of local trouble s experienced at St. John ' s. Tennyson
and Salt y related the example of an incident in which a local foundr y refused to
supply steel plate to repair a dam aged merchant vessel becau se the work was being
done by a competitor.106 While the two historians examined the general
mili tarization of Sydn ey durin g the Second World War as much as the naval aspect,
their methodology of examining the evolution of this important naval/air base and
convoy assembly port is a helpful guide in exploring the experience of St. John 's.
Tennyson might be more of a Cape Breton historian, but Sarty is well versed on
defensive arrangements on Canada's east coast durin g the Battle of the Atlantic,
having authored 771e Maritime Def ence of Canada and co-author ed St. John
Fortifications, 1630-1956.107
The American presence was a significant factor in both the Battle of the
Atlanti c and Newfoundland. The United States had strategic jurisdiction over the
I05lbid., 2 11-213.
106lbid., 257.
I07S arly (ed .), Maritime Def ence of Canada; and Roger Sarty and Doug Knight, St. John
Fortifications, 1630-1956 (Fredericton, NB: Goose Lane Books, 2003).
Western At lantic and all forces therein - includin g the RCN - and exercised this
control from Argentia , Newfoundland. The United States obtained base sites
throughout New foundland and in other British territ ories in the Western Hemisphere
as a result of the famous "destroyers for bases" deal and its presence impacted
greatly on the populations of all of these areas. There appears to be something of a
div ision of opinion as to whether Newfoundland was an integral part of this deal or
a separate item altoget her. Much has been made that the British gove rnme nt offered
base sites in Newfo undland to the America ns " freely and without considerati on."
This suggest s that the British proffered them to the United States regardless of
whether the US transferred the fifty destroyers or not. Philip Goodhart's promotes
this view in the somew hat melodramatically titled Fifty Ships that Saved the World.
He argued that Churchill wanted to give the sites to the US as a sign of good will
betwee n the two grea t English-speak ing nations but that Roosevelt wanted to buy
them. The two parties' finally compromise was that bases sites in Newfoundland
and Bermu da wou ld be given and the rest traded for the destroye rs.lOS Steven High' s
Base Colonies in the Western Hemisphere, 1940-1967 argues, on the other hand,
that the deal entirely included New foundland and Bermud a and that their officia l
exclusion was a poli tical expedient to appease the predomin antly white population
in each co lony which might not agree to it if they thought Britain was simply
trading their territory to another country.'09 Indeed , authorities portrayed the deal as
a patrioti c duty in Newfo undland. Both Peter Neary 's "Newfoundland and the
'08Philip Good hart, Fifty Ships that Saved the World: The Foundati on of the Anglo-
American Alliance (New Yark : Doubleday and Co. 1965), 173.
109Steven High, Base Colonies in the Western Hemisphere, 1940-1967 (New York : Palgrave
Macmill an, 2009) ,25 and2 l3 , 1I0tc48.
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Anglo-Am erican Leased Bases Agreem ent of 27 March 1941" and David
MacKenzie' s "A North Atlanti c Outp ost: The Americ an Milit ary in Newfoundl and,
194 1-194 5" were somewhat ambivalent about this. Neary sugges ted that in return
for the fifty destro yers, Britain made sites and facil ities in the Caribbean and British
Guiana avai lable to the US, and promised to secure sites in Newfoundland and
Bermuda " freely and witho ut consideration." llo MacKenzie contended the deal gave
the US the rights to estab lish bases on severa l British co lonies in the Western
Hemisphere, including Newfo undland and Bermuda, agai n without
compensation. II I Th is sugges ts that agree ments for Newfo undland and Bermud a
were negoti ated simultaneously with the formal destroye rs for bases deal, but
outside it. American sources genera lly do not make any distinction .lf Regardless,
the American presence in New foundland, as much as the war itself, prompted
Canada's enthusiastic response to the establishment of the St. John's -base d the
Newfo undland Escor t Force (NEF) in 1941.
Mac Kenzie exam ined this theme in more detail in Inside the Atlantic
Triangle: Canada and the Entrance of Newfoundland into Confederation, 1939-
1949. He suggeste d the Canadian gove rnment was determin ed to transform
Newfoundland from a liab ility into an asse t and rightly concludes that this was
1I0Peter Neary, "Newfo undland and the Anglo-American Leased Bases Agreement of 27
March 1941 ," Canadian Historical Review, LXVII, No.4 (Dece mber 1986), 491-519.
IIIDavid MacKe nzie, "A North Atlantic Outpost: The America n Mil itary in Newfo undland,
1941-1945," War & Society, XX II, NO. 2 (October 2004) , 51-74 .
112Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman and Byron Fairchild , Guarding the United States and
Its Outposts (Washington , DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1964; reprint: US
Government Printin g Offic e, 2000). One exception is Morison, History 0/ the United States Naval
Operations. E sa.
acco mplished with the formation of the NEF.113 Neary has also done a considerab le
amou nt of research on this period, and his Newfoundland in the North Atlantic
World, 1929-1949 is the premier source for the Commission of Gove rnment years in
Newfoundland. The war, and in particular the American and Canadian bases,
brought previously unknown prosperity to the count ry and influenced
Newfo undland's event ual inclusion into the Canadian confedera tion. t l4 Malcolm
Macl.eod also recog nized Newfo undland's importance to Canada, both
operationally and politic ally, in Peace of the Continent. He accurately contended
that Canada's interest in the defence of Newfoundl and had as much to do with
future con sideration s as with winnin g the Battle of the Atlantic . To this end, Canada
wanted to change the tremendous mistrust Newfoundlanders had towards Canada
and to allay any fears that the establishment of the various Canadian bases was a
move to gain possession of the island .115
Another useful study of Newfound land during the war years is
Newfoundland : Economic, Diplomatic, and Strategic Studies, edited by R A.
MacKa y."6 In September 1941, MacKay and Dr. S.A. Saund ers arrived in St.
113 ln April 1941 Mackenzie King met with President Roosevelt at Hyde Park. During one of
their conversations concerning Canada's interest in Newfoundland, Roosevelt voiced the opinion that
Canada should take ove r the small domi nion. King replied that Newfoundland had not been brought
into Confederation because it had been a liability but that Canada was going have to turn it into an
asset. With the form ation of the NEF a month later, Newfoundland suddenly became an asset. See
David MacKenzie, Inside the Atlantic Triangle: Canada and the Entrance of Newfoundland into
Confederation, 1939-1949 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 65.
II' Peter Neary, Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World 1029-/ 949 (Montrea l: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1988; 2nd ed., Montreal: McGill-Qu een ' s University Press, 1996).
115Ma icolm MacLeod, Peace of the Continent: The Impact of the Second World War
Canadian and American Bases in Newf oundland(S t. John ' s: Harry Cuff Publish ing, 1986), 18.
116R.A. MacKay (ed.), Newf oundland: Economic, Diplomatic, and Strategic Studies
(Toro nto: Oxfo rd Univers ity Press, 1946).
John 's as par t of the Supervisory Committee on Newfound land Studies appointed
the previous June by the Royal Institute of Internationa l Affa irs. The Committ ee's
mandate was to study the economy and external relationship s of this small, but
strategically important , corner of the Commonwealth . The aforementioned volume
resulted, and while pub lished in 1946, most of the volume was authored and set in
type duri ng the war years and for the most part maintained the poin t of view from
which it was origina lly written. The study comprises a num ber of essays by some of
Canada 's leading historians, including A.M . Fraser and A.R.M. Lowe r, on all
aspects of what the editor termed "The Problem of Newfoundland," the "problem"
being what to do with Newfoundland after the end of the war l l ? Of particular
interest is Lower's "Transition to Atlantic Bastion" in which he referred to
New foundland as "the stopper in the Canadian bottle."I IS Lower astutely concluded
that without the air and nava l bases provided by Newfo undland, victory in the
Atlantic would have been de layed if not forfeite d altogether.
Another exce llent source is a collection of documents rather than a study .
Documents on Relations between Canada and Newfo undland, Volume I, 1925-1949
contains a wide selection of docum ents pertainin g to the Canadian presence in
New foundland. In particular, Chapter I includes documents concerning the position
Newfoundland held in the Canadian Defence Plan and, most importantly for this
study, those on the establishment of the base in St. John 's . This compilation also
contains an excellent introduction by RA MacKay, which was publi shed separa tely
117/bid., 3_38.
I ISA.R.M. Lower , "Transition to Atlantic Bastion ," in ibid., 484- 508.
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in 1974 as Newfoundland in North Atlantic Strategy in the Second World War.11 9
MacKay pointed out that the Permanent loint Board on Defence at its first meeting
recognized "Newfoundland's strategic significance, both for the defence of Canada
and the United States and for the protection of transatlantic trade and air routes.,,120
Due to security concerns, no Canadian accounts of the Battle of the Atlantic
were produced during the war, and any newspaper and magazine articles were
highly censored and produced mainly for propaganda purposes. Consequently, any
"contemporary" material on the war in the Atlantic was produced after the fact.
Alan Easton's 50 North was the first, and perhaps most well known. In "The
Popular Image of the Canadian Navy" Michael Hadley suggested that Easton's book
was "Canada' s Cruel Sea" and called it a "central icon" of the RCN's fight in the
Atlantic.121 Easton claimed that 50 North was "factual" because he set it to paper in
1945 while it was still fresh in his mind.122
l ames B. Lamb and Hal Lawrence, both former seagoing officers, wrote four
of the most popular, and most quoted, memoirs of the RCN during the Second
World War. Lamb's The Corvette Navy and On the Triangle Run appear in many
historiographies of the RCN, as do Hal Lawrence's A Bloody War: One Man 's
119R.A. MacKay, Newfoundland in North Atlantic Strategy in the Second World War
(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974).
12°Bridle (ed.), Documents, I, xxxi.
l2IThis refers, of course, to Nicholas Montserrat' s novel of the same name. See Michael L
Hadley, "The Popul ar Image of the Canadian Navy," in Hadley, Huebert and Crickard (eds.), A
Nation 's Navy, 52.
I22Alan Easton, 50 North: An Atlantic Battleground (London: Eyre and Spotti swoode,
1963; 2nd ed.,M arkham, ON:P aperjacks, 1980), 10.
Memories of the Canadian Navy and Tales of the North Atlantic .123 The Salty Dips
collection produced by the Ottawa Branch of the Naval Officer s Associati on of
Canada is also a good source for first-hand accounts of Canada 's naval experience
in World War 11.124 The aforementi oned cannot be considered learned volumes, but
such works are useful as they include popu larly he ld impressions and some of the
sma ller details on the day-to-day operations of the RCN, includi ng the base at St.
John ' s, which are often omitted as incidental in the larger works.
There has been a tremendous increase in interest in Newfo undland about the
war yea rs, and a large numb er of texts have appeared in recent years. However,
many are by amateur historians and therefore lack the rigour and/o r resea rch present
in more scholarly studies. At best, they rely on scholarly secondary sources, at
worse on anecdotal evidence and dubious published resourc es. Consequently, few
add anything substantial to the historiography of New foundland du ring the Second
World War and in some cases only serve to perpetuate local myths and stereo types.
An exception to this is the recently publi shed Occupied St. John 's: A Social History
of a City at War, 1939-/ 945, edited by Steven High. Comprising seven essays by
ten professional historians, Occupied St. John 's examines the impact of the Second
123James 13.Lamb, The Corvette Navy: True Stories fro m Canada 's Atlantic War (To ronto:
Macmill an of Canada , 1977; 2"d ed., Toro nlo: Fitzhenry and Whites ide, 2000) ; Lamb, On the
Triangle Run (Toro nto: Macmill an of Canada, 1986); Hal Lawrence, A Bloody War: One Man 's
Memories of the Canadian Navy, 1939-45 (Toro nto: Macmi llan of Canada, 1979); and Lawrence,
Tales 0/the North Atlantic (Toro nto: McClella nd and Stewart, 1985).
124Mack Lynch (ed.), Salty Dips (Ottawa: Nava l Officer s' Associatio n of Canada, 1983).
World War from a number of aspects and takes 0 11 a few of the more popu lar myths
about the perio d.125
Unfortunately, very little work has been undertaken on the "Hostilities-
Only" bases that were deve loped during the Second World War. On the Allied side,
British and American histor ians have limited their research to their large naval
establishments such as Scapa Flow, Singapore , Gibraltar or Pearl Harbor. Texts on
the German facilities in France and Germany tend to concentrate on the construct ion
and use of huge U-boat bunkers . Most of the afore mentioned deal solely with
operatio ns from these bases , and none actually attempts a ground-level examination
of their establishment, developm ent and administrat ion. This dissertation contributes
to this largely ignored area of naval history and to our understandin g of the Battle of
the Atlantic in genera l by chronicling the evolution of St. John ' s, Newfo undland
from merely a poorly defended harbour in September 1939 to a naval base of
strategic import ance a few of years later despite inter-governm ental tensions, labour
difficulti es, a convoluted comm and structure, and delays in construction. From the
Canadian standpoint, I argue that Canada's insistance on establishing the base was
as much to enhance its international presence and protect its special interests in
New foundland as to aid the Allied war effort. Furthermore, I show that despite these
difficulties, HM CS Ava lon permit ted the RCN to "hold the line" dur ing the most
critical period of the Battle of the Atlantic when failure could have dramatically
altered the course of the Second World War.
125Steven High (ed .), Occupied St. John' s: A Social History of a City at War, 1939-1945
(Mo ntreal: McGi ll-Que en ' s Univer sity Press, 2010).
Chapter 2
Cry "Havoc!" and Let Slip the Dogs of War
When the Seco nd World War erupted in Septembe r 1939, Newfo undland was little
more than a min or British outpos t off Canada's cast coas t. It was famous for its Grand
Banks, which was a source of friction between a num ber of countries, and as the most
easterly point on the North American continent it was the location of many important
wireless and trans-Atlant ic cable stations. But with its fragile economy and under-employed
and largely und er-educated population, it was ruled by a London-appointed Conuniss ion of
Government and kept afloat by grants and loans from the Briti sh government.
Newfoundland in some ways was the unwanted child of the Briti sh Empire. This changed,
however, as the Battle of the Atlantic moved further west, and Britain' s vital lifelines to the
New World were seriously threatened. A full escort system was needed to protect the flow
of supplies , and one end had to start in the western Atlantic. Suddenly, Newfo undland
became important.
No discussion of "Newfyjohn" - as military personnel affectionately called
Newfoundland and St. John ' s in particular during the war - can make sense without a brief
review of the island 's SOD-year history as a British outpost. Offic ially "discovered" in 1497
by John Cabot, Newfoundl and already had a prosperou s indigenous population, and indeed
was actually se ttled 500 years earlier by Vikin gs who built a thriving, ifultimately doomed,
community at Lanse-aux-Meadows on the Great Northern Peninsula. In the intervening
period, the island was largely forgotten until the late fifteenth century when Cabot returned
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to England with tales of codfish so plentiful that they could be hauled aboard in baskets.
Within a short period, most of the major European nations fished on the Grand Banks, and
in 1583Sir Francis Drake sailed into St. John's harbour and claimed the island forEngland.
Two years later, Sir Bernard Drake firmly established English control by destroying the
Spanish fishing fleet. From that time forward only English and French vessels were allowed
in Newfoundland waters.
France, initially confined to the west coast, slowly realized the strategicimportance
of Newfoundland, and in 1662 established a garrison at Plaisance (Placentia) in Placentia
Bay. It was designated as the seat of government in Newfoundland and the base for all
French activities in the region. The French attacked and burned St. John's to the ground in
1696, and again in 1708. Indeed, until the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), France controlled
Newfoundland. Under the treaty, however, France lost Newfoundland but retained rights to
an area between Cape Bonavista and Riche Point which became known as the French
Shore. This did not end English/French tensions, though, and S1. John's once again fell
briefly to the French in 1762. Under the Treaty of Paris in 1763 the French relinquished
Newfoundland but retained fishing rights on the French Shore and ownership of the islands
of St. Pierre and Miquelon. With the peace, structured settlement and proper government
was soon forthcoming, especially when inexpensive exports from the American colonies
immediately before the American Revolution lowered the cost of provisions. The period
between 1763 and the end of the Napoleonic wars was the greatest period of in-migration in
the island's history.
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The first half of the nineteenth century was reasonably stable and prospero us. By
mid-century, responsib le govern ment was in place, and Philli p Little became
Newfo undland's first Prime Minister. The next half was not quite as sta ble as the dominion
I
suffere d through severa l financial disasters and a major fire almost completely destroyed
St. John 's in 1892. Things improved with the dawn of the new century , and in 1904 France
relinquis hed its claim to the French Shore, and the Permanent Court of Arbi tration in The
Hague upheld Newfound land' s right to regulate American fishing on the Grand Banks.
However, there were war clouds on the horizon.
When war was decla red in August 1914, New foundland quickly answere d the call
to arms. Neverthel ess, such patriotism came at a tremendous cost: by the end of the war
almost every family had a friend or relative killed or wounded in action, and the island ' s
war debt , combin ed with the liabiliti es assum ed when the government took over the
Newfo undland Railway, eventually led to the dominion's near financial collapse and the
imposition of Commission of Gove rnment in 1934. The Commission, comprising three
Newfoundlanders and three Britons, acting in coop eration with the governor, instituted
economic reform s, reorganized the civil service and improved health , education and other
soc ial services . The economy responded, but the real recovery came from the Second World
War. Newfoundland' s strategic location played a major role in world events, and once
aga in the country was "occupied" by foreign armed forces.'
IThe most rece nt gene ral history of Newfoundland and Lab rador is Sea n T. Cadigan, Newfoundland
and Labrador: A History (Toro nto : University of Toronto Press, 2009). For an in-depth study of sett lcment
and government in Newfoundlanl dur ing the seventeenth ande ightcenth centuri es, see Peter E. Pope, Fish
Into Wine: The Newfoundland Plantat ion in the Seventeenth Century (Chape l Hill: University of North
Caro lina Press, 2004); and Jerry Bannister, The Rule of the Adm irals: Law, Custom and Naval Government in
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When First Sea Lord Winston Churchill ordered His Majesty' s ships to commence
hosti lities aga inst Germany on 3 September 1939 neither he nor anyone in the Royal Navy
(RN) could foresee the kind of sea war they would eventua lly fight. The RN still ruled the
waves, but naval strategy continued to be centred on the batt leship and the set-piece naval
engage ment. The U-boat experience of World War I was still remembered, and convoys
were immediately init iated, but the Admiralty considered the V-boat threat to be minimal;
ASDl C - the newly developed underwater detection device now known as Sonar -
supposedly guaranteed that. As a result, the RN regarded the German surface fleet as the
main threat.2
To face the German fleet, Britain had several forces. First, there was the Horne Fleet
comp rising five battleships, two battle cruisers, two carriers, twelve cruisers, seventeen
destroyers, seve n large minesweepers and two submarine flotillas. The Channel Force
fielded two battleship s, two carriers, three cruisers and nine destroyers . The carriers, like
their aircraft , were almost all obsolete, and a V-boat sank HMS Courageous early in the
war while on anti-submarine patrol. Britain had numerical super iority in AS DlC-equipped
Newfoundland, 1699-1832 (Toro nto: University of Toronto Press, 2003). The classic work on the
Commission of Gove rnment/Seco nd World War years is Peter Neary, Newfo undland in the North Atlantic
World, 1929-1949 (Montreal: McGill-Queen' s University Press, 1988; 2nd ed., Montreal : McGill-Queen ' s
University Press, 1996). An excellent examination of recruitment for the (Royal) Newfoundland Regiment
durin g WW I is Mike O'B rien, "Out ofa Clear Sky: The Mobilization of the Newfoundland Regiment, 1914-
1915," Newfoundland and Labrador Studies, XXII, No.2 (Fall 2007), 40 1-427. On the Royal Naval Reserve
in Newfoundland, see Mark C. Hunter, To Employ and Uplift Them: The Newfoundland Naval Reserve, 1899-
1926 (St. John ' s: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 2009); and Bernard Ransom, "A Nursery of
Fighting Seamen? The Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve, 1901-1920," in Michael L. Hadley, Rob Huebert
and Fred W. Crickard (eds.), A Nati on 's Navy: 1n Quest of Canadian Naval Identity (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1996), 239-255.
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escort s compared to German y' s U-boats by a ratio of almost four to one, but the ratio of
merchantmen, the Ll-boats' targets, to escorts was a dauntin g twent y to one. Churchill's
misguided decision early in the war to create huntin g groups to search out U-boats "like
cavalry divi sion s" further depleted the number of escorts available for convoyin g ) Because
it was as difticult for a hunt ing group to find a U-boat in the vast expanse of the Atlantic as
it was for a U-boat to find a victim, the best place for both parties to intercept their targets
was around the convoy itself. Indeed, this became the strategy pursued by both foes as the
war progressed .
The Royal Air f orce' s (RAF) Coas tal Command, comprising seventeen squadrons,
was the poor first cousin of the RAF and, like the Fleet Air Arm, was equipped with out-of-
date aircraft. The mainstay of the force, the Anson bomb er, did not have the range to f1y
round trips to No rway to block the German fleet 's ex it from the Kattegat into the North
Atlantic. Inaddition, Coas tal Command lacked both fighters and heavy bombe rs, and the
aerial depth charge had yet to be developed.'
Britain depended upon imports for survival, especia lly in wartime, and its position
was much the same at the beginning of WW II as it had been at the start of the Great War.
The country still relied heavily on its overseas empire and imported approx imately fifty
2Dan van del' Vat, The Atl antic Campaign: The Grea t Struggle at Sea, 1939-1945 (New York :
Harper and Row, 1988), 164- 167.
3Ibid.; and David J. Lyon, "The British Order of'Battlc," in Stephen Howarth and Derek Law (eds.),
The Battle of the Atlan tic, 1939-1945: The 50,h Anni versary International Naval Confe rence (Annapo lis:
Naval Institute Press, 1994), 266-275.
4Van del' Vat, At lanti c Camp aign, 164-167 .
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mill ion tons of goo ds per year, inc luding all its oil and hal f its food and indust rial raw
materials. The merchant navy contained 160,000 men, including 4,500 masters, 13,000
office rs and 20,000 engineers, and numbered approximately 3,000 ocean-going and 1,000
coasta l vesse ls tota lling 2 1,000,000 tons of shipp ing. At anyone time, 2,500 British
merchant vesse ls were at sea . Despite its size , however, the Britis h merchant navy could
carry only three- quarte rs of the country's imports and fo reign hull s supplied the remainder.
For the Admiralt y, protection of Britain ' s vital lifelin es, as represented by its merchant
fleet , prov ed a prodi gious task, espec ially given the esco rt-to-merchant vesse l ratio. As a
result, the Admiralty sought other mean s to prot ect the ships from attack.'
As the risk of If- boat attack s was thou ght to be minimal at this time, the main threat
was considered to be surface raid ers. The Adm iralty reviv ed its Trade Division in 1936 and
a year later appointed a Shipping Defence Ad visory Committee with liai son officers to
instruct the merchant marine in defensive measures. By the beginnin g of the war, 10,000
offic ers had under gone trainin g - 2,000 in gunnery - and 1,500 sea men had been instructed
on how to maintain and operate large calibre guns. As the likelihood of war became more
apparent, the Admiralty set up the Defensively Equipped Mer chant Ship (OEMS) program
to find and install old naval, anti- aircr aft and machine guns on merch ant ships, as well as to
recruit the personnel to man them . Thi s was a dauntin g task con siderin g that there were
5,500 such ships to be armed, but by the end of 1940, some 3,400 ships were conv erted to
5Ibid., 184. See also Thom as A. Adam s, "The Control of British Merchant Shippin g," in Howarth
and Law (eds.), Bailie of the Atlantic, 158-178; Tony Lane, "The Human Economy of the British Merchant
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OEMS. Ultimate ly, this progra m absorbed 190,000 men from the merchant and Royal
navies, the Royal Marines and even the army - more men than served in the pre-wa r
merchant navy."
The Admira lty did not forget the first naval lesson of World War I - that the most
effec tive way to protec t merchant ships was to convoy them. Unfortunately , avai lable
resources often did not match requiremen ts; as a result, early convo ys were often
inadequately defended and subjec t to seve re losses. Regardless, sinkings of independently
routed ships outstripped those travellin g in convoy by a margin of more than five to one.
This trend continued into 1940, but it started to decline in the midd le of the year as more
and more ships were put into convoys.i
But what about the enemy? Under the terms ofthe Versaill es Treaty that ended the
Great War, the Germ ans surrendered most of their capital ships and destroyers, and all their
U-boats. What remained was mainly for coastal defence and consisted of eight old pre-war
batt leships, eight light cruisers, thirty-two destroyers and torpedo boats, and some
minesweepe rs and auxi liary craft . The Allies further tried to guarantee that Germany would
never threaten their control of the seas aga in by stipulating that no new capital ships could
exceed 10,000 tons. Faced with such limitation s, as well as crippled economically by war
Navy," in Howarth and Law (eds .), Bailie of the Atlantic, 45-59; and Philip Pugh, " Military Needs and Civ il
Necess ity," in Howarth and Law (eds.),Ba llle of the Atlantic, 30-44 .
· Yan der Vat, Atlantic Campaign, 184- 186. See also Alan J. Scart h, "Liverpool as HQ and Base," in
Howarth and Law (eds .), Bailie of the Atlantic, 240-25 1.
7Y.E. Tarran t, The V-Boat Offensive, 1914 -1945 (Annapoli s: Nava l Institute Press, 1989),8 9.
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reparations, the form er Imperial Navy shrank to a shadow of its former sel f. Yet despi te
these difficulties Germ any endeavo ured to rebuild its navy,"
In 1924 , the cons truc tion of s ix Wolf - and six Mowe-class torped o boats began at
the Wilhe lrnshaven Dock yard ; these vessels formed the nucleus of the reborn
Kriegsmarin e. At the same tim e, the light crui ser Emden was nearin g completi on (it
ultim ately made nine trainin g cru ises to foreign ports before the outbr eak of war in
Septembe r 1939). From June 1934 to mid-1935, it was commande d by Fre gattenkapi tan
Karl Donit z, who left the cruiser to organize and train Ge rmany's rerncrging U-boat fleet.
About the same tim e the last of the torpedo boa ts were co mpleting in 1929, Deutsche
Werke laid down a revo lutionary class of ship in its shipyar d at Kiel. Designated a
PanzerschifJe, the Deutschland (later renamed Lutzowy was what beca me know n as a
"pocket battl eship ." About the size ofa heavy cruise r, but with the pun ch ofa battlesh ip,
Deutschland and its sisters were not intended for fleet engage ments . The strategy from the
outse t was commerce raiding, and planners designed and built these cap ita l ships with this
so le purp ose in mind . This change in tactics, as well as Bri tish ove r-confi dence in the
ef fectiveness of ASDIC, led the Admiralty and Canadian Nava l Headqu arters (NS HQ) in
Ottaw a mistakenl y to dismi ss the U-boa t threat."
Admiral Eric Raeder was appointed head of the German Navy in 1929. He had
served with Admiral Fran z von Hipper durin g the First World War and, poss ibly more
' Robert Jackson , The German Navy in World War 11(London: Brown Books , 1999), 7-8.
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important, wrote the offic ial German nava l history of that conll ict. Raeder was fully aware
of the achiev ements of the relati vely few German comm erce raiders that had roamed the
oceans. The se craft not on ly sank thou sand s of ton s of enemy shipping but also tied down
the large number of enemy capital ships that were sent to sea rch for them . Raeder
authori zed the construc tion of Deutschland' s two sister ships, Scheer and GrafSpee, and he
probab ly wo uld have ordered more if not for Hit ler' s rise to power in 1933.10 Hitler viewed
himself as a bit of a nava l architect and often presented sketches to Raeder of huge capital
ships for the Ge rman navy. Might and majesty were part of Naz i lore, and in 1938 Hitler
and Raeder drew up the Z-Plan, which called for the construction ofa ba lanced fleet which
they felt wo uld be more than capab le of sweepi ng the RN from the seas . This fleet wou ld
take a decade to build, howeve r, and Hitler pro mised Raeder that there would be no war
with Brit ain until at least 1944." The Z-Plan also includ ed a fleet of233 U-boa ts by the end
of 1945 .12
In defiance of the Versailles Trea ty , and in utm ost secrecy, Germany started
buildin g If- boa ts in 1922, when a submarine office was set up in The Hague under cover of
a Dutch firm . Unde r the guise of design ing and constructing submar ines for foreign
countri es, Ingenierskaantor vor Scheepbouw (IvS) set about producing prototypes for what
would ultim ately become the designs that would comprise the reborn Germa n U-
9/bid.,7 -9.
IO/bid. , 7-8 .
IIVan der Vat, Atlant ic Campaign, 65-66 .
68
booteswafJe. Between 1928 and 1935, when Hitler "threw off the shackles of Versailles," it
produced nine submarines lor Turkey, Finland, Spain, Russia and Romania. The 1935
Anglo/German Naval Agreement allowed Germany once again to build U-boats on a par
with Britain and the rebuilding of the German Navy was finally in the open. Over the next
four years, the Kriegsmar ine perfected two main submarine designs, the Type VII and the
Type IX, with the former ultimately becoming the workhorse of the Battle oft he Atlantic.
Significantly, more than seven hundred vessels of several configurations, including use as
aircraft traps, werebuilt. 13
Also of significance in 1935 was the appointment of Karl Donitz as Fahrer der U-
Bootes. The man who ultimately directed the German offensive in the Atlantic, Donitz had
just finished a tour as captain of the training cruiser Emden and had been a U-boat skipper
during the Great War. British warships sank him in the Mediterranean at the end of the war,
12Eberhard Rossler, The U-boat: The Evolution and Technical History of German Submarines
(London: Arm s and Armour Press, 1981), 116.
I3 Van der Vat, Atlantic Campaign, 62-63. The Type Vll appeared in a numb er of variations, but the
basic design was 220 feet long and twenty feet wide, displacing 76otons on the surface and carrying fourteen
torpedoes. The Type IX also appeared in several variations but the most plenti ful, the IXC (IXC/40) , was
roughly 252 feet long, 22 feet 6 inches feet wide and displaced a Iittle overll OOtons.It carriedtw enty-two
torpedoes in two torpedo room s. The Type X was designed and built as a tanker/supply submarine and
displaced over 1600 tons and was minimall y armed. See Robert C. Stem, Type VII U-Boats (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1991); David Westwood , Anatomy of the Ship: The Type VII U-Boat (London: Conway
Maritim e Press, 1984; rev . ed., London: Conway Maritime Press, 2003), 7-13 ; Type IX U-Boats: German
Type IX Submarine, German Submarine U- I IO, German Submarine U-155, German Submarine U-505,
German Subm arine U-862 (N.P.: Books LLC, 20 10); and John F. White, U-boat Tankers, 1941-45:
Submarine Supp liers to Atlantic Wolf Packs (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing, 1998), 38-39. The 1110st
exhaustive study of the developm ent and evolution of the German U-boat is Rossler, U-Boat: The Evolution
and Technical History of German Subm arines, but other very good overviews of the Seco nd World War U-
boat include Chris Bishop, Kriegsmarine U-Boats 1939-45: The Essential Submarine Identification Guide
(London: Amber Books, 2006); Gordon Williamson, Wolf Pack: The Story of the U-Boat in World War //
(Oxford : Osprey Publi shing, 2005) ; David Miller, U-Boats: The lllustrated History of the Raiders of the Deep
(Washington, DC: Brassey 's, 2000); and Philip Kaplan and Jack Currie, Wolfpack: U-Boats at War, 1939-
1945. (London: Aurum Press, 1997; reprint, London: Aurum Press, 1999).
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and Donit z spent some time interned in Britain . A career officer, he rejoined the navy upon
release and rose steadi ly through the ranks due to his "healthy ambition and outstanding
leadership qualities.v'<In July 1935, Raeder ordered him to Wilhelm shaven to take up the
post as head of the new V-boat arm. Although not that enthu siastic at first, he threw himself
into the task with typica l zeal and was soon pressing for the three hundr ed boats he
determined were necessary for a successful commerce war against Brita in. l s At the same
time, he started to deve lop what he would later call Rudeltaktik, or wolfpack tactics. Donitz
was aware of the British boast that ASDIC was eighty percent successful, but he was
convinced that new tactics could defeat it. He felt that ifhi s U-boats attacked a convoy en
masse - like a pack of wolves - at night on the surface, the esco rts would be totally
ove rwhelmed and basically end up chasing phantoms. Later events proved him correct.
Don itz even publi shed a booklet in 1939 called Die U-booteswa.fJe (The V-boat Arm) in
which he voiced his theories on V-boa t commerce warfare . Unfort unate ly, the British did
not obtain a copy of this book until 1942, and by then the Rudeltaktik had proven its
wort h. 16 Regardl ess, when war started in Septembe r 1939, Donitz on ly had fifty-seven V-
boats in commi ssion, of which only thirty-nine were Fron tbootes (fro ntline boats) with the
remaind er being small Ty pe II coastal boats. Despite this, and the limitations placed on him
by international rules outlawing unrestricted submarine warfare, plus the many side trips
(i.e., support of the invasion of Norway) forced upon him by Hitler, Donitz 's V-boa ts sank
l4Peter Padfield, Donitz: The Last Fuhrer (London: Victor Go llancz, 1984), 138. See also van dcr
Vat, Atlan tic Campaign, 63-64 .
15Jackson, German Navy in World War II, 13- 14. See a lso van dcr Vat, Atlantic Campaign, 63-64 .
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over one and a half million tons of Allied shipping in the first twelve month s of the war. By
the time the first contingent of thc Newfoundland Escort Force (NEf' ) sailed through the
Narrows into St. John ' s harbour at the end of May 194 1, that total had doubled.17 The
Roya l Canadian Navy (RCN) thus faced a daunting challenge.
As previ ously noted , Canada 's navy started with great fanfar e, albeit mired in
controver sy, with the Canadian Naval Service Act of 1910.18 The first ships of the new
navy were two ex-British cruisers, HMCS Niobe and HMCS Rainbow . Niobe, captained by
W.B. MacDonald , RN, of British Columbia, sai led into Halifax harbour on Trafa lgar Day,
2 1October 1910 . Rain bow, much smaller than Niob e, was to be stat ioned on the west coast
of the countr y and did not arrive until 7 Nove mber 1910.19 Waitin g on the Halifax
waterf ront for Niobe to arrive was midshipm an Percy Ne lles, Cana da's future Chief of
Nava l Staff (CNS) for the first few, awful years of the Battle of the Atlantic.i" That batt le
was well in the future, but the threat would be the same: Germa ny.
When Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August 19 14, so did the entire British
Empire, includi ng Canada. Unfortunately, the promise of the 1910 Naval Service Act had
not borne fruit, and the RCN consisted of a run-down cruiser on each coas t and 350 officers
16pad field, D6nitz , 158-160 and 170-17J.
17Tarrant, U-Boat OfJensive, 81 and 149-150.
I' Joseph Schull, Far Distant Ships : An Officia l Acco unt of Canadian Naval Operations in World
War /I (O ttawa : Edmond Cloutier, 1950 ; 2"ded., Toro nto: Stoddart Publ ish ing, 1987), 5. For a revi ew of the
controver sy precedin g the estab lishme nt of the RCN as we ll as its difficulties thereafter, see chapter I above.
19Marc Miln er, Canada' s Navy: The First Century (Toro nto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 19-
20Tony Ge rma n, The Sea is at Our Gates: The lIi story of the Canadian Navy (Toron to: McClelland
and Stewart , 1990) , 27.
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and men . For a co untry with the largest coa st line in the wo rld , this was a dismal state of
affairs . This was not los t on Briti sh Columbia Premi er Sir Rich ard McBri de, and in a
"cloak-and-dagg er" deal worthy of a mystery novel , the BC go vernment procured two
submarines from the Electric Boat Comp any in the United Stat es. Initia lly named Paterson
and McBrid e, the RCN soon took them over and renamed them CC I and CC2. Ironically,
the presence of these two subma rines on the west coas t was more of a deterrent to Germ an
attac k than was Rainbow.21 However, the old cru iser wo uld st ill be ca lled upon to defend
Ca nada in hostil e waters.
On the first day of the wa r, two Royal Navy sloo ps, HM S Shearwat er and HM S
Algerine rep ort ed the Ge rma n cruise rs Nurnberg and Leipzig off the Mexican coa st
headin g north . Ottawa orde red Co mmandeer Walter Hose, RCN to intercept the two British
ships and defend them aga inst attack by the Ge rma n squadro n. The comm unique ended
with an admo nishme nt to "remember Nelson and the British Navy .,,22Fortuna tely , Rainbow
never enco untered the Ger ma n ships and avoided what wo uld undou btedly have been a
shor t, vio lent, and entire ly one-sided battle. The old cruiser returned to its base in
Esquima lt and patroll ed the wes t coas t for the remai nder of the wa r, fina lly being paid off
in April 19 17? 3 Niobe's wa r was j ust as eve ntful, but mu ch shorter.
2JMilner, Canada 's Navy , 4 1.
22Marc Milner, North Atlantic Run: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle fo r the Convoys
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 5.
2JGennan, Sea is at Our Gates, 39.
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At the outbreak of hostilities, naval authorities stirred Niobe from its state of ncar
decay at Halifax and readied it for sea within the space of three weeks. Shorthanded despite
trained crewm en being scro unged from every part of the country, it sailed for St. John' s,
Newfoundland. The Royal Naval Reserve branch in the colony had been in existence since
1900 and provided Niobe with 107 trained seamen. For the first time in its Canadian career,
Niobe had its full complement of700 offic ers and men.24 Niobe subsequently escorted a
troopship to Bermud a in September, and over the next several month s it searched for
raiders among the icebergs in the Strait of Belle Isle and joined the British cruisers
blockadin g New York to prevent enemy merchant ships from sailing for home. However,
by midsumm er the next year, the ship was worn out. Niob e needed a major overhaul, but its
age and infirmit y did not warrant the expenditure. The Admiralty offered a replacement, but
by then the RCN could not provide the men. Niobe ended its days a rusting hulk, shattered
in the Halifax explosion of December 1917.25 From this point on, Canada ' s navy consisted
of requi sit ioned auxiliary vessels used for patrols in the Gulf ofSt. Lawrence and along the
shores of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland.
The interwar period was an era of anti-war sentiment, isolationism, and serious
economic difficulti es. In 1933, the Chief of Staff, Major-General A.G .L. McNaughton,
suggested that the RCN be sacrificed to save the Army and Air Force.26 Fortunately, this
did not occur, but the alternate solution suggested by Treasury Board almost accomplished
24Jbid.
2sMilner, Canada 's Navy, 59.
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the same result. The Board proposed to slash naval appropriations from two and a half
million dollars a year to just a half million. In response, the RCN embarrassed the
government into reconsidering this option by threatening to pay off the fleet, thus leaving
Canada with a navy but no ships." The RCN narrowly missed extinction, but this incident
clearly demonstrated the uphill battle to maintain a credible naval force in the years
preceding the Second World War. There was barely enough money around to pay
personnel, let alone to acquire more ships. This situation eased somewhat in 1935 when
Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King was returned to power. Actually, before
their electoral defeat to the Conservatives four years earlier, the Liberals began expanding
the RCN to a basic force of six destroyers. The King government ordered HMCS Saguenay
and HMCS Skeena in 1929-30 per Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) Admiral Walter I-lose' s
recommendation based on First World War experience. Upon King's resumption of power,
and with the threat of war looming, the RCN acquired four relatively modern destroyers -
Ottawa, Fraser, Restigouche and St. Laurent - from the RN over the next four years,
jo ining Saguenay and Skeena, which were commissioned in 1931. This force formed the
backbone of the RCN in 1938 at the time of the Munich crisis with its promise of "peace in
our time." With the possibility of war narrowly averted, Ottawa finally announced plans for
a fleet capable of defending both the east and west coasts. Both the government and naval
authorities recognized the vulnerability of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, not least because
26Gennan, Sea is at Our Gates, 60.
27Milner, North Atlantic RlIl1,6.
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Japan was engage d in a war of conquest in China and was an ally of Germany. lf Germany
declared war, Japan would not be far behind. The authori ties, believing popular nava l
wisdom, expecte d that the threat would come from surface raiders, not submarines,
Regard less, in now famil iar fashion, the government's support turned out to be "political
eyewas h," and the money approved by cabinet did litt le more than buy the drawi ngs?8
Combined with th is political foot-d ragging, there was a gcneral lack of lcadcrship
and initiative on the part of NSHQ in Ottawa. This deficiency started at the top with the
CNS, Vice Admiral Percy Nelles, Ne lles had spent much of his career alternating shore and
sea postings with the RCN and RN, includin g command of the cruiser HMS Dragon in
1930, and HM CS Saguenay in 1931. He had been groomed by Hose to take over as CNS in
1934 and was prom oted to Rear-Admi ral in 1938.29 Nelles was an able admin istrator and
treated issues and subordinates with thought ful consideration, but he did not have a
particularly forceful personality and was more the "senior public servant than professional
seadog.,,3o
Like their chief , many of the staff at NSHQ had spent major parts of their careers
aboard some of the Royal Navy 's most glamorous ships. Consequently, they embraced the
RN's view that proper naval warfare consisted of battleships poundin g away at each other in
true Mahanian fashion. Most looked to the future, envisioning a large well-balanced navy, a
proper first cousin of the "senior service." In the peacet ime RCN, and in all fairness in most
28German, Sea is at Our Gates, 65.
29Schull,Far DistantShips,2-3.
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peacetime navies, promotion was contingent upon good stall work and glamorous sea
postin gs. Few envis ioned what the RCN ' s role would become when war finally broke out."
Admira l Ne lles wro te on the eve of World War II that anti-subma rine warfare had
advanced so much over the interwar yea rs that U-boat attack s were no longer a major
threat.32 This line of thought was consistent with popu lar naval wisdom at the time. For
one thin g, despi te the experience of WWI, most naval planners perceived that submarines
would continue to adhere to the "rules of war.,,33 They major ity naively thought the
Germans would honour these regulations, if for no other reason than to keep the United
States out of the conflict. Furthermore, the major Western pow ers deprecated the
destructi ve potenti al of Germ any ' s U-BooteswaJJe. The admira ls in Whit ehall quite simply
believed their own propaganda. They were confident that the newl y developed ASDIC
completely negated the threat, despit e the lack of rigorou s testin g and trained personnel. In
fact, Admiral A.E.M. Chatfield, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, announced in 1936 that
Briti sh anti-subma rine measure s were eighty percent effective.34 Regardl ess, when war
lOGerman, Sea is at Our Gates, 6 1-65.
l lJack Macbeth, Ready, Ay e. Ready : An Illustrated History ofthe Roy al Canadian Navy (Toronto:
Key Porter Books, 1989), 24-25. See also Kenneth P. Hansen, "The Superior-Simple Ship Fleet Construct,"
Canadian Naval Review, III , No. 2 (Summer 2007), 4-7.
l2Michael L. Hadley, U-Boats against Canada: German Su bmarines in Canadian Waters (Kingston:
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985), II.
ll In theory, a submarine was supposed to stop a merchant vessel to determine if it was transporting
contraband. If so, it was to allow the passengers and crew to abandon ship before sinking it. Of course, in a
war zone this was seldom possible because many merchantm en were armed, and with the presence of wireless
sets on most ocean-going vesse ls, the firstt hing a ship did when sighting a submarine was send out an SSS
distress signal to signify that it was being attacked by a Ubo at,
l' Milner, North Atlantic Run, 9.
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erupted, Canada had few anti-submarine vessels to speak of and fewer people trained to
operate ASDI C.
When Canada opened hostiliti es with Germany on 10 September 1939, the war was
a week old. However, the RCN had actually been at war since 28 August when it sent out
its first mobi lization calls and established its coastal defences and defended ports. The fleet,
such as it was , was put on a war footing, and by the time war was actually declared all
segments of the RCN, including 3684 reserve s, were either on duty or on their way to the
coastsr" As two-third s of the fleet was on the west coas t of the country, NSHQ took steps
to transfer it cas t, where the threat was most acute. By 31 August, HMCS Fraser and St.
Laurent sailed to join Saguenay and Skeena in Hali fax, arriv ing fiftee n days later. NSI-lQ
sought to put the four destroyers under the British Comma nder-in-Chief for America and
the West Indies (C-in-C, A and WI), Admiral Sir Sydney Mey rick, a move based upon the
precedents es tablished in the Great War. The Canadian govern ment, however, decided that
the coun try's naval forces were for home defence and would rema in in Canadian waters
under Canadian control.i'' Conseque ntly, instead of jo ining the Brit ish fleet, patrollin g for
U'-boats and surface raiders, Canada's fleet of destroye rs was used to escort convo ys in the
approaches to Halifax harbour. 37 Saguenay and St. Laurent were the first to be used this
way, esco rting convoy HXI on 16 September. Also patrollin g Hali fax harbour , as well as
other "defended ports," was a plethora of smaller craft which the RCN begged, borrowe d or
3SIbid., 13.
36Milner, Canada 's Navy, 81.
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purch ased as a stop-ga p mea sure unti l mor e suitable patrol craft could be obtained . As most
of these craft cam e from gov ern ment departm en ts, their crews were retained as members o f
the RCN Reserve, Spec ial Serv ices, so mannin g was not a probl em . Yet as expedient as
these craft were, they were not design ed for the kind of wor k that was requir ed and co uld
not be ex pected to last too long. A proper form of patro l craft was needed . The answe r
ca me in the form of a "pa tro l vesse l, whaler type " - the corvette."
The RCN, like most navies, had a long-stand ing desire to acquire a fleet of "proper"
war ships to prot ect the count ry 's coas ts and endeavo ure d durin g the inter -war years to
obtain such a fleet . After the Munich Crisis of 1938 and the Cz ech Cris is in early 1939,
Ne lles pre ssed for the acqui sition of a fleet of powerful Trib al-class destroyers. These
"pocket crui sers" were ideall y suited to Canada 's needs as they had the speed, enduranc e
and firepower to take on ju st about anything that the Germ an s co uld throw at them .
Consequently, in Ma y 1939 J.L. Ralston , the Mini ster o f Defence , informed Parliament that
the navy's ultim ate objective was a naval force of eighteen Trib als plus a depot ship, e ight
anti-submarine vesse ls and sixtee n mine sweeper s, divid ed betwe en the cast and west
coas ts, as well as eight motor torpedo boats and a moth er ship for the east coast.
Unfortunately, eve nts outpaced thi s plan ; the decl aration of war forces the navy to scramble
for vess els. Giv en "carte blanch e" to plan its ex pansion, the biggest probl em was findin g
shipyards to build the propo sed fleet. Canadian yar ds lack ed the ex pertise to build such
37Milner, North Atlanlic Run, 14.
38Mac Johnston, Corvettes Canada: Convoy Veterans 0/ JVorld War 1/ Tell Their True Stories
(To ronto: McGraw-H ili Ryerson, 1994; reprint, Toronto : John Wiley and Sons, 2008), 1-3.
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complex ships as the Tribals, and British yards, now fully occupied with war work, could
neither take any orders nor supply skilled workman to provide the needed expert ise to
Canada . To fill the gap, a new design of patrol craft was obtained.t"
The Flowe r-class corvette, as it was named, developed from Southern Pride, a
whale catcher built by Smith's Dock in Yorkshire, England. The RN placed its first order
with Smith's in July 1939 and considered the ship suitable because certain characteristics
required for whale catching - "seaworthiness, manoeuvrabilit y, and rapid acceleration"-
also were required for anti-submarine warfare. A mission from the Canadian Manufacturers
Association return ed from the UK at the end of August 1939 with the plans, which they
gave to the National Research Council (NRC). The NRC in turn provided these to NSHQ,
which quickly compared the corvette to the Halcyon-class patrol vessel, or "bramble
sloop," a design that it had initially wanted the British to build . Although the corvett e ' s
speed, endurance and armament were not as good as the sloop, it was considered adequate.
It was also easy to build and could be construct ed quickly in Canadian yards."
As internati onal tensions rose, Prime Minister Mackenzie King faced the possibility
that Canada would once again find itself embroiled in a European war as part of the British
Commonwealth. Rememb ering that the country had been almost brought to the point of
civil war by the con scription issue durin g the Great War, he did not want to find himself in
the same position as his predec essor, Sir Robert Borden. King's answer was to support the
39Milner, Canada 'sNavy , 80. See also Hansen, "Superior-Simple Ship Fleet Construct," 4-7.
4°Johnston, Corve ttes Canada, 3.
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less personnel-intensive branche s of the arm ed forces: the air force and the navy. He also
intended that an y wa r would benefit Ca nada industrially . Anything that could be built in
Ca nada for the war effort would be constructed domestically. Consequently, when the RCN
submitted its revi sed naval constructi on program in September 1939, Cabinet immediately
approve d it. The first progra m ca lled for twenty-eight co rve ttes to be built by twelve
shipyards fro m the Maritimes to the west coast, all delivered by the end of the 1940
navigation sea so n. Another order for thirty-six quickly followed, bringing the total to sixty-
four. British Prim e Minister Winston Churchill referred to these little warsh ips as "cheap
and nasties." Th ey were at least inexpensive: dependin g on the location ofthe building yard
and adjustme nts to spec ifications, contrac t prices never exceed ed $606, 000 per vessel.4 \
The navy still had its heart set on a fleet of Triba ls, and part of the expansion plan
was to trade ten of the corvettes to the Briti sh for these destroyers. Unfortunately, no barter
system could be agreed upon, and the RCN ende d up with more ships than had originally
been plann ed . Th e majority of the contracts could have been cance lled, and some were
transfe rred to the Admiralty on acco unt, but NSHQ let the rest stand. This meant that the
navy ' s hith ert o cautio us three-year expansion plan was reduced to two. Fortunately, the UK
allowe d the constru ction of two Tribals in British yards in early 1940, and another two in
1941 , but none would be ready until 1943. Regardless, with this "e mbarrassment of riches"
the navy ' s mannin g probl em soon became apparent.V
"tu«
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The declaration of war found the RCN consisting of 145 officers and 1,674 mcn;13
plus approximately forty retired officers and 3,684 Reserves, With the dispatch of the last
of the Reserve on the day war was declared, the RCN just about exhausted its reservoir of
trained men. NSHQ put a mobilization plan in place, the first calling for 5,472 men of all
ranks by the end of 1940 and a further 7,000 by the end of the following year.44 1twas soon
evident, however, that these projections would be surpassed much earlier than anticipated, a
fact which presented a number of challenges for NSI-IQ.
Shortages of every kind plagued the expansion of 1939-1940. Many sailors went
without uniforms since nobody foresaw that by the end of September 1940 the navy's size
would increase to 10,000 men. Training staff were in very short supply, a deficiency the RN
was unwilling to alleviate, and housing became a problem. The navy needed skilled and
semi-skilled personnel, but it was losing thousands to the other services, particularly the
RCAF. This placed the RCN on the horns of a dilemma - it needed the men but had no
place to put them. During the first naval staff meeting in January 1940, it was noted that
temporary housing was desperately needed before the RCAF absconded with the best men.
The RCN even had to lower its minimum age from twenty-one to nineteen to counter the
Air Force's absorption of available manpower.V Yet despite the competition for manpower,
growth soon surpassed projections.
4JSchu ll,Far DistantShips. I.
44M ilner, NorthAtlantic Rlln, 14.
45/bid ., 14- 16.
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At the end of 1939, NSHQ anticipated that after three years the war time strengt h
would be 1,500 officers and 15,000 men. Thi s figure was surpasse d in half the time. But it
was not un til the fall of Prance in May 1940 that expans ion reall y began . France ' s
capitulation left Canada as Britain 's primary ally and gave Macken zie King grave concern
about the vu lnerability of Canada ' s vast coast line. Prim e Mini ster Churchill convinced the
Canadian Pr ime Mini ster that Canada 's first line of defence was really the English Channel
and that Canada' s inte rests were better served if its destroyers were stationed there. Aidin g
Churchill's arg umen t was the posting of the RN ' s Thir d Batt le Squadron at Halifax.
Although comprised of aged battl esh ips, the squadro n was more than a suffic ient deterrent
to enemy attacks along Canada ' s east coas t. Co nseq uently, at the end of May Restigouche,
Skeena , and St. Laurent sai led in company to the UK, followed by Fraser from Bermuda . It
was also abo ut this tim e that the RCN got the not altoget her welcome gift of six surplus
WWI- vint age Amer ican destroyers."
US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt desperately wanted to send Churchill "all
aid short of war" after the fall of France . However, the deep iso lationist sentiment in the
United States hamstrun g him. In order to aid Britai n he had to make it appea r to be in
America's national interest to do SO.47 In August , Roosevelt met wit h Macken zie King in
Ogdensb urg , New York , and agree d to form the Perma nent Joint Board on Defence (P18 D)
aimed at the defence of the Wes tern Hemis phere should Britain be forced to capitu late.
"iu«, 14-21.
47Peter Neary , "Newfoundland and the Anglo-American Leased Bases Agreement of 27 March
194 1," Canadian IIistorical Review, LXVII, NO.2 (December (986) ,4 95.
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Shortl y thereafter , Britain and the US conclu ded a deal whereby the US would turn over
fifty mothba lled WW I destroyers in return for bases on British territory in the Western
Ilemisphere. Six of the destroyers, narrow ofbeam and /lush-d ecked for the relatively calm
Pacific Ocean , were immed iately transferred to the RCN. Manning these ships - and the ten
corvettes originall y plann ed for the Admiralt y - exhausted the RCN's supply of disposable
manpower. As 1940 drew to a close and the ships of the first buildin g program were
comi ng off the ways in rapid succession, the RCN was looking at havin g to find trained
crews for fifty-four corvettes, twenty-five minesweepers and an assortm ent of motor
launches, a total of approxi mately 7,000 officers and men. This number did not include
personnel to man new shore establishments.V This challenge fell into the lap of the former
premie r of Nova Scot ia, Angus L. Macdona ld.
In the summer of 1940 Prime Minister King appo inted Macdona ld to the position of
Nava l Minister. On paper, he was subordinate to the Minister of Defence, Col. lL. Ralston,
but Macdonald esse ntially ran the affai rs of the RCN and sat on the War Cabinet.
Enormously popul ar in his home province, and a true friend of the navy, Macdonald
doggedly suppo rted naval expans ion but stayed out of the operationa l side unti l the crisis of
1943, when the RCN's deficiencies in manpower, training and materiel precipitated its
48 Milner, North Atlantic Run, 27.
83
removal from the Nort h Atlantic .49 Sti ll, Macdonald acted as the navy 's conduit to the War
Cabinet and proved to be one of the most import ant nava l ministers in Canadian history.i"
By earl y 1941, all of Canada 's destroyers, except two Town -class (ex-USN) vessels
held back for repa irs, were involved in escort duties in the Northwe st Appro aches with the
Clyde Escort Force. Unfortunately , the British cruiser HMS Calcutta had cut HMCS Fraser
in two in a co llisio n the previo us June, and HMCS Margar ee, Fraser 's replacement ,
suffered the same fate in September 1940, killing 142 of her 181 man crew, many of whom
were Fraser survivo rs. In the meantim e, ten corvettes built for the RN were also on convoy
duty. These corvettes had been accepted from the builders by the RCN and sent oversees to
the RN with Canadian passage crews - in some cases armed with wooden guns - only to be
taken over by the Admiralty, crew and all, and sent into the fray. By this point, U-boats
attacked convoys on the surface, using the Rudeltaktik, and exacte d a heavy toll on
shipping. In late September 1940, Convoy HX 72 lost eleve n ships 350 mi les west of
Ireland . SC 7 was decimated off Rockall in mid-October, followed a few days later by HX
79. In these three convoys alone, forty-three ships were sunk, acco unting for almost a
quarter ofa million tons of Briti sh shipping. Not one of the attacking U-boats was lost."
49Macdonald, rath er than the Admiralty, pushed strongly for Ca nada to estab lish the RCN base in
Newfoundland . See Paul Bridle (ed.) , Documen ts on Relations between Canada and Newfoundl and O:vols.,
Ottawa: Departm ent of Externa l Affairs, 1974-1984), 1, 585.
50Milner, Canada' s Navy, 85. Canada had a separate Minister of Nava l Serv ice until the 1920s at
which time the position was ama lgamated under the Min ister of Nationa l De fence . It was re- institu ted during
World War II and filled by Macdon ald and, after his resignation in 1944, by D.C. Abbott . In December 1945,
the naval and air min istr ies we re com bined unl er a re- inst ituted Depa rtment of Defence headed by Brooke
Claxton.
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The Britis h responded to this new development by extending esco rt coverage further
west into the Atlantic. Previously, escorts left their outgoin g char ges and picked up their
inbound ones at roughly 22 degree s West longitude , but by April 1941 escort coverage
extended to 35 degrees West, aided by the Br itish occupation of Iceland. This produc ed a
drop in losses of convoyed ships but led to a corre spo ndin g increa se in sinkings of
indepe ndently routed ships (IRS). By May 194 I , this ratio was 2.5 IRS to I ship in
convoy. r' The answe r was to includ e more ships in convoy and extend esco rt coverage
further into the Atlantic from the western end. Ne wfoundland was the obvio us location to
set up a new naval base.
Durin g the Second World War , the RCN developed six No rt h Atlantic naval bases
in addition to St. John ' s: Montr eal, Quebec City , Gas pe in Quebec, Saint John , New
Brun swick , and Shelburne and Sydney in Nova Scotia.i '' All were created for different
purp oses, from fittin g-out newly compl eted warship s coming from shipyards in the Great
Lakes to the basing of esco rts and/or assembling co nvoys . But they can be genera lly
clas sified into two groups; those that serv iced merchant ships and non-operational
warships, and those that provid ed for the repair and re-suppl y of operational wars hips. The
bases at Montreal, Quebec City and Saint John fell into the first category.
By the outbreak of Second World War, Montr eal was both Canada's largest city and
its most important port. Th is was something of an anomaly because the city is located
52Tarrant, U-BoatOfJensive, 101.
53Ha lifax was already an established naval base by the start of WW II and was also greatly developed
duri ng the wa r.
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approx imately 450 miles inland from the Gulf of St. Law rence . The exp lana tion is the St.
Lawre nce River, which penetrat es the North Amer ican continent for 1000 miles and was
the main route for the flow of Canada's ocea n exports and much of its interna l trade.
Montr eal was the largest inland port and as a result played an important part in naval
routing and the final fitti ng-out of new warships heading cas t from the shipyards of the St.
Lawrence River and the Great Lakes."
Naval authorities established a naval routing offi ce in Montreal at the very
beginning of the war and the of fice served as an important conduit through which passed
volumes of inform ation from head offices of the multitud e of shipping agents based in
Montr eal and the Mini stry of War Transport (MWT). A merchant marine mannin g pool
was established in the port in Jun e 1941 , and Montr eal became one of the largest training
centres for Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships (OEMS) in the Briti sh Empire; an anti-
aircra ft dome teacher and a firin g range similar to the one found at Halifax were established
in 1943 and 1944 , respectively.f In addition to the repair, fitting and mai ntenance of
OEMS equipme nt, the degaussing of both merchant ships and warships as protection
aga inst magneti c min es was also an important task undertaken in Montr eal. Montreal also
became the fittin g-out port for most new construction that came up the St. Lawrence from
Grea t Lakes shipyards . Upon arriva l at the port , the Montr eal base supplied new RCN ships
with all necessary stores , confid enti al books , and navigational equipment; as well, any
54Gilbert Tucker, The Naval Service a/Ca nada (2 vols., Ottawa : King's Printer, 1952), II, 147.
55/bid., 1I, 149.
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necessary minor repair s were made. Many of these ships were commission ed in Montreal,
and a naval mannin g poo l was established at Longueui l, located on the south shore opposite
the city, to supply the needed crewmen .i"
Quebec City served a similar function. Located approximately 150 miles eas t o f
Montrea l, Queb ec City has always played a major role in the defence of eastern Canada and
for centuries stood guar d aga inst hostile forces venturing up to Mo ntrea l and the Great
Lakes . It was also the site of the first nava l contro l serv ice on the St. Lawrence River . To
facilit ate this, two eighteen-pound mobile guns were installed on the Island of Orlea ns,
approx imately 20 mil es downriv er. Since the chances of the enemy penetratin g that far
were co ns idered remote, Quebec City's main role was similar to that of Montreal, DEMS
repair and maint enance, and the fitting-out and working-up of new RCN ships were
undertaken at the port , as we ll as degaussing of both merchant and naval ships. In 1940,
authorities made arrange ments to store ammunition and depth charges at Levis and in an
old fort on the south side of the river, and in 1943 another si te was occ upied to store
mun itions for newly construc ted RCN ships. As new co nstruc tion tapered off towards the
end of the wa r, shipya rds in Quebec City and area were used to repair and refit Canadia n
warship s.Y
Sa int John , New Brun swick is situated at the mouth of the Saint John River and is
one of two principal winter port s in eastern Canada. It ranked third in 1938 behind only
Montr eal and Sydney in the volum e of cargo handl ed. Furth erm ore , it was the Atlantic
56/bid., II, 15 1.
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terminus of the main line of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) and was also served by a
branch of the Canadian National Railroad (CN R). Its berthing capac ity excee ded that of
Halifax, but the port' s main features were its two drydocks, one of which, at a length of
1080 feet, was capable of handl ing a warship the size of a battl e cruiser. Recognizing this,
the Admira lty in January 1941 asked NSHQ to prepare the dry dock to refit capital ships.
This was a tall order because it necessitated deepenin g the channel and providing the
machinery and skilled labour necessary to work on such compli cated vesse ls. Nava l
author ities drew up plans and dredged the channel before the need was rendered
superfluous by US entry into the war; only one capital ship (I-IMS Ramillies) eve r used the
dock, and then with difficult y. Regardless, both naval and merchant vesse ls used the docks
extensively.f
NSHQ never considered Saint John to be in much danger of attack it thus was only
lightly defended. Initially , two six-inch guns at the entrance plus several light artillery
pieces prot ected the harbour , but in 1940 milit ary authorities added three 7.S-inch guns
along with two 4.7-ineh guns. Once the threat of surface attack all but disappeared in 1943,
the milit ary progressively placed these guns in maintenance. An anti-boat boom guarded the
harbour entrance in 1941, and a year later authorities installed an anti-torpedo net across the
approaches to the dry dock and fittin g-out berths as protect ion against airborne torpedo
attack. This was removed in 1943 when it was seen as a danger to ships using the docking
57/bid., II, 148- 151.
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faciliti es. Naval author ities never installed anti-submarin e nets becau se the water depth in
the appro ache s to the harbour provided a natura l barri er, and the high tides and strong
currents in the Bay of Fundy rendered this type of defenc e irnpracti cal j"
Nav al force s operating from Saint John were never more than what was required for
local defenc e. For most of 1942, this force consisted ofthc armed yacht s, lIM eS Caribou
and Husky , and two motor launches . NS HQ augment ed these force s in 1943 with two RN
traw lers '" and two minesweepers, all of which were in turn rep laced by five motor launches
by the end of the yea r. Thereafter, the force remai ned stable, and in January 1945 it
compr ised two trawlers and six motor launches.61
The bases at Gas pe, Shelburne, and Sydney, fell into the seco nd gro up offaci lities.
Gas pe, at the tip of the Gas pe Penin sula, was ideally suited to guard the entrance to the St.
Lawrence River. Nava l authorities first considered establishi ng a naval base there as early
as 1940, long before U-boats started their forays into the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the St.
Lawre nce River itself. Init ially, developm ent was to be modest , but with the invasion threat
to Grea t Britain in the sum mer of that yea r, nava l planners looked at Gasp e as a fleet
anchorage for RN ancIJor USN ships in the eve nt of a British surrende r.r' As this threat
dim inished , Gas pe was envisage d as a defended harbour and sma ll adva nce base, and in
of Strateg ic Studies, 1996), 138-168; and Roger Sarty and Doug Knight, Saint John Fortifications, 1630-1956
(Frede ricton, N B: Goose Lane Books, 2003), 78- 100.
59Tucker, Nava l Serv ice of Canada, II, 155; and Sarty and Knight, Sain t John Fortifications, 78- 100.
6°The Royal Navy conve rted a number of North Sea traw lers at the beginn ing of the war and had the
Western Isle-class trawler pur pose-buil t for use as anti-subm arine and escort vesse ls.
61Tucker, Na val Service of Canada, II, 155-157. See also Sarty and Knight , Saint Joh n
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Octobe r of 1940, HMCS Vison arrived to be the first warship stationed there , but it left a
mont h late r and returned to Halifax when the sub-command closed for the winter. The
followi ng spring, constructio n started on the base, and in June four armed yachts, HMC
Ships Reindeer, Raccoon, Lynx, and Vison, arrived to form the Gaspe Force. The base was
forma lly com miss ioned as HMCS Fort Ramsay on I May 1941. In early 1942, U-boats
launched the "Battle of the St. Lawrence ,,,63and by the summer twenty-three ships had been
sunk in the Gulf, including Racoon and the corve tte HMCS Charlottetown.64
The St. Lawrence River was closed to all but coastal traffic in Octo ber 1942 and
remained so through 1943.65 With the resulting lull in both shipping and enemy activity,
opera tions from lIM CS Fort Ramsay also dimini shed. Throughout 1943, the base
continued to suppo rt a force of three to five minesweepers and twelve to fourteen motor
launches, reachin g its peak complim ent of sixty-two officers and 585 men in Octobe r, far
short of the 1,184 men projected earlier in the year. With the absence of any enemy activity,
NSHQ recon sidered the planned enlargement of existing facilities, and eventually the fixed
artillery defences were placed in maintenance and the men released for overseas duty.66In
September 1944 , the second Battl e of the St. Lawrence comm enced when the corvette
62Tucker, Naval Service a/ Canada, II, 18 1.
63A name co ined by the Ottawa Journal in 1942.
64Fraser McKee and Robert Darlington, The Canadian Naval Chronicle, 1939-1945 (St. Catharines:
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HMCS Norsyd attacked U-541 south of Anticosti Island.67 Over the next two months U-
boats torpedoed two RCN ships, I-IMCS Magog and Shawinigan, and one merchant ship,
Fort Thompson, then moved south to the Halifax approaches, never to return.68 During this
period, activity at Gaspe increased, but the end of the navigation seaso n in December
signa lled the quietus o f I-1MCS Fort Ramsay as an opera tional base.
Shelburne, Nova Sco tia, had been earmarked as the location of an advance base as
far back as 1940, when the Adm iralty chose it as a likely spot to put a contraband control
station for neutral vessels trave lling to Europe. Its harbour was sheltered and unencumbered
by either naval or mercanti le traffic ; even more important , it was situated close to regular
shipping rout es. Another factor, which became moot after the spring of 1940 with the Nazi
conquest of Western Europe, was that its location did not violate the United States Pan-
Amer ican Neutrality Zone which prohibited US-flagged ships from entering any belligerent
port in the Western Hemi sphere. Plans were drawn up in 1941, and includ ed not only those
facilities required to operate Shelburne as an advance base but also to install a 3,000-ton
haul -out which would facilit ate repairs on warships up to the size of a destroyer.l"
All the base faciliti es, except the haul-out , were completed by the spring of 1942,
and in May the base was commissioned HMCS Shelburne . By this time, repair facilities for
67Hadley , V-B oats against Canada, 230.
68Jilrgen Rohw er, Axis Sub marine Su ccesses, 1939-1945 (Cambridge: Patrick Stephens, 1983), 186-
187; and McKee and Darlin gton, Canadi an Naval Chronicle, 193 and 250. HMCS Magog did not sink at the
time of the attack but was a "C onstructive Tota l Loss" and eve ntually brok en up in 1947.
69Tucker, Naval Service a/Canada, 11, 175-177 ; and Sarty , " Canada' s Coas ta l Fortifications," 154
and 162.
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both nava l and merca ntile vessels were at a premium, and severa l cast coast ports were
chosen to be develope d in these capaci ties. Shelburne, with its icc-free harbo ur and close
proximity to Hali fax and other larger Nova Scotia repair facilities, was ideally suited to be a
major repai r and refillin g base. It would have a small and a large haul-out , and plans were
made to construc t a machine shop and to enlarge accom moda tions to provid e for the
manpower required to operate a repair base . All facilities were completed by the summer of
1943, and in its first year HMCS Shelburne repaire d or refitted forty-two warships on the
3,000- ton haul-out alone, not to ment ion those carried out on the 200-ton haul-out and
alongside."
With the formation in 1944 of the Shelburne Force, comprising eight Fairmile patrol
boats, the complim ent at HMCS Shelburne far excee ded that proposed in the original plan,
reaching 2,000 by the end of the year. This put a strain on accommodations, and the RCAI'
station and army hospital were acquired in early 1944 , followed in September by the army
fortress headquarters, subsequent to the withdr awn of all fixed artillery defences from
Shelburne. Plans were also developed in early 1944 to expand faciliti es at the base,
ineludin g an additional wharf and a thirty-five-ton crane , but very little was completed
before being cancelled as the end of the war became imm inent. i '
Sydney, Cape Breton, was probably the most compara ble wart ime base to St.
John ' s. HMCS Protector , like HMCS Avalon, was responsible for both local and ocean
7°lbid.. 176-179. See also lbid.
7 1Ibid., 179-180. See also Ibid..
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escorts, plus con voy asse mbly and administration. Sydney was also the originator of the
infamous SC convoys, " which suffered the greatest losses among all convoys during the
war. These sinki ngs in turn led to the RCN being removed from the North Atlantic for
trainin g in the winter of 1943 (See Chapter 5 for a full discussion of this) . Of all the ports
chosen for base development in 1940, other than Hali fax, Sydney was the on ly one that
already possessed a naval establishment. This is not surprising, as the port ranked second
only to Mont real in the amount of seaborne cargo handl ed. This part ially resulted from the
vast coal min es located ncar Sydney, as well as its import ant iron and steel industry. Thus,
Sydney had long been earmarked for modern fixed-artill ery defences, but at the outbreak of
the war all that could be provid ed were two six-inch guns from the former WW1 cruiser
HMCS Rainbow. Anti-submarine nets were also appro ved before the war but were not
installed until 1940. A year later, anti-torpedo nets were installed inside these to offer
greater protection to the ships moored in the harbour .i''
In April 1940, the Admi ralty sugges ted that Sydney replace Halifax as the North
Americ an con voy assembly port durin g the summer month s. Yet despite the opinion that
relocation of the convoys to Sydney would save the diversion of approx imately 100 ships
per month , Halif ax was retained, with Sydney used as a sub-asse mbly point. Further to this
72There are a few interpretations as to exac tly what "SC" stood for. Gilbert Tuc ker says it was
Sydney-Clyde, while Marc Milner suggests that it originally meant Sydney Convoy, changed to Slow Convoy
after they were transferred to New York in 1941. The confusion could result from the sources referenced. For
example, the RCN called HX convo ys Halifax Convoys, while the RN referred to them as H(omeward from
Halifa)X convo ys.
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point, the Admiralty decided to convoy slower ships(those with a maximumspeed 01'7.5to
9 knots) as a group, rather than have them retard the progress of faster ships. The first of
these convoys, called the SC convoys, sailed on 15 August 1940.74
The development of Sydney as a convoy assembly port dramatically increased the
tempo of activity at IIMCS Protector. Not only did the SC convoys assemble at Sydney,
but so did coastal convoys to Quebec, Halifax, and points in between, as well as to Wabana,
Port-aux-Basques and other ports in Newfoundland, plus USconvoys bound for Greenland.
To keep up with the increase in coastal activity, in 194I, several new-construction corvettes
were allocated to Sydney, including HMCS Napa nee, Dauphin, and Arvida , joined later by
Kamsack, Shawinigan, Louisbur g, Sudbury and the minesweeper HMCS Nipigo n. Despite
their notoriety, the SC convoys only sailed from Sydney until the summer of 1942, at which
time they were transferred to New York, This, and several changes in the Battle of the
Atlantic, had a significant impact on the naval base at Sydney?5
In January 1942, Admiral Donitz despatched the first wave of Operation
Paukenschlag to North America.i" By April, almost all of Canada's naval effort was
73Brian Tennyson and Roger Sarty, Guardian of /he Gulf Sy dney, Cape Breton, and the Atlantic
Wars (Toronto: Univer sity of Toronto Press, 2000), 2 1t . See also Tucker, Naval Service of Canada, II, 179;
andSarty, "Ca nada'sCoastat Fortifications," 140-163.
74Tennyson and Sarty, Guardian of /he Gulf, 232. See also Sarty , "Ca nada's Coas tal Fortifications,"
140- 163.
75Tennyson and Sarty, Guardian of the Gulf, 265-66 . See also Sarty, "Canada ' s Coastal
Fortifications," 140-163.
76pa ukenschlag has a number of translations, including " roll of the drum " and "s trike of the drum."
Inth is case, ithadthe same sort ofconnotations asBlilzkrieg. Since early in the war, Hitler had ordered
Diinitz to avoid confrontations with USN forces, despite their escorting convo ys throu gh the Atlantic theatre,
in an effo rt to keep the Americans out of the war for as long as possible. With the Japanese attack on Pearl
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conce ntrated in the At lantic or coastal waters. With the move of the SC convoys to New
York in the summe r of 1942, the Sydney Force included three Bangors, two armed yachts,
six Fairmiles, and three small auxi liary minesweepers. By October, this was augmented by
six more Bangors and six Fairmilcs; aside from horne port defence, the Sydney Force was
also responsible for the escort of the Sydney to Port-nux-Basque ferry and the convoys to
Corner Brook, and for cont ributing to the Gaspe Force. During 1943, the force was further
enlarged with RN trawlers, and after the mining of the Hali fax Appro aches, by two Royal
Navy Y-class minesweepers. By October 1943, the Sydney Force contained twenty-two
Briti sh and Canadian wars hips. Sections of trans-Atlantic convoys still assembled at
Sydney , and this force esco rted them to the rendezvous with their ocean escorts, but for the
most part the force's main duty was to escort local convoys. By the end of the war, the
Sydney force had escorted 4848 ships in local convoys."
By the spring of 1942, Halifax was seriously conges ted and there was no area in
which to expand. Furthermore, an attack from the sea or air could put the port out of action
for an indefinite period of time. With this in mind , National Defence for Naval Services
announced that it considered Sydney to be second in importance on the east coast and that
in case of emergency "a ll esse ntial naval operations would be carried out from that point.?"
Harbor and the subsequent Germa n declaration of war, the gloves were off, and Donitz was able to unleash his
forces aga inst the America n eastern seaboard with OperalionP aukenschlag.
77Tennyso n and Sarty , Guardian a/ the Gulf, 265. See also Tucker, Naval Service a/Ca nada, II, 167-
168 and 17 1.
78 Memo for Ca binet War Committee, 22 and 30 April 1942, as cited in Tucker, Nava l Service 0/
Canada , II, 17 1.
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Sydney had considerable potentia l for expans ion and afforded the opportunity to develop a
base that was relativel y safe from attack in the least amount of time and at reasonable cost.
The plan to expand Sydney was approved in Apri l 1943 at an estimated cost of almost
$11,000,000, and included facilities to accom modate 2500 people. The new facility,
Protector II, wou ld be located at Point Edward across the harbour from the existing
facilities, Protector I. The Point Edward facilit y carried out its first refit on the anti-
submarine traw ler HMS Liscomb that summer , and in October 1943, the two were
combined and com missioned as HMCS Protector. However, after 1943 the Battle of the
Atlantic had changed, and the U-boats were now the hunted instead of the hunters, despite
the activity in Canadian inshore waters. HMCS Protector remained an important local
escort base for the remainder of the war, as well as a repa ir and refitti ng facility for the
RCN, but after the reloca tion of the SC convoys in the summer of 1942, the Sydney base
experie nced "a definite loss of interes t.,,79
All of these bases were sub-commands of Halifax, then and now Canada's largest
and most important naval base. Halifax had held this position since the early nineteenth
century when Briti sh forces were stationed there, and it retained it afte r the RN passed it
ove r to the RCN when the latter service was create d in 1910. Halifax was a natura l
candidate for nava l deve lopment. It was strategica lly located along the sea routes between
the US and Br itain and had a magnifi cent harbour and well-deve loped port facilities. Before
the Second World War, all naval activities in Halifax centred on HMC Dockyard , which
79Tennyson and Sarty , Guardian of the Gulf, 285 and 316. See also Sarty, "Ca nada's Coastal
Fortifications," 140-163.
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contained only minim al capaci ty given the size of the pre-wa r RCN. But after September
1939 Halifax not only became a base for the RN but also an important convoy assembly
port due to the capacity of the she ltered Bedford Basin . Despite never being a trans-Atlantic
escort base, Hali fax develope d into the nerve centre of the RCN's effo rts on the east coast,
and after Apr il 1943 contro lled all naval operations in the Canadian Northwest Atlantic.
HMCS Avalon came under its umbrella, although up until 1943, St. John 's was only
responsible to Halifax for manning. Unfortunately, this relat ionship exacerbated tensions
between the Newfo undland and Halifax commands. Animosity already existed between the
two Flag Officers in Command, Leonard Murray in St. John ' s and George Jones in IIalifax,
but after HMCS Avalon was established in May 1941, St. John' s received the majority of
the RCN' s new construct ion. While these were "worked up" in Halifax, they generally
arrived at HM CS Avalon with the only qualified watch office r on board being the captain.
At the time, trainin g facilit ies at St. John ' s were totally inadequate and crews had to learn
on the jo b, much to Murr ay's exasperation. Yet because Hali fax had more extensive repair
faciliti es than St. John 's, NEF ships continually went there for major repairs and upgrades.
Upon arriva l, the Halifax Command replaced the crews of these now experienced ships
with new recruit s before sending them back to Newfoundl and. Murr ay compl ained loudly
of this "poaching," but to no ava il. Ultimately, it was ju st another of the many challenges
the Newfoundland Command had to overcome in its struggle to keep the RCN 's ships at
sea and operat ing durin g the Battle of the Atlantic.t"
80S arty, "Ca nada's Coastal Fortifications," 142-163; Tucker, Nava l Serv ice a/Canada, 11, 105-146;
William D. Naftel, Halifax at War: Searc hlights, Squadrons and Submarines, / 939- / 945 (Halifax: Formac
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It is important to recall tha t the RCN developed mainl y two types of bases on the
cast coas t of Cana da . Although initi ally conceived as just a temporary forward base, tlM CS
Avalon would ultimately incorporate the featur es of both of them. But this was all in the
future, and when war was dec lared in Septemb er 1939, few Canadians and even fewer
naval officers could anticipate how the destinies of the RCN and Newfo undland were
inextricabl y linked . To most Ca nadians, New foundland was a backw ard , eco nomica lly
depressed rock jutt ing out into the Atlantic Ocean of f the coast of Ca nada. Yet in less than
two years it wo uld beco me an integral part Canada's most important milit ary com mitment
of the Seco nd World War.
Publishing, 2008), 33-8 1; John Griffith Armstrong, The Halifax Explosion and the Roy al Canadian Navy
(Vancouver: VBC Press, 2002), 9-24; Sarty, "The Halifax Military Lands Board: Civil-Military Relations and
the Developm ent of Hali fax as a Strateg ic Port, 1905-1928," The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du nord, XII,
No. 2 (April 2002), 45 -68 ; Mare Milner, "Rea r-Admiral Leonard Warren Murray: Canada' s Most Important
Operational Commander," in Michael Whitby, Richard H. Gimblett and Peter Haydon (eds.), The Admirals:
Canada 's Senior Nava l Leadership in the Twentieth Centllly (Toronto: Dundum Press, 2006), 97- 124 ; and
Richard O. Mayne, " Vice-Admiral George C. Jones: The Political Career of a Naval Officer," in Whitby,
Gimblett and Haydon (eds.), The Admira ls, 125- 155.
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Chapter 3
Humble Beginnings: September 1939-May 1941
In the space of twenty-one month s, from Septem ber [939 to May [94 l ,
Newfo undland evo lved from being a helpless outpos t in the North Atlantic to an
important bastion of Western Hemispheri c defence. Whereas in 1939 the
Commission of Governm ent had to beg what it could from both Britain and Canada
for its own defence, by the following May it was the host country for the armed
forces of its two closest neighbours . But this was, and would continue to be, a
difficult relationship as the United States and Cana da both pursued their own
agendas in Newfoundland, while the Commission of Govern ment tried to protect the
colony's interests from being buried under international relations and the pressures
of war. This beca me more than evident in the intrigues surrounding the negotia tions
for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) esco rt base at St. John 's . Canada saw it not
only as an opport unity to improve its internationa l presence but also as a means to
protect its interests on what it felt was Canada's front door step . The Newfoundland
gove rnment , on the othe r hand, ever fearful of Canadian intentions, did not want to
give that country any greater hold over its territory than was abso lutely necessary.
This would cause delays and frustrations on all sides .
When it entered the Second World War as part o f the British Empire,
Newfo undland was totally defenceless . The colony had always relied on the Royal
Navy (RN) for prot ection and assumed that this would continue to hold true. The
Admiralty, however, felt that the threat to New foundland was slight and that it could
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not afford to divert scarce resources unless danger materialized. I Nevertheless, the
Commission of Government could take its own measures, and these were
immediately initiated. While Governor Humphrey Walwyn had not been an
exceptional, or even popular, figure as head of the Commission of Government
before September 1939, the former navy man came into his own during the war
years. As the war clouds gathered, he initiated committees to examine such serious
matters as censorship, recruitment , currency, rationing, and of course, defence.2
Among his major concerns were the two airports. The Newfoundland Airport at
Gander and the trans-Atlantic seaplane base at Botwood were developed during the
1930s for civilian purposes by the Newfoundland and British governments. The fear
was that the Germans might want to neutralize both facilities as a strictly defensive
measure or, even more worrisome, to acquire them for their own use in hostilities
against Canada and the United States.3 Walwyn discussed the formation of a
Newfoundland Defence Force to protect such vital installations with the Dominions
Office (DO) in May 1939 and requested funds and equipment." The DO approved
the request, and dispatched training officers and a limited amount of equipment
'G reat Brita in, National Archives (TNAlPRO), Admira lty (ADM) 1/10608, Admiralty
minute, Director of Plans, 15 March 1940 . See also TNAIPRO, ADM 1110608, Admiralty to Dreyer,
2 May 1940.
2"Newfoundland Emergency Defence Measures," Evening Telegram (St. John' s), 2
September 1939.
3Air Offic er Commanding, Eastern Air Command, to Secretary, Department of National
Defence, 29 May 1940, in Paul Brid le (ed.), Documents on Relations between Canada and
Newfoundland (2 vols., Ottawa : Department of Externa l Affairs, 1974-1984), I, 77-78.
"Govemo r of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary, 22 May 1939 inibid., 1, 35.
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from Britain .5 The Newfound land Government, however, put the plan on hold in
August until the force could be fully outfitted.6 In the meantime, Walwyn suggested
that the Canadians be invited to take over the protection of both facilities for the
duration.' The British Air Ministry rejected this, as London was afraid that once
they got in the Canadians would be hard to dislodge, and these two airports would
be very important to civil aviation after the war."
Actually, Canada made the commitment to defend Newfoundland even
before it entered the war against Germany," Where once Ottawa considered
Newfoundland to be a "liability,,,IO it now saw its neighbour as an "essential
5Dominions Secretary to Gove rnor, 26 June 1939, and Dominions Secre tary to Governo r, 30
August 1939 in ibid., 1, 37.
6Commissioner of Justice to Commission of Government for Newfoundl and, 31 August
1939, in ibid., 1, 39-41 .
1Governor to Domin ions Secretary, 15 September 1939 in ibid., 1, 45-46.
8Peter Neary, Newf oundland in the North Atlantic World, 1929-1949 (Montr eal: McGill-
Queen ' s Univ ersity Press, 1988; 2nd ed., Montre al: McGill-Queen ' s University Press, 1996), 116.
See also Neary , "Newfoundland and the Anglo-Ameri can Leased Bases Agreement of 27 March
1941," Canadian Historical Review, LXVII, NO. 4 (December 1986),4 93.
9Secretary of State for Externa l Affairs to Governor of Newfoundl and, 2 September 1939, in
Bridle (ed.), Documents, 1,4 1. See also Extract from a Speech by Prime Minister, 8 September 1939,
in ibid., Documents, 1,4 3.
IODuring a meeting with Prime Mini ster Mackenzie King at Hyde Park in April 1941,
President Roosevelt sugges ted that Canada should take over Newfoundland. Mackenzie King replied
that New foundland had not been included in Confederation before that because it was a liability and
Canada would have to make it into an asset. J.W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, Vol. I
(To ronto: Univers ity of Toronto Press, (960) ,202. See also David Mackenzie, Inside the Atlantic
Triangle: Canada and the Entrance of Newf oundland into Confe deration, 1939-1949 (Toro nto:
University of Toronto Press, 1986) , 65. In 1933, Canadian Minister of Finance Edgar N. Rhodes
summed up Ottawa 's view of Newfoundl and when he declared that, if part of Canada, it "wo uld
really in effect become another Ireland ...a nuisance and alwaysgrumblin g and wanting something."
Peter Neary , Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 1929-1949 (Montreal: McGill·Queen's
University Press, 1988 ; 2nd ed., Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), 20. See also
Peter Neary , '''A Mortgaged Property ' : The Impact of the United States on Newfound land, 1940-
1949," in Twentieth Century Newf oundland: Explorations, James Hiller and Peter Neary, eds. (St.
John's,NL:B reakwa ter, 1994) 179- 193.
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Canadian interest" and an important part of the "Canadian orbit." )) Indeed , Prime
Minister Mackenzie King argued in September I939 that not only was the defence
of Newfo undland and Labrado r "essential to the secur ity of Canada" but also by
guara nteei ng its integr ity, Canada would actua lly be assis ting Britain and France 's
war effort by relieving them of that responsibility.V Yet despit e these altrui stic
sentiments, the rea lity was that New foundland presented a numb er of potential
targets important to Ca nada : the airport at Gander; the sea plane base at Botwood;
the iron ore mines on Bell Island which provided the ore for the stee l mills in Cape
Breto n which repre sented one-t hird of Canada's stee l production ; the num erou s
cable and wireless sta tions along the coas t; and of cour se, the city of St. John ' s, the
eco nomic and polit ical centre of New foundland. Further more, thanks to its
geog raphical positio n, Ottawa viewed Newfound land as the "key to the gulf of
Canada" and " in many ways [its] firs t line of defence .,,13Indeed, Governor Walwyn
lament ed that it was "quite apparent that Newfoundland [was] being considered
on ly in so far as the defence of Ca nada is conc erned .,,14
l l High Commissioner for Newfoundland to Secretary of State for Externa l Affa irs, 3
Decemb er 1941 ,in ibid., I, 115.
12Extrac t from a Speec h by Prime Minister, 8 Septe mber 1939, in ibid ., 1, 43.
13l. W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record (4 vols., Toro nto: University of Toronto
Press, 1960), I, 202; and Minutes of a Meeting of War Cabinet Committee , 17 September 1940, in
Bridle (ed. ), Documents, I, 99. See also Minutes of a Meeting of War Cabinet Committee, 10 June
1941, in Brid le (cd .), Documents , 571; High Commissioner in New found land to Secretary of State
for Externa l Affairs, 3 December 1941, in Bridle (ed.), Documents, 1, 115; and Secretary of State for
Externa l Affairs to Domini ons Secretary, 2 March 1941, in Brid le (ed.), Documents , 103. For a
further examination of Newfoundland's strategic importance, see A.R.M Lowe r, "Transition to
Atlantic Bastion," in R.A. Mac Kay (ed .), Newfoundland : Economic. Diplomati c, Strat egic Studies
(Toro nto: Oxford Univers ity Press, 1946), 484-508.
14provi nc ial Archives of New foundland and Labrado r (PANL), GN 38, S4- 1-2, File 2:
Jl 2(a)-40, Gove rnor to Secretary of State For Dominion Affairs, 5 Apr il 1940.
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Dur ing the " Phony War" in Eurape, 15 the Canad ian gove rnment did not act
upon its commitment to Newfoundland's defence. In fact, after visiting Ottawa in
March 1940 to d iscuss Canada's defence plans for Newfo undland, Commi ssioner
L.E. Emer so n comp lained that no prepara tions had been made. i'' In meetings with
the Chief of the Ge nera l Staff Major-G enera l T.V. And erson , the head of the Royal
Canadian Navy (RCN) Rear-Admiral Percy Ne lles, and Royal Ca nadian Air Force
(RCAF) Chief Air Vice Marshal G.M. Crai l, Emerson discovered that no
instru ctions had bee n issued relating to Newfoundl and other tha n for the defence of
Bell Island and those parts of the coas t that were imp ortant to the defence of
Canada. No prov isions at all had been made to base anything in Newfo und land to
protect the popul ous but very vulnerable coast stretching from Ca pe Free l at the
head of the Bonavista Penin sula to Cape Race at the southern tip of the Avalon
Penin sula. Durin g his March meetin gs, Emerson sugges ted basin g reconn aissance
seaplanes at Bay Bull s or Trepassey on the Southern Shore, or eve n somewhere in
S1. Mary 's or Placenti a Bays. The Canadians regretted that "they did not have any
planes to spare, " but they did offer to train men to man the guns on Bell Island .17
This state of affairs changed as the German Blitzkri eg swept through France
and the Low Co untries in the spring of 1940. In Jun e, Ottawa dispatched the 1st
Battalion of the Black Watch of Canada to Botwood and stationed five Douglas
15The period from the end of the invasion ofl'oland in September 1939 to the start of the
Blitzkrieg in the West in May 1940 is also known as the Sitzkr ieg due to the lack of any fighting in
Europe.
16PANL , Memorandum for Commission, GN 38, S4-1-2, File 2:J12-49, 23 March 1940.
"tua., I'ANL , GN38, S4- 1-4, File 5: J12-40, Memorandum for Commission, 23 March
1940.
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Digby bomb ers from RCAF No. 10 Squadron at Gander. 18 I3y November 1940, the
newly appointed Commander Combined Newfoundland and Canadian Military
Forces Newfo undland, I3rigadier P Earnshaw, had arrived in St. John ' s, and the sites
for two 4.7- and ten-inch guns had been selec ted at Signal Hill and Cape Spear,
respect ively. In addition, a further two six-inch guns were propo sed for St. John ' s
on top of the 75-mm examination battery at Fort Amherst. 19 This must have pleased
Gove rnor Walw yn, who had been so concerned a few month s earlier that he
requested keepin g the four-in ch gun off the damaged SS King Edward which was
being repaired in St. John ' s. London denied the requc st.i" Unfortun ately, the
Canadian s did not have any modern six-inch guns to spare but suggested that
perhaps the Americans might have some with them when they arrived the next
month.i' They were right , as four 155-mm mobile guns, four three-inch Anti-
Aircraft (AA) guns and a number of smaller AA guns as well as an ample supply of
ammunition were due at St. John's short ly after the arriva l of the troops hip Edmund
18C.p. Stacey, Six Years of War: The Army in Canada. Britain and the Pacific (Ottawa:
Queen' s Printer, 1955), 178-180. See also David MacKenzie, Inside The Atlantic Triangle: Canada
and the Entrance of Newfoundl and into Confe deration. 1939-1949 (Toronto : University of Toronto
Press, 1986); and Robert Kavanagh, " W Force: The Canadian Army and the Defence of
Newfoundl and in the Second World War" (Unpublished MA thesis, Memorial University of
Newfoundland, 1995) .
19Permanent Joint Board on Defence, Journ al of Discussions and Decisions, Report of
Service Memb ers, 17 December 1940, in Bridle (ed .), Documents, 1, 136- 137. See also Governor of
Newfo undland to Secret ary of State for Externa l Affa irs 7 January 1941, in ibid., I, 139-140; Library
and Archives Canada (LAC), Record Group (RG) 24, Nava l Offic er in Charge (NO IC), Vol. 11,956,
C.M.R. Schwerdt to Gov ernor, 31 December 1940; and Stacey ,Six Years of War, 54 1.
20pANL, GN3 8, File 2: J23-40, Memorandum for Commission, 23 May 1940. See also
Governo r to Dom inions Secretary, 25 May 1940 in Bridle (ed.), Documents. 1, 76; and Dominions
Secretary to Gove rnor, 10 June 1940 in Bridle (ed.), Documents, 1,80.
21Secretary of State for External Affairs to Gov erno r of Newfound land, 10 January 1941, in
I3ridle (ed .), Documents, I, 140.
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B Alexandert: By the end of the year , 775 men from the Cana dian 53rd Infantry
l3attalion had arrived to defend St. John 's.23 Gove rnor Walwyn was no doubt
relieved.
The RCN was also making plans for Newfoundland, especially for St.
John ' s. In October 1940, Nava l Serv ice Headquarters (NS HQ) decided to institu te a
Nava l Examination Service at the port, comme ncing I Decemb er, to contro l
shipping entering St. John's Harbour and prov ide further defence for the facilit ies. It
proposed that HMCS Amber would proceed to St. Jolm's for duty as an examination
vessel and that a Port War Signal Station be installed at Cabot Tow er. NS HQ
requested that the Nava l Officer in Charge (NOIC), Captain C.M.R. Schwerdt,
RN,24 make arrangements for their accommodation. NSHQ assumed these plans
would meet the approval of the Newfoundland government.f but in what may have
been a portent of thin gs to come, Ottawa neglected to make arrangements to pay for
them.26 Regardl ess, the Newfoundland Government approved the request, and by
the end of the year the Examination Service was up and runnin g. As well, the anti-
22Secrctary of State for Domin ion Affairs to Domini ons Secretary, 16 February 1941, in
ibid., 1, 164.
23Permanent Joint Board on Defence, Journal of Discussions and Decis ions, Report of
Service Memb ers, 17 December 1940 , in ibid ., 1,1 36-137. See also Governo r of Newfound land to
Secretary of State for Externa l Affa irs, 7 January, 1941 in ibid., I, 139-140.
24Capt. Schwedt had been serving as the Governor's secretary and took ove r as NO IC at the
start of hostilities.
2SNationai Defe nce Headquarters to Nava l Office r in Charge, St. John ' s, 31 October 1940,
in Bridle (ed.), Documents, I, 135.
26Governor to Secretary of State for Exte rnal Affai rs, 6 Nove mber 1940 inibid ., I, 136.
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torp edo defenc es for St. John 's harbour were on site and ready for installa tion in the
sp ring .27
By the tim e the first ships of the Newfo undland Esco rt Force (NEF) - IIM C
Ships Agass iz, Alberni, Chambly, Cobalt, Collingwood, Orillia and Wetaskiwin -
under the comma nd of Commander J.D. "Chummy" Prent ice, RCN, on Chambly -
sai led thro ugh the Narrows, St. John 's was well on its way to being a well-defe nded
harbo ur. It was already the base for the New foundland Defence Force (NDF)
compris ing five co rve ttes, two minesweepers and four Fairmile patrol boats.28
Ca ptain Schw erdt and his small staff arranged to install the anti-torpedo baffle at the
entrance to the harbour , and enlarged the Examination Service by enlisting two
form er Ne wfoundland Customs cutters, Marvita and Shulamite, complete with their
crews . A 4000-ton Admiralty fuel tank was under constructi on , and a Port War
Signal Station plann ed at Cape Spear along with a High Frequenc y Direction
Findin g (HF /DF , or Huff Duff) station and a radio beacon .r" Under NSHQ
instructions, one RCN leading signalman and five ratin gs manned Cabot Tower as a
Port War Signal Station, and Fort Amher st sited as an Examination Battery
including four RCN signalmenr''' The Canadian Army compl eted this battery in the
fall of 1941 ; in the interim , American troops manned four mobil e ISS-mill imetre
27Permanent Joint Board on Defence, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of
Service Memb ers, 17 December 1940 in ibid., I, 136-137.
28Department of National Defence (DND). Directorat e of History and Heritage (DHH),
NSS- IOOO-5-20, Vol. I, Flag Officer Newfo undland (FONF), monthly report, CCNF to NSHQ, 30
June 1941.
30lbid., NSS-1000-5 - 13.5, Month ly report on proceedings, Lt-Cdr. R.U. Langston , RCNR
(for NOIC), to NSHQ, 3 1 March 1941 .
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guns and two eight-inch railway guns in and around St. John ' s for defence.31 By the
spring of 194 1, St. John ' s was an armed camp, and the Battle of the Atlantic had
entered an important stage .
Despi te tremendous successes by the V-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic
during the first part of the war, the tide actually started to turn duri ng the winter of
194 1. This is not to say that both sides failed to have some spectacular successes as
well as tragic failures during this period. Rather, by the time the first ships o f the
NEF sailed into St. John ' s harbour , the Atlantic war had reached a new phase that
started to favo ur the Allies. The year began well for the Germans when in early
January 1941 , The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Supreme High Command of
the Armed Forces or OK W) put I/KG 40 with Focke-Wulf Fw200 Condor long-
range bomb ers under Donitz's command. For the first time, the U'-Boat chief had
aircraft to help direct his wolfp acks to the vital convoys feedin g Britain 's war effort.
With a range of almost 600 miles, these aircra ft roamed far out into the Atlantic to
search out targ ets. Once found , the aircrews report ed the conv oy ' s position to V-
boat Command or guided the V-boats to their targets directly. Also in January, the
heavy cruisers Gneisenua and Scharnhorst left Brest for an anti-shipping campaign
in the Nort h Atlantic. Shortly thereafte r, their sister ship, Admiral Hipper, also
sortied, and all three broke into the Atlantic through the Denmark Strai t without
being detected by the Alli es in early February. By the end of their mission in March,
31Roger Sarty (ed.), The Maritime Def ence of Canada (Toronto: Canadian Institute of
Strategic Studies, 1996), 155.
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Gneisenua and Scharnhorst had sunk twenty-two ships for a total of 115,622 tons.32
Hipper sank eight more ships before her return in rnid-February.f
Despite such successes, the potential of the Condors' anti-shipping patrols
was never rea lized. In the main, this was due to their difficulty in giving the U-boa ts
correct navigat ional data on the location of a convoy. Consequently, even if a plane
detected a convoy , the wolfpack could not find it unless the Condor homed it in with
radio signa ls. Given the time it took for the pack to reach the datum point, as well as
allied anti-a ircraft measures, the Condors often had to depart before the U-boats
located their target. Neverthel ess, during the first three month s of 1941, U-boats
sank 620,000 tons of Allied shipping. However, with the gales of March came
disaster. In quick succession, Germany ' s three most famou s U-boat aces - Prien,
Kretschm er and Schepke - were all sunk. Only Kretschm er surv ived his sinking,
and he was eventually interned at Camp Bowman ville in Ontario . So disastrous was
the loss of "T he Bull of Scapa Flow" that Prien ' s death was kept secret for months.
To many histor ians, these losses capped off what was known as "The Happy Time"
for the U-boats. Up to this point , the Battle of the Atlantic seemed to be going all
Germany's way - successes were many, while casualt ies were relatively low.
Despi te being serious blows to morale - Prien, Kretschm er and Schepke were
national heroes - their losses were only the thirty-sixth, thirty-seventh and thirty-
eighth of thirt y-nin e U-boats sunk in the eighteen month s since the beginning of the
32JiJrgen Rohw er and Gerhard Hummelchen, Chronology of the War At Sea, 1939-1945:
The Naval History of World War Two (London: [an Allan, 1972; 3rd rev. ed., London: Chatham
Publishing, (992), 55.
33Robert Jackson, The German Navy in World War II (Londo n: Brown Books, 1999), 86.
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war. But from April to the end of the year , month ly successes dimini shed , and by
the end of 194 I a further thirty U-boats had been lost"
Historian s point to two import ant measures which were largely responsible
for the chan ge in Allied fortunes. One is how Coastal Command operated its
aircraft. In Apri l, Coastal Command came under the control of the Admir alty and
tactics changed . To this point, aircraft gave only close escort protecti on to convoys,
mean ing that they patro lled in front of the formation. This did not take advanta ge of
the aircrafts ' range and speed or the fact that the wolfpacks were homed into the
convoy by a shadower to the rear or runnin g parallel to the convoy j ust beyond the
horizon. Coas tal Command discovered that most U-boat sightings around convoys
were made by aircraft coming or going to interce pt their convoys rather than when
they got there. Conseq uently, from the spring of 194 I, Coas tal Command sent
aircra ft further afie ld to detect and at least put down shadowi ng U-boats , or if the
pack had already gathered, to drive off the attacker s before they could do much
damage . The other measure altering the balance of power in the Atlantic was the
increase in the numb er of escorts per convoy . Escorts now formed into groups with
the Senior Officer Esco rt (SOE) giving instructions through short -range radio-
telephone. This was faci litated in large measure by the introduction of fifty ex-USN
destroyers Britain received in exchange for giving the US bases on British territory
in the Western Hemisphere."
34V.E. Tarrant, The U-Boat Offensive. 1914-1945 (Annapo lis: Nava l Institute Press, 1989),
97-103 .
35Eric 1. Grove (ed.), The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, 1939-/ 945 (Aldershot:
Ashgate Pub lishing,1 997) ,66-69 .
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In the summer of [940, the British were dangerou sly short of destro yers for
convoy escort duty. The Roya l Navy (RN) lost a large number dur ing the ill-fated
Norwegian campaign and the evac uation at Dunkirk, with sti ll more being sunk or
damaged whi le held in port to counter the expected German invas ion of Britain.
Prime Ministe r Winston Churchill appealed to Pres ident Frank lin Roosevelt in May
for " forty or fifty of [his] older destroyers " to fill the breech unti l new construction
compensated for the Iosses" Roosevelt was more than willing to do this , but the
United States was officia lly neutral and such a transfer would contravene
international law as well as inflame isolationist sentiment in the US. The answer
seemed to be an exchange of sorts. As a gesture of friendship , Churchill proposed
that Britain would allow the US to lease land on British territory in the Western
Hemisphere for bases, and a reciprocal gesture would be made of the destroyers as
well as other military hardware. Unfortunately, this remedy was too subtle for
American poli cymaker s, who preferr ed a more direct and docum ented swap. On the
other hand , a straight exchan ge of assets would not have gone down well in the
territories involved or in Britain . Indeed, British Mini ster of Supp ly Lord
Beaverbrook opined that if the British were going to make a bargain, he did not
want to make a bad one, and in his opinion, granting British territory to the
Americans for ninety-nin e years in exchange for fifty WWI-vintage destroyers was
a bad deal." The solution came in a compro mise that gave the British their gesture
and the Americans their busin ess deal. Leases would be given "freely and without
36H. Duncan Hall, North American Supply (London : HMSO, 1955), 139.
37Philip Good hart, Fifty Ships that Saved The World: The Foundation of the Anglo-
American Alliance (New York: Doub leday and Co., 1965), 172.
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consideration" to the American s in Newfound land and Bermud a, while similar
facilities wou ld be traded in Jamaica , Trinidad , British Guiana, St. Lucia and
Antigua for the fifty destroyers. Th is solved the probl em, and the "destroyers for
bases" dea l, as it became known, was anno unced on 3 Septemb er 1940 .38
In January 1941, the first of the Americans arrived at St. John 's , to set up
naval and air bases on the island under arrangements made by the Green slade Board
in the fall. The Board, named after its head, Rear-Adm iral John W Greenslade, and
includin g Brigadier-General Jacob L Devers, Lieutenant-Co lonel Harry 1. Malony
and Major Town send Griffiss toured the various territ ories in the Western
Hemisphere included in the Anglo-American Leased Bases Agreement throughout
September 1940 in order to choose appropriate sites for the proposed US bases.39
Two month s later, the USN formed Support Force Atlantic Fleet under Admira l
Bristol, opera ting out of Argentia, in Placentia Bay, ostensibly to escort American
convoys to Gree nland and Iceland . While doing so, on 10 April USS Nibla ck
attacked a submerged contact with depth charges . While no results were
forthcoming, this was the first recorded instance of Amer ican action against the U-
boats in the Battle of the Atlantic. The boundary of the Western Hemisphere was
advanced to 30 degrees West a week later. At the same time, the US naval base at
Bermuda opened for operation, and US TG 7.3 under the command of Rear-Admi ral
Cook arrived to comm ence the Central Atlantic Neutrality Patrol.40 On the other
38Stetson Conn, Rose C. Enge lman and Bryon Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its
Outposts (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1964; reprint, Washington, DC:
US Government Printing Office , 2000) , 359 .
39lbid., 359 .
'ORohwer and Hummelchen, Chronology , 58.
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side of the Atlantic, despi te continued heavy bomb ing, Western Approaches
Command (WAC) moved to Liverpool from Plymouth which allowed closer co-
operat ion between staff and the men at sea. However, these were not the only
reasons behind the Allies' change in fortunes.
The Allies started to win the technology war in early 1941. One major
component , radar, became more readily available to esco rts, although Canadian
forces habitually lagged behind the RN in this area.' ! Radar-equipped escorts were
able to penetrate the cloak of invisibilit y that night surface attacks gave the V-boats
in wolfpack operations. In addition, miniaturization of Huff-Duff systems allowed
the SOE to detect Ll-boat radio signals long before an attack comm enced. This
permitted the Convoy Commodore to alter course while one or more escorts
converged on the triangulated signal's point of origin, usually a shadowing
submarine, and sink it or at least drive it down.
These advances facilitated a numb er of intelligence captures on the high seas
durin g the first few month s of 1941. On 4 March, HMS Somalia captured secret
German naval codes from NN04 Krebs which allowed the Gove rnme nt Code and
Cipher School at Bletch ley Park, ju st outside London, to decode selected German
Enigma messages ove r the next few months . However, it was the captur e of V-I I0
and the recovery of an intact nava l Enigma machine and codebooks that really gave
British code break ers an insight into the German naval codes. On 9 May, V- I IOwas
41David Zimmerman, The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa: How Admirals, Scientists, and
Politicians Impeded the Development of High Technology in Canada 's Wartime Navy (Toronto:
University of Toro nto Press, 1989), 84, notes that by December 1942, of the fifty-seven warships in
the North Atlantic without radar, forty-five (seventy-five percent) were Canadian.
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blown to the surface while attack ing HX 123 and abando ned. A party from I-1MS
Bulldog boarde d the If-boat and recovered a treasure trove of secret papers, codes
and an Enigma machine. The U-boa t was taken in tow but sank en route to Iceland.
The recovered intell igence, combined with that salvaged from the German
weathership Mtinchen near Jan Mayan Island two days previous, allowed Bletchley
Park to read Enigma messages for most of June. Still, this did not come in time to
counter Operat ion Rheiniibung , the Atlantic breakout of the German batt leship
Bismarck and heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen under Admiral Liitjens.42
On 22 May, British reconnai ssance aircraft confirm ed the departure of the
two capital ships from Norway. Thus alerted, the British Home Fleet under Admiral
Tovey sortied from Scapa Flow and intercept ed the German ships in the Denmark
Strait two days later. During the ensuing engage ment, Bismarck sank HMS Hood
with the loss of ove r 1400 men but was itself damag ed, causing a reduction in
speed. Over the next several days, the RN subjected Bismar ck to carrier-borne
torpedo plane attacks which finally resulted in two hits on the steering gear
renderin g the battle ship un-manoeuvrable. Unabl e to escape and ordering its consort
Prinz Eugen home, Bismarck was surrounded the next day and battered to a blazing
hulk by shells from the battl eships King George Va nd Rodney . Bismarck ultimately
scuttled itself leaving many of its crew in the water. RN ships rescued 110 men, but
42Rohwer and Hummelchen, Chronology, 53-62. See also F.H. Hinsley, et al., British
Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Infl uence on Strategy and Operations (4 vols., London:
HMSO,1 979-1990),1 , 336-339.
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a V-boat scare forced the Britis h to leave the rest to the ir fate . Onl y five were found
se veral hours later by a U-boat and a weathership .Y
Wh ile the Britis h rej oiced at this spectacular vic tory , it was sti ll tinged with
sa lt due to the tragic loss of HM S Hood and continuing losses o f merchant shippi ng
in the Atla nt ic. Duri ng May , the Allies lost sixty- three ships." Although almost
half of these were lost in the Freetown area of Africa, the rema inder were sunk in
the North Atlant ic , ma ny in convoy . 0 13 318 outward-bou nd from Britain was
attacked at the begi nning of the month with the loss of five ships and 013 126 was
se t upon by a pack of six U'-boa ts and suffered a total of nine ships sunk. This last
attac k prompted the Admiralty to instigate end-to-end con voy esco rt and to decide
that the wes ter n end wo uld be based at St. John 's.45
Initi all y, the RN escor ted convoys to 22 degrees West , but as the Ll-boats
adva nce d wes twa rd, Brit ain pushed this to 35 degrees West and occ upied Iceland,
both to deny it to the Germans and to use it as a forward esco rt base. The RCN,
based out of Ha lifax , Nova Scotia, could on ly provid e escor t as far as the Grand
Bank s, which left approxima tely 1200 mil es where convoys travelled with littl e or
no prot ecti on . This area became known as "T he Pit. " and this was the stretc h of
ocea n where the U-boa ts now opera ted with appare nt imp unity . It soon became
clear that es tablishing a forwar d base at St. John ' s, as had bee n done at
43Ibid., 62-64. See also Hinsley, et 01., British Intelligence, 1, 339-345.
"Tarrant, U-Boat OjJensive, 101.
45W.A.I3. Douglas, et al., No Higher Purpose: The Operational History of the Royal
Canadian Navy in the Second World War, 1939-1943, Volume 11, Part 1 (St. Catharines, ON:
Vanwe Il PublishingLtd., 2002),183 .
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Hvalfjordhur , Iceland , wou ld extend coverage more than 600 miles further east into
the Atlantic.
Towards the end of May the British Admiralty sent a message to Captain
C.M.R. Schwe rdt, RN, the NO IC at St. John ' s, explaining that due to the advance of
the U-boats they were "now forced to use a base on the Western side of the Atlantic
for escorti ng destroyers and corve ttes." They indicated that they were interested in
using St. John 's for this and aske d his opinion on whether it was feasib le as an
escort base, and if not, what was his next choice." Schwerdt had long demonstrated
his abilit y both as the Governor's personal secretary and as the NOIC at St. John ' s.
Indeed, Canadian historian Roger Sarty has correctly suggested that the fine job that
Schwerdt and his small staff did in preparin g the ex-U SN destroyers for their trans-
Atlantic cross ing to Britain helped introduc e St. John ' s as a possible escort base.47
Schwerdt replied that St. John ' s was the best choice in Newfoundland and
optimistically suggested that it was only hampered by fog "two or three days per
month." It also featured a soon-to-be-completed 4,000-ton Admiralty fuel tank. His
next choice was Botwood , which had less fog but was undefended and had no fuel
storage faciliti es.48 On the other hand, at the time, convoys were routed through the
Strait of Belle Isle into the Labrador Sea, which made Botwood much closer than St.
46TNA/I'RO, ADM 116/4526, Admir alty to NOIC, St. John ' s, 20 May 1941.
47Roge r Sarty , persona l communication, May 2006 . In a message to the First Sea Lord, the
C-i n-C, American and West Indies Station recogn ized the Adm iralty ' s fortun e at having Schwerdt at
St. John's . Ibid., AD M 1/4526 , C-in-C, American and West Indies to Adm iralty (Fo r First Sea Lord),
15 June 194 1.
48Ibid., AD M 116/4526, NOIC St. John's to Admi ra lty, 20 May 1941.
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John's, which was on the other side of the island .49 With St. John ' s being
Schwerdt's clea r choice, the Admiralty asked him whether St. John 's could
accommoda te a depot ship, an oiler, a SOD-foot supply ship, five destroyers, five
corvettes, a sloop, and a cutter at the same time.50
The Admiralty also asked Nava l Service Headq uarters (NSHQ) as to the
number of new constructi on corvettes it could provid e for a force in the
"Newfoundland focal area.'?' The Admiralt y received NSHQ's enthusiastic reply
that seven cor vettes were immediately avai lable for posting at St. John' s with fifteen
more in a month and a total of forty-eight in six month s. Ottawa also offered to
"undertake [the] task of anti-submarine convoys...which would involve utilization of
all R.C.N. destroyers.t'Y To sweeten the pie, CNS Admiral Percy Nelles offered to
establish the base from "Canadian sources.,,53 Commander E.R. Mainguy (soon to
be Captain) was offered as commander of this force.54 The Admira lty thought
49Marc Milner, North Atlantic Run: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle for the
Convoys (To ronto: University of Toronto Press, (985), 62.
50TNA/ PRO, ADM 116/4526, CNS to Adm iralty, 26 May 1941 .
5JLAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 3892, NSS 1033-6-1, part I, Newfoundland Convoy Escort
Forces, General Data and Correspondence , NSHQ to Admira lty, 2 1 May 1941 .
52/bid.
5JTNN PRO ADM 116/4526, CNS to Admiralty, 26 May 1941.
54PANL, GN 38, S4-2-4, file 2, NSHQ to Admiralty, 2 1 May 1941. E. Rollo Mainguyw as a
member of the Class of 1915 at the Royal Naval College of Canada. At the start of the Second World
War, Mainguy took command of HMCS Assinaboine and in 1940 was appointed to HMCS Ottawa.
It was in Ottawa that Maninguy claimed the RCN's first U-boat kill , although it was not awarded
until forty-two yea rs after the war. He join ed the NEF in June 1941, was promoted to Captain and
appointed as Capt. (D) at HMCS Avalon in July 1941 . He served in that post until 1942, also serving
briefly as FONF before mov ing to Ottawa as the Chief of Nava l Personnel. He commanded the
cruiser HMCS Uganda in the Pac ific theatre until 1946 and became Canada 's sixth CNS in 1951.
Wilfred G.D.Lund, " Vice-Admiral E. Rollo Mainguy: Sailors' Sailor," in Michael Whitby, Richard
II. Gimblett and Peter Haydon (eds.), The Admirals: Canada's Senior Naval Leadership in the
Twentieth Century (To ronto: Dundum Press, 2006), 186-2 12.
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Mainguy was too juni or, but Captain L.W. Murray, then in London as Commodore
Commanding Canadian Ships (CCC S), was perfectly acceptablc.f Ottawa readily
agreed.
Canada, and the RCN in particu lar, had a number of reasons for wanting the
base in St. John ' s to be a "Canadian" enterprise. For one, the protection of the vital
trans-Atlantic convoys was the single most important responsib ility of the Batt le of
the At lantic. Without the "safe and timely arrival" of the convoys in the UK, the war
in Europe would be lost. The RN had been derelict in its preparati on in this area.
The Admiralty thought that the menace to trade would come from surface raiders
and that any submarine threat would be nullifi ed by the development of ASOIC.
Nonetheless , within the first few months of the war, it was evident that German U-
boats were more than ju st a mere nuisance and that the RN was woefully short of
escort craft.56 The government of Prime Minister Mackenzie King saw trade
protection as an area where Canada could make a major contribution to the war
effort without suffering the horrendous casualties of the First World War.
Furthermore, the prospect of concentrating all of Canada's ava ilable naval forces in
one area and with one vital and well-defin ed obje ctive, under a Canadian officer,
was very attractive to both the RCN brass and their politi cal bosses.57 Canadian
55TN A/ PRO, ADM 116/4526 , e NS to Adm iralty, 26 May 1941.
56During the first four month s of the war (Se ptember-Decembe r 1939), U-boa rs sank over
half a million tons of British shipping, includin g the aircraft ca rrier HMS Courageous and the
battleship HMS Royal Oak, the latter at the fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow, Scotland . See Ta rrant, U-
Boat OjJensive, 84.
57Gilbert Tuck er, The Naval Service of Canada (2 vo ls., Ottawa : King ' s Print ers, 1952), ll,
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Minister of Defence J.L. Ralston suggested at a meeting of the War Cabinet that it
offered the RCN the opportunity to play "a n important and vita l role in the Western
Atlantic.,,58 From the onset of the war , Ca nada resisted any British attempt to
subordinate its sovereignty and the autonom y of its armed forces . Unlike the
governments of the other Commonwealth and occupied natio ns , the King
government refused the sugg estion that the RCN simply opera te as part of the RN.
The country ' s small fleet was built to pro tect Canada ' s exte ns ive coas tline, and was
on ly transferred to UK waters at the personal appea l of Winston Churchill. The
crea tion of the NEF and the establishment of the RCN base at St. John ' s could be
see n as a move directl y related to the defence of Canada.59
Another reason that the Canadians wanted a major naval force operat ing out
of St. John ' s was because by this time the American presence in Ne wfoundland was
increasin g as the US built bases and outposts from coast to coast. By war's end, tens
of thousand s of Ame rican servicemen were stationed in Newfoundland and
Labrador , and hundr eds of thousand s of mil itary personn el and passengers had
passed throu gh the various US facilities in the co lony .f" Furthermore, thanks to the
Anglo-A merican Staff Agreement (ABC I), signed without Canadian parti cipation
58Minutes of Meeting of Cabinet War Committee, June 20, 1941 in Bridle (ed.), Documents,
59LAC, RG 24, Vol. 3892, NSS 1033-6-1, part 1, Nfld. Convoy Escor t Force, Genera l Data
and Corres pondence, Lt-Col. K.S. Maclachlan, Assistant Deputy Minister of Naval Service, and
Admiral Percy Ne lles, CNS , "Notes for Minister of Nat ional Defence," I July 1941. See also C.P.
Stacey, Arms, Men and Governm ents: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa : Queen' s
Printer,1 970), 311 .
6°John N. Cardolis, A Friendly Invasion: The American Military in Newfoundland, 1940 to
1990 (St. John ' s: Breakwater Books, 1990), 19. See also Conn, Enge lman and Fairchi ld, Guarding
the United States; Goodhart, Fifty Ships ; and Hall, North American Supply .
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in early 1941, the United States was ass igned strategic con trol over the Western
Atlantic and all the nava l forces therein, includin g Canadian, when they entered the
war. The Canadian government feared that this agreem ent was a further attempt to
oust Canada from Newfound land.61 Conseq uently , Canadian authori ties worried
abou t both a permanent American presence in Newfound land and also that the
RCN's more experienced forces would be unde r Ame rican directio n.62 Canada
needed both to impress upon its allies the "vital nature" of its interest in
New foundland and to project itself on the world scene." As Malcolm MacLeod
noted, "Ca nada was determin ed to become a weighty presence in Newfoundland,
both for the sake of winnin g the war and for future considerations.,,64
Meanwhil e, Schwerdt replied that St. John's harbour could acco mmodate no
more than ten ships moored mid-harbour because the meteorological ships City of
Toronto and Arakaka were based in St. John ' s and that the Americans were
anticipating a continual flow of transports, not to mention regular merchant ship
traffic. He sugges ted that wharfage for the some of the destroyers, the corvettes, and
depot ships could be requisitioned but that dredging and repairs to the wharves
would be necessary. The remaining destroyers and the oiler would have to anchor in
6lMilner, North Atlantic Run, 33.
62W.A.B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force (To ronto: Univers ity of Toronto
Press, 1986),386.
63Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee, 29 Octobe r 1941, in Bridle (ed.),
Documents, uo.
64Malcolm MacLeod , Peace of the Continent: The Impact of the Second World War
Canadian and American Bases in Newf oundland (St. John ' s: Harry Cuff Pub lishing, 1986), 18.
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the midd le of the harbour. Schwerd t conc luded that space for any more than the
aforementioned wou ld be "most difficult to arrange with any security oftenure.' ,65
This state of affairs did not seem to deter the Admiralty, which concl uded
that whi le " facilities may be lacking at first...t his can be acce pted in view of the
urgent neces sity to establish [the] base." It then laid out a long list of requirements
which included six buildings for ordinance and 50,000 square feet for naval and
victualling stores including refrigera tion. The propo sed force also grew to thirty
destroyers and corvett es (fiftee n each) and six s100ps.66 Support wou ld consist of a
depot ship, an oiler and a store ship and personne l totalling forty-six officers and
1000 men. The 4000-ton Admira lty oil tank would be used for refuellin g the force.
Despite knowin g that the local hospital could barely service the civilian population,
the Admiralty thought it would suffice for the naval perso nnel as well.67
In a very short period of time, Newfo undland went from a helpless outpost
in the Nor th Atlantic to being "the key to the western defence system.t'" Whereas
in 1939 the Commiss ion of Government worr ied about how to cope with its own
defence, by May 1941 New foundland had become an armed camp, occupied by
Canadian and American armed forces . However, this was, and would continue to be,
an uneasy relationship as the Unite d States and Canada both pursued their own
agendas in Newfo undland, while the Newfou ndland governmen t tried to look after
65pANL, GN 38, S4-2-4, file 2, NO[C, St. John' s, to Admiralty, 23 May [94 1.
66/bid.
67TNA/PRO Cab inet Papers (CAB) 122/85, "Use of St. John ' s Newfound land as Base," 24
May 194 1.
68Joseph Schu ll, Far Distant Ships: An Official Acco unt of Canadian Naval Operations in
World War II (Ottawa : Edmond Cloutie r, 1950; 2nd ed., Toronto : Stodda rt Publi shing, 1987), 430.
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the co lony ' s interests. These tensions were quite ev ident in the establ ishme nt of
HMCS Avalon at St. John ' s. Canada saw the escort base as both an opportunity to
impro ve its interna tional presence and a mea ns to protect its interests in
New foundland from the Americans. As we will see in the next chapter , the
Newfo undland government, not without ju stification , was suspicious of Cana dian
intenti ons and did not want to give that co untry any grea ter hold ove r the co lony
than was abso lutely necessary. This caused de lays and frustrations on all sides and
would continue to do so for the remainder of the war.
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Chapter 4
Into The Breech: June 1941 -Ma y 1942
It was not long before the plans for the proposed base at St. John ' s started to
snow ball. Initially, the Admiralty had proposed to run a sort of shuttle service
between Newfo undland and Iceland. The Newfo undland Escort Force (NEF) would
escort a conv oy to the Western Ocean Meeting Point (WESTOM P) west of Iceland;
from there an Iceland-based force would escort it to the Eastern Ocean Meetin g
Poin t (EASTO MP) where it would be passed to the Royal Navy (RN) . This plan
was shelved when the Admi ralty decided tha t it was a more effective use of scarce
resourc es to extend both the WESTOMP and EASTOMP into a Mid -Ocean Meeting
Point (MOMP) and to usc Iceland only for refuelling. To facilitate this, the strength
of the NE F was increased to thirty destroyers, twenty-four corvettes and nine
sloops; of this numb er, sixteen would be in St. John ' s at anyone time. The
New foundland Commission of Gove rnment doubted whether St. John' s could
handle the increased force without extensive improvements to the proposed
facilities, whil e the British Ministry of War Transport (MWT) questioned its impact
on the repair and maintenance of merchant vessels. Canada did not balk at the
increase in forces, but when the estimates came in at around CAN $ I0 milli on, the
governme nt backtracked from its original offer to underwrit e the base.' This
deci sion caused some embarrassment to all parties.i The Admiralty reali zed it would
'Great Britain, Nat iona l Archives ("rnA/PRO), Admira lty (A DM) 116/4526, United
Kingdom High Commiss ioner in Ca nada to Dominions Office, II June 194 1.
2lb id, ADM 1/4387, H.N. Morrison, Head of Milit ary Branch (M Branch), minute, 27 July
have to make a "substantial contribution to its capital cost" and sugges ted that a
fifty/fifty split (five million do llars apiece) would be accep table.' For its part, the
Newfo undland government felt it was preferab le from "the point of view of the
future of Newfo undland," as well as for popular suppor t, for the base to be tota lly
owned and operated by the Admiralty." Tensions had long existed between the
governments of Canada and Newfoundland, and the local population was suspicious
of any furth er Canadian involvement in Newfoundland. While the presence of army
and air force personnel could be viewed as being involved directly in the defence of
Newfoundland, a naval base could not. Establishing the NEF was getting more
complicated by the day and was going to become more so.
The existing faciliti es at St. John ' s were totally inadequate for the
maintenance and supply of a major naval force, and until they were upgraded the
NEF would have to depend on supply and repair facilit ies afloat. Moreover, any
improvements ashore would take time to construct, and a substantial port ion wou ld
have to be completed before the onset of winter, which gave the Admira lty no more
than six month s. As some of the necessary materials had to come from the United
States throu gh the Lend-Lease Program, Military Branch (M Branch ) wondered if it
would be easier to ju st ask the Americans to construct the base as they were then
doin g in Lond onderry, Northern Ireland, and at Gareloch, Scotland. The Admiralty
3/bid., Morrison, minule, 15 June I94 1.
"Governor of Newfoundland 10 Dominions Secretary, 6 June 1941, in Paul Bridle (cd.),
Documents On Relations Between Canada and Newf oundland (2 vols., Ottawa: Department of
Externa l Affairs, 1974-1984),1 , 568.
knew, however, that the Newfo undland government would "s trongly objec t to the
U.S. having a hold over the base."s
No netheless, the Americans were already constructi ng facilities at the
northeast corner of the harbour. If the Americans developed the proposed escort
base, the US would have contro l over a sizable portion of St. John ' s Harbour.
Actually, the Admira lty knew that the Newfoundland government was very
sensitive to either the US or Canada having a larger presence in Newfoundland than
they already had. It was well aware that both countries had shown "scant regard for
the views of the Newfo undland Governm ent" when they created the US-Canada
Permanent Joint Board on Defense (pm D) the year before.6 Prime Minister
Mackenzie King and President Roosevelt agreed to form the PJBD when they met
in Ogdensburg, New York, in August 1940. One of the Board ' s first duti es was to
produce a worst-case plan, code-named "Black," to be institut ed in the event that
Britain fell and North America lay open to Nazi attack. This plan includ ed the
occupation of New foundland.7 Learnin g of this second hand from the American
mission investigating locations for the proposed bases, the Commission of
Gove rnment complained to Lond on that the Canadians were makin g plans without
consultation and warned that this could cause a publi c backlash if it were made
public."
5TN A/PRO, ADM 114387, M Branch, minute, 17 June 194 1.
7W.A.B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force: The Official History of the Royal
Canadian Air Force (2 vols., Toronto: Univers ity of Toronto Press, 1986), 383.
8TNAI PRO, ADM 116/4409, Government of Newfou ndland to Dominions Office, 16
Septembe r 1940. See also Peter Neary , "Newfoundland and the Anglo-American Leased Bases
Furthermore, Newfoundland's treatment in the Anglo-American "Destroyers
for Bases" agreement, signed on 17 March 1941, had left the Commission of
Government with a bad taste in its mouth. Although announced the previous
September, the deal was actually negotiated at the same time that President
Roosevelt was pushing his Lend-Lease Bill (passed II March 1941) through
Congress, and this had a serious impact on the negotiations for bases in
Newfoundland.9 It was obvious from the start that the Americans had definite ideas
as to what they wanted in any agreement. Knowing Britain's desperate need for war
materials, they pressed their advantage, sometimes not very subtly." Of particular
concern to Newfoundland 's government representatives were the "general powers"
insisted upon by the Americans. These essentially granted the US total autonomy
over the areas to be leased, giving it unprecedented authority over the property and
inhabitants ofa sovereign country.I I The Newfoundland government had also hoped
to acquire economic considerations from the United States as compensation for its
contribution to the deal, but it was sadly disappointed. The best the Americans
Agreement of 27 March 1941," Canadian Historical Review, LXVII , No. 4 (December 1986), 491-
519.
9The Lend-Lease Bill permitted the US government to provide war supplies to Great Britain
without the Brit ish having to pay for them. Up to this point, Britain had to pay for any supplies on a
"cash- and-carry" basis, and its foreign reserves were by now exhausted .
lOIn response to the slow pace of negotiations, Roosevelt sugges ted to the British
Ambassador to Wash ington, Lord Halifax, that the pending Lend-L ease Bill might be jeopardized if
agreement was not achieved soon. See Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman and Byron Fairchild,
Guarding the United States and Its Outposts (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military
History, 1964 ; reprint, Washington, DC: US Government Printin g Office, 2000), 373.
lINealy , "Newfoundland and the Anglo-American Leased Bases Agreement ," 5 \O.
offered was the promi se to "co nsider sympathet ically" the development of mutual
trade between the two countries. 12
New foundland's represe ntatives in the negotiations, L.E. Emerson and J.G.
Penson, recognized that the terms of the agreement were "one-sided throughout and
often extremely harsh" and might not be well received when made public .13 Acting
on Gove rnor Walwyn ' s suggestion," they requested that Prime Mini ster Churchill
address a personal letter to the people of Newfo undland acknowledg ing "the
considera ble sacrifi ces" that the American plan represented and portraying
acceptance of the agreement as a matter of patriotic duty." In public, the
Newfoundland government presented the agreement as fair and equit able, and the
accord was accepted without serious objec tion once it was made public. Regardless,
New foundland had taken "some hard diplom atic knocks."!" an experience that
coloured the Commissio n's attitude when it came to giving either the US or Canada
a further hold ove r New foundland.I?
Ironi cally as it turned out, the Adm iralty thought that the Newfo undland
gove rnment would probably prefer the Americans over the Canadians because the
12Dav id MacKenzie, Inside the Atlantic Triangle: Canada and the En/ranee of
Newfoundland info Confederation, 1939-1949 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 51.
I3 Library and Archiv es Canada (LAC) , Record Group (RG) 24, Vol. 11,956, NFM 2-8, L.E.
Emerson and J.G. Penson to Go vernor o f New foundland, 19 March 1941 .
"Tbid., Go verno r of Newfoundl and to Emerson and Pension, 17 March 1941.
lS" Letter Fro m Prime Min ister to Commissioner of Defence," Evening Telegram (St.
John' s), 27 March 1941.
16Neary, "Ne wfoundland and the Anglo-American Leased Bases Agreeme nt," 514.
17TNAI PRO, AD M 1/4387, M Branch, minute, 17 Jun e 1941.
US occup ancy would in all likelihood be less permane nt. 18 By this time, however,
the Canadians had already "set preparations in motion and it [was] too late to make
other arra ngements. v' " Londo n dec ided that in order to prevent furth er de lay, the
cost of estab lishing the base should be shared betwee n the I3ritish and Canadian
governments with the Newfoundland Commission as agent , and asked the
Americans for assistance und er Lend-Lea se. The Admiralty asked the Domi nions
Offic e to put pressure on both the Canadian and Newfoundla nd governments to
agree to this arrange ment, stress ing the impor tance of speed in esta blishing the base
and ask ing for coo peration to achieve this.z°
Whil e this was go ing on, a committee comprised of Admiral Sher idan, RN,
Captai n Schwer dt and Enginee r Captain Stephens, RCN, met with the
New foundland Commiss ion of Gover nment to discuss Rear-Admir al RN Bonham-
Carter's apprecia tion of the potent ial for St. John ' s to meet Admiralty requ irements.
Bonham- Carter was the RN 's Flag Offic er, Nor th Atlantic Esco rt Squadro n, based
in Halifax and had previou sly visited St. John ' s. Bonham -Carter felt that St. John 's
harbour could accommo date the force envisioned by the Admira lty but only with
considerable dredgin g and wharf construction. The Admiral further suggested that
Harbour Grace co uld also be used to handle any over flow , at least for vesse ls up to
the size of a corve tte . Still, acquiring the waterfront prop erty necessary for the base
was not go ing to be easy . The Commiss ion warned the Admiralty of the "great cost
"tu«, M Branc h, minute , 18 June 1941.
19/bid .,MBranch,minute, 17 June 194 1.
2°/bid.
which will be involved in compensating the owners of the waterfront properties for
the damages which will be caused to them by the requisitionin g of their premises.?"
Later in the month, the Base Planning Committee met to "make specific
recommendations" for facilities for St. John' s.22The com mittee propo sed that the
Knights of Columbus Building be purchased, that leases on the Reid and Angel
Build ings continue on a six-month basis, and that a new administration building
with a com bined Royal Canadian Navy (RCN)/Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF)
opera tions room be constructed. With the planned move of the Royal Rifles of
Canada to Valcartier, Quebec, accommodation for approximately twenty-five
officers and 1000 enlisted men would be provided in the Canadian Army barracks,
but canteens, sports and recreational facilities would have to be built. Most of the
committee ' s attention, however, was directed at the opera tional needs of the NEF.
Impr ovements to the harbour included appro ximately 3450 feet of wharf front age -
thirty-feet wid e - alon g the south side, and another 2065 linear feet of the same
width on the north side, both of whieh would require dred ging. Magazines would be
built on Crown lands outside the city. App roximately 85,400 square feet of storage
space (including 2400 square feet of refrigeration) was to be built in the dockyard
area along with 18,800 square feet for repair shops and another 5000 square feet for
torp edo stores. A 250 -bed hospital was proposed for a site next to the city 's General
Hospital , along with a separate sickbay near the army barracks. It further
2 ITNAIPRO, ADM 116/4526, Government of Newfoundland to Dominions Office, 6 June
22/b id ., AD M 1/4387, Base Planning Committee, Minutes of Twenty-s ixth Meeting, 23 June
recomm ende d that the existing army hospital "be set aside for V.D. cases. ,,23 While
the committee recogn ized that it was impossible to estimate the total cost of the
plan , it suggested that it "should not exceed" six million do llars .24 This figure did
not include the cost of acquiring the sites, and this was where the probl em lay .
Londo n recognized that the Newfound land gove rnment was not happy about
the Canadia n encroac hment and suspecte d that the cost es timates were probably
"swollen by the figures which [the Newfound land Govern ment were] in a position
to charge the Canadians for requisitione d property , and compensation to owners,
and other local services .,,25 This suspicio n would continue to cloud Canadian and
Brit ish relations with the Newfo undland gove rnment durin g the war. The British
High Comm issio ner to Canada warned the Adm iralty in July of his "apprehension
[over the] use of the New foundland Government as purchasing agent" for just this
reason.i" Indeed , Admir alty officials soon "s trongly suspect[ed that] the U.S.
Gove rnment [had] been soake d" by the Newfo undland gove rnment's compensation
board." Not surprisingly, Ottawa wanted to bypass the New foundland government
altogether and deal directl y with the British govemment.f The Admiralty was
getting tired of all the "complications [that had] arisen on the other side of the
"tu«
2S/bid., M Branch, minute, 27 June 1941.
"Tatd., British High Comm issione r to Canada to Adm iralty, 23 July 1941.
27/b id ., ADM 1/4388 , British Admiralty Delegation to Washington to Admiral ty, 5 August
28/b id., ADM 1/4387, Dominion s Office to British High Commissioner to Canada, 26 June
1947.
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Atlantic .,,29 From the very beginning, and in spite of the Canadian offer which
started the confu sion , it never harboured "any doubt that the capit al cost should be
[the Admiralty's] liability." Finally , after a month of bickerin g, the Admiralt y
reverted to its orig inal proposal to develop the base at St. John 's itself and invited
the Canad ian government "to assist with mater ials and transferab le equipment. "
Londo n also thou ght that the Americans cou ld help under the Lend-Lea se Program.
To allay the Newfo undland govern ment's concerns, title to the sites of the new
facilities would rest with either it or the British government.i''
The arrangement was finalized in a message to all parties at the end of June.
Notin g particul arly that the Newfoundl and gove rnment was in agreement, the
Admiralty announced that it would be responsible for providin g the naval facilities
and services for basing the NEF at St. John ' s. These facilities and services would be
arranged between the British and Newfo undland govern ments on an agency basis
per Admira lty plans and estimates . The occupation of exis ting premises and title to
new ones, as well as all associated sites and improvements, would be vested in
either the New foundland gove rnment or the Admiralty. The Admiralty would be
responsible for all capit al cos ts of these new works and serv ices . Canada, in turn,
would be responsible for the "administration and maintenance of the naval base,"
which would also be under the command of an RCN Commodore (Murray)." Ever
conscious of cost, the Canadian gove rnment requested clarification that the RCN's
maintenance responsibiliti es were limited to opera tions and not physical
29/bid., British High Commissioner to Canada to Admira lty, 23 Ju ly 1941.
30/bid., M Branch, minute,2 7 June 194 1.
»iu«, Admira lty to Chiefof Naval Staff (CNS) , Ottawa , 29 June 1941.
maint enance. Regardless, eve n though its actual capi ta l investment was now
minim al, Otta wa still felt it should have first right of refusa l on the base if the
Admiralt y should decide to transfer its share of the asse ts.32
The N EF was inaugurated on 2 June 1941 when I-IMC ships Chambly,
Orillia and Collingwood rendezvoused with l-IX-129 northeast of Newfoundland.33
As the Commodore Commanding, Newfo undland Force (CCNF) had not ye t
arrived, this was done under the authority of the Nava l Offic er in Charge (NOIC),
the ab le Captain Schwerdt. Commodore Murray arr ived shortly thereafter and set up
his office in the New found land Hotel along with Schwerdt.34 Murray had been
Commodo re Commanding Canadian Ship s (CCCS) in the UK and had attended a
series of naval staff meetings at the Admi ra lty as the RN pushed convoy escor t
further west in the winter of 1940/1941 . It was Murray who persuaded the C- in-C
Western App roaches Command, Sir Percy No ble, his old captain in HM S Calcutta,
that the gap in the tran s-Atl antic escort system co uld be so lved by crea ting a
Canadian base in Newfoundland . No doubt this play ed a great part in his
appointme nt to the post of CCNF ove r Mainguy, although Mur ray him sel f modestly
contended that he was merely "i n the right place at the right time.,,35 Consideri ng
32/bid., British High Commissioner to Ca nada to Domin ions Offi ce, 5 July 194 1.
3JMarc Milner, North Atlantic Run: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle for the
Convoys (Toronto : University of Toro nto Press, 1985), 47.
34LAC, RG 24, Flag Offic er, Newfo und land Force (FON F), Vol. 11,953, file 1-1- 1, vol. I,
Commodore Commanding, Newf ound land Force (CCN F) to Nav al Servic e Headqu arters, Ottawa
(NSHQ ), monthl y report , June 194 1. "Commodore" is really a title more than an actual rank and was
usually conferred upon a Capta in in a pos ition norm ally occupied by an Admiral. Murr ay was
promoted to Rear Admiral in Septemb er.
3SMarc Milner , "Rear-A dmira l Leonard Warren Murray: Canada' s Most Important
Operationa l Co mma nder," in Michael Whi tby, Richard H. Gimblett and Pete r Haydon (eds.), The
the size of Schw erdt' s staff at St. John' s when Murra y arrived, CCN F was lucky the
depot ship HMS Forth arriv ed the next day, and he was able to draft some of the
crew to handle the greatly increased code and cipher traffic and to man the Staff
Office (Operations) full time."
During July, the NEF was organized into twelve groups, eleven for regular
convoy escort and one for special convoy s, such as those for troopships, and an
operational schedule based on a I IO-day cycle commenced on 12 July. Six RCN
corvettes were allocate d to the Newfoundland Local Defence force, but while the
first patrol s of the Strait of Belle Isle were started, CCN F discontinu ed them after
only two convoys due to fog. However, five local convoys from Wabana were
escor ted during the month. Progress was made with the anti- torpedo baffle at the
entrance to S1. John's harbour , with buoys being laid out to mark the extremit ies of
the two northern barriers and steps taken to put attachments in the rocks to hold the
inshore end.3? The baffle was completed by the end of August despite being
damaged by HMS Chesterfield on 24 August." By the end of the month , 129
warships had passed throu gh St. John ' s, consumin g 14,000 tons of fuel oil. Admiral
Murray reported that even with this number of ships, the supp ly of fuel was
adequate and fuelling arrangements were working well. This service, however, was
Admirals: Canada's Senior Naval Leadership in the Twentieth Century (Toronto: Dundum Press,
2006), 96-123. See a lso Roger Sarty , " Rear-Admiral L.W. Murray and the Batt le of the Atlantic : The
Professional Who Led Canada's Citizen Sailors." in Bernd Horn and Stephen 1. Harris (eds.),
Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders (Toro nto: Dundum Press, 200 1),
165-186.
36Schwerdt'sstaff at the time consisted of himself and three other offic ers plus three typists
and one writer. LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,953, file 1-1-1, vol. 1, CCNF to NSIIQ , monthly report,
June 1941.
"tu«, CCNF, monthly Report, July 1941.
»tu«.CCNF, monthly report , August 1941.
provided by facilities afloat, and Murray argued that more permane nt faciliti es
ashore were "an urgent nccessity .v'"Also during July , approva l was given to
construct the naval hospital, but in the interim, temporary accom modations were
arranged in the basement of the Memorial College on Parade Stree t.40
At the same time, a delegatio n consisting ofRear Admira l Sheridan, Mr. R C
Thompso n of the Mini stry of War Transport, Mr. Andrew s, the Officer in Charge of
Works in Bermuda and Mr. EA. Seal, head of the British Admiralty Delegation
(BAD) in Washington , arrived in St. John ' s. The purpose of the visi t was to provide
the Admiralty with an on-the-ground appraisal as to what was requir ed to establish
the escort base.4 lThe first issue was the small size of St. John ' s harbour and the
resulting conges tion. Sea l observe d that the harbour was so congeste d that the
introducti on of naval vesse ls would result in a decrease in space for merchant ships
(and vice versa). The biggest problem was providing alongside accommodation for
the NEF.42 The north side of the harbour was occupied by the town , and the various
commerc ial firms were crowded together along the waterfront. Sir Wilfred Woods,
Commissioner of Public Utilities with the Newfoundl and Gove rnment advised the
delegation that expropriation of this waterfront property would not only
detriment ally impact on the economy of New foundland but also would be
"ex tremely expensive." The Americans were already developin g the east side just
39/b id .
4o/b id.
4'TNA /PRO, ADM 1/4387, memor andum, St. John' s, Newfou ndland Nava l Base, 8 July
west of the en trance to the harbour to accommodate their shipping. The south side
was occupied by commercial firms, the main ones being Imperial Oil, Job Brothers
and Bowrin g Brother s Ltd. The jettie s, Seal observed , were " in an extremely
ramshackle condi tion" and requir ed extensive impro vement s to meet naval
standards. The only bright spot was the Newfo undland Dockyard, owned by the
New foundland gove rnme nt, which Ministry of War representative Thompson
concluded was "effic iently and keen ly run.'A3
In the course of the ir investigations, the delega tion discove red that Canadian
authorities planned to take over a large parcel of land at the extreme northwest
corner of the harbour. This property was utilized by two coa l import compa nies and
occupie d by "extremely old and decrepit buildings" whic h would require
demoliti on . It would also be necessary to build a breastwork around the prope rty to
provid e berthin g for two destro yers alongside and to accommodate the workshops
on shore. Sea l quoted Lt. Jeckell , RCNR, a Canadian civil engineer , who suggeste d
that buildin gs of standard Canadian design could be constructed on the site for
seventeen cent s a cubic foot.44 The only practical plan for providin g space alongside
for the ship s of the NEF, the delegation concluded , was to impro ve and extend the
exis ting wharfage on the south side of the harbour. With that view in mind, Seal
thought that if the British govern ment were going to inves t so much money on
improving the own ers ' sites, this should be reflected in the rent they were charged.
The problem was that the owners wanted to be left alone and not have their
"tse:
44lbid.
premises impro ved because they felt that use by the Admiralty would cause them a
"considerable amount of inconvenience and extra expense." From the other side, the
need to j uggle naval berthing to accommodate commercial mar itimc activity would
necessitate more wharfage than was required for naval purposes. On this subject ,
there seems to have been some confusion as to the size and composition of the
propose d NE F. Sea l and his comra des appear to have been under the impression that
they were see king to accommodate only the thirty-four dest royers ass igned to the
NEF, only seven of which would be in the harbour at anyone time. They thought
that the remaind er of the force - the corvettes and sloops - would be based in
Halifax. They did , however, recogn ize that a local defence force of live corvettes,
six minesweepers, four Fairmile pat rol boats, a boom lighter, a tug and four harbour
craft also had to be accommodated."
On 10 July 1941, Seal presented his report to Sir Wilfred Woods for
approv al by the Commission.46 At the same time, Wood s submitted Thompson's
report to the Commission members, inform ing them that it dealt "entirely with the
dockyard and other requ irements of merchant ships in St. John 's harbour."
Thompson's report point ed out the difficulty caused by the congestion in the
harbour. He suggested that even though forty-six merchant vessels were present in
the harbour at one point durin g the previous year, this did not mean that the harbour
could accommodate such a large number consistently or safely. He felt that thirty
was the maximum numb er under normal circumstances and suggested that this
' Sfb id.
· · Prov incial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador (PANL) , GN 38, S4-2-4, file 2,
memora ndum for Commiss ion of Gove rnmen t, 10 July 194 1.
would be further reduced to twenty-five when the RCN was using some of the
harbour faci lities. Thomp son made a number of recommend ations for improvin g the
efficiency of the port , including straightening and enlarging berthin g facilities on the
north (or town) side of the harbour, bui lding new shops, and appointin g a full-time
hull and mac hinery surveyor to dete rmine the type of repair work that needed to be
undertake n and its prior ity. The estimate d cost of this work was $750,000:17
None of this would work, however, without Thompson's most important
recomm endation - the recruitm ent and training of additional labour to facilitate
current and future ship repair needs. Thompson sugges ted that the British
experience of ensuring that there was alwa ys a suffic ient numb er of ships
undergoin g repairs to keep the expanded workforce occupied should lessen any
union resistanc e to the plan.48 The British gove rnment accepted the responsibility
for the cost of trainin g up to 200 men and asked the Newfoundland gove rnment to
arrange it. Lond on also sugges ted that Newfoundland might want to adopt measures
that had been undertaken in British shipyards, where the Emergency Powers
Defence Order provid ed that every worker employed in shipbuilding or repair was
to be paid for every week he was "capable and available for work," even if he did
not actually work .49 This provision appeased trade union concerns, and thus with the
"complete agreement" of the unions involved, the Newfoundland government
47/bid.
48/bid.
49/bid., GN 38, S4-2-3.3 , file 4, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Gove rnor of
Newfo undland, 8 September 1941. London agreed to cove r the total cost of this scheme in Decembe r
1941. See ibid., Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Governor of Newfo und land, 20 December
194 1.
propos ed to start the program with an initial intake of twenty-five men in mid-
September, increasing to " 100 or more if we find such numb ers can be handled.,,5o
Although reservations abou t the success of the scheme lingered , and some delays
were experienced, the first twenty-five apprentices were take n on by the midd le of
November. 51
Meanwhil e, durin g August, twenty-on e convoys were escorted without loss
using no fewer than four escorts each. Further protection was provided when
combined RCN/ RCAF operat ions commenced, facilitated by situating an RCAF
opera tions room next to the RCN operations room, with a direct line to the telegraph
room of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs and two city lines. In addit ion, a
cont inuous listening watch was instituted at several Departme nt of Posts and
Telegrap h wireless sta tions outside St. John ' s which were in contact with
approx imately 100 low-power wireless stations throug hout the coasta l regions of
Newfoundland. Observers were instructed to report any and all aircraft - espec ially
at night - as well as any unidentifi ed ships, gear or wreckage.Y This led to a mine
being reported by a New foundland Ranger in La Scie on the Baie Verte Peninsula in
mid-A ugust. It had been picked up off Horse Islands by a local resident and towed
ashore. Apparen tly the finder had hoisted it on to the pier and with the help of
severa l of the local men then rolled it a considerab le distance to his store house. The
50/bid., GN38, S4-2-3.3, file 4, Secretary of State for Dominion Affa irs to Governor of
Newfo undland, 13 September 1941. See also "Mechanics to Tra in at Loca l Dockyard s," Evening
Telegram(St. John' s),22August 1941.
51pANL, GN38 , S4-2-3.3, file 4, Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for
Dominion Affairs, 14 November 1941.
52LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,953, file 1-1-1, vol. I, CCNF, monthl y report, August 1941.
ranger suggested that it was miraculous that "a ll the people living in the little
.were not blown to pieces.,,53
But the high point of the month was the arrival in Newfoundland of l-IMS
Prince of Wales carrying Prime Minister Churchill and USS Augusta with President
Roosevelt on board . Up to this point, all Allied convoy s and their esco rts were under
Admira lty contro l. This changed in August when Churchill arrived in Placentia Bay
to meet with Rooseve lt to plan war objectives which ultimate ly produced the
Atlantic Charter.54 As a result of this confere nce, the US Navy (USN) assume d
strategic cont rol over the Western Atlantic and took over the escor t of all IIX
convoys and fast west bound convoys, leaving the slow SC convoys for the RCN.
Meanwhile, plans for the esco rt base were also finalized, and towards the
end of the month Mur ray presented the Commiss ion of Government with the actual
drawings for the proposed deve lopment for approva l. On them he noted the harbour
improvements - the Naval Dockyard and wharves on the northeast side of the
harbour next to the Newfo undland Dockyard, plus the wharves, refue lling facilities
and the underground magazine on the south side . The naval barracks wou ld be built
ju st north of Prince of Wales College (between Golf Ave nue and Prince of Wales
53Ibid., Ranger B. Gill to Chief Ranger, 16 August 1941 , in CCNF , monthly report , October
" Ibid., CCNF , monthl y report, August 1941. The Atlantic Charter was the procl amation
made by Churchill and Roosevelt at the conclusion of the ir mee ting in Placentia Bay and promi sed a
return to freedo m and dem ocracy for all mankind. It is somew hat ironic that this histor ic meeting
took place in Ne wfoundland, which at the time was under the governance of a non-elected
commissio n appo inted by Britain, and the United States was a neutral nation . See Peter Neary ,
Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 1929-1949 (Montrea l: McGi ll-Quee n' s Unive rsity Press,
1988; 2nd ed., Mo ntrea l: McGill-Q uee n' s University Press, 1996) , 162; Samue l Eliot Mori son,
History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. I: The Bailie of the Atlantic,
September 1939-May 1943 (Bo ston: Litt le, Brown , and Co. 1947; reprint , Urbana: Univ ersity of
Illinois Press, 200 2),69-70; and Sando r S. Klein, "Wou ld Disarm Aggressors and Restore Self-Rule
to All ," New York World-Telegram, 14 August 1941.
Stree t), the naval hospit al adjace nt to the Fever Hospital (Cave ll St reet) and the
comb ined office r's acco mmodation and administration bui lding next to the
Newfoundland Hotel (Plymouth Road) . He informed the Commiss ion that all
construction contracts were placed with the ECM Cape Company and that dredging
wou ld be undert aken by J.P. Porter and Sons. Eve r mind ful of local sensitivities,
Murra y also inform ed the commiss ion that all parties had been rem inded of the
necessity of ob tain ing the "requisite permi ssion of the Muni cipa l Authorit ies.,,55
This eve ntua lly led to some problems when the City Council demanded payment for
buildin g permit s and the Ca nad ian Departm ent of Na tional Defence refu sed to send
them the plans becau se parts were considered secret.56
In September there were a co uple of major changes in the Newfoundland
Command. First, Murr ay was promoted to Rear-Admir al and became Flag Offic er
New foundland Force (FONF) . The second was the re-o rganiza tion of the NEF into
six six-ship escort groups in anticipation of the plann ed withd rawal of all RN ships
from the NEF as a result o f the USN takin g over respon sibility for the I-IX convoys
and fast westbound con voys. Initi ally, the Admiralty thought that the America n
SSpANL, GN 38, S4-2-4 , file 5, CCNF to Sir Wilfred Woods, 25 August 194 1.
s6LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,949, file I- I-I , Department of National Defence (DND) to
CCNF, 25 November 25 1941 ; and DND to CCNF, 6 December 194 1. This was not the only instance
of tension between the city administration and the Canadian government. The City ofSt. John ' s felt
that the Canadians should pay property taxes on their facilities and share the cost of road
maintenance due to the increased traffic and damaged caused by the variousservices. In one instance,
a Canadian cont ractor was accused of driv ing his tractor home for hismidday meal,l eaving a trail of
torn pavem ent in his wake. The Canadian government felt it was exempt from paying taxes and
accepted no liabili ty for the extra wear and tear on the city ' s roads. However, it did agree to a one-
time lump sum payment to help repair the roads and promised to instruct its contractors to practice
due diligence with city property and services . City ofSt. John' s Archives. See, for example, City of
St. John ' s Arch ive, MG40 , Jackman Collection, 2-2-2, file 38, J.J. Mahoney to Charles Burchell, 6
October 1943; Burchell to Mahoney, 25 November 1943; Mahoney to Major-General J.B. Brooks,
14 Apri l 1943; Mahoney to Commodore C.R.H. Tay lor, 10 June 1944; and Mahoney to E.G.M. Cape
and Co . Ltd., 7 Jun e 1944.
assumption of j urisdict ion would release RN forces for service in the eastern
Atlantic. However, it soon became evident that the NEF did not have the forces,
most particu larly destroy ers, to protect the SC convoys properly, and the Admiralty
agreed instead to detail five more RN destroyers and seven corvettes to the NEF.57
Even so, Murray felt his forces were still inadequate for the job at hand, espec ially
since of the twelve RN ships committed, only three were immed iately avai lable. The
rest were refittin g or had suffered serious breakdowns and were under repair. In
addition, two destroyers were detached from the NEF to escort the hospital ship
Pasteur and as part of the protection for the troop convoy TC-14. Neve rtheless,
Murra y hoped it would be possible to maintain escort groups of eight warships,
including two destroyers, in each group.58 At the same time, Murray tried to
acco mmodate the new American command arrangement in the Western Atlantic.
To this end, "excellent liaison" was maintained durin g the month between
Murray and his staff and that of the Commander of US Task Force 4 (TF4) ,
Argentia, Adm iral Bristo l, and his staff. Both senior offic ers exchanged courtesy
visits, and held conferences to iron out the strategic changes agreed upon between
London and Washin gton the month before. To lubri cate the transition, and to
encourage good relations, Bristol and Murray appointed perma nent liaison officers
to each others' staffs. As well , he sent commanders of RN and RCN destroyers to
Argentia for inform al discussions with their American counterparts.i"
S7/bid ., 953, CCNF, monthly report, September 1941.
s8/bid., CCN F, monthly report, September 1941.
s9/bid.
With the re-organizat ion of the Western Atlantic convoyi ng system, the
sailing schedules for fast and s low convoys departing from Halifax and Sydney,
respecti vely, were also changed. They now left every six days , as wou ld the
correspondin g fast and slow outward bound (ON) convoys from the UK. HX
convoys took the Cape Sable route along the south coast of Newfoundland to the
WESTOM P, while the SC convoys traveled the more round-about route through the
Strait of Belle Isle. While Murray could not maintain a full-time patrol of the Strait,
he did detach ships of the Newfoundland Defence Force to perfo rm anti-submarine
(A/S) sweeps for SC-44 and SC-45 during the montb.' "
The NEF also scored its first victory over the U-boats durin g September. As
I-1MCS Chambly (Commander Prent ice, SO) and HMCS Moose Jaw were the only
two ships ass igned to the New foundland Defence Force at the time, they sailed in
company early in the month on a trainin g cruise along the convoy routes so that they
could offer immediate assistance if requ ired . The two corvettes sailed from St.
John ' s on 5 Septemb er and were consequently well place when U-boats attacked
SC-42 on the 9th• Chambly and Moose Jaw proceeded to a point approximately five
miles ahead of the convoy, and in a brief but wild melee that includ ed the U-boat
captain climbin g onto Chambly from his conning tower, they sank U-501. While
Chambly return ed home with its prisoners, Moose Jaw remained with the convoy
for the rema inder of its voyage."
6Olbid.
61lbid.
Meanwhile, base construction ashore was proceed ing slowly. Bad weather at
the beginning of September resulted in the loss in transit of two scows owned by
J.P. Porter and Sons. This considerably delayed progress in dredging various parts
of St. John ' s harbour because a replacement did not arrive unti l the third week of
Septembe r. No sooner had work commenced when prob lems arose over where to
dump the dredged materials. Without asking the Newfoundland government, the
contractor assumed that the spoils from the dredg ing could be dumped back into the
harbour. Thi s was not the case, and it was only after numerous appeals to the
Commission that permi ssion to do so - with minor cond itions such as clearing any
floati ng debr is - was given.62
By the end of September the site for the administration bui lding was cleared;
the foundation walls of the six central wings of the hospital were poured and some
of the framing compl eted; the excavation and some of the found ation for the
barracks were parti ally completed; and the concrete walls and some the roof rafters
for the barracks garage were in place . In addition, the clearance of the dockyar d site
was ninety-fiv e percent complete, and construction of the wireless station and the
Port War Signal Station were progressing well. In the interim , HMS Greenwich and
HMS Georgian (renamed Avalon 11 and used for accommodation) arrived to take
over from Forth, which left on 18 September.f Unfortunately, Avalon II was
overcrowded unti l the passenger vessel, HMCS Prince Henry , which had been
62/bid.
rtu«; RG 24, FONF, RG 24, Vol. 11,953, file 1-1- 1, vol. I, Report of Proceedings by the
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requisi tioned by the Canadian government, arrived in Novemb er to take the
over flow .64
In October the re-organization of the NEF into six groups of eight ships was
completed, and Murray expressed his hope to keep each group intact. The arriva l of
three Free Frenc h corve ttes assigned to the NEr helped faci litated this . He also
hoped to give the groups more time in port. The opera tiona l schedule allowed each
group to have a short turnaround in Iceland and then about eleven days at St. John' s.
This longer period in port not only gave the crews a respite from the rigours of the
Battle of the Atlantic but also allowed the repair and upgrading of equipment,
particularly RD F (radar). The North Atlantic was hard on the ships of the NEr , most
especially the delicate electronic gear. The heavy pounding of the Atlantic swells
dam aged asdie domes, and rattled del icate vacuum tubes, and the salt water
corroded contacts and wiring. Furthermore, engines and boilers often needed
attention after every cross ing, guns required routining, and the scrap ing and painting
of rust spots on exposed surfaces was a constant necessity. Layovers also provided
the opportunity for trainin g. To achieve this, FONF sent the I3ritish submar ine L-27
which to Harbour Grace to train escort crews in anti-submar ine detec tion and
tactics. Mur ray also sugges ted that ships visiting Harbour Grace should not only
train in AlS but also carry out all around " work-outs" (general dri ll, gunnery
practice, etc.) .65
"tu«, Report of Proceedi ngs for the Month of Novembe r, Captain of the Port, in CCNF,
monthly report , Nove mber 1941.
65/bid., CCNF , monthly report, October 194 1.
About this time , the contractor assigned to bui ld the RCN faci lities began to
have diffic ulties with the local longshoremen ' s union. In a letter to Capt. Schwerdt ,
Edgar Gi lbert of the Canadian Department of Natio nal Defence (DND) complain ed
that a crew of longshoremen unloading piles from a ship had take n a week to handle
only half of the cargo. In addition , they halted work in the midd le of one afterno on
to atte nd a meet ing, but they returned intoxicated and quit worki ng two hours later,
having acco mp lished little. The followi ng day, he claime d that longshoremen
prevented the contrac tor from unloading railway cars to transport materials off-site,
threate ning a work stoppage if the contracto r did so.66 On anot her occa sion , having
demanded the job of unloading lumber for dock construction, local longshoremen
left the jo b incomplete, requiring it to be finished by the contrac tor whose men
unloaded the lumber at a rate three times faster than the local longshoremen."
Gilbert char ged that the longshoremen were causing unnecessary delays and
expense and that their actions practically "amount[ed] to sabotage ." He enquired
whether it was "possible to prohibit longshoremen, as a union, from handl ing
defence materials?,,68 Mur ray had expressed the same view to Sir Wilfred Woods
severa l month s earlier when, on a couple of occasio ns, valuable ships missed their
sailings because longshoremen refused to work durin g bad weather. If the men
knew the imp ortance of the cargoes, Murray felt they probably would have
continued working, but rather caustica lly he told the commiss ioner that it was not
66Jbid., Edgar Gilbert to Captain of Port, 23 Octobe r 1941, in CCNF, monthly report,
October 194 1.
67Jbid., Gilbert to Capt. C.M.R. Schwerdt, 29 Octob er 1941, in CCN F, monthly report,
October 194 1.
68Jbid., Gilbert to Schwerdt, 23 Octob er 1941.
navy policy to "take the whole water-front into our confide nce.,,69 A possible
contributing factor to this obstinacy was the ill-wi ll that was create d among the local
population by the Commission of Governme nt' s two-t ier wage scale.7o
Delays in acquiring the required sites added to these tensions, with the
Newfoundland gove rnment blaming the Cana dians, and vice versa, for the hold-ups.
A flurry of correspondence during the month between the New foundland
Commissioner of Public Utilities, Sir Wilfred Woods and Murray clearly illustrate
the frustration on the part of both sides . Woods accused the Canadian authorities of
leaving arrangements in a "half-baked coudition.T" to which the FONF retorted that
Woods was " inclined to feel hurt at being left with no one to hold his hand in these
arrangements.t' Y The root of the problem was the issue of compensation for
landowners affected by the establishment of the RCN base. An arbitration board
was originally set up in mid-194 I to assess compensat ion for parti es with claims
against the US assoc iated with the Anglo-American Leased Bases Agreement. " The
Newfo undland Gove rnment detailed this same board to assess compe nsation for
people who were dislocated or otherwise inconvenienced by the establishment of
HMCS Avalon. The head of the BAD, E.R. Sea l, expressed concern about the
69/bid., 95 1, Capt. L.W. Murray to Woods, 10 July 194 1.
70In an attempt to contain inflation and protect local business from having to match the
wages paid by Amer ican and Ca nadian contractors, the Commission of Governm en t brought in a
maximum wage scale for local labour. This caused consid erabl e dissent because if two men were
doing the same job but one was from outside New foundland, the local man would be paid less than
his Amer ican or Canadian co-worker. For a full discussion , see Steven High , Base Colonies in the
Western Hemisphere, 1940-1967 (New York: Palgrave Macmill an , 2009).
7ILAC, RG 24, FONF , Vol. 11,949 , Wood s to Murray , I Octo ber 194 1.
"tu«, FONF to NS HQ, 1 October t941.
73High, Base Colonies, 141 - 146. See also Neary, Newf oundland in the North Atlantic World,
board's awards as early as the summer of 1941, whe reby he state d that he thought
that the Ame ricans had been "soaked.,,74 Seal felt that the board had made
"excessive awards, " charging that it had shown "a scandalously biassed [sic] and
casua l mann er." He was equally as critica l of the Newfoundl and government's
lawyer, who Sea l saw as " incompetent, if not worse .,,75 The difficulty lay mainly
with the interpretation of " market value." The American s, Britis h and Canadians
viewed it as simply what a property was worth on the open market without due
consideration to local conditi ons. The Newfo undland gove rnment, on the other
hand, felt it also had to includ e "injurious affection" and awarded compensation for
such thing s as lost business, loss of a vegetable garden, or relocation of a fishing
stage . In one case it even awarded compensation for a haystack. 76 This difference
of opini on continu ed to cause problems and in August 1942, R.W. Rankin, a
Canadian government real estate advisor, arrived to report on the workings of the
arbitration board for the Canadian govemment.f
Novemb er turned out to be a rough month for both the NEF and the
Newfoundland Command in general. First of all, the weather was continuous ly bad.
This had a detrim ental effect on both the men and the ships of the NEF, not only due
to actual weather ancl/or battle damage but also because cross ings took longer,
74TNA/ PRO, ADM 116/4388, British Admir alty Delegation (BA D) to Admi ralty, 5 August
1941.
viu«; BAD to Adm iralty, 15 March 1942.
76Christopher A. Sharpe and AJ . Shawyer, " Building a Wartime Landscape ," in Steven
High (ed.), Occupied St. John 's: A Social History of a City at War, 1939-1945 (Montrea l: McGill -
Queen's Unive rsity Press, 2010) , 44-46 . See also High, Base Colonies, 141-146.
77LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,953, file 1-1- 1, vol. I, Report of Proceedings by
Maintenance Captai n, Captain of the Port, in FONF, monthly report , August 1942.
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which meant that there was less time in harbour for the esco rts and their crews. To
offset this, Naval Service Headquart ers (NSHQ) sugges ted that the number of
groups in the NEF be increased. Murray had reservations about this because there
were not enough destroyers to go around as it was. Indeed, during November only
six of the thirteen destroyers assigned to the NEF were operation al, and Murray did
not expect this situation to improve. I-Ie complained that the ex-USN Town-class
destroyer s were undependable and that even the River-cla ss destroyers were
enduring punishment at sea.78 Lord Beaverbrook 's reservation s about trading British
territory for fifty obsolete destroyers in the Anglo-American Leased Bases
Agreement seem to have been justified.
Aside from the difficulties with the weather, it soon became evident that the
U-boats were venturing further westward in search of targets . On 3 November , SC-
52 was attacked off the northeast coast of Newfo undland, losing four ships in two
attacks. The convoy scattered and returned to Sydney, but by this time the
movements of U-boats southward towards Cape Race had sparked some special
patrols off St. John ' s. Unfortunately, while the Special Harbour Patrols did not
encounter any U-boa ts, HMCS Ouganda was lost when, while on patrol at the inner
baffles, the engine backfired and burst into flames. The depth charges were rendered
safe and dropped overboard, and the crew taken off without injury before the vessel
sank.79
Construction of the base continued satisfactorily durin g the month, and Capt.
Schwerdt trave lled to Ottawa to report on progress . Murray was gratified to learn
78Ibid., 953, FONF, monthl y report, Novemb er 1941.
79Ibid., Gilb ert to Schwerdt , 29 October 1941, in FONF, month ly report, November 1941.
that the Admiralty had agreed to the construction of the hospital as originally
envisioned, namely without a section reserved for merchant seamen casualties and
with a separate accommodat ion block for nurses. The Admiralty also agreed to a
third seamen's block at the naval barracks and the completion of a new wharf on the
south side of the harbour, opposite the Bowring Brothers ' and Job Brothers '
properties. Further progress was made in dredging the harbour, and construction
was started on the RCN wharf on the south side. Unfortunately, some of the original
wharf along the Cashin property had to be demolished to build cribwork, which
reduced the space available for berthing warships by 150 feet. In addition, three
tunnels of appro ximately thirty feet each were blasted into the Southside Hills for
the magazines.soWork on the foundations and sidewalls at the naval dockyard had
also commenced. Most important, the Mobile Training Unit (MTU) garage was
finished and now housed the training bus. The wireless building and the Port War
Signal station at Cape Spear were also well advanced. The six centre wings and the
four north wings of the hospital were shelled and roofed but still needed windows
and doors, all of which were on order. Building #2 (workshop) of the naval barracks
was at a similar stage, while Building #1 (the sickbay and guardhouse) was weather-
tight and now used as sleeping quarters for the mechanics. According to the Captain
Schwerdt's report , work on the rest of the naval barracks complex was "proceeding
satisfactorily.v" However, HMCS Avalon almost suffered a serious setback in
SO/bid., Report of Proceedings for the Month of November, in CCN F, monthly report,
November 1941.
SI/bid.
November when a major fire threatened the offic ers' adm inistration and
accommodations block next to the Newfoundland Hotel.
Durin g the Second World War, there were a number of devastatin g fires in
St. John 's. 82 Probably the most notorious occurred at the new Knight s of Columbus
hoste l on Harvey Road just before Christmas 1942, but in a tow n compri sed of
mainly old, attac hed, wooden-frame buildings, any fire could be catastrop hic. The
one at "The Arena" on the night of 28 Novembe r 1941 was no different. Formerly
known as the Prince' s Rink , the building was located j ust behind the Newfo undland
Hotel and was owned by the Arena Rink Company of which prom inent St. John's
businessmen Chesley Crosbie and Chesley Pippy were the major shareholders. The
fire started early in the evening, and the Central and Eastern Fire Stations
responded . Befor e long, however, it was evident that more equipment was needed
and, for the first time in eight years, a second alarm was rung, signifyi ng that all
ava ilable fire equipment was required. All the armed forces in the city responded.
The Ameri cans sent two pump er trucks from Fort Pepperrell , and Ame rican and
Canadian army, air force and naval personnel grabbe d shovels , axes , and buckets to
help contain the fire. Sparks and flamin g debris fell among the lumber at the RCN
admini stration buildin g, which was located adjacent to the arena, but fortunately
servicemen posted there prevented the fire from spreading to the partially
construct ed buildin g. Ultimatel y, the surrounding structures were saved with little
smoke or fire dama ge, but the forty-two-year-old skating arena and the adjace nt St.
John ' s Curling Club buildin gs were both total losses, a severe blow to both the
82Governor Walwyn observed that many of these fires occurred on Saturday nights when
these places would have been full of service personnel. PANL, DO 35/135 9, Gov ernor ' s Report, 30
June 1945.
civi lian popu latio n and the various armed forces in the city. Ten thousand dollars
insurance was carried on the Curlin g Club building and eighty thousand on the
Arena .83
On the same day as the tire, an "extremely interesting meetin g" took place,
pres ided over by Cha irman of the Harbours Board , Sir Wilfred Woods. Capt.
Schwerdt, Commander E.L. Armstrong, RCN, local Ministry of War Transport
representative Eric Bowring attended , as well as the Mari ne Superintendent of the
Newfo undland Railway and a number of shipping agents and wharf owners. The
purpose of the meeting was ostensibly to discuss the problem of congestion in St.
John ' s harbour. The problem had two main causes: ships were waiting too long to
be unloaded and it was taking too long to clear warehouse and wharf space of cargo.
The first was the result of the second, and the second was due to plain old human
greed.84
Knowin g of the large orders being placed by American and Canadian
authorities, firms both large and small were hoardin g stock in anticipation of
shipping difficulti es, thus occupying warehouse and dock space that was needed for
other purpo ses. As a result , ships idled in the middl e of the harbour waiting for
sufficient space to become available to unload. Combined with the difficult ies with
local longshoremen, it is easy to understand the frustration of naval authorities. In
the end, the Chair man of the Customs Board prom ised to tackle the immed iate
problem of the cleara nce of cargo currently on wharves and in warehouse s and
""Arena and Curling Rink Completely Destroyed in Spec tacular Blaze, Evening Telegram
(St. John ' s), 29 Nove mber 1941; and LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,953, file I-I -I , vol. I, Report of
Procee dings, in FONF , monthly report, Nove mber 194 1.
84LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,953, file I-I-I , vol. I, Report of Proceedin gs for the Month
of Nove mber , in FONF, monthly report , November 194 1.
undertook to investigate the construction of a bonded ware house to facilitate faster
clearance of goods from these areas, presumably by prov iding alternate secure
storage facil ities.85
Decemb er was a fairly quiet month for the New foundland Command.
Continuing bad weather throughout the month caused damage and delays among the
NEF, but there were no attacks on NEF-es corted convoys. FONF decided at the end
of the Decemb er to re-organize the NEF into seven groups from six, thus reducing
the compos ition of each group to six warships. While this was not ideal, Murray felt
that at least this scheme provided for a reasonable period between crossings for ship
repair and rest and trainin g for the crew. To help compensate for the weaker group
strength, Mur ray proposed that ships from other "longest off ' convoys could detach
temp oraril y to ass ist ones that were clearly threatened. In addition, four ex-Sydney
Force corvettes were due to join in January, bringing the force up to sixty corvettes,
and NSHQ promi sed that five modifi ed corvettes were earmarked for the NEF when
they became ava ilab le. Unfortunately, some of the older corvet tes would be
detached to Charles ton, South Carolina, for modi fication . The first six-ship group
sailed from St. John ' s on 22 December to escort SC_61.86
Of course, in December 1941, after the Japanese bombin g of Pearl Harbor,
the Americ ans officially joined the war. This did not have much initial impact on
the operations of the NEF, although the Commander of Task Force 4 (TF 4), under
whose command the NEF operated, did order the ships of the NE F to commence
8S/bid.
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hostilities with Japan forthwith.f"This caused a bit of confusion at the time because
Canada had yet to issue its own declaration of war aga inst Japan." Such
embarrassments illustrate the difficult command-and-contro l situation facing the
New foundland Command. While Murray co-operated quite well with Admiral
Bristol in Argcntia , the same cou ld not be said about the officer commanding US
ground forces in Newfoundland, Major-General G.C. Brant. At a meet ing with the
heads of the Canadian army and air force in Newfoundland, Brigadier Earnshaw and
Group Captain MacEwan, Brant expressed displeasure at his treatment, complainin g
that even though he was the ranking officer in St. John ' s he was being treated "like
a Second Licutenant. ,,89 Gove rnor Walwyn thought him to be very co-opera tive and
efficient and "likc[d] him very much personally.r" but the heads of the Canadian
services found Brant to be belligerent , inconsistent and prone to "s it by himself and
nurse imagined wrongs." Murra y suggested that he should be kept "sweet" by
keeping him constantly inform ed. To this end, Brant assigned a Major Meyer as a
liaison officer on Murray's staff.91
With the Americans now full particip ants in the conflict and their facili ties in
New foundland an integral part of Western Hemisphere defence, local military
authorities addressed the issue of Newfoundland' s vulnerability to attack . Brant felt
"tu«, RG 24, FONF, Vol. t 1,505, MS 1550- 14636-1, Secretary of the Navy, Washington,
to FONF, 7 Decemb er 1941 .
"tu«, FONF to Naval Secretary, NSHQ, 8 December 1941.
S9/bid., FONF to Naval Secretary, NSHQ, 3 1 December 1941.
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9 1LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,505, MS 1550- 14636-1, FONF to Nava l Secretary , NSHQ,
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that an attack was not only possible "but very probab le." After Pearl Harbor, he was
concerne d that aircraft catapulted from merchant ships would spearhead any
attack.92 With this in mind, Murra y and Brant, along with all the other service heads,
met with Newfoundl and commissioners Emerson, Puddester, Wild and Winter at
Emerson's office to discuss defence arrangeme nts for Newfou ndland. All agreed
that an attack would have to come from the sea and wou ld like ly take the form of an
air assault." The Kriegsmarine had four aircraft catapult ships which Murray felt
would be the most likely vehicles for any attack on St. John ' s. They had the range
and endurance, and two could carry multiple aircra ft. The others carried at least one
aircraft each , and all could be used as mother ships for a larger force. Murray
forwarded this intelligence to Brant.94 Consequently, a comprehensive blackout
regime was discussed . Emerson proposed that a two-week continuous blackout be
tried at the end of January . Notice would be given in newspapers, and the
regulations would cover all of St. John ' s and surrounding area, includ ing
Conception Bay . During the blackout , local radio stations would be asked to
suspend their broadca sts so that enemy forces could not use them to home in on
their targets. The committee conclud ed that air raid shelters were impractic al since
an effecti ve shelter needed to be at least thirty feet underground to protect against
high-explo sive bomb s and St. John ' s, for the most part , sits on solid rock. Further,
as an air assault would come from the sea and thus be limited in size, a sustained
attack was not anticipated, and because radar had not yet been installed, the raid
92/bid., Vol. 11,951, Brant to Admira l Commandi ng, New foundland, 24 Decembe r 194 1.
93 PANL, GN 38, S4- 1-6, file 8, Civil Defence Meeting, minutes, 15 December 1941.
94LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,951, Murray to Gene ral G.C. Brant, 6 January 1942.
would probab ly be over before peop le could take shelter. Thu s, the committee fclt
that the main cause of casualti es would be falling debri s and splinters. Experience in
Britai n showed that the best defence against this was for peop le to stay in their
homes , under stairs or in cupboards or pantries, and to tape or board up windows."
However , the committee thought that any attack ing forces wou ld probably usc
incendiaries as opposed to high-explosive bombs, so fire actually posed the biggest
danger.96
Any attack on St. John ' s would probably concentrate on shippi ng in the
harbour and the docks. But since the city was built up around the harbour with
mainl y wood en buildin gs and homes, any attack, especially with incendiaries,
would pose a serious fire hazard to the whole area. To combat this threat, the
committe e had at its disposal the local Auxiliary Fire Service, the RCAF fire unit at
Torbay and the US fire unit at Fort Pepperrell. In addition, homes and businesses
would be enco urage d to take their own fire precaut ions, including the provisio n of
stirrup pump s and bags of sand. Fire wardens could also be orga nized and called out
in the event of attack .
The oth er probl em facing the authorities in St. John ' s was what to do with
those left homeless by an attack." It was easy to anticipate that any serious
incursion would leave several thousand people homeless. The America ns offered
9SIndeed a book published in 1940 in Britain entitled 101 Things To Do In War Time
includ ed, among other useful advice, instructions on protection from splintering window glass,
black ing-out wind ows and basic first aid. See Lillie B. Horth and Arthur C. Horth, 101 Things to Do
in War Time 1940: A Practical Handbook / or the Home (Lon don: B.T. Batsfo rd, 1940; reprint,
London: B.T. Batsford, 2007).
96pANL, GN 38, S4-1-6, file 8, Civ il Defence Meeting, minutes, 15 December 1941.
97l bid.
Camp Alexander as emerge ncy accommoda tion for up to 2000 peop le, as well as
their facilities at To rbay Airport and Argentia. Evac uees wou ld need to be fed, and
US military authorities also offe red mobile kitchens to feed tire fighter s and those
forced to evac uate their homes. To this end, food supplies would have to be
stockpiled. The committee hoped that the merchants of St. John's could arrange for
the storage and distribution of foodstuffs. In the meant ime, homeowners would be
asked to stockpile several days' essential supplies for an emergency. The meeting
adjourned with arrangements apparently well in hand."
In December l-lMCS Prince Henry , which had been providing overflow
accommodation space for the Newfoundland Command, departed for Halifax in
anticipation of resuming seagoing operations. While approx imately eighty men were
accommodated ashore at the Knights of Columbus and YMCA hostels, this still left
295 men on board HMCS Ava lon II. These men were mainly engine room ratings
responsibl e for repair work and boiler cleaning for the ships alongside. While
Murray recognized that board ing men at the two hostels was not conducive to naval
disciplin e, he felt it was "preferable to and more economical than the provision of
another chartered vessel.,,99 Prince Henry 's departur e for Halifax presented the
opportun ity to send Lt.-Commander P.E. Heseltine, RN, the base Ordnance Officer,
and Lt. L.A. Bown , RCNVR , to Halifax to investigate the laying of an indicator
loop and associated minefi eld at the approaches to St. John ' s. While there, both
officers met with the Director of the Technic al Division of the RCN, Captain G.
98Ibid.
99LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,953, file I-I-I , vol. I, Report of Proceedings for the Month
of December 1941, in FONF, monthly report, Decemb er 1941.
Hibbard, and they agreed upon a plan to install two guard loops to cove r the
channels from the end of the outer and midd le baff1es and a visua lly controlled
minefield in the narrows opposite Chain Rock. A light net wou ld indicate the
presence of a submarine in the minefield and a patrol cra ft fitted with dep th charges
would destroy it. This plan had the advantage of positively indicat ing a submarine in
the minefield , and the depth charges would sink the submarine without blocking the
harbour while minimi zing any collateral damage. The contro l station for the
minefield would also be close to the Port War Signal Station to speed
co mmunication. The FONF hoped that the various cables, mine loops, mines and
nets could be collected and ready for shipment by the end of Decemb er.100
Base constructi on slowed as Christmas drew near, prompt ing "a large
numb er of Newfoundland workmen to take their leave." Regardless, by that point
the naval hospital was sixty percent complete, the administration building was thirty
percent finished, and the officers ' quarters seventy percent done. The naval barracks
were almos t finished but were being held up because of delays in receiving
millw ork (windows , doors, etc.) and heating equipment. Nava l authorit ies blamed
this on the still unresolved problem of congest ion in St. John ' s harbour. In
Decemb er, 165 merch ant vessels arrived at St. John ' s, and on any given day
approximately seventeen warship s were in the harbour. Work on the Naval
Dockyard was also slow, dependent on the progress of the breastwork. However,
work on the garage, canteen, inflammable stores, machine shop and guard house
was proceedin g satisfactorily. The wireless station was compl eted, but the Cape
Spear Port War Signal Station was only sixty percent finished, progress having been
"Xl/bid.
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impeded by bad weather.101 Yet while things were progressing at (-I!vICS Avalon , the
Battle of the Atlantic was entering a new phase that would severely challenge the
Allied war effort in the Western Atlantic .
When Hitler fina lly dec lared war on the United States on I I Decemb er
194 1, it brought a sense of relief to Admiral Karl Donit z, the Befelschaber der
Uboote, or Commander-in-Chief of U-boats. 102 This was because the declaration
finally ended the undeclared war that had been raging for month s between his U-
boats and American force s in the North Atlant ic.103 What had started as the
Americans maint ainin g a "neutral ity patrol" had slowly but surely progressed to the
blatant esco rt of British convoys . This had not been without cost to the United
States. In September, V-652 torpedoed USS Greer, USS Kearney had been hit on 10
October, and on 31 October USS Reuben James was sunk by V-522. Now that the
US was officia lly in the war, Donitz reasoned that with the Americans ' attention
diverted to the Paci fic, the whole east coast of the United States was wide open for
attack. 104 He was abso lutely correct. The USN was totally unprepared for the
onslaught that enve loped it in early 1942. Whether the Commander-in -Chief of the
US flee t, Admira l Ernes t J. King, was Anglophobie, as some have sugge sted , or ju st
did not appreciate the potentia l of Donitz' s U-boa ts, he refused to institute coastal
IOILAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,953, file I- I- I, vol. I, Report of Proceedings for the Month
of December 1941 , in FONF, monthly report, December 1941.
102GUnther Hessler, The V-Boat War in the Atlantic 1930 -1945 (3 vols., London: IIMSO,
1989),11,1 .
103Karl Donitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Day, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
1990), 183.
I04Nathan Miller, War at Sea: A Naval History a/World War /I (New York: Scribner, 1995;
reprint, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 29 1.
convoys alon g the eastern seaboard. This caused what some have sugges ted was a
defeat for the USN equal in scale to the attack on Pearl Harbor. IOs
The opening salvo of Donitz ' s U-boat offensive against the US was fired by
Kap itanl eutnant Rienhard I-Iardegan in V- 123. On 12 January 1942, he sank the
British steame r Cyclop s approximately 100 miles southeast of Cape Sable , Nova
Scotia . I-1ardegan was in command of one of eight U-boat s that compri sed the first
of three waves of the init ial assault on Nort h Amer ica, code-named Pauk enschla g or
"drumbeat." For the next six month s, the U-boats caused havoc along the eastern
seaboard of North America and even into the Caribbean. The USN, like the pre-war
RN, had not prepared for a war against the U-boats and was also woefull y short of
escor t vesse ls. This seems incredible, considering the British experience , as does
Admiral King' s refusal to institute convoys . He felt that an inadequate ly escorted
convoy was worse than no convoy at al1.106 The British, on the other hand , had
found ju st the opposite . The best - really the only - defence agai nst U-boat attack
was convoy, regardless of the inadequacies of the escort. Admiral King's view
prevailed , however, and when Hardegan and his cohorts arrived in American waters
they not only found plenty of targets but also shipping lanes that were still operating
under peacet ime condit ions. Ships were not darkened, beacons and lighth ouses were
still lit, and wireless messages were being sent in the clear.
The Commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier had a difficult job on his hands.
To battle the onslaught, Admiral Adolphus "Dolly" Andrews USN had a force of
IOSMichael Gan non, Operation Drumbeat: The Dramatic True Story of Germany 's First U-
boat Attacks along the American Coast in World War /I (New York : Harpe r and Row, 1990), xviii.
IO"Dan van der Vat, The Atlanti c Campaign: The Great Struggle at Sea, / 939-/ 945 (New
York : Harper and Row, (988) , 242.
on ly twenty anti-submarine vessels, including seven Coast Guard cutter s, three WW
l-vintage Eagle-class sub-chasers and two pre-WW I patro l boat s. 107 Andrew s had
no air co ver to speak of, and the patro l planes he did have were too few to make a
differe nce . Civilian watercraft and airplanes were ultimately added to Andrews'
resources with little effec t. Of course, the main reason for this scarcity was the
Pacific War. With the Japanese advance continuing almost unchecked, the USN
hauled mo st of its assets out of the Atlantic for duty in the Pacific . The other
proble m lay in USN doctr ine. Like the pre-war RN, destroyers and other escort
vesse ls were reserved for the protection of capital ships . Consequently, while there
were esco rt vessels ava ilable on the Atlantic coast for convoy escort , they were
reserved for the USN's heavy units and specia l assignme nts.ios
By the end of the first wave of the U-boat offensive in early February , fifty
ships had been sunk with no German casualties.109 The Briti sh were alarmed and at
a loss as to why the Amer icans did not institute the well-prove n convoy system .
Severa l missions were sent to Washington investigate the problem and found a
numb er of di fficulti es. The Americans had no experience in the rigours of locating
and sinking U-boats, and unlike within the British sys tem, there was little co-
ordination betwee n the USN and the Army Air Force . Likewise, there was no
I07Clay Blair, Hitler 's UiBoat War: The Hunters, /939- /94 2 (New York: Random House,
1996), 461. See also David Jordan, Wolfpack: The U-Boat War and the Allied Counter-Attack; / 939-
1945.(StaplehurstSpellmount,2002) , I03-105.
I08/bid., 465-466.
I09Hadley, V-B oats against Canada, 57.
centra l body to formulate anti-submarine doctrine, and research in the field was still
in its infancy. In short , the Americans were in trouble.I 10
During the first quarter of 1942, U'-boats sank over 1.25 million tons of
shipping in the Nor th Atlantic, most of it in areas under Amer ican control. Shipping
that was, at great expe nse in men and materiel, safe ly convoye d across the North
At lantic by the RN and RCN was being sunk jus t Sh0l1 of its des tination . Some have
suggested that this situation almost complete ly negated the adva ntage that
America 's j oinin g the war gave the Allies. 111 Grow ing eve r more alarmed, the
Admiralty sent experts such as Roger Winn, Head of the Admiralty's V-boa t
Trackin g Room, to Washington to help combat the mount ing losses and offered ten
corvettes and two doze n anti-submarine trawlers with their crews to help stop the
slaughter. I IZ The VSN accepted the trawlers but turned down the corvettes because
the navy felt that VS shipyards could supply these in short order. l 13 Regardless, a
partial con voy system, soon dubb ed the "bucket brigade," was initiated so that ships
received some protection durin g the day and sought refug e at night at the nearest
port. This sys tem caused serious delays in the arrival of cargoes , but it did cut
losses. Over the next few month s, a full-fledged interlocking system was developed
from Halifax to ports in South America as the V-boats continued to move south into
the Caribbean.114 By the time this system became fully operational in June 1942,
IIOJordan, Woljpaek, 106. See also Van der Vat, At/antic Campaign, 264-265.
IIl lbid., 239.
112lbid ., 264- 266. See also Thomas Parrish, The Subm arine: A History (New York: Viking
Penguin, 2004) , 260-26 1.
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however, almos t three million tons of shipping had been lost off the American east
coast and in the Caribbean. lI5
While most of the losses during the first four months of 1942 were in
American territorial waters, attacks in Canadian waters were also part of Donitz' s
strategy. I16 The first sinking in "Ca nadian" waters was actua lly Reinhard
Hardegan ' s sinking of the British steamer Cyclops southeas t of Cape Sab le, Nova
Scotia on 12 January .I 17 Th is was really an "ac t of opportunity" because Hardegan
was just passing through Canadian waters on his way to his station off New York, as
Operation Paukenschlag was not supposed to start until the next day when the rest
of his group was expected to be in pos ition. But Cyclops was j ust too good a target
to let go, and Admira l Donitz had given permission to attack large vessels if the
opportunity presented itself. ll8 Cyclops was in the wrong place at the wrong time.
Regardless, three medium -sized Ll-boats were detached from Group Seydilit z in
mid-Atlantic in early January and ordered to Canadian waters. I 19 Eric Topp in V-
552 patrolled approxim ately fifty miles off Cape Race, Newfoundl and ; Heinrich
Bleiehrodt in V-109 took station south of the Grand Banks; and Ernst Kals in V-l3 0
114Van del' Vat, Atlantic Campaig n, 265-266.
115From the first arr ival of the If -boa ts in mid-January 1942 unti l the Am erican campai gn
ended at the end of July, 360 ships we re sunk off the US eastem sea board. See Eric J.Grove(ed.),
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guarded the Ca bot Strait betwee n Newfoundland and Nova Scot ia. 12o Kals drew first
blood , sinking both Frisco and Friar Rock on 14 Jan uary. Nex t was Topp , who sank
Dayrose on the ISlh and Frances Salman on the 181h. By this time, Walter Schug in
U-86 had also arrive d in position near Cape St. Francis at the tip of the Avalon
Penin su la, where he sank the 427 I-ton Greek steamship Dimi trios 0. Thermio tis.
Meanwhile, Bleichrodt's U-I09 had reached a position 110 miles southeast of
Halifax, and on the 19th he sank Emp ire Kingfi sher ju st south of Cape Sable. On the
ned he sank the 488 7-ton Brit ish steamer Thilby with one torpedo.V' Of the four
boats, U-I09 would have the least success in Canadian waters, being constantly
plagued with defective torpedoes, as were all o f those in the Pauk enschlag first
wave.
122 It go t so bad that Eric Topp ' s U-522 was forced to hold up one freighter
with nothin g more than a machin e gun. After lettin g the crew abandon ship, To pp
sank the vesse l with 126 round s from his 8.8-mm deck gun.123
Hot on the heels of the first wave of Pauk enschlag were the boats of the
second. Although most were destined for the still mostly virg in waters off the US
eastern sea boa rd, all traversed Canadian waters and so me claimed vic tims. Those
boats ordered to the eas t coast of Canada were concentrated in three areas: the east
coas t of Ne wfoundland, the western side of the Cabot Stra it, and the Hali fax
Approaches . Operatin g from 2 1 Janua ry to 19 Februar y, nine U-boa ts sank a total of
thirt een ships and damaged two others . In one notabl e episode , U-754, commanded
12°Hadley, V-Boa ts against Canada, 63 .
121Jurgen Rohwer, Axis Submar ine Successes, / 939-/ 945 (Cambrid ge: Patr ick Stephen s,
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122 Hadley, V-boa ts against Canada, 71.
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by Gerhard Bigalk, sank the 3876 -ton Greek steamship Moun t Kithern with two
torped oes a mere two miles from St. John' s harbour .124
By the time the third wave hit Canadian waters in early February , targets
were not as plentif ul, and air surveillance frequently forced the boats to dive. While
V-96 under Heinric h Lehmann-Willenbrock had considerable success, sinking five
ships in eighteen days , the rest did not fare as well. The third wave produc ed the
first U-boat losses in North American waters. On I March, Nava l Reserve Ensign
William Tapu ni, flying a Lockheed Hudson out of Arge ntia , surprised V-656
(Kroning) on the surface approx imately twenty-five miles south of Cape Race.
Taken totally unprepared, the U-boat was sunk with all hands. Fiftee n days later,
another patrol from Argen tia sank V-503 (Gericke) south of the Virgin Rocks
approx imately 300 miles east ofSt. John 's.125
Despite these losses, Donitz' s offensive on the eas t coast of Canada had
been success ful. Between January and March 1942, V-boats sank a total of forty-
four ships in Canadian waters.126 As this figure represented twenty percent of the
total sunk worldwi de, the Canadian governmen t could not keep such news from the
public .127 In the face of grow ing sensa tionalism in the press , the author ities were
forced to make a statement. On 5 March, Lt.-Cdr. William Strange , RCNVR, of
J2' Hadley, V- boats against Canada, 73.
125Blair, The Hunters, 512.
126Hadley, V-boats Against Canada, 79.
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Plans and Operations ,128 admitted to a local Canad ian Club audience and the press
that U-boats were opera ting in Canadian waters. However, he added that this was to
be ex pecte d and not to give such incursions "unreaso nable promin ence."
Furthermo re, he stated that the gove rnme nt would in futur e refrain from making
announcements conce rning "maritime opera tions" so as not to reveal any
information to the enemy.129 As a result , the public were not informed when
Kapita nleutnant Karl Th urmann 's V-5 53 starte d the next series of attacks in the
early hours of 12 May 1942. At approximately 06 15 GMT (about 3:15 AM
Canadian Atlantic tim e), Thurm ann sank the 5364-ton Briti sh steamer Nicoya
sixteen kilom etres north of Point e ala Fregate on the Gaspe Pen insula. He followe d
this up a few hours later by sinking the 47 12-ton Dutch ship Leto en route from the
VK to Montreal. Thurm ann also claimed a hit on a 3000-ton vesse l, although
official records do not indicat e a sinking at this time. 130 Canadian authoriti es
imm ediately initi ated convoys and prompt ed the Eas tern Air Command to increase
air patrol s both inside and outside the Gul f of St. Lawrence. As well, on 21 May,
Cape Gaspe Light , includin g its outer beacon s, was extinguished.i" By this time,
however, V- 553 was on her way out of the Gulf head ed for the Bay of Fundy and
the east coast of the United States.
This sharp increase in U-boa t activi ty had serious consequences for the NE F
and its base at St. John ' s. Admir al Murr ay started his Janu ary report to NS I-IQ by
I28Strange would be a major figur e in the equipment scandal tha t enveloped the RCN in
1943.
129Hadley, Usboats Aga inst Canada, 81.
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noting the sudden concent ration of Ll-boats and the increased attacks in the Western
Atlantic. Local escorts of ocean convoys were strengthened, and as far as poss ible,
coasta l shipping was also put in convoy . From mid-January to the end of the month,
forty-four merchant ships were esco rted to various destinations. Murray well knew
the lessons that the Americans had yet to learn - " in very few cases have esco rted
merchant ships been attacked, however small or inadequate the escor t." Even if the
esco rt only consis ted of a minesweeper, its presence seemed to have the "requisite
deterrent effec t." Indeed, warships in transit to Hali fax were co-opted to provide
escor t to coastal convoys along their routes . In addition, precautions were taken to
protect shipping load ing or at anchor at Wabana, Conception Bay and at Bay Bulls.
Regardless, a number of sinkings occurred in Newfo und land waters which the
FONF attributed mainl y to the dispersal of a numb er of ON convoys due to
"exceptionally bad weather." This weather, especially the hurricane that hit the
North Atlantic mid-m onth , caused considerable damage to ships of the NEF,
resulting in only four destroyers being available for duty durin g most of the
month .132
The increa sed U-boat concentrations in the Western Atlantic also hastened
changes in the North Atlantic escort system. At meetings held in Washington, the
RN, RCN and USN decided to push the WESTOMP further east to 45 degrees West
and to change the eastern terminu s for the NEF from Iceland to Londonderry. The
US groups would remain in Iceland . This allowed a strengthened escort for both the
western and eas tern legs of the jo urney as the renamed Mid-Oc ean Escort Force
(MOEF) accompanied the Halifax-based Western Escort Force (WEF) to the new
132LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,953, File I-I -I , vol. 1, monthl y report, January 1942 .
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WESTOMP and reinforced the British Easte rn Loca l Escort Force (ELEF) from the
EASTOMP to the newly completed escort base at Londond erry in Northern
Ireland .133 As London derry played such an important role in later events impacting
IIMCS Avalon , a brief discussion of this base is necessary.
Similar to IIMCS Avalon, the escort base in Londonderry was a produ ct of
necessity more than plannin g. Denied the use of ports in Eamon de Valera ' s neutral
Eire, Londonderry was the most westerly port suitable for development as a naval
base. Like St. John' s, it had the leanest of facilities at the time, but withi n a very
short period it became the most important repair, maintenance and training base in
the United Kingdom .
During World War I, Britain had used several Irish "Treaty Ports" for its
anti-submar ine war, the most notable being Queens town in Cork harbour on the
island ' s south coast. 134 But thanks to a gross miscalculat ion by the British General
Staff and Prime Mini ster Nev ille Chamberlain, these ports were return ed to Ireland
in 1938. 135 Churchill seethed at what he considered this " feckless act," and in his
memoirs sugges ted that many lives were needlessly lost as a consequence of this
" improvi dent examp le of appeasement.v'r" As a result, convoys were routed to the
north of Ireland to come within the protect ion of the RN and Coasta l Command
aircraft . This suffice d for the short term, but barring the forcible retak ing of the
133lbid. See also van Ocr Vat, Atlantic Camp aign, 262 .
134Joseph T. Ca rro ll, Ireland in the War Years, 1939- 1945 (Newton Abb ot: David and
Charles, 1975), 25.
136Winslon S. Churchill, The Gather ing Storm (18 th ed., New York : Bantam Books, 1961),
Treaty Ports, the Admi ralty needed a base in Ireland, and its one real choice was
Londonderry .F"
For the first coupl e of years, the nava l base at Londonderry was ju st "an
obscure little organisation" called HMS Ferret, devoted to the conver sion of fishing
trawlers to mine sweepers and coasta l escorts.138 It was not until late 1940, as the
convoy batt les became more ferociou s, that the Admira lty decided to upgrade the
facilities to accom moda te and repair larger warships.l '" As Donit z's U-boats
ventured farther into the Atlantic and Iceland was occupied as a forward base,
Northern Ireland, like New foundland, became strateg ically important. As Churchill
said later, " [t]here by the grace of God, Ulster stood like a faithful sentinel.,,140
Escort forces began runnin g between Iceland and Londonderry, and by early 1942
Londonderry forces were taking over convoys that had been escorted as far as the
MOMP by ships of the NEF. In the meantim e, the US had entered the fray and was
build ing its own facilities at Lisahally.
In Janu ary 1941, almost a year before it actua lly entered the war on the
Allied side, the Unit~d States drew up plans to deve lop "Derry" as a trans-A tlantic
convoy termin al. On 30 June 1941, 362 "c ivilian technicians" arrived to begin
construction of a base that would eventually includ e ship repair facilities, a radio
station, barracks and administrative headqu arters, plus ammunition and storage
137John W. Blake, Northern Ireland in the Second World War (Belfast: HMSO, 1956;
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depots. The base was officially commissioned on 5 Febru ary 1942, and by May the
num ber of US personn el in Northern Ireland reached 37,00 0. Ultimate ly, the US
spent five mill ion do llars developin g the facilities, the majority being targeted for
the repair, maintenance and refuelling of convoy esco rts.14 1 The repair facilities
were especially important to the RCN.
During the summer of 1942, there were seve n British, one American and
four Canadian escort groups operating out of Londonderry , but by March 1943
Canadian forces acco unted for more than half the escort forces based there .142 By
this time, Londonderr y had become the most important escort base in the North
West approaches 'V with 149 escorts, twice the numb er at the Brit ish bases at
Liverpoo l and Greenock combin ed.144 The RCN assumed almost sole responsibili ty
for maintaining the MOEF after D-Day, and by the end of 1944 Canadian ships
made up the maj ority of seaborne forces using Londonderry. In February 1945, 109
RCN warships were serviced at the Londond erry faciliti es.145
Londond erry was an important port for the RCN for a numb er of reasons.
Possibly the most significant was trainin g, and Londond erry was the operational
anti-submarine training centre for all three navies based there. The RN provided
most of the trainin g faciliti es, and throu ghout the war these faciliti es played a vital
'4Ilbid., 574-575 . See also Derri ck Gibson-Harris, Life-Line to Freedom: Ulster in the
Second World War (L urga n: Ulster Society, 1990), 16-30.
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role in prov iding instruction to the inadequ ate ly trained ships of the RCN . As the
l3attle of the Atlantic intensifie d, Londonderry beca me the main anti-submarine
trainin g base in the Eastern Atlantic. 146 "Tame" submar ines were used to teach
ships' crews the subtleties of tracking submerged U-boat s, and the Night Escort
Attack Teacher (NEAT) trained them in measures to battle the highly successful
Rudeltakt ik perfected by Donit z' s comm anders . Until 1944, the instructio n
Canadian ships receiv ed in Londond erry was often the only organi zed trainin g the
crews experienced after accepting their ships from the builders in Canada despite
the FONl~'s attempts to provide this at HMCS Avalon.
Anot her crucia l aspec t for the RCN was the repair facilities. While both the
RN and USN had facilities at Londonderry, by the fall of 1942, most repair work on
Canadian ships was undertaken by the America ns. l3y the end of 1943, sixty-eigh t
Canadian ships had been repair ed at the United States Na vy Yard in Lisahally . The
American repair facilities were not only well equipped but also efficie ntly organized
to reduce paper work and avoid unnecessa ry delays . The work was completed with a
speed and thorou ghn ess that the Canadians appreciated, and it inclu ded not only
runnin g repairs but also refits. This was especially important to the RCN as many
Canadian esco rts came off the ways either lacking in importan t rig or with
obso lesce nt fittings . Londonderry was particularly well sui ted to this task from the
RCN's point of view as I3ritish equipment was more readily avai lable in Nor thern
Ireland than at the bases and refit yards in North America . Considering the
repai r/modern izatio n crisis that enveloped the RCN in 1943, it could be argued that
146Samue l Eliot Mori son , The Two-Ocean War: A Short History ofthe United States Navy in
the Second World War (Bo ston: Little, Brown, 1963; reprint , Annapolis : Nava l Institute Press, 2007),
104.
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Londo nderry's major impact on the RCN's participa tion in the Battle of the Atlantic
was its con tribution to keeping Canadian warships at sea and reasonably well
equipped.l'"
In the meantime , there were further developments ashore at St. John's in
January 1942. Reti red Lieutenant-Co lonel Leonard Outerbridge became Director of
Civil Defe nce (DC D), replacing Charles 1-1. Hutchings, the forme r inspector general
of police who had been appointed Director of Air Raid Precautions (ARP) in Apri l
1940. 148 This was a welco me chan ge because Hutch ings had refused to co-ord inate
his air raid measures with the various fightin g services . Outerbridge, on the other
hand, took imm ediate measures to keep the services in the loop, and liaison office rs
from each serv ice were appointed to his staf f. Blackout was enforced start ing in late
January, and steps were taken to darken the naval establishment, includin g those
faciliti es under construction . Captain of the Port Schw erdt was also concerned with
the increased submarine activity. The temporary minefield and indicator loops at the
approac hes to St. John ' s harbour had worn out, and Schw erdt worr ied that a Ll-boat
might try to force its way through the Narrows. Later events would ju stify his
concern. Measure s were underw ay by the end of the month to re-lay the loops and
minefield with the arrival of Lt. B.G. Jemm ett, but in the interim, patrols were
institut ed using the few harbour cra ft ava ilable, puttin g a "seve re strain" on their
crews. 149
147Tucker, Naval Service of Canada, 11, 208.
148LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vo l. 11,953, file I-I-I , vol. I , month ly Report , January 1942. See
also Neary , Newf oundland in the North Atlantic World, 126.
149LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vo l. 11,953, file I-I-I , vo l. I , Report of Proceedi ngs, St. John ' s
Na val Base, monthly report , Janu ary 1942.
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Thank s to both the seve re weather and U-boat activit y, congestion in St.
John ' s harbour again became a serious prob lem. During Janu ary, 140 merchant
ships arriv ed at the port , many having to be berthed alongside four abreast. On one
day alone there were fifty-three merchant ships taking refuge at St. John 's in
additio n to the da ily average of twenty-one NEF escort s . The Newfound land
government intended to lay addition al moorin gs, but as this requir ed the clearing of
most of the harbour for a month , this measure was postponed until May, when
authorities hoped congestion would be somewhat allev iated. In the meantime , some
of the ove rflow was sent to Bay Bulls, the only avai lable anchorage with adequate
communication facilities within reasonable dista nce of St. John 's. It could
acco mmodate approx imate ly ten ships but was expose d to U-boa t attack from the
sea . Patrols were instigated when forces were avai lable, and DND promised to
supply four Fairmi le patrol boats as soon as possible.ISO
The reorganization and renaming of the convoy esco rt sys tem came into
effect in February. The difficu lty lay in maint ainin g the requir ed strength. A large
numb er of ships for the reconstitut ed Mid-Ocean Escort Force (MOEF), both
destroyers and corvettes , had to come from the UK and had not yet arrived. This put
considerab le strai n on Murray's resources, as maintaining a six - ship escort group
"absor bed every single corve tte at F.O.N.F's disposal." Ultimately, a conference
with the comm ander of the newly re-designated Tas k Force 24, Admiral Bristol,
decided that, by adhering to a tight schedule, Canadian or mixed
Canadian/American groups could adequately escort the first seven eastbound
convoy s, both HX and SC, as well as assis t the escorts of ON convoys . Murray
ISO/bid.
hoped that the situation would improve when the promised reinforcements arrived
and the weat her moderatcd.P'
The MOEF also suffere d its first casualt ies in February with the loss of the
Free French Ship Abysse and )-HvlCS Spikenard. Abysse was torpedoed the night of
8 February escorting ON-GO, while U-136 sank Spikenard two nights later in the
mid-Atlantic, escorting SC-G7. Unfortunately, Spikenard's group-mates did not
discover its loss until the next day, by which time all exce pt eight of its crew,
including the captain, had pcrishcd.i" Both losses were keenly felt in the
New foundland Command.I53 On the brighter side, the first of the twenty-four anti-
submarine trawlers promi sed by the British to help contain the slaughter along the
American eastern seaboard arrived at St. John ' s. After a short layover for fuel and
runnin g repairs, the ten small warships proceeded to Hali fax or New York. With
coastal convoys having been instituted in response to the increased presence of U-
boats in New foundland waters , Murray pressed these ships into service as escorts
for these convoys. Regardless, despite the institution of coas tal convoys , fear of
attack prompt ed many Newfo undlanders to travel ove rland from St. John ' s to
Canada, rather than by sea. This increase in traffic caused some strain on the
Newfoundland Railway' s already overloaded faciliti es, to the point where the
manager requested that Capt. Schwerdt limit the numb er of naval personnel
boardin g any one train . Schwerdt recognized that the RCN account ed for sixty
151Ibid ., lllont hly rep0l1,February 1942.
1520 ne can still see " Spikena rd's Spike" proud ly displayed at the Seagoi ng Officers Club,
better know n as "The Crow's Nest" in St. John ' s, founded by Ca pt. (D) E.R. Mainguy in 1942.
Hadley, UiBoots against Canada , 256.
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percent o f forces personnel using New foundland Railway services, but as the Battle
of the Atlanti c, not necessarily the RCN, dictated naval travel requir ements,
Schwerdt cou ld not comp ly. A weekly steamer service was added "to cope with the
situation.,,154
There was also progress in base developm ent despite typica lly bad winter
weather. The wire less receiving and transmittin g stations and the Cape Spear Port
War Signa l Station were finished and manned . The hospita l, admin istration buildin g
and officers' accommodation block were all well advanced, and whi le construction
of the naval barracks was well in hand, completion was being held up by the 110n-
arrival of the heatin g system. Bad weather was also causing problems at the
dockyard. Work at the site was retarded because condition s prevented the
comp letion of the breastwork. Regard less, approximately 500 feet of wharf at the
western end of the harbour was almost finished, and 200 feet at the west end of the
Bowrin g Brothers ' property were "sufficiently advanced to be usable." Desp ite this,
conges tion was such that ships were berthed three and four abreast along wharves
that were still under construction. This issue was discussed at a meeting at the end
of February atte nded by Sir Wilfred Woods in his capacity as Chairman of the
Newfo undland Harbours Board , as well as other officia ls. The meeting
recommended that a floa ting dock moo red near Cahill Point and able to
accommoda te both des troyers and corvettes would grea tly imp rove the situation in
St. John ' s harbour .155 To this end, meetings were held in London later in 1942
IS' Ibid., Report of Proceedings by Maintenanc e Captain, Captain of the Port, in FONF,
monthlyreport, Febru ary 1942.
ISSlb id.
between the Mini ster of War Transport and the Canadian Min ister of Muniti ons and
Supply, C.D. Howe, in an effort to obtain a section of the Vicker' s Float ing Dock in
Montrea l. London argued that as Montreal's benefi t to merchant shipping was
severely limited by both the freezing of the St. Lawre nce and the fear of U-boat
attack, the Vicker 's dock was of little use where it was. 156 Unfortunately, NSHQ did
not share this view and could not support the scheme as it felt that not only would
removal of the dock negative ly impact new construction but also its presence at St.
John 's would actua lly add to the congest ion problem.157
The month of March started out, quite literally, with a bang at HMCS
Ava lon. On 3 March, three large explosions were heard ju st outs ide St. John's
harbou r during the lat~ afte rnoon. It took a couple of days before the cause cou ld be
determined, but U-boa t attac k was suspected.l '" The Americans had attacked a
submerged con tact the previous month in Placentia Bay, not far from their base at
Argentia, and U-656 had been sunk by an Argentia-based aircra ft just south of
Trepassey on I March .159 Captain (D) immediately dispatched patro ls to investigate
but to no ava il. However, torpedo fragments were recovered from the rocks below
I S6TN A /PRO, ADM 116/4526, Domin ions Office to Newfou ndland Government , 16
October 1942.
1S7Ibid., NSHQ to Admir alty, 26 October 1942.
IS8This incident was not reported in the newspapers and, indeed , many people did not learn
of the source of the exp losions until a lter the war. Training and test firing of guns were regular
occurrences and the explosions would probably have, at least initially, been dismissed as such. There
is also some question as to whether two or three torpedoes were fired at the Narrows. Rowher claims
that only two were fired, while the FONF in his report wrote that three explosions were heard. It is
possib le that the third exp losion was actua lly an echo from the first hit under Fort Amherst. Jurgen
Rowher, Axis Submarine Successes, / 939-/ 945 (Camb ridge: Patrick Stephens, 1983), 82. LAC,
FONF, RG 24, Vol. 11,953, file I- I- I, Vol. 1, Report of Proceedings by Mainten ance Captain ,
Captain of the Port , in FONF, monthly report , March 1942. See also LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 6901 ,
file 8910- 166/25 vol. 1., FONF to NSHQ, 5 March, 1942.
IS9LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,95 1, CTF 24 to FONF, 3 February 1942.
Fort Amherst a few day s later which proved that torpedoes had been fired at St.
John' s harbour. Nava l authori ties could not see any reason why a U-boat
commander would do this, or why all three missed the entrance.160 Possibly
prompted by this attack , a week later Murray received a request from the
New foundland gove rnment to come lip with a denial plan should the Germans
mount some sort of landin g at St. John 's.
With the United States now an offic ial belligerent, local commande rs
became very concerned about a German raid on New foundland. Indeed, evide nce
given at a 1944 US Congress ional hearing sugges ted that Hitler actually did plan to
attack Newfoundl and as part of a campaign against the United States. 161 President
Roosevelt had expressed his concerns to Prime Min ister Churchill the previous
April and proposed sending additi onal American forces, comprising a half battery of
eight-inch guns, one squadron of three medium and three heavy bomber s, and fifty-
seve n officer s and 575 men to bolster defences.162 Fortunatel y, the torpedo attack in
March was the closest St. John ' s came to a direct assa ult, but by then the British
government had already released its secret "Scorched Earth Polic y" to the
governments of its domini ons and colonia l dependenci es.163
160lbid., Report of Proceedings by Maintenance Captain, Cap tain of the Port, in FONF,
monthly report, March 1942.
161"Says Newfoundl and Was Included in Hitler's Plans," Evening Telegr am (St. John ' s), 13
July 1944.
162LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,956, Secretary of State for Dominion Affai rs to Governor, 8
April 1941.
1631bid ., RG24, Vol. 11,927 , MS 1400-4, vol. t , " Instructions Issued To Certai n Colonial
Depe ndencies on ' Scorched Earth Policy.'" See also Paul Co llins, '''Canada' s Plan to Torc h St.
John' s' dur ing the Seco nd World War : Upper Canadian Arrogance or Tabloid Journalism?"
Newfoundland and Labrador Studies, XXIV, No. 2 (Fall 2009), 26 1-270; and Kerry Badgley,
Faced with the very real possibi lity of invasion in 1940, the British planned
to leave noth ing of value for the Germans. The instruct ions called for the destruction
of all naval, army and air force installations, plus cable and telegraph stations, oi l
and gaso line stocks, food and raw materials, transportation faci lities (including
harbour installations), mine work ings and equipment, as well as all supplies of
currency, stamps , secur ities and other valuable docum ents. Quite naturally, the
British plan stresse d tota l destruction without consideration for recovery afte r the
enemy withdrew. Measures had to be "Rigoro usly Applied in Practice" and
emphasized that the decision to implement them against private property "s hould
not repeat not" be left to the individuals involved. Large property owners would be
taken into the gove rnment's confid ence and assured that such a plan was a worst-
case scenario only and that their propertie s would be destroyed only as a last resort.
On the subject of compensatio n, the instructions suggested that any sort of award
would have to wait until after the war. On the other hand, in the event that small
property owners were un-cooperative, provi sions were made to requisition such
properties before they were destroyed. This would allow payment without setting a
precedent of immediate compen sation.164
The Newfo undland government also received a copy of these instructions. In
early March, Emerson sent dupli cates of a condensed version of them to all military
commanders in St. John ' s, plus the new Director of Civil Defence, and requested a
" ' Rigorously Applied in Practice' : A Scorched Earth Policy for Canada and New foundland during
the Seco nd World War," The Archivist , No. 446 ( 1998), 38-43 .
164LAC, RG24, Vol. 11,927, MS 1400-4, vol. I, " Instruct ions Issued To Certain Colonial
Dependencies on ' Scorched Earth Policy. '"
meeting to discuss the formu lation of a plan for Newfoundland.165 This was ten days
before the Canadian War Cabinet approved its own release of the plan. Indeed,
instructions were not forwarded to the Joint Services Sub-Committee (JSC)
Newfou ndland, or any other JSC, until 18 April.166 Regardless , Admiral Murray
ordered his staff, under the chair of Captain (D) Capt. E.R. Mainguy, to draft a
proposa l for the destruction of the RCN facilities. In May, a committee comprising
Lt.-Cmdr Heseltine, RN, the base Ordinance Officer, Lt. Cmdr. Thompson,
RCNVR, Staff Officer (Intelligence) and Engineering Lt. Ross, RCNR, met in
Captain (D)' s office to discuss a general scorched earth policy. They decided that
because most of the RCN buildings in St. John ' s - the hospital, barracks,
administration and officers' accommodation buildings - were made of wood, the
quickest way of destroying them was by fire. Similarly, they proposed the use of fire
for most of the wharves, machine shops, dockyard and buildin gs on the south side of
the harbour - all exce pt the buildings on the Marine Agencies Ltd. wharf. The
committee cauti oned that if these buildings were still used as a magazine, the non-
explosive material should be smashed because fire could result in "the whole of St.
John ' s [being] flattened if the explosives were detonated." For the same reason, the
underground magazines would just have their roofs blown in. The various fuel oil
tanks on the south side would have their valves opened or pipes smashed and would
be burned. All naval stores, stock, vehicles and harbour craft would also be burned.
1651bid., Emerson to FONF, 11 March 1942.
I661bid., RG 24, FONF, Vol. 5256, file HQS-22-l -l 3, memo to CGS on "Scorched Earth
Policy," 22 June 1944.
The committee recomm ended that any merchant shipping that could not be
evacuated would be scuttled or burned , "taking into cooperation any other
authorities as necessary.t'"
The committee consulted throughout the summer, and in September Captain
Mainguy, now actin g as interim FONF, issued copie s of "Denial Plans - Nava l
Installations, Equipment and Supplies " to the other service heads. The navy 's plans
were compre hensive and fraught with danger. Fire was still to be the main means of
destruction. The RCN build ings in St. John ' s would be burned . The Newfo undland
and Naval dockyard s would be demolished using depth charges, naval vehicles
would be driven off wharves , and the harbour entrance would be sealed with block
ships. The authors repeated their concern as to how best to destroy the naval
ordinance faciliti es on the south side of the harbour. The proposal for the Imperial
Oil fuel tank s was equally worr isome . The easiest and most effec tive means of
destroying the fuel stocks was simply to open or smash the valves and ignite the
leakin g fuel. However, the authors cautioned that if this were done, it could "result
in a fire, the extent of which cannot be gauged." Even if the fuel was not ignited and
was simply contained behind the concrete retainin g walls surrounding the tanks, the
authors cauti oned that the fire danger would still be great.168
Some in the military establishment doubted the need for a sco rched earth
policy at all. Rather, Eastern Air Command Chief of Staff Air Marshall F.Y.
Heakes, RCAF, felt that "while the present scales of attack warra nt a Denial
167/bid ., Vol. 11, 927, MS 1400-4, vol. I, Draft copy of Minutes of Meeting on "Scorched
Earth Policy, 22 May 1942.
16S/bid., Denial Plans - Naval Installations, Equipment and Supp lies, 23 Septemb er 1942.
Scheme, they do not warrant a 'Scorched Earth Policy." He further advised that
"the less said about ' Scorched Earth' on the east coast, the better, for morale
reasons.,,169 Captain Schwerdt thought that other than the really vital installations,
such as the dockyards, works hops, and fuel and ordina nce depots, there was really
no "particular obje ct in destroying the shore establishment." I-Ie recognized that
confidenti al docum ents had to be destroyed but sugges ted that the "Nava l
Accommod ation, Admini strati on and other buildin gs might ju st as well be left."
Indeed, Schwerdt op ined that preventin g an enemy landing and acts of sabotage by
fifth columnists or others was "more important than the completion of an effective
'Sco rched Earth Poli cy.,,,17o Regardless, the policy remained in force until a month
after D-Day when "the improved strategic situation" prompted the Chiefs of Staff
Committee in Ottawa to cance l the scorched earth policy for both the Atlantic and
Pacificcoasts.171
In the meantime, Murray round that the new convoy escort system initiated
the previous month was workin g reasonably well. All exce pt the British groups,
now based in Arge ntia under Commander D. Mcintyre, RN, were up to full strength,
but even they never sailed with fewer than five ships . The difficu lty lay with the
WLEF , which used St. John's for refuell ing and repair. In some cases, the
turnaround time between assignments was only a few hours, a situat ion which put
tremendous strain on both men and ships, espec ially the older ex-USN destroyers
169/bid., Vol. 5256, file HQS-22-l -13, Acting/Air Member for Air Staff to Chief of Air
Staff,80ctober I942.
17°/bid., Vol. 11,927, MS 1400-4 , vol. I, Schwerdt to FONF, et al., "' Scorched Earth'
Policy, Newfoundland, 14 March 1942.
171/bid., Vol. 5256, file HQS-22-l 3, "Extract From Minutes Of Meeting Of Defence Council
Held on 7 July 1944 ."
whic h required constant upkeep . Mur ray recomm ended at least two or three days for
turnaround, but NSHQ still pushed the WOMP further east in March to 50 degrees
West, thus extending the WLEF' s duties even further. The minesweep ers of the
Loca l Newfound land Defence Force were not spared either. Besides their
mineswee ping duties, these little ships were further drafted as local coastal convoy
escorts . During the month, forty-four merchant ships were esco rted in seventee n
coastal convoys , many by minesweepers .l"
Conges tion was again a problem durin g March when the remainder of the
A/S trawlers destined for the US arrived at St. John ' s. These were coa led and
provisioned as quickl y as possible, but the presence of these ships caused extreme
congestion, necessitating them being berthed up to four on each side of a moored
ship. Even though the trawlers were coal-fired, fuelling facilities at St. John ' s were
also becomin g a concern. Fuel storage for naval vesse ls was still afloa t because the
Impe rial Oil facil ity was used exclusive ly by merchant ships. However, the MOEF
was dependent on Imperial Oil for replen ishment of its stocks, and when the
company did not import enough fuel at the beginn ing of the month to replenish the
oilers Clam and Teakwood, stocks fell to 1800 tons. As daily consumption was
roughly 725 tons, this caused Capt Schwerdt considerable concern.173
In the meantim e, Lt. Jemm ett 's attempt s to lay anti-submarine defences at
the approaches to St. John 's harbour met with failure for a numb er of reasons,
includin g weathe r. As the commander of I-IMRT Tenacity observed , there was no
l12/bid., RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,953, file I-I - I, vol. I, FONF, monthly repo rt, March 1942.
J13/bid ., Report of Proceedings by Maintenance Captain, Captain of the Port , in FONF,
monthly report, March 1942.
transition period between the heavy seas of the North Atlantic and the calm waters
of St. John ' s harbou r. Ultimately, Lt. A.R. Turnb ell, RCN, in charge of controll ed
minin g at Hali fax, arrived in St. John 's and redesigned (he outer detector loop and
superintended the laying of the minefield . While this was not completed by the end
of the month , construction of the contro l house and barrack s did progress
satisfactorily. I'"
At this time, the question of a secondary service facility was also
investigated. Schwerd t nomina ted three candidates - Bay Bulls, Harbour Grace and
Aquaforte, furth er along the Southern Shore. Bay Bulls was his first choice because
it was mor e likely to be ice-free than the other two and thus more access ible during
the winter. Schwer dt felt this aspec t was most importa nt since the major ity of
repa irs would be from weather damage dur ing the severe winter month s. Schwerdt
also thought that acquiring the needed sites would be less expe nsive at Bay Bulls
than at Harb our Grace. The difficulty lay in protecting the anchorage , which he
argued was "diffic ult to divorce from the question of the...Marine Dock." An anti-
torpedo baffl e would have to be installed along the wide mouth of the bay.
Schwerdt's seco nd choice , Harbour Grace, was more sheltered and easier to defend
and was already used to a limited degree by the RCN. It was connected by the
Newfoundland Railway and had accommodation and wharfage, includin g a small
privately owned marin e dock. On the down side, it was not as icc-free as either St.
John ' s or Bay Bull s and was too far away to be cons idered an extensio n of the St.
John ' s repa ir organizat ion. Aquaforte came in a poor third due mainly to its
174/bid.
isolation . It had a better harbour and could be defe nded more easily than Bay Bulls,
but it was not connected to St. John's by either road or railway.175
Construct ion of the base at St. John ' s cont inued unabated durin g March
despite the poor weather. Three of five magazine tunnels planned for the Southside
Hills had been excava ted, and approx imate ly 150 feet of wharf was finished, or
nearly so, and the cribbing for j ett ies 1-4 was completed. The Administration
Building and the Officers ' Acco mmodatio n block were complete except for
equipment, including heating, as was the naval hospital, which had ten wings
occupied and two still under construction. Unfortunately for the patients and staff,
this facility was "being indifferently heated by temporary measures.Y"
With the Batt le of the Atlantic having moved mainly to the east coas ts of
Canada and the United States , April was a relatively quiet month for the MO EF. No
MOEF- escorted convoys were attacked durin g the month , with Murray noting that
all losses had been of unescorted vessels . This was fortunate because while
Canadian groups were at full strength, the British groups were still inadequate with
only one destroyer and four corvettes per group. Murray hoped that this would
improve by the summer with each group containing two destroyers and four or five
corvettes. In the meantime , the slack was taken up by US and RCAF aircra ft which
supplied at least some air cove r to even coas tal convoys . Fortuitously, many coastal
convoys during Apr il were sailing directly to Halifax and could ava il of the
continual stream of escort vessels travelling back and forth between St. John' s and
I"tu«
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lIMCS Stadacona. During the month, 175 merchant vessels arrived in St. John's ,177
ami a total of twenty local convoys sailed. All in all, the FONF felt that the new
convoy system was working well and, despite the extended MOMP, even his
concerns over the turnaround of the WEF were alleviated during the month, thanks
mainly to the improved weather.178
One new cause for concern for Murray, however, was the increased number
of incidents of drifti ng mines. Mines and mysterious explosions were reported from
Bonavista, Musgrave Harbour, Notre Dame Bay and Cape Bauld. What was
particularly troublesome to the FONF was that these appeared to be British
mines;179 consequently, an officer and a rating were sent to Halifax to undergo
training in mine disposal. Captain Schwerdt thought that this was highly advisable
under the circumstances, as local residents could not be "restrained from falling on
any unknown and strange object in order to collect mementoes." He related one
incident in which a salvaged mine was completely dismantled before any report was
made of its discovery and its interior displayed to all and sundry by the "intrepid
wreckers .,,18o
Thanks to the improved weather, continued progress was made on base
facilities. Probably most appreciated by the average sailor was the completion and
opening of the naval canteen on 22 April. Schwerdt felt that this amenity would be
"'tu«, Report of Proceedings by Maintenance Captain, Captain of the Port, in FONF,
monthly report , April 1942.
178/bid ., FONF,l11onth ly report,April 1942.
179/b id.
I80/bid., Report of Proceedin gs by Maintenance Captain , Captai n of the Port, in FONF,
l11onthlyreport,Apri I 1942.
of "outstanding benefit to Naval personnel" because it was on the streetcar route and
not too far from the new YMCA hostel club, The Red Triangle. 13y this time, much
of the hospital was finished and in full operat ion, and the Officers ' Accom modation
building was "to all intents and purpo ses complete." On the other hand, the
dockyard garage still needed doors and a concrete floor, and the Administration
13uilding and the naval barracks were held up by prob lems with completing the
heat ing system.181
With the concent ratio n of U-boat attacks further west during May, the threat
to mid-Atlantic shipping decreased, and only one convoy (ON-92) was attacked
durin g the month . As a result , Murray opened the convoy cycle to seven-day
intervals from six and reduced the number of MO EF groups to twelve from
fourteen. Thi s allowe d NSHQ to assign seven corve ttes to the newly formed tanker
convoys to the Caribbean.182 Meanwhil e, the Admiralty decided that eleven groups
were adequ ate and released 13ritish Group 5 (13 5) for the same purpose.
Unfortunately, this re-organization shortened the lay-over period for the ships of the
remainin g groups to only six days. This, in turn , led to congestion problems,
especially considering that all WEF groups were also turnin g around in St.
John 's.183 On ave rage, there were twenty-five escorts daily in St. John 's harbour, in
181/bid.
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add ition to the 263 merchant vesse ls that passed through the port during the
month .184 Of this num ber, ninety were escorted betwee n St. John ' s and various other
ports in twenty-eight different convoys . To help relieve the pressure, Murray
attempted to "s tagge r" the A, B, and C Groups of the MOEF. This provided
indiff erent results because there were still periods when St. John' s was overcrowded
with ships and others when none arrived at all.185 Neve rtheless, the fuelling
problems were lessened to some degree in the middle of the month with the arrival
of Scottish Heather with 8500 tons of Admiralty fuel. At the same time, Major
Dunsmor e, representin g the Fuel Controller, arrived in St. John ' s to access the
fuelling situation.l'" Regardl ess of these difficulti es, as well as frequent fog, bad
weather and uncertainty over the position of convoys, Mur ray felt that the escort
system in general "continued to work satisfactorily" with few delays in escorts
rendezvousing with their charges .18? There was one concern, though: trainin g.
As most ships needed their lay-over time for boiler cleanin g and/or repairs,
there was very little left for any trainin g between convoy assignments. This was
alleviated somewhat durin g turnaround at Londonderry, but Murray also tried to
pull a few ships out of operation durin g May for group training. This was conducted
at Harbour Grac e under the discernin g eye of Commander Prentic e in HMCS
Chambly , who had scored the NEF ' s first Ll-boat kill of the war. The ill-fated P-514
I B4Ibid., Report of Proceedin gs by Maintenance Captain, Caplain of the Port, in FONF,
monthly report , May 1942.
Iviu«, FON F,lllo nthly report, May 1942.
186Ibid., Report of Proceedings by Maintenance Captain, Captain of the Port, in FONF,
monthly report, May 1942.
I 87Ibid., FONF,lll on thly report ,M ay 1942.
arrived on 17 May and provided invaluable A/S training for ships of the MOEF.
Until the arriva l of a second submarine, the WWI-vintage I3ritish L-27, P-514
alternated between Harbour Grace and trainin g the I3 Groups in Argentia. It was on
transit from Argent ia the following month that the ex-USN R-class submarine was
mistakenly sunk with all hands by the minesweep er HMCS Georgian. This was not
only a human tragedy, for P514's loss seriously hampered trainin g for the MO EF.188
During the second week of May, a full-scale air raid dri ll was carried out in
St. John's involving both the fighting service s and the civ il defence authorit ies. It
revealed a numb er of ser ious de fic iencies in both equipment and orga nization. Part
of this could have been due to the absence of Lt.-Comm ander Feilman, RCNVR,
who had been appointed ARP Officer at Hali fax. His replacement , Lt.-Commander
V.T. Elton, RCNVR , did not arrive in St. John ' s until 21 May. Regardless, the drill
showe d clea rly that there was a serious lack of fire-fig hting equipment, first aid
stations, and gas masks and decontamination units for the civ ilian popu lation. While
some of the material deficiencies were being recti fied, Capt. Schwerdt suggested
that a series of exercises was needed to bring departmental organizatio n up to
scratch. Regrettably, so much time and manpower were being expe nded on base
construct ion and maintenance of the escort forces that these exerc ises could only be
conducted at their expense.189 As the lull in V-boat activity in the mid-Atlantic
would soo n end, this was not an option.
ISS/b id., Sec also Hadley, Li-Boats againsl Canada , 98-99 .
189LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. t 1,953, file 1-1- 1, vol. 1, Report of Proceedin gs by
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May also saw the arrival of survivors of the convoy battles being waged
offshore. As it was often the closest port of refuge, St. John's was a safe haven for
survivors during the war, and had been since the arrival of the RCN in 1941.190Over
a period of two days in May, the rescue ship Bury and I-IMCS Shediac arrived at St.
John' s with 24 1 survivors from five torpedoed merchant ships on board. Two were
off-loaded to hospital, and some were put in the care of Mona Wilson and the
Canadian Red Cross, but the rest were kept aboard Bury and sailed for Halifax the
next day.191Over the next year, 2976 survivors arrived at St. John's, and evidence
suggests that twice this number were cared for in St. John's during the Second
World War, many requiring medical care.In This brought another concern to the
attention of the FONF. In early May, Dr. Mosdell, Secretary for Public Health and
Welfare for the Newfoundland government, called on Admiral Murray with a
serious problem. With the influx of service personnel and workers employed at
military facilities around Newfoundland, medical care in the outports was suffering
because doctors were moving to the larger centres. The government had built a
number of cottage hospitals since 1934 to care for outport people, but these were
now in jeopardy due to the lack of doctors to operate them. In most cases, military
doctors, both Canadian and American, offered free care to civilians living around
the various bases and outposts, but the cottage hospitals were an essential service for
'90"Sixty_Four Survivors of Torpedoed Ships Reach Newfoundland Port," Evening Telegram
(St.John's) , 16June 1941.
19ILAC, RG 24, FONF , Vol. 11,953, file I- I- I, vol. I , Repo rt of Proceedin gs by
Maintenance Captain, Captai n of the Port, in FONF, monthly report, May 1942. See also Gillian
Poulter and Douglas O. Baldwin, ''' Never a Dull Moment in this Port :' Mona Wilson and the
Canadia n Red Cross in Wartime St. John' s," in High (ed.), Occupied St. John '5,22 0-250.
192DND, Directo rate of History and Heritage (DHH ), NHS 8000 , 25, Lt. Stuart Keats, "T he
Royal Canadian Navy in Newfound land, 1940-1944," October 1944.
many isolated areas, and this was of grave concern to the Newfou ndland
gove rnment, es pecially in the event of some sort of epidemic or other medical
cmcrgency.i'"
Progress continued on construction of the base throughout May, but a
number of projects were held up due to the non-arrival of centra l heatin g equipment.
The naval hospital was still operating with a temp ora ry sys tem only, and the
barracks were complete except for heating which arrived late in the month. This last
jo b was espec ially pressing as the Royal Fleet Auxi liary City of Dieppe, which had
been supplying acco mmodation alongside, left for Quebec early in May, and no
doubt Lt.-Commander S.W. Davis, RCN, had his hands full sorting things out when
he arriv ed mid -month to take over duties as executive officer of the naval barracks.
The Admini stration Buildin g was awaiting completion of the main plottin g room
and other operational areas, particularly communi cations facilities, before naval
headquarters could be moved from the Newfoundland Hotel. The offic ers' quarters
were being cleaned prior to being furnished, but they were await ing the arrival of an
adequate numb er of cooks and stewards to get the galley and other housekeeping
equipment ready for the care of the officers of the comrnand.l'"
Captain Schwerdt considered that the progress on the Nava l Dockyard was
"remarkable takin g into account the difficulti es with which the build ers have had to
contend ." These difficulties included congestion caused by the backlo g of stores and
supplies which were still languishing ashore despite the promi ses of the Chairman
193 LAC, RG 24, FON F, Vol. 11,953, file 1-1-1, vol. I , Report of Proceedin gs by
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of the Customs Board back in November 1941. Most of the buildings were more
than half compl ete, and some, such as the naval canteen, were in usc. The Dockyard
breastwork was ready for paving, and jetties I, 3 and 4 required only the installation
of bollards, some boat hooks and floating fenders. Jetty 2 was about halfway
complete. In the meantime, 180 feet of the south side wharf was ready, and
considerable progress was made on the piles and bracing for the remainder. Progress
in this area was hampered by the depth of water, the need to splice the piles and the
requirement of having all the bracing ready in advance of the pile-driving
equipment. 195 Regardless, a remarkable amount of work had been accompli shed
since the previous summer.
As has been shown, establishing the base at St. John 's was a lot more
comp licated than the Admiralty had anticipat ed. This was partly its own fault as it
started the ball rolling before it had a clear idea of what was needed. Initially, the
NEF was to be the North American component of a three-part convoy escort system
that also includ ed an Iceland Escort Force and the exis ting Clyde Escort force . The
comp lications arose when NS HQ offered to accept responsibility for the North
American part, including establishing the base at St. John ' s. The Canadians had a
number of reasons for wanting to do this, some not necessarily military in nature.
For one, the RCN did not just want to be an adjunct to the R.N. Having Canadian
naval asse ts operatin g from a Canadian base under a Canadian officer in traditional
Canadian waters was very attracti ve to both the RCN and the government of Prime
Minister Mackenzie King. The other, equally important, consideration was the
Americans. Thanks to the Anglo-American "Destroyers for Bases Deal" the
19S1bid.
Americans were build ing bases and outposts across Newfoundland. The Canadian
government teared that Canada could find itself with an American protectorate on
its front door step if it did not exert its "specia l interest" in Newfoundland. A major
naval base at St. John' s was "j ust the ticket." The prob lem was that the
Newfoun dlan d government was not very keen on having a larger Canadian or
American presence in Newfoundland, especially in St. Joh n's harbour. The
Commiss ion of Government had a number of good reaso ns for this reluctance .
Newfoundland and its gove rnment had been show n little cons ideratio n by either the
American-Canadian PJI3D or in the Anglo-America n Leased Bases deal. If a naval
base was go ing to be deve loped at St. John ' s, as far as the Commiss ion of
Gove rnme nt was concerned, it had to be British.
To add further confusio n, the Admiralty decided to eliminate the Iceland leg
of the convoy escor t circ uit and have the NEF escort convoys directly to a MOMP
into the waiting arms of the RN. Of course, this would require a larger force and
more substantial facilities at St, John ' s. With an estimated cost of ten million
dollars, the Canadian gove rnment had seco nd thoughts abo ut shouldering the
financial burden and withdrew its offer to underwrite the base . The Admiralt y
offered to cover half and thought that the Americans could be aske d to cons truc t the
base under Lend-L ease. However, if the Newfo undland gove rnment did not want
the Canadians to have ownership of a fair share of St. John ' s waterfront property,
they did not want the Americans to have it either. The Admiralty realized that its
best option was to revert back to its original plan and deve lop the base itself with
whatever help it could get from both the Canad ians and Am ericans .
By this time , however, a month had gone by, and the ships of the NEF were
escorting convo ys and being serviced by faciliti es al1oat. Nego tiations were
underway to acquire shore front land, but it was a slow process because most owners
ju st wanted to be left alone . Added to this was the Admiralty's suspicion that the
Newfoundland government, which was negotiating compensation, was not
necessar ily act ing in their best interests. Further delays occurred due to labour
troubles on the waterfront and prob lems obtain ing needed building materials.
Winter was approac hing, and as much progress as poss ible had to be made before
bad weather hamp ered construction. The Uni ted States' officia l entry into the war
also complicated things for the New foundland Com mand. With the US a true
bell igerent and Newfo undland the site of two army bases, two naval stations and
four airbases, not to mention its strategi c location, local comma nders were fearful of
a German attack. Furthermore , in disregar d to the provisio ns of the ABC-l
agree ment under which the USN was supposed to take over convoy responsibilities
in the Western Atlantic, the Amer icans hauled all but a toke n force out of the Nort h
Atlantic for duty in the Pacific, while retaining strategic contro l of the Western
Atlantic, includin g Canadian forces. To add insult to injury, as a result of the
slaughter of ships along the US eastern seaboar d, Admiral Murray had to detail
precious resources to convoy duty to the Caribbean. Still, a year afte r the first ships
of the NE F sailed through the Narrows, I-lMCS Ava lon was fully operational, and
base facilities were slowly but sure ly starting to take shape.
Chapter 5
Holdin g the Line - June 1942 to May 1943
While the Americ ans were gett ing some sort of hand le on the situation off
their eastern seaboar d, things were heating up aga in off the east coast of Canada.
The "Battle of the St. Lawrence," a term coined by the Ottawa Journa l, was not
actually a batt le but a series of effective If-boat sort ies that acco unted for the
heaviest Canad ian losses in the inshore zone. I Recognizing the Gulf of St. Lawrence
as a hub of both local and trans-Atlantic shipping, Don itz sent six U'-boats over a
six-month period to attack seven convoys, sinking twenty merchantm en, a loaded
troopship and two Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) warships? The piece de resistance,
as far as domestic impact was concerned, was the sinking of the Sydney to Port-
Aux-Basque passenger ferry SS Caribou with the loss of 136 people, including ten
children.
On 30 Jun e 1942, V- 132 under the command of Kapitan leutnant Ernst
Vogelsang penetrated the Cabot Strait and entered the Gulf of St. Lawrence . For the
first few days, he reconnoitred the area, but despite the presence of targets, mist
and/or distance frustrated his efforts. But in the early hours of 6 July, Vogelsang
sighted and tracked the Quebec-S ydney convoy QS-15. Shortly thereafter, he
initiated an attack which Eastern Air Command would later describe as "the greatest
loss that was sustained in anyone locality" off the east coast of Canada.3 In the
' Michae l L. Hadley, V-boats against Canada: German Submarines in Canadian Waters
(Kingston: McGill-Qu een ' s University Press, 1985),8 2.
2Giinther Hessler, The V-Boat War in the Atlantic, 1939 -1945 (3 vols., Lond on : IIM SO,
1989),II , 37.
3Hadley, Usboats against Canada, 101.
space of a few minutes, Vogelsang sank the Belgian Hianaut , the Greek Anastassios
Pateras and the British-registered Dinaric. 4 This attack, however , was not without
conse quences for U-132. The Bangor minesweeper I-lMCS Drummondvill e (Lt. J.P.
Fraser, RCNVR ) sighted the U-boat and gave it a severe pounding. The attack
exacerbated previo us battle damage, most notab ly the main ballast pump which
contro lled the boat's tr im. Slowly U-132 sank to 180 metres. With only eighty
kilogra ms of compresse d air left to blow the ballast tanks , Voge lsang decided to
surface and put his faith in the darkness, the If-boat 's speed and its manoeuvrability.
Allhou gh spotted by one of the escorts, now two miles distant , U-I3 2 eluded him in
the darkne ss. When Vogelsang finally reached the IDO-metre sounding, he
submerged and lay on the bottom to make repairs.'
For the next week, U-I32 patrolled the Strait of Belle Isle but sighted no
temptin g targets. Vogelsang therefore deemed this area to be "unfavourable" and
headed back to the mouth of the St. Lawrence River where he had enjoye d his
previo us suceess es .6 He arrived off Cap de la Madeleine on 20 July and sighted the
Quebec-Sydn ey convo y QS- 19 escorted by HMCS Weyb urn, HMCS Chedebucto
and the two Fairmil e patrol boats, Q-074 and Q-059. In a daring daylight attack ,
Vogelsang penetrated the convoy at periscope depth and fired two torpedoes. One
hit SS Frederic k Lensen, damaging it so that when towed to Grand Vallee Bay it
broke in ha lf and sank. U-I32 made its escape in the resu lting confusion and,
traversing the Ca bot Strait unmolested, sent a lengthy situation report on 24 July. U-
"Jurgen Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes, / 939-/945 (Cambridge: Patrick Stephens,
(983),1 07.
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132 arrived home safely after a patrol of sixty-eight days , having steamed 10,000
mi les. With its score of five ships sunk, the patro l was considered "a fine success.,,7
Thin gs were fairly quiet for the next month . There were no sinkings in the
Gulf itself, but there was some act ivity to the east of Nova Scotia . The east coas t of
North America was no longer the "happy hunting ground" it had been for the
prev ious six months. Few ships now travell ed alone , and the last seven V-boats to
operate off the coas t found few valuable targets. U-458 (Digg ins) claimed a 4870-
ton merch antman, but U-89's bag was only the fifty-four -ton schooner Lucill e lvI,
and U-754's( Oestermann) the 260-ton American fishing vesse l Ebb 120 miles south
of Halifax. 8
With Donitz concentrating his efforts further south, June was fairly quiet for
the Newfoundland Command. Only two convoys were attacke d - ON- I00 and ON-
102 - with the loss of just one stragg ler from ON-100 . However, the command did
suffer two "seve re and painful losses" durin g the month. P-5 I4 was sunk by mistake
off the southern Ava lon Peninsula, and the Free French corvette Mimosa was
torpedoed with only four survivors while escorting ON-I 00. Regardless of these
tragic losses, ninety ships in twenty-six local convoys arr ived at their destinations
unscathed . Regardless, Murray knew that this lull in V-boat attacks in the mid-
Atlantic would not last much longer. With the increasing strength of both surface
and air escort s in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico , he knew it was only a matter of
time before the V-boa ts, emboldened by their successes in the Western Hemisphere,
1Tony German, The Sea Is at Our Gates: The History of the Canadian Navy (Toronto:
Mcf.l clland and Stcwart, 1990), 117.
SHadley, V-boals against Canada, 107.
moved back into their fami liar hunting ground s in the mid-Atlanti c. Neve rtheless, a
meeting in Washin gton in early June attend ed by Murra y' s Chief of Staff, Capt.
Bidwe ll, dec ided to further reinforce the escort forces in the Caribbean at the
expense of the Mid-Ocean Escort Force (MOEF) . This forced Murray to reduce the
size of each group to six vesse ls, with two being destroyer s whenever possible . This
move released eight corvettes for duty in the Caribbean thea tre. The redeployment
of these ships, along with the loss of P-514, effectively halted any local training for
the MOEF.9
Whil e not of major impact on the war effo rt, but indicative of a growing
problem in St. John' s, two naval ratings were court marshalled durin g the month for
theft. IO Whil e the presence of the various armed forces allaye d local fears of
German assa ult, it also created other difficult ies worth noting. With so many young
men in St. John ' s, many away from home for the fir st time and with money in their
pockets, it was almost inevitabl e that some would end up in troubl e with the police.
Indeed , stati stics indicate that durin g 1941, a year from the arrival of the Americans
and six month s after the creation of the NEF, there were 34 17 criminal prosecutions,
an increase of 1203 over 1940 and almost double the number in 1939." By 1943
there were 8000 cases, 1000 more than 1942.12 A large portion of these were liquor-
9Library and Archiv es Canada (LAC), Record Group (RG 24), Flag Office r Newfou ndland
Force (FaNF), Vol. 11,953, file I-I-I , vol.I , FaN1', monthly report, June 1942.
viu«, Report of Proceedings by Maintenance Captain, Cap tain of the Port, in FONI' ,
monthly report, May 1942.
II"Crimina l Cases Show Increase over 1940," Evening Telegram (St. John' s), 31 December
12"Very Busy Year In Magistrate ' s Court ," Evening Telegram (St. John ' s), 31 December
related, and many involved the men of the RCN . Possib ly the most notorious
incident occur red on Christmas night in 1941 when 150 naval ratings destroyed the
Imperial Cafe on Water Street." Popular memory has it that the Ameri cans were
much better beha ved than the Canadian s, and a review of the Magistrate ' s Court
section of the Evening Telegram during the war seems to bear this out. Seldom did
a day go by that a Canad ian naval rating or soldier did not appear before the
magistrate.14 Yet in truth the infrequency with which American servicemen
appeared before the bench resulted as much from an agree ment between the
Newfoundland government and US authoriti es as from better behaviour. 15 Some
American mi lita ry personnel did appear before local courts, but the majority were
transferred to the US mili tary. While the punishments handed out by military courts
were often harsher than those of the civilian courts, this special treatment raised the
ire of some in the community." In the case of the two RCN ratings, the accused
were acquitted due to lack of evidence .17
13"Chinese Cafe Gutted By Nava l Ratings," Evening Telegram (St . John ' s), 27 December
" Fora an offic ial view of the behaviour of Canad ian perso nnel and the disparity between
Canad ian recreational faci lities and those of the Amer icans in St. John' s, see Memorandum from
Director of Externa l Operations, Wartime Information Board [G.W. McCracken] to General
Executive Manager, Wart ime Information Board [A.D. Dunton] , in Paul Bridle (cd.), Documents on
Relations between Canada and Newfoundland (2 vols., Ottawa: Departm ent of Externa l Affairs,
1974-1984 ),1 ,8 71.
IlThe so-ca lled " Welty Agreement" between the general in command of American forces in
Newfoundl and and New foundland Justice and Defence Commissioner Emerson provide d that
American servicemen would be transferred to American authorities for punishment. Provincia l
Archiv es of New foundl and and Labrador (PANL) , GN 38, S4-2-4 , file 3, Welty to L.E. Emerson, 4
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Jun e was also marked by an air raid scare . Early in the month the mayor of
St. John ' s, A lbert Carne ll, phoned Commissione r for Defence Emerson from
Mont real with supposedly rel iab le information from a prom inent citizen that a
num ber of enemy aircra ft would attack St. John ' s on 10 June. A "ye llow" alert was
issued, and all air raid measures were instigated for the nights of both 9 and 10 June,
although only the fight ing serv ices stayed on high alert on the ro". Fortunately, no
raid occurred. Another bit of excitement took place in the midd le of the month ,
although this was more a celebratio n than a threat. The first United Nations Day was
held in St. John ' s. Fiftee n hundr ed service personn el and eight hundr ed civil defence
member s took part in a parad e through St. John ' s wi th honour s given to His
Excellency the Gove rnor, Admiral Walwyn , and the senior mi litary com manders in
front of Go vernment House. Unfortunately, there were not many ships of the MO EF
in the harbour at the time, but Murra y was able to scrape togeth er a naval contin gent
compri sing rou ghly 100 sea men.l"
Progress on the base continu ed, but Canadian bureaucra cy was causing
delays. Despit e app roval from Naval Services Headquarters (NS HQ), the
Supervising Eng ineer still requir ed approva l from his own department to proceed
with certain item s. To save time, Schwe rdt suggested that approv al from NS I-IQand
the Enginee r's departm ental head should be issued concurrently. Nevert heless,
construction was advancing at a satisfactory rate. Tunn els 3, 4 and 5 of the South
Side magazine were well in hand , the latter two being more than 400 feet deep.
Number I fuel tank was erecte d and was being tested wit h wate r for leaks, and the
site for tank Numb er 6 was being clea red. Co ntractors had nearly comp leted the
I'/bid .
South Side wharf for its full length from Job Brothers proper ty westwa rd, and
progress was underway at the New foundland Fuel and Engineering and the Marine
Agencies wharves. At the Nava l Dockyard, all of the cribw ork west of the haul-up
slip was finished, and work on the slip itself had begun . Most of the buildings were
nearly finished, although Buildin g 7 would be delayed for upwards of six months
due to the di fficulty in obtaining heating and other equipment. The heating plant
finally arriv ed for the hospital and was being installed, and both the administration
buildin g and the offic ers' accommodation buildin g were ju st about ready for
occupa ncy. All the nava l barracks , with a few exceptions, were ready for habit ation.
Thus, by the end of June 1942, after a year of delays, negotiation s, setbacks and
chan ges in juri sdiction , Murray was finally seeing I-lMCS Avalon take shape.19 This
was fortunat e, becau se the next six months were goin g to bring trying times for the
Flag Officer Newfoundland Force (FONF) and the rest of the MO EF.
By the beginnin g of the summer of 1942, when the Amer icans had stemmed
the tide of slau ghter along their eastern seabo ard and in the Caribbean and Gulf of
Mexico , Donitz again turned his sights on the North Atlantic . As a result , the FONF
noted an increase in U-boat sightin gs in the waters patroll ed by the MO EF durin g
July . One outward-bound convoy - ON-113 - was attacked on 23 July with the loss
of three merch antm en, and another - ON-115 - was shadowed by U-boats. HMCS
St. Croix, one of the ex-U nited States Navy (USN) Town-class destroy ers from the
"destroyers for bases" deal, sank U-90 while escorting ON- 113, and HMC Ships
Skeena and Wetaskiwin escorting ON-115 sank U-588. Both sinkings were
19/bid .
confirmed by large amount s of wrecka ge and human remains.i" While Mur ray had
diffic ulty finding escort s due to refits and repairs, none of the 124 ships escorted in
twenty-four local convoys was molested, despite being on ly lightly escorted by
Bangor mineswee pers which lacked radar.21
In July Captain C.M.R. Schwerdt, Captain of the Port and until June 1941
the Naval Office r in Charge (NO lC) of St. John 's , departed . Schwerdt had come to
St. John 's as Governor Walwyn 's private secretary and took on the responsibilities
of NOIC when war was declared. With only a skeleton staff, Schwe rdt had arranged
for the defence of St. John 's, set up an examination service, installed signa l sta tions
at Cape Spear and Signa l Hill and been the Admira lty's point man in estab lishing
HMCS Avalon. No doubt these accomp lishments led to his appointme nt as NO IC at
Sydney, Cape Breton. Comma nder G.B. Hope, RCN, arrived as Schwerdt 's
replacement along with his assistant, Acting/Lt-Commander J.O. Merc hant,
RCNVR . Until the arrival of Actin g/Captain W.L.B. Holm s, Hope also served as
Commanding Offic er ofHMCS Avalon.22
In the meantim e, all of the naval offices exce pt that of Extended Defence
Officer (XDO) Captain Langston moved from the New foundland Hotel to the new
administration buildin g. This build ing also acco mmodated the Nava l Control
Service Officer (NC SO), the Maintenance Office r Rescue Tugs (MO RT) and the
Mini stry of War Tran sport (MWT) as well as numerous Royal Canadian Air Force
2°/bid., FONF, monthly report, July 1942. See also W.A.B . Douglas, et al., No Higher
Purpose: The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War,
1939-1945, II part 2 (St. Catharines : Vanwell Publishing , 2002), 492-496 .
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22/bid., Report of Proceedin gs by Maintenanc e Captain, Captain of the Port, in FONF,
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(RCAF) offices , Shortly thereafter, the Captain ' s Offic e for HMCS Avalon moved
to the newly comp leted barracks at 13uckma sters' Field along with the Leave and
Transpor tation Office . With the barracks finished, a meeting was held in
Commander Hope' s office to discuss moving Captain(D) as well as some selected
maintenance person nel to thc now somewhat redundant l-lMCS Avalon 11 (the
former SS Georgian) , and towards the end of July a representative of the Chief
Engineer's staff flew to Ottawa to discuss these plans with NS HQ. Meanwhile, the
rest of HMCS Avalon was nearing com pletion. The var ious shops and stores at the
dockyard were "substantially complete," as was the garagc, and contractors had
almost finished the excava tion of the magazines, albeit delayed somewhat by rock
falls. The fuel tanks were progressing satisfactori ly with Number I ready to be
connected to the wharf and Number 2 erected excep t for the roof . Numbers 3-5 were
in various stages of preparation.F
The month of August was a busy time for HMCS Ava lon as a number of
VIPs arrived in St. John 's . The first was Captain C.N .E. Currey, RN, who arrived by
Trans-Canada Airlin es on 2 August to inspect the torpedoed tanker British Merit
which was being towed into St. John ' s. The ship was equipped with an anti-torpedo
"Admiralty Ne t Device" (AN D), and Captain Currey, one of the originators , was
ferried out to the stricken ship. Nex t to arrive was the Chief of the Nava l Staff
(CNS), Vice-Adm iral Percy Nelles, who arrived on 4 August on an inspection tour.
He visited the Combined Operations Room (COR) and was briefed by Murray and
Air Com modo re C.M. McEwe n on combined RCN /RCAF operat ions in the western
Atlantic. He also inspected the rest of the facilities of HMCS Avalon as well as
several of the ships in port . On 9 August Paymaster Director General Commander
R.W. Wright , RCN , arrived to comp lete a detailed survey of accountant personnel at
HMCS Ava lon. Limpi ng into port at the same time was HMCS Assinib oine, which
had been severe ly damage d in its enco unter with U-210 in defe nce of SC-94.
Interestingly, on board Assiniboin e at the time was Dr. Gi lbe rt Tuck er, who after the
war would write two volumes of the officia l history of the RCN. R.W. Rankin
arrived towards the middle of the month to rep lace Major Lyon , who had been
handlin g the se lection and acquis ition of the var ious base sites for the Canadian
gove rnme nt and had been reporting on the work ings of the arbitration board .i"
New foundland Commiss ioner Woods probably welcomed Rankin ' s arriva l as he
had not found Lyo n's perform ance satisfac tory."
A.B. Manarey, Tra nsport Superviso r from NS HQ, also arrived in mid-
August to inspect and report on motor transport faci lities in St. John 's . While in the
city, he was instrum ental in arranging the hiring of a civilian dispatcher and also
recommended that NSHQ provid e additional vehicl es and a centr al garage. Captain
H.N. Lay, RCN , Director of Operations (DO D), and Capta in W./-I. Creery , RCN,
Chief of Staff (COS) to the Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast (COAC), arrived a
week later for a joint opera tions confere nce with Ame rican aut horities. They met
with Comma nde r Woolrid ge, USN, who was represe nting Admira l Bristol, and
Captain Bidw ell at Naval Headqu arters in St. John ' s to discuss problems with the
"ts,«, Report of Proceed ings by Mainte nance Captai n, Captain of the Port, in FONF,
monthly report, Augu st 1942.
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new tran s-Atlanti c convoy schedule.i" They agree d upon a sc hedule that prov ided a
balanced tim e at sea for all MOEF groups and equal layover time at both the eastern
and wes tern termin als. In addition, the comm ittee decided that a more effici ent
repair service co uld be provided for the B Gro ups at Argentia by stagge ring their
arriva ls, and a sa iling schedu le was esta blished that co uld be opened out to eigh t
days when necessitated by winter operating conditions.V Later tha t day Cree ry,
acco mpa nied by Major Dunamore , rea l estate advisor Rankin, Maint enance Office r
in Charge (MO IC) Lt.-Comm ander R.U. Langston and E.V. Gilbert , Engineer of
Docks and Dredgin g, went to Botwood to look at the o il tank site chosen ea rlier by
Captain Bid well and Commander Hope. They decided to use tha t site for the Naval
Headquart ers, Barracks and Stores , and chose another one for the oil tanks. The
paperw ork was drawn up by Rankin and forwarded to Ottawa. 28 The same day,
Com mander G.R. Weym outh , RN, arr ived from England en route to Argentia.
Whil e in St. John 's he briefed Murray and his staff on the latest development s and
policy concernin g Type 271 radar, High Frequency Direction Finding (I-IF/DF ) and
Very High Frequency (VI-IF) radio transmission. At the invitation of Captain Lay,
Weym outh accomp anied him to Ottawa by air upon his return from Argentia/"
The last VIP to visit St. John ' s durin g August was the Governor General of
Canada, Major- Gene ral Alexa nder Cambridge, First Earl of Athlone, and his wife
Princ ess Alic e, both of whom arr ived on 25 August. After a flurr y of public
261bid., Vol. 11,953, file 1-1-1, vol. I, Report of Proceedings by Main tenance Captain,
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appeara nces, luncheons and inspections of the newly con structed nava l faciliti es -
some in less than perfect weather - the Vice-Regal coup le departed on 29 August.
Two other interesting visitors to St. John 's durin g the month were the British S-
Class subm arine Seawolf, vetera n of the Nort h Sea campai gn, en route to a refit in
Philadelphia, and the training submari ne L-27 on its way to the UK after a refit in
the US.30
While Murray was dealing with all this act ivity ashore during August,
Donit z' s U-boats continued to concentrate their activities on the mid-ocean
convoys. The battle for ON-115 , during which I-IMC Ships Skeena and Wetaskiwin
sank V-588 on 31 July, continu ed into the first week of August, resultin g in three
more ships being sunk and two U-boats severely damaged." SC-94, escorted by
group C 1, was attack ed on 6 August and lost eleven ships over five days, the worst
losses on the north ern convoy routes in almost a year. In return , Donitz lost two U-
boats - V-2J O (HMCS Assi niboine) and V-3 79 (HMS Dianthus) - plus severa l
damaged, some seriously. The sinking of V-2JO by Ass iniboi ne on the first night of
the battl e for SC-94 was something right out of a war novel. Assiniboine, under the
command of Lt.-Comm ander John Stubb s, RCN (who later became Staff Office r
Operation s at St. John ' s and went down with HMCS Athabas kan off the French
coast in 1944), sighted V-2J O early in the evening on 6 August and closed at full
speed. After a thirty-minute gun battle in which the combatants wove in and out of a
fog bank hurlin g shells at each other, Stubbs eventually managed to manoeuvre his
ship into a favourable position and ramm ed the U-boat abaft the conning tower
30lbid.
3lDouglas, et 01.,No Higher Purpose, 503 .
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while dro pping a pattern of sha llow-set dept h charges at the same time. The blow
was fata l for U-210, and the crew scuttled the boat and abandoned ship. Thirty-e ight
survivors were recovere d, but the U-boat's captain, Kaptanleutnan t Rudolf Lemcke,
was killed with all the bridge crew late in the battl e when one of Assi niboine's shells
hit the conning tower. Assiniboine suffered fourt een casualties, including one killed .
The destro yer was damaged so seve rely in the actio n that it limped home to St.
John ' s for repair s, arriv ing on 9 August. The next MO EF convoy to be attacked was
ON- I22 , which was esco rted by the Bri tish B I group. It was stalked by ten U-boats
over a span of twent y hours and lost four merchantmen for two U-boa ts damaged. It
is no wond er that durin g August, 120 survivor s, including three RAF /RCAF aircrew
and sixteen Ge rman POWs from U-2l 0, were land ed in St. John ' s.32
Meanwhil e, work on HM CS Ava lon continued apace . Most of the
adminis tration, medical, accommodation and mess buildin gs were finished and
occ upied, with the rem ainder nearing compl etion . All of the dockyard buildin gs had
been turn ed over by the cont ractor other than the mach ine and shipwright shops, the
guardhouse and the centr al heatin g plant , all of which were well adva nced. Most of
the wharves and jetti es were being compl eted or were in use, which was we lcome
news because 27 6 vess els passed through St. John ' s durin g August, not includ ing
the twent y-four naval vessels that were on hand on any given day.33 There was also
a change in comm and of the MO EF when Admira l Mur ray was prom oted to
Commanding Officer Atlan tic Coa st (COAC) , taking over his duties on 18
32LAC, RG 24 , FONF, Vol. 11,953, file 1-1-1, vol. 1, FONF, monthly report, August 1942.
See also Douglas, et al., No Higher Purpose, 506-507 and 525.
33LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,953, file 1-1-1, vol. I, FONF, month ly report, August 1942.
September, with Capt. (D) E.R. Mainguy comm andin g in the interim unti l Murray' s
replaceme nt, Commodore I-I.E. Reid, RCN, assumed his duti es as FONF at the end
ofOctober.34
By September, it was clear that Donitz' s If-boats were back in the northern
waters, including those around Newfoundland, in force. Several convoys were badly
mauled, and a tota l of 479 survivors were landed at St. John 's durin g the month ,
includ ing sixty-eigh t crew from I-IMCS Ottawa - sunk in the defe nce of ON- 127 -
and forty-nin e OEMS (De fensively Equipped Merchant Ships) personne l." Closer
to home, on the night of 4 September U-513, under the command of Rolf
Ruggeberg, followed the ore carrier Evelyn B into the Wabana anchorage in
Conception Bay. Spending the night submerged in seve nty feet of water , Ruggeberg
rose to peri scope depth the next mornin g and sank two ships, SS Saganaga and SS
Lord Strathcona. Slightly damaged by a collision with Strathcona, U-513 left the
scene, once agai n tra iling Evelyn B. Twenty-nine men were killed in the attack , all
aboard Saganaga" No thing appeared in the press about this incident, no doubt the
result of the stric t censors hip regime in place, but news qu ickly spread." The public
was shaken because the attack had occurred in broad day light, in an inshore
340 0uglas, et al ., No Higher Purpose, 64 1-643.
3SLAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,953, file I-I-I , vo l. I, Repo rt of Proceedings by
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36Jak Mailm an Showell, V-B oats at War: Landings on Hostile Shores (Londo n, Ian Allan,
1973; 2nd ed., Ann apolis: Nava l Institute Press, 2000), 38-39; and Hadley, V-B oats agains t Canada,
116. See also Steve Neary , The Enemy on Our Doorstep : The German Atta cks at Bell Island,
Newfound land, 1942 (St. John 's: Jespersen Press, 1994), 7-34.
37It would have been impossib le to contain the news of the attack as many of the survivors
had been resc ued and cared for by the local resident s and then transported to St. John's. For a
discussion of censorship measures undertaken in Newfoun dland, see Jeff A. Webb , The Voice of
Newfoundland: A Social History of the Broadcasting Corpo ration of Newfo undland, 1939-1949
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protected anchorage . Captain Mainguy comp lained that while losses in convo ys
were accepted as the " fortunes of war," sinkings so close to St. John ' s were harder
to exp lain to the public, which cons idered them the result of "dereliction of duty on
the part of the Navy ." Mainguy rightly saw such event s as being the result of too
few resou rces, sugges ting that the sca rcity of esco rts for local convoys was being
"keenly felt." The number of such escorts ava ilable depended largely on the
numb ers requir ed for the more important trans-Atlant ic convoys , and the FONF
quite simply had to make a choice. Mainguy was concerned, however, that if the U-
boats decided to make "resolute attacks" in coastal waters, Newfound land' s trade
could be brought to "a virtual standstill.,,38
The local defence force received some relief in mid-m onth with the arriva l
from the UK of the 30th Motor Launch Flotilla (MLF) under the command of Lt.-
Commander Daish, RNVR , and HMCS Preserver. The 30th MLF, based out of St.
John ' s, would provide protection for Bay Bulls, and Preserver, which was based in
Harbour Grace , would act as mother ship to the 715t and n'd MLF s. This allowed
the FONF to establish a permanent patrol at Wabana using the 71st and two boats
from the n'dand a regular schedule of ore convoys between Wabana and Sydney.
By the end of September, eleven ore carr iers, along with eighteen other vesse ls, had
been success fully convoyed between the two ports .39
Similar to his predecessor, Mainguy had to contend with a number of
distin guished guests during September. The Right Honourable Clement Aulee,
38LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,953, file I-I-I , YoU , FONF, monthly report , Septemb er
1942.
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Brit ish Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister , arrived
on 14 September on a fact-findin g tour and inspected the new administration
building .l" The Joint Defence Committee, including Captain H.G. deWol f, RCN,
Director of Plans (DO P) at NSHQ, and Mayor Fiore llo La Guardi a of New York,
made a flying one-day visit to St. John's on the nIh Also arri ving in St. John ' s in
Sep tember was Colonel P.F. Clarke, the Prope rty Comm ission er, who met with the
manager of the New foundland Fuel and Engineering Company to negotiate for the
site of a proposed power house on the south side of the harbour. Clarke reached an
agreement with Ne wfoundland Fuel and Engineering to lease the requir ed site for
$ 1.00 per annum in exch ange for the navy straightening the road through the
property by removing approx imately 600 cubic yards of rock at a cost of $ 1500.
This was a typic al arrangement between the RCN and property owners on the south
side of the harbour. In most cases, the RCN received the use of a site for the cost of
improvements which were turned over to property owners at the end of the war."
The RCN , RCAF , the Canadian Army, the United States Army, and Army
Air Corps condu cted comb ined manoeuvres durin g Septemb er, which also included
members of the local Air Raid Precautions (ARP) organization. The exercise took
the form of a mock landin g some distance outside St. John ' s and thoroughly tested
4°For a review of Attlee' s visit to Newfou ndland and his concl us ions, see Peter Neary,
"Clement Attl ee ' s Visit to Newf oundland, September 1942," Acadiensis , XIII, No.2 (Spring 1984),
101-109 . A furth er parliamentary mission comprised of three British Ml' s travelled to Newfoundland
in June 1943. It was not a formal Commiss ion of Enquiry but an inform al "goo dwill" tour; it did
however, submit its findings to the Domini ons Office in November 1943 and issue a more formal
report in Decemb er 1943. See Great Britain. National Archives (TNA/PRO) , Premier 4/44/3,
"Memorandum by Secretary of State for Dominion Affa irs to the War Cabine t," November 1943;
and "Ne wfo und land Past and Present: Add resses by Members of the Par liamentary Mission to
Newfo und land," 2 December 1943.
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the defence preparedn ess of the local command . Overa ll, the exercise was a success
and afforded the opportunity to improve defence arrangements still further.42 This
exercise took place shortly after the release of the navy' s Denial Plans (sec chapter
4), but Mainguy did not make any connection betwe en the two in his monthly report
to NSHQ .
Constructio n of HMCS Avalon neared completion by the end of September
with most main buildin gs fully occupied. Some areas of the barracks were yet to be
finished, however, due mainly to the non-arrival of equipment. The same could be
said for the dockyard, where most buildin gs were finished, although the central
heatin g plant was still not operational due to delays in receiving equipment. Also
awa iting compl etion were the sickbay, yard water and sewer installation and
fencin g. The magazines were having their interiors timbered, and the two-story
office buildin g on the site was complete excep t for heating, plumbin g and painting.
The six fuel tanks were at various stages of construction; most were well advance d,
but only Tank 1 was ready to receive oil. The remaining buildings - the Port War
Signal Stations at Fort Amherst and Cape Spear and the Mobile Training Unit
garage - were fully operational, and the Gunnery School was complete exce pt for
minor items. Work had begun on the new boom defence gate at the Narrows, with
completion expected by the end of October.43 The command arrangements at HMCS
Avalon were also finalized in September when Lt.-Commander Davis assumed
command from Captain I-Iolms, with Lt.-Comm ander H.W. Balfour , RCNVR ,
42/bid.
43/bid.
taking over from Davis as Executive Offic er (XO). Lt. R.S. Astbury , RCNVR ,
assumed com mand of Avalon J1, which was used as office and living
accommodation alloat. 44
The base chaplaincy was also establishe d duri ng the month under the
command of the Chaplain- in-Charge, J.M. Armstro ng. Church services were held
both at the base and on board the ships of the MOEF , and ward rooms and messes of
thirty warships were visited. Three marriage ceremonies were conducted.
Interestingly, the chaplains were also responsible for censoring ratings' mail, and
" four to five hundr ed letters" were handled a day. The chaplains also had the sad
duty of writin g to next- of-kin , and did so to the famili es of those lost on HMCS
Ottawa /" Sailors ' religious needs were likewise well met outside the naval
establishment. The Church of England Cathedral on Church Hill , and St. Mary's, St.
Michael ' s and the historic St. Thomas churches held services for those men of that
faith every Sund ay at II AM and 6:30 PM. So did the United Church at the Gower
St., Cochrane St. , George St. and Wesley United churches. Roman Catholics could
attend mass every hour from 7 to 11 AM on Sundays, and at 7:30 and 8:30 AM on
Wednesdays, and confession was scheduled at convenient times every Wednesday,
Friday and Saturda y. Presbyterians were welcomed at St. Andrew's Church on
Queen ' s Road , and the Salvation Army held services at its halls on Springdale,
Ade laide and Duckworth streets every Sunda y at II AM and 6:30 PM. Christian
" Ibid" Report of Proceedings by Commanding Office r, HMCS Aval on, in FONF, monthly
report, Septe mbe r 1942.
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Scientists gathered at the Cros bie Hote l on Sunday mornin gs and Wednesday
evenings."
As with the previous month , U-boats remained concentrated in the North
Atlantic and off the east coas t of Canada durin g Octobe r 1942. However, Mainguy
reported that the month had been "very largely free of instances of a major
character," although ON- 139 was attacked on 22 October and HMCS Morden
landed 192 surv ivors, including seniors, women and children, in St. John's a few
days later. Despite the loss of the 30th MLF to Sydney in the middle of the month,
the FON F still maintained the regular schedule of Wabana/Sydney convoys, a tota l
of sixteen being run each way during October. I-Ie also inaugurated defensive patrols
for Botwoo d and Lewisporte with the transfer of HMCS Preserver and four of its
brood to Botwood early in the month . But the big news for Octob er was the sinking
of the Port-aux-Basques to North Sydney passenger ferry SS Caribou in the early
hours of 14 October, 120 miles west of Port-aux-Basques.V Caribo u was the last
casualty of the Battle of the S1.Lawrence .
As we have seen, the Battle of the S1. Lawrence was actually a series of
highly success ful Ll-boat incursions into Canadian waters that started in June with
Kap itanleutnant Vogelsang' s attack on QS-15 in early July. The next stage of the
Battle commenced at the end of August when Kapi tanleutnant Paul Hartwig, in
command of U-517, attacked the American troop ship SS Chatham in the Strait of
Belle Isle. It was the first US troop ship sunk durin g the war, but fortunately loss of
46D.C . M iller (ed.), St. John's Naval Guide Book (St. John ' s: Robinso n Blackmore , 1942),
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life was slight. U-517 esca ped on the surface unseen while Hart wig ' s packmate, U-
165 (Hoffma nn), attac ked the 3304-ton SS Arlyn and the 7253 -ton tanker SS
Laramie. Laramie surv ived with five cas ualties, but Arlyn sank an hour later with
the loss of thi rteen passengers and crew ."
Hartwig cont inued furth er south into the Stra it and decided to investigate
Forte au Bay, Lab rador, which Sailing Directions49 sugges ted might be an anchorage
for merchan tmen in the western end of the Stra it of Belle Isle. In the dark hours of I
September, Hartwig entered the bay and ventured within sixty-five feet of the mai n
jetty in search of targets. Findin g non e, he departed unscath ed and undetected .
Continuing along the Labrado r coas t, Hartwi g sighted not one but two convoys: the
inbound NL -6 and outbound LN-7. With the esco rts occ upied with preventin g the
two convoys from mixing, U-517 was able to get in positi on to fire at the 1781-ton
laker SS Donald Stewart. Just at the moment of firing, one of the esco rts HMCS
Weybu rn spotted Hartwig and turn ed to ram. Unable to overta ke U-517 as it
submerged, Weyburn opened up with its four- inch gun but missed. Donald Stewart
sank with the loss of three of its crew , and U-517 escaped.i"
Meanwhile, U-165 had been trackin g the Quebec-S ydn ey convoy QS-33
compri sing eight merch antm en with five escorts, includin g the co nverted yacht
HMCS Racoon. In the darkn ess on 6 Sept emb er, U-165 fired a salvo at the 2988-ton
Greek Aeas and sank it. Two of the torped oes missed the target , and shortly
thereaft er Racoon reported being attacked by two torpedoes, one of which went
48Hadley, Usboats against Canada, 112-114.
49A ma nua l issued to mar iners giving informa tion on harbours, curr ents, navigational
beacons, etc.
50Hadley, U-boats against Canada, 115.
right undern eath it. It then apparently ran up the torpedo track for 6000 yards,
droppin g depth charges . Abo ut two and a half hours later two explosions in rapid
success ion were heard . It was assumed that Racoon was attacki ng a conta ct, but
despi te a searc h and calls for it to report its position it was never seen again. Two
weeks later, wrecka ge identified as from the yacht washed up on Anticosti Island,
and a month after the sinking, the badly decomposed body of one of its officers was
found . A board of inquiry concluded that the sink ing was due to enemy action, but
this could not be confi rmed because U-165 was sunk along with its log book on the
way back to France after this patrol."
Shortly afte r the loss ofI-l MCS Racoon, the RCN lost another of its warships
to the enemy. HMCS Charlott etown, in company with two other corvette s, was sunk
off Cap Chat on II September 1942 by U-517. Its loss domin ated newspapers for a
week after the news was released .Y As Commodore Mainguy observed the previous
month about the Waban a sinkings, people were prepared to hear of losses in the
dangerou s wastes of the Atlantic Ocean but not in Canada's "mare nostrum ,' the
Gulf of St. Lawrence. But the real tragedy of Charlo fietown was that most of the
casualties were caused by the ship's own depth charges . None had been set to safe,
and they exp loded when the sinking hull reache d their prese t depth . Of its entire
crew of close to a hundr ed men, only fifty-seven survivo rs were rescued, three of
whom later died ashore. The perpetrator of the attack, the redoubt able Paul Hartwig,
escaped retributi on at the hands of Charlottetow n's asso ciates and sank two more
51Ibid., 117-118 and 131.
52Marc Milner, Canada 's Navy: The First Century (Toront o: University of Toronto Press,
1999),107.
ships before heading home. In total, U-517 acco unted for eigh t vesse ls, including
Charlottetown.53
Public outcry over the sinkings in the Gulf and pressure from the British
Minis try of War Transport (MWT) forced Ottawa to close the St. Lawrence River to
all but local convoys. Trans-A tlant ic shipping was re-ro uted to ports in Nova Scotia,
New Brun swick and the US.54 As a result, when Kapitanleutnant Ulrich Graf and
the crew of U-69 entered the Gulf on 30 September, they found no targets. Griif
retraced U-132's track up the St. Lawrence, and on the night of 8/9 October sighted
the homeward -bound convoy NL-9. Despite the presence of three esco rting
corvettes, Graf sank the 2245-ton steamship SS Carolus with the loss of twel ve of
its crew. Thi s sinking, less than 200 miles from Quebec City - the furthest
penetrati on of the river to date - caused an uproar in both Quebec and Ottawa .55
Still , this was nothin g compar ed to the public reaction to Graf's next victim.
The Sydn ey to Port-aux-B asqu e ferry SS Caribo u left Sydney for its last trip
at approximately 9:30 PM on 13 October. According to its escort, the Bangor
minesweeper HM CS Grandmere, the night was very dark with no moon.
Grandmere 's skipper, Lt. James Cuthbert, RCN, was unhappy about both the
amount of smoke Caribou was emitting and his screening position . In his mind the
best place for him to be was in front of Caribou, not behind as the Western
Approaches Convoy Instruction s (WACI) advi sed. He felt he would be better able
SlRohwer, Axis Submarine Successes, 119-126.
S4Milner, Canada 's Navy , 108.
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to detect the sound of a lurking If-boat if he had a clear field in front to probe.56 He
was correct, for in Car ibou's path lay U-69.
At 3:2 1 AM U-69 spotted Caribo u "belc hing heavy smoke ." OrM
misidentifi ed both the 2222 -ton Caribou and Gram /mere as a 6500-ton passenger
freighter and a "two-stack destroyer." At 3:40 AM, according to Grandmere's log, a
lone torpedo hit Caribo u on its starboard side. Pandemonium ensued as passengers,
thrown from their bunks by the explosion, rushed topside to the lifeboat stations.
For some reason , several families had been accommodated in separate cabins and
now sought each other in the confusion. To make matters worse, several lifeboats
and rafts had either been destroyed in the explosio n or could not be launched.V
Meanwhil e, Grandmere spotted U-69 in the dark and turned to ram it. Graf ,
still under the impre ssion he was facing a "destroyer" rather than a minesweeper,
crash dived. As Grandmere passed over the swirl left by the submerge d submarine,
Lt. Cuthbert fired a diamond pattern of six depth charges. Evading the barrage, OrM
headed for the sounds of Caribo u sinking to the bottom, knowing that the survivors
floating on the surface would inhibit Grandmere from launching another attack . U-
69's manoeuvre went unnoticed by Grandmere, and Cuthbert dropped another
pattern of three charges set for 500 feet. Graf fired a "Bold," an ASDIC decoy the
British referred to as a "Submarine Bubble Target" (SBT), and slowly left the area.
At 6:30 AM Grandmere gave up the hunt and began to pick up survivors .
Unfortunately, they were too few: of the 237 people aboard , only 103 were found
56Douglas How, Night ofthe Caribou (Hantsport, NS: Lancelot Press, 1988), 46-47.
57/bid., 73.
alive and two died shortl y thereafter. 58 Of the forty-six-man crew , mostly
Newfoundlanders, on ly fifteen remai ned. Five families were decimated: the Tappers
(li ve dea d), To ppers (fo ur) , Aliens (three) , Skinners (three), and Tave rnors (the
captain and his two sons) . The press truth fully reported that " Many Families [were]
Wiped OUt.,,59 The St. John ' s Evening Telegram repor ted that the disaster left
twenty-one widows and fifty-one orphans in the Cha nnel/Port-aux -Basque s area of
Newfou ndland .60
Amo ng the cas ualties were also twenty-two nava l personnel, ineluding
Nurs ing Sister A. W. Wilki e. RCN , and W.H. I-lathw ay and Preston H. Ca wley of
the Naval Stores Departm ent. Sister Wilkie was buried in St. John 's on 20 Octo ber
with full milit ary honours. Mr. Caw ley 's body was sent to Edmo nton for burial, but
Mr. Hath way ' s was not recovered. HMCS Avalon suffe red another severe loss
dur ing the month with the death due to surgica l complications of Lt.-Com mander
R.U. Lan gston , the NOIC at Botwood. Lang ston served as the Co mmand Executive
Officer (CXO), MOIC , and XDO in St. John ' s before bein g appointed to Botwo od
in July 1942. He was buried with full milita ry honour s in the Church of England
Cemetery on Forest Road in St. John ' s. Commander B.L. John son, captain of
lIM CS Preserver, took ove r as the acting NOI C at Botw ood .61
58Jbid., 72 and 85.
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While the construction on almost all of the buildings at HMCS Avalon was
complete, the occupancy of many was still delayed by the non-arrival of equipment.
This was the case with the laundry and bakery facilities at the naval barracks, and
even the elec trical services at the dockyard were j ury-rigged because "a
co nsiderable amount of the necessary equipment [had] not been received by the
Contractors." Such delays had plagued the base at St. John ' s since its inception. To
try to remedy this, NS HQ sent Construction Liaison Offic er (CLO) Sub-Lt. W.A.
Ramsay, RCNVR (Specia l l3ranch), to survey the construction projects. Commander
I-lope felt that Ramsay was of considerable assistance and strongly recommended
that such an officer be appointed at St. John ' s as soon as possible. He felt that a
local CLO could expedite construction and guarantee that a building was ready for
occupation when handed over to the RCN.62 One bright spot was the opening of the
third ratings' block at the naval barracks, which brought the total num ber of men
acco mmodated at the barracks to 890.63 Gove rnor Walwyn felt that the barracks
were well equipped, but worried about the lack of fire equipment.i"
If-boat activ ities continued to be prevalent in the northwest Atlantic ,
including New foundland waters, durin g Nove mber. Three ocea n convoys - SC- I07 ,
ON- 144 and ON-14 5 - were attacked, all with serious losses. The most serious was
SC- I07 which lost fifteen of forty-two merch ant ships over three days durin g the
"tua.. Report o f Proceedin gs by Maintenance Captain, Captain of the Port, in FONF,
monthly report, October. 1942.
63/bid., Report of Proceedings by Commanding Officer, HMCS Avalon, in FONF, monthly
report, October 1942.
64TNAI PRO, Dominions Offic e (DO) 35/ 1354, Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of
State for Domin ion Affairs, quarterly report, 3 1 December 1942.
first week of Nove mber. ON-144 lost six merchan t ships , as we ll as the Norwe gian
corvette Montbretia in mid-month, and ON- 145 lost one, although another two were
torpedoed but survived." A total of 109 surv ivors were landed at St. 10hn' s.66
Shortly after these attacks, A/Capt. F.L. Houghton , CO S to the FONF , travelled to
Ottawa to meet wit h USN, Royal Navy (RN) and Canadian authorities to discuss
recent developm ents in the northwest Atlantic. As a result, the Western Support
Force (WSF) was created by withdraw ing all the destro yer s from the Western Escort
Force (WEF) and formin g them into groups to provide support to both eastbound
and westbound convoys. At additional meetin gs in Argentia between Houghton and
Commander TF 24 ' s staff, it was decid ed that CTF 24 would be the opera ting
author ity with the FONF as his deputy. The support groups would be based in St.
John ' s and travel back and forth between 35 degrees West. When the force became
operational later in the month , it consisted of eight ships operating in four groups,
each cont ainin g two destroy ers .I"
Pos sib ly the biggest upset for the comm and on the local level in Novemb er
was the second attack in two month s on shipping at anchor at Wabana. At
approx imately 3 AM on 2 November V-5i B, under the comman d of
Kapitan leutnan t Friedrich Wissmann , round ed the southern end of Bell Island and
entered the sheltered Wab ana anchorage, locally know as "The Tickle." There,
65LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,953, file 1-1-1, fol. I, FONF, monthl y report, November
1942. See also Douglas, et al., No Higher Purpose, 534; and Arno ld Hague, The Allied Convoy
System. 1939-1945: Its Organization, Def ence and Operation (St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing,
2000), 137and I6 1.
66LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,953, file I-I -I , vol. I, Report of Proceedings by
Maintenance Captain, Captain of the Port , in FONF, month ly report, November 1942.
67lbid. See also Marc Milner, North Atlantic Run: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Bailie
for the Convoys (Toronto: Univers ity of Toronto Press, 1985), 188-189.
silhouetted in the light of a searchlight, he found seve ral ore carriers at anchor. At
approximately 0330 he fired one torpedo at the 3000-to n Anna T. It missed, passed
under the bow of SS Fl yingdale, and exploded ashore at the loading dock.
Wissmann then fired two torpedoes at SS Rose Castle. It is interesting to note that
the prev ious month V -69, having just sunk Carib ou, fired a torp edo at Rose Castle
ju st outside St. John ' s harbour. Fortunately for the ship, it was a dud. It was not as
lucky this time, and Rose Castle sank, taking twenty-eight of its crew with it, five of
whom were New foundlanders. The next target was the Free French vessel PLAl 27,
which sank almost imm ediately after being hit with the loss of twelve men. In the
ensuing confu sion , and despite the presence of a corvette and two Fairmile patrol
boats, V -5I8 escaped on the surface in the darkness. In a ten-minu te attack, two
ships, along with forty men, had been lost.68
There was something else notable about V-5IB' s foray into Conception Bay.
Sinking shipping was not its only mission. On board the U-boat was Werner von
Janow ski, a spy for the Abwehr, the German milit ary intelligenc e organization.
Evading patrol s in Conception Bay and surv iving a surprise attack by a Digby
bomb er just south of Cape Race, V-5IB made its way through the Cabot Strait and
into the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Initially, the plan was to land von Janowski at a point
in the St. Lawr ence River. This was discarded in favour of the Baie des Chaleurs,
between New Brunswick and the Gaspe Peninsul a. On the mornin g of 8 November,
V-5IB entered the mouth of the bay submer ged . With no shoals and a depth of more
than 200 feet, the bay offered clear passage for the If -boat. Sur facing that night,
6'Mallman Showe ll, UiBoats at War, 37-38; and Hadley, V-B oats agains t Canada, 152. See
a lso Neary, Enemy on Our Doorstep, 49-94.
Wissmann beac hed the U-boat on a sandbar not far from shore, and Janowski was
transported by dingy. All went well , and at 0120 on 9 November the dingy return ed,
and V-5i8 lifted its bows and depar ted the bay. Wissmann was well satisfied and
considered the mission a success. Unknown to Kapitanleutnant Wissmann,
however, his passenger was caught within twenty-four hours.69
The Governor o f Newfoundland, Admira l Walwyn, was outraged at the
sinkings otT Bell Island. The previous day, he had been on a hillside overlook ing the
anchorage and was horrified to see two ore ships at anchor awaitin g a loadin g berth.
Upon his return to St. John ' s, Walwyn called COS Capt. F.L. Houghton and told
him that he thou ght " it was madness to let ships lie unprotected" at the anchorage.
Walwyn felt it was wiser to leave them in St. John 's until a berth was vacant."
Indeed, Capt. Schwerdt had sugges ted a similar scheme several month s earlier
which was apparently received "so mewhat casually by the Canadian Nava l
authorities." The Dominions Office also criticized local naval authorities, unfairly
charging that despite the sinkings in Septemb er, noth ing had been done to protect
the anchorage and concluded that the incident "reflect[ed] little credit on those in
charge.,,71 In truth , the newly appointed FONF, Commodore H.E. Reid , knew the
risk and that anti-submarine protection at Waban a was inadequate. However , he had
little choice but to do the best he could with what he had if the vital ore shipments to
Sydn ey were to continue before the ice set in for the winter. The greater threat was
69Dean Beeby, Cargo of Lies: The True Story of a Nazi Double Agent in Canada (To ronto:
University of Toro nto Press, 1996) ; and Mailman Showell, U-Boats at War, 37-38 . See also Hadley,
V-Boats against Canada, 151-164.
7°TN A/PRO, DO 35/ 1354, Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for Dominion
Affairs, quarterly report , 3 1 December 1942.
711bid., Dominio n Affairs Office, memo randum , 28 January 1943.
while the ore carriers were at sea, and despite the strain on his resources, Reid had
maintained the regular schedule of Wabana/Syclney convoys, a total of sixtee n being
run each way dur ing October. 72 Besides, with 250 merchant vessels passing through
St. John ' s durin g November, and with an average of twenty-seve n naval vessels in
port on any given day , there was very little room left to spare." In the end, net
protection was installed off the loading piers, ancl pro visions were made to allow
only two ships to load at a time while being protected by an escort vessel and a
Fairmile patro l boat." These measures must have worked because no other attacks
occurred in the anchorage for the rest of the war.
In the meantim e, construction at HMCS Avalon wound down as bui ldings
were compl eted or construction stalled due to the non-delivery of necessary
equipment. The hospital and dock yard were still on temp orary electrical services,
the wireless receivi ng station still awaited the installation of a generator , and the
laund ry, bakery and central heating plants were all awa iting equipment.
Nonetheless , the magazines and fuel tanks were nearin g completion, one being in
use and two finished exce pt for fittings.
Decemb er 1942 was a rough month for the Newfo undland command for a
numb er of reasons. Weather conditions were terrible and many ships, both naval and
merchant , suffered some degree of storm damage. Necessary repairs strained the
facilities of both the depot ship, HMS Greenwich, and the docky ard to the utmost
durin g the month . Possibly the worst examp le was I-IMS Beverley , which arrived in
72LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,953, file I-I -I , vol. I, FONF , monthl y report, October 1942.
73Ibid., Report of Proceedings by Maintenance Captain, Captain of the Port, in FONF,
monthly report , Novemb er 1942.
74lbid.
St. John 's missing a funnel, necessitating a five-day stay at the dockyard. Convoys
were also hard hit by the enemy dur ing December. Eight of them reported U-boat
contacts and four were attacked , with ON- I54 losing sixteen ships. With the
extreme bad weather, refuelling at sea was impossible, and the escor ts often had to
detach to refuel at the Azores or to return to St. John 's. Fortunately, the newly
formed WSr was able to fill the breech along with USN ships from Argentia and
escorts from the WEF out of Halifax. Regardless, four ships were lost from I-1 X-217,
the first convoy to avai l of the WSF, and three merchant ships and HMS Firedrake
were sunk from ON-153. U-boats also got a straggler from ON-152.75 No wonder
sixty-six survivors were landed at St. John ' s during the month . i" Admiral Bristol,
CTF 24, decided during December that all MOEF groups, whether Canadian, British
or American, should depart from St. John' s. This had a number of advantages. Each
ship would meet its assigned convoy with a full allotment of fuel, and it would also
give the RN and USN crews some rest-and-relaxation time in St. John ' s. This
reassignment, of course, placed still more pressure on FONF' s staff, but Reid felt
that after eighteen months in operation the arranging of rendezvo us, fuelling and
provisions had been sufficiently perfected to stand the strain.77
The ships of the Newfoundland Force also felt the pressure of meeting the
requirements of the local convoy system, many conta ining twelve to eighteen
vessels. In addition, escorts were needed to screen ore carriers both en route and
75Ibid., FONF , monthlyreport, December 1942.
76lbid., Report of Proceedings by Maintenance Captain, Captain of the Port, in FONF,
monthly report, December 1942.
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while loading at Wabana , as we ll as on the retu rn voyage.i" In spite of the severe
wea ther, the install ation of the anti-torpe do net at Wabana progressed well during
December. Even rescue tugs were used as escort s dur ing this tim e, in between their
other duti es.79 HMRT Frisky towed targets for firing pract ice at both Harbour Grace
and St. John ' s, sea rched for severa l vess els in distress, offe red assistance to I-IMS
Caldwell and attempted to salvage the tug Champlain off Law n Bay on the Burin
Penin sula. I-IMRT Tenacity was similarly employe d durin g the month assisting four
disabled ships, including EM Ships Caldwell and Broadway .r'
Wint er weather and the non-arrival of equipment continued to delay
completion of so me work at I-IMCS Avalon. The hospit al and dockyard remained on
tempo rary electr ica l services, and the laund ry, bakery and wireless receiving station
were still awa iting necessa ry equipment. Variou s other building requir ed minor
work , althou gh the maga zines and fuel tank s were pro gressing on schedule, with
two of each already compl eted . Also durin g Deeember, E.V. Chambers, a real estate
advisor, arriv ed to negoti ate the exclu sion rights on the Hickman prop erty to the east
of the naval dockyard and to investigate the possibilit y of acquiring land west of the
dockyard for berthin g additi onal naval vessels. Chambers was unsucc essful in his
negotiat ions with the Great Eastern Oil and Import Company for a site on the south
side of the harb our to con stru ct a YMCA buildin g and a wet cant een /" This became
78/bid.
79/bid.
8°/bid., Report of Proceedings by Maintenance Captain, Captain of the Port, in FONF,
monthly report , Decemb er 1942.
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a more significant setback a few days later when the Knights of Co lumbus hall
burn ed with tremendou s loss of life, includin g twenty -five naval personnel.
War is a youn g man ' s game, and this was certain ly true of the RCN durin g
the Second World War. The average ages of RCN and RCNVR offic ers durin g the
war were twent y-nin e and twent y-eight yea rs, respectively. The average lower-deck
age was eve n lower at twent y-two years, with many of the men being ju st ove r
eighteen.V Surrounded by such youth, recreation and enterta inment were major
factor s in crew mora le. Whereas the Am ericans provid ed faci lities for their
personn el on the var ious bases, the Canadia n services re lied heavily on local
faci lities .83 While barely more than a good-s ized town , St. John ' s did its utmost to
meet this challengc."
Sports , of course , were major features of any rec reat ion program , and there
was no shor tage of compe titive and recreatio nal oppo rtunities in the city, all
avai lable to RCN personnel. Rugby, socce r, baseball , so ftba ll and cricke t were
played at the Feildian and Ayre Athletic Gro unds, and at the St. George's and
Memorial Fields , and aside from the var ious service and open leagues, hockey was
played almost daily at the St. Bon's Forum and the Prince of Wales Arena. Tennis
82David Zimmerma n, "The Social Background of the Wartim e Navy: Some Statistical
Data," in Michae l L. Had ley, Rob Huebert and Fred W. Crickard (eds.), A Nation's Navy: In Quest 0/
Canadian Naval Identity (Mo ntreal: McGill-Q ueen' s Unive rsity Press, (996), 275. RCNR officers
werc mostly older, re-commi ssioned former RN and RCN office rs. Most of them held senior
administrative positions in Ottawa, Halifax or overseas.
83Evidencesugges ts that it was this reliance on public fac ilities(or lhe lack lhereol)thatw as
the root cause of the VE Day riots at Halifax in 1945. See R.B . Ca ldwe ll, "The VE Day Riots in
Halifax, 7-8 May 1945," The Northern MarinerlLe Marin du nord, X, No. I (January 2000),3-20.
Indeed, some argue that it was the lack of established naval recreationa l faci1ities rathert hano utdated
equipment that was at the heart of the RCN' s morale probl em. See Richard O. Mayne, Betrayed:
Scandal, Politics, and Canadian Naval Leadership (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006), 82.
84Unless otherwise noted, all information concemin g facilities avai lable to nava l personnel
comes from Miller (ed.), St. John 's Naval Guide Book.
was of fered at Govern me nt House (oftice rs only), Bowr ing Park and the Riverdale
Te nnis Club. Swimm ing, go lf, squash and bowling were available to officers and
men alike at vario us faci lities throu ghout the city, and bicycl es could be rented at
Mart in 's Cyc le Sho p on Duck worth Stree t, Thc navy provid ed badm inton and
gy mnas ium faciliti es at the naval barracks at Buckma ster Field, and hun tin g, fishin g
and "s pe nding a few day s under can vas" were a ll attractions of the Na val Ca mp at
Don ovan ' s, ju st outs ide St. 10hn ' s.85
O f cour se, " liquid refreshment " was a requiremen t for any successful run
ashore, and o ffice rs had the pick of the more "civilized" es tablishments, including
their ow n Seagoi ng Offic ers ' Club, better known as "The Cro w ' s Nest." Officers
were also expecte d to attend Captain (D)' s cocktail party ev ery Friday. Whi le the
yo ung oftic ers were charged a one-do llar cov er, the invit ati on guara nteed that their
fem ale companions were "a dmitted free of charge." From ther e, the happ y couples
could proc eed to the City Club, Bally Haly Go lf Club or the Bell a Vista Co untry
Club. Both officers and men frequ ented the Old Co lony Club and the Terra Nova
Club. Ships' crews had naval cant eens at the naval dockyard on Water Stree t and at
the naval barracks. In addition, those of the low er deck had their pick of dozens of
cafes and taverns that ca tered to the ordinary soldier and sailor. Som e of these were
conside red less than respectable. Two of the mo st notor iou s were the Gre en Lantern
on Water Stree t and the Qu een Tavern on Queen Stre et , both o f whi ch caused the
8SThe St. John's Nava l Rest Camp was officia lly opened by Capt. (D) Newfoundland, Capt.
J.M. Rowland, in July 1943. LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,505, Repo rt of Proceedings by Nava l
Office r in Charge (NO le) , Administrative War Diaries, 1445-102-3, sub. I, vo l. I, July 1943.
Chief of Police concern because they were often " frequented by disorderly
persons.t''"
Nor was there a shortage of places to eat, althou gh the military had to put a
number of them "off limits" due to health concerns . Officers could also get a meal
for forty cents at the Fort William Officers Mess and the Naval Barracks Officers
Mess, and both officers and men were welcome at the United Services Overseas
(USO) Club at the corner of Bonaventure Avenue and Merrymeeting Road. There
were a variety of restaurants and lunch counters on Water and Duckworth streets,
and tearooms on Henry Street and at Rawlins Cross. For a town of just over 40,000
civilians, St. John ' s boasted a total of five cinemas - the Paramount, Capitol ,
Nickel, Star and York - all of which featured the latest Hollywood films.
To get to the various attractions, the men of the Royal Canadian Navy could
choose a number of forms of transpo rtation, all at reasonab le prices. Street cars cost
twenty cents, buses ten. Taxis charged seventy cents during the daytime and one
dollar at night, but as the 1942 Naval Guide Book pointed out, most were "very
loathe to carry passengers to and from the South Side." Transportatio n to and from a
ship by way of "bum boats" cost twenty cents "if obtainable," but the authorities
had to bring in regulations governing these harbour craft after a couple of near
disasters.87 The more studious could avail of reading material from a number of
places, includin g the Gosling Memorial Library on Duckworth Street, the RCN's
86"Police Ask Order against Beer Parlours," Evening Telegram (St. John ' s), 30 January
87"Two Motor Boats Collide in Harbour," Evening Telegram (St. John ' s), 10 January 1941.
See also "Harbour Regulations," Evening Telegram (St. John ' s), 27 June 1941. Publ ic Archives of
Newfound land and Labrador (PANL), Government of Newfoundland, Department of Public
Utilities, GN 38: S5- 1-2, File 9, P.U. 38(a)-4 1,"Regulations for the Control of Small Boats Plying
for Hire or Reward in the Harbou r ofSt. John ' s," 17 June 1942.
Magazine Exchange and the Canadian Legion at the corner of Bannerman Street and
Military Road which offered material to "officers, ratings and their families."
Shopping was offered by four main department stores, all located on Water
Street: Bowring Brothers, Ayre and Sons, James Baird and the Royal Stores, and
there were no fewer than six drycleaners, including Soon Lee' s near Rawlins Cross,
the site of the only traffic lights in the city. Two locations of the Commercial Cable
Company and the Water Street office of the Anglo-American Cable Company ("Just
Ask for 'Anglo''') provided telegraph facilities, and telephone service was the
responsibility of the Avalon Telephone Company.
Possibly the most heavily utilized service facilities in St. John ' s during the
Second World War were the three hostels. The Caribou Hut was likely the most
famous of the three. During the 1637 days it operated, "The Hut" rented 253,551
beds, served 1,545,766 meals, and hosted 1518 movies, 459 dances, 395 shows and
205 Sunday night sing-songs with a total attendance in excess of 700,000 people.ss
Canada's High Commiss ioner to Newfoundland, Charles Burchell , officially opened
the Red Trian gle, the YMCA hostel on Water Street West, on 8 Janua ry 1942. Built
at a cost of $100,000, the facility boasted a social hall for dances and concerts, a
lounge, an llOO-person dinin g room and sleeping accommodation for fifty men.89
The Knights of Columbus hostel on Harvey Road opened in December 1941. The
horseshoe-sh aped building featured an auditorium, recreation room, restaurant and
dormitori es, and could accommodate approximat ely 400 men. All of the hostels
88Margaret Duley, The Caribou H UI (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1949), 28.
89"Offic ial Opening of St. John 's 'Y ' Hostel," Evening Telegram (St. John ' s), 10 January
were famous for their hospitality, but unfortunate ly the latter became infamous for a
tragedy.
On 12 December 1942 a fire broke out in the attic of the Knights of
Columbus hostel. The buildin g had been built to provide a recreation facility for
military and merchant marine personnel, and dances, concerts and other
enterta inment s were held frequently . All were well attende d, and the event held that
cold December night was no different. Uncle Tom's Barn Dance played to a packed
audience , and the show was broadcas t ove r radio station VOCM . Suddenly there
was a cry of "F ire!" and the broadcast ended. Within forty-five minute s ninety-nine
people were dead, includin g twenty-five naval personnel (only seventeen of whom
were ident ified), and 100 were injured." The inquiry into the fire, headed by retired
Chief Justice Sir Brian Dunfield , concluded that many of the victims died from
smoke inhalation rather than from the fire itself. Most had been trapped in the
auditorium because the exits opened inward and did not have "panic bars," and the
windows were shuttered because of blackout regulations. In his February 1943
report , Justice Dunfi eld concluded that while the fire was the work of an arsonist ,
there was no evidence that enemy agents had started it.9 1
Regardless, suspicion of enemy action persisted , and not without some
ju stification . There had been other fires in buildings frequented by military
personn el durin g the same period . The Old Colony Club had burned with the loss of
four lives, and fires had been set at the usa Club on Merrym eeting Road and the
900 arrin McGrath, Last Dance: The Knights of Columbus Fire (St. John 's: Flanker Press,
2002), 5-16.
91Ibid., 2 1-45. See also Gerhard P. Bassler, Vikings to V-Boats: The German Experience in
Newf oundland and Labrad or (Montrea l: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 287-290.
Red Trian gle hostel on Watcr Street. Much was made of thc fact that someone had
torched the Knights of Columbus hostel in Halifax shortly before. However , what
really fuelled alarm was the rumour that only ninety-eight bodies of the ninety-nine
people reported killed were recovered . No one was ever charged with the crime .
Overall , the year 1942 was difficu lt for the Allies. Durin g the first six
mont hs, the Japanese had advanced almost unchecked througho ut the western
Pacific. Rommel had the British on the ropes in North Africa, and Adm iral Donitz' s
U-boa ts had moved across the Atlantic and decimated shipping within sight of land
from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the Gulf of Mexico. Whereas the Americans
stopped the Japanese advance at the Battle of Midway, and the British halted
Rommel at El Alamein, Donit z 's U-boa ts continued to exac t a terrible toll on Allied
shipping. When the United States belatedly commenced convoy ing along its easte rn
seaboa rd in the spring, the U-boats simply moved further south into the Caribbean.
As this theatre became untenable, Donitz moved his forces back into the North
Atlantic, includin g the waters around Newfoundland. If there had been any doubt
among Newfo undlanders that they were at the front lines of the Atlantic war, these
were washed away with the torpedo attack on St. John ' s, the sinkings at Bell Island
and the tragic loss of Caribou in the Gulf The fire at the Knights of Columbus
which claim ed so many lives seemed just a culmination of a year of disasters both
at home and abroad. Yet as Winston Churchill announced to the House of Commons
in London, 1942 was not the beginnin g of the end, but perhaps it was the end of the
beginning, The NE F had been re-designated the MOEF and now provided
continuous protect ion to both eastbound and westbound convoys , and suppor t
groups based out ofSt. John's came to the aid of endangered convoys . Ashore, most
of the facilities at I-IMCS Avalon were comp lete and occupied, and despite many
cha llenges, the RCN was meeting its ever-increasing respon sibi lities. But a
reckonin g was comin g, and the RCN wou ld pay the price.
The winter of 1943 was something of a watershed for the RCN . By the end
of 1942, it provided upwards of forty percent of the esco rt groups in the North
Atlantic, yet suffered fully eighty percent of the shipping losses. The Admiralty
blamed this disparit y on the RCN 's lack of trainin g and poor leadership.f NSHQ
more correc tly blamed it on outdated equipment and the continua l increases in
responsibi lities. Regard less, Ottawa eventually bowed to Admira lty pressure and
transferred the Canadian C Group s at St. John 's to Western Appro aches Comm and
in January 1943. Ostensibly, this was to fill the vacuum left by the deployment of
RN escorts to the new ly formed tanker convoys in the central Atlantic , but it also
affor ded Canad ian esco rts the opport unity to ava il of the modern training facilities
at RN bases. Considering that most senior Canadian office rs felt the RCN had been
doing the bes t it co uld against tremendous odds and ever -increa sing respo nsibi lities,
92While the comp laints about trainin g were certa inly valid and were not denied by Canadian
naval authorities, there was a certain amount of British snobbery in the criticism of leadership. The
I3ritish did not trai n the ir offic ers in leadership beca use the majo rity , especially senior offic ers, were
produ cts of the pub lic (read priv ate) schoo l system which, by definition, was supposed to imbue
them with lead ership qu aliti es. As offi cer appointments in the RCN were based on criteria other than
old school tics, the Briti sh natur ally assumed that Canadians were inferior leaders. Nonethe less, the
Royal Navy did produ ce a num ber of office rs' pamphl ets to aid RN office rs. The first, entitled "The
Officers Aid e Me moi re" and issue d in 1943 actua lly included rather patern alist ic instruct ions on the
subtleties of leadership . See Brian Lavery (corn p. and intro.), The Royal Navy Officer 'S Pocket-Book
/944 (Lo ndo n: Co nway Maritim e Book s, 2007) .
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many looked at the withd rawal of Canadian forces from the main theatre of
operations as a bctrayal"
Despite what the future held for both the RCN and the Battle of the Atlantic,
enemy action was conspicuous by its absence durin g the fir st month of 1943.
Commodore Reid found that January was "notable for the lack of U-boat sightings
and attacks on convoys." Some of this good fortune was a result of evas ive routing
(Bletchly Park were making inroads in the new German Triton code by this time
after a year' s blackout), but it was also in large measure due to the atrocious weather
that started in the new year. Even though several conv oys were shadowed and
report ed by U-boats, only one, HX-222, was actually attacked with the loss of one
ship. Still, many convoys became badly scattered, and while one straggler was
torpedoed , man y more found ered or were so badly damaged by weather that they
were abandon ed. The North Atlantic gales did not spare the MO EF either. Only four
of the twelve destroyers assigned to the WSF based at St. John ' s were kept runnin g
durin g the month , with HMS Roxborough suffering the worst dama ge when stormy
seas stove in its bridge, killing its captain and first lieuten ant and washin g another
man overboard. 94 The weather also played havoc with the newly inaugurated JH-HJ
convoys between St. John ' s and Halifax. Not only did ships leaving St. John ' s have
to contend with monstrou s seas and high winds, but often their moorin g lines froze
to the buoys and had to be chopped off with axes. Reid complained that this often
93For a full account of Admir alty efforts to transfer RCN forces to the eastern Atlantic in the
fall of 1942, see Milner, North Atlantic Run, 189-213. See also Milner, "Squaring Some of the
Corners," in Timothy 1. Runyan and Jan M. Copes (eds.). To Die Gallantly: The Bailie of the Atlantic
(Bou lder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 132; and Mayne, Betrayed, 96-98.
94LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,505, FONF, monthly report , January 1943; and Report of
Proceedings by NO IC, Administrative War Diaries, 1445- 1023, sub. 1, vol. 1, January 1943.
delayed departures by several hours and on occas ion led to ships havin g to wait for
the next outbound con voy" This had the expec ted effect on congestion in the
harbour, with 154 merch ant ships passing through the port and thirty-five warships
alongs ide dai ly. The bad weather, however, did stabilize the numbe r of men
accommodated in the barracks at 980 as men on leave and newly drafted personnel
were stranded at their departur e points."
Perhaps wanting to assess Admiralty complaints about the efficiency and
trainin g of the RCN, Naval Minister Macdonald arrived in St. John ' s for a brief tour
at the end of the month ." He found that most facilities were completed and fully
occupied. Some buildin gs, however, such as the hospital , bakery and various
dockyard faci lities, still awaited equipment. The NO IC complained that it was
unfortun ate that whole systems were not shipped together as often one part would
arrive but could not be installed until the rest were delivered . An example was the
asphalt tiles for floorin g two of the magazines: the tiles had arrived but not the glue
to hold them in place. Indeed, the NOIC wondered if some of the missing equipment
had even been ordere d. The tank farm on the south side of the harbour was a
pressing conc ern . Only one tank was in operation, with seve ral more finished or
nearly so, but contract ors had completed none of the pipin g to the wharf.98 Until it
was fully operational, the RCN had to depend on base oilers afloat and/o r the
Imperial Oil faciliti es which were shared with civilian vessels.
9Slbid" FONF, monthl y report , January 1943.
" Taid., Report of Proceedings by NOIC, Administrative War Diaries, January 1943.
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If weather was the great est enemy in the Nor th Atlantic in January, by the
follow ing month, Donitz 's If-bo ats usurped the honour. Reid noted "a considerable
increase " in U-boat activity during the month, and a total of twenty-four ships were
sunk in the six convoys attacked. ON- 166, escorted by the American A.3 Group,
was the worst hit, losing eleven ships over four days. One of the problems
Commodore Reid faced was a shortage of escorts. With the C Groups leaving for
the VK during January and February , plus enemy action and weather damage taking
a toll on the remaind er, the r ONF was having a hard time meeting commitments.
Again in Febru ary, only four of the remainin g eleven WSF destroyers were
available for duty, and then mainly thanks to the tireless efforts of the base
engineering staff and VSS Prairie in Argentia. The VS Coast Guard cutter
Campbell was damaged after rammin g a U-boat attacking ON-1 66, and HMCS
Assiniboine arrived in St. John ' s with a damaged AlS suite and had to be sent on to
Halifax for repairs. Actually, the weather was playing havoc with AlS domes. Only
one ship of C.3, I-IMS Burnham, arrived in St. John ' s after esco rting ON-163 with
its ASDIC dome fully functional. Such wear and tear on both the ships and their
crews was further exacerbated by the drastically reduced turna round time resulting
from the shortage of esco rts. This also led to tremendous conges tion in St. John ' s
harbour ; whil e there were actually fewer warships, they passed throu gh St. John ' s
with greater frequ ency. Consequently, while only 112 merchant vessels arrived at
the port , almos t 200 arrivals of naval vessels were recorded , not including Fairmile
patrol boats and harbour craft . The local defence forces were also fully stretched
trying to maintain the JI-I-I-{Jconvoy schedule along with the local convoy s, and at
mid-m onth a patrol by Fairrn iles was initiated along the approaches to St. John 's.99
Considering the duration (forty-eig ht hours) and the amount of fuel these little ships
consumed dur ing such patro ls (2500 gallons), Gove rnor Walwyn wondered whether
they were wor th the expensc. l'" To add to the strain, the NarC lost one of his
harbour defence cra ft to fire early in the month, with three of its crew suffering first-
or seco nd-deg ree burns. Unfortunately, bad weather prevented the slack from being
picked up by aircraft patrols, and Reid comp lained that he was still waitin g for the
long-range Liberator bomb ers to arrive from the UK. He could not believe that with
hundreds of these aircraft arriving in Britain weekly, a few squadrons could not be
released to the Newfoundland command. He grumbled that the authorities did not
fully appreciate the difference these aircraft could make to the Battle of the Atlantic,
"where the threat to our trade convoys and consequently to our whole war effort is
at its highest." lol Thi s became es pecially acute the next month .
Much has been made of how close the Germans came to winnin g the Battle
of the Atlanti c. Churchill is often quoted as saying that U-boat attacks were "the
true evil" and that the Nazis should have invested everythin g in the U-boat
campaign.I02 March 1943 is often pinpointed as the pivotal month when a total of
120 ships were sunk totallin g 630,000 tons, the fifth highest month of losses in the
99/bid., RG 24, FO NF, Vol. 11,505, FONF , monthly report, Febru ary 1943; and Report of
Proceedin gs by NO IC, Adm inistrat ive War Diaries, 1445·102-3, sub. I, vo l. I, February 1943.
IOOTNA/PRO, 003511355, Gov ernor ' s Report for the Yearly Quarte r ending 30 June 1943.
IOILAC , RG 24, FONF , Vol. 11,505, FON F, monthly report, Febru ary 1943; and Report of
Proceedin gs by NOIC, Admin istrativ e War Diaries, 1445-102-3, sub. I, vol. I, Febru ary 1943.
I02Winston S. Church ill, The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate ( 11th ed., New York :
Bantam Books, 1962), 109.
entire waL l03 The official historian of the RN in World War II, Captain Stephen W.
Roskill , RN, wrote that it was at this point that the Anti- If-B oat Division of the
Admiralt y started to doubt the effectiveness of the convoy system, and he asse rted
that Britain was on the brink of defeat in the Atlantic .l'" A number of historian s
have argued more recent ly, however, that while the losses in the winter of 1943
were significant, especia lly on top of the enormous losses of 1942, the German s
never came close to winning the Batt le ofthc Atlan tic.
Clay Blair has sugges ted that in their rush to describe the " massacre" of
ships in the fall of 1942 (which was used as ju stification for pulling the St. John ' s-
based RCN out of the Atlantic for trainin g in early 1943), histori ans have seldom
examined Germa n casualties (sinkings and aborted patrols due to battle damage). U-
boats were able to mount attacks on only six of the thir ty-five convoys that crossed
the Atlantic durin g this period. These assaults acco unted for a total of fifty-seven
merc hant ships out of a tota l of approximately 1700, plus two destroyers totalling
343,535 tons. At the same time, Allied forces sank sixteen U-boats, an into lerable
exchange rate for the Germans . Further, this actua lly represented a decrease in
sinkings per U-boat per patrol from the previous two month s. During July/August
103From all causes . Definitive figures for this period are diffic ult to find. Some sources
included losses from all areas, while others included vesse ls that 111ade it toport but were total losses
nonetheless. See V.E. Tarra nt, The V-Boat Offensive, 1914-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
1989),11 6; Andrew Williams, The Battle of the Atlantic: The Allies ' Submarine Fight against
Hitler's Gray Wolves of the Sea (London: BBC Worldwide., 2002), 247 ; and Nathan Miller, War at
Sea: A Naval His tory 0/ World War 11 (New York: Scribner, 1995; reprint, New York: Oxfo rd
University Press, 1997), 343-344.
I04Stephen W. Roski ll, The War At Sea. Vol. 11: The Period 0/ Balance (London: HMSO,
1956), 367. See a lso Jurgen Rohwer, The Critical Convoy Battles 0/March 1943 (London : Ian Allan,
1977), 187; and TNA /P RO, ADM 199/2096, Review of the U-Boat War for the Year 1943 (as given
in the Anti-Sub marine Report, December 1943).
1942, U'-boats sank .92 ships per patro l, whereas duri ng September/October this
decreased to .78.105 The loss rate continued to drop in the next two month s.
Durin g Nove mber/December 1942, I.l-boats sank thirty-four merchantm en in
the NOIi h Atlantic . But this needs to be put in perspect ive: only forty-three of the
eighty-four V-boats that went to sea durin g this period sank anything, produ cing a
sinkings per boat rate of .63 for November and .75 for Decemb er. In return, the
Allies sank twelve Usboats. In the meantime, 1159 of the 1218 ships convoyed
across the Atlantic reached thei r destinations unscathed . During the first four
months of 1943, the Allies sailed appro ximately 2400 merch ant ships across the
Atlantic : 1320 in eastbound convo ys to Britain and 1081 in westbound convoys. Of
these, If- boa ts sank III vesse ls, representin g a mere five percent of the total.
Moreover , this included thirty-eight vessels on their way back to North America in
ballast , and therefore their loss had no effect on Briti sh import s. From the point of
view of the Brit ish abi lity to wage war, 1247 out of 1320 (94.5 percent ) of
eastbound ships laden with war supplies reached their destinations.106
1ak Mallmann Showe ll's research reveals that the U-boat war in the Atlantic
actually started to go again st the Germans as early as 1940 when the number of
ships sunk per Ll-boat at sea began to decline.l'" During the first "Happy Tim e" in
105Clay Blair, Hitler 's U-Boat War: The Hunted, / 942-1945 (New York : Random House,
1998),47-49.
106/bid. ,134_13 5.
107 Indeed, Captain (D) Newfoundland, Captain E. Rollo Mainguy scored the RCN's first
U-boat kill in 1940 whil e in command of HMCS Ottawa. Unfortunate ly, but in typical fashion, the
Admira lty did not credi t it to h im and it was forty-two years afte r the war that he was finally awarded
the kill. Wilfred G.D.Lund, "Vice-Admiral E. Rollo Mainguy: Sa ilors' Sa ilor," in Michael Whitby,
Richard H. Gimb lett and Peter Haydon (cds.) , The Admirals: Canada 's Senior Naval Leadership in
the Twentieth Century (Toro nto: Dundurn Press, 2006), 186-212.
the autumn of 1940, U-boats were sinking 5.5 ships per mont h per U-boat. But there
were only ten U-boats at sea at anyone time, and only half of these were ever in a
position to attack. By the time the second "Happy Time" peaked in May 1942, U-
boats were only sinking two ships per boat even though there were upwards of
sixty-one boats at sea . Up to 1941, it was possib le for most U-boats to make
mult iple attacks on the same convoy. From 1941 onwa rds, thanks to Allied anti-
submarine measures, they could not get into a shooting posit ion more than once.
Furthermore, the high numb er of sinkings durin g the first part of 1942 occurred
along the American eastern seaboard and was more a consequence of the United
State s' failure to proteet its shipping than the skill of the U-boat commanders. As a
matter of fact, the diversion of the limited num ber of ava ilable U-boats along the
eas tern seaboard of the United States was actually a strategic blund er for the
Germans.108
By 1941, the Alli es already had "the winning hand that would ultimately
defeat the U-boats." By removing boats from the North Atlantic battl e in 1942 for
eas ier huntin g in the western Atlantic and Caribbean, Admiral Donit z gave the
Allies the breathin g space needed to perfect that winning hand. The Alli es were able
to refine technolo gy, increase the number of esco rts, and impro ve trainin g in time
for the crucial convoy battles of the winter of 1943. By that time, V-boat numbers
had risen to 116 boat s at sea, but the sinking rate per boat had dropped to often less
than a half a ship sunk per Uvboat. Consequently, the rate of sinkings fell from over
I08Jak P. Malhn an n Showe ll, V-Boats under the Swastika: An Introduction to German
Submarines, 1935-1945 (Londo n: Ian Allan, 1973; 2nd ed., Annapo lis : Nav al Institute Press, 2000),
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five ships per U-boat per month in 1940 to two U-boats per sinking by the winter of
1943.109
The centrepiece of the crisis theory were four convoy batt les durin g the first
twenty days of March - I-1X-228 and 229, and SC-121 and 122." 0 In these four
convo ys , over half the March sinkin gs in the At lantic were accomp lished (thirty-
nine ships) . Regardless of the fact that these losses accounte d for approx imately
twenty percent of the co nvoys involved, eleven othe r convoy s got through without
incident , and a twelfth only lost one vesse l. Such losses were serio us, but do they
constituted the "c risis of crises" depicted by Roskill in his official history?' !'
Michael Gannon completely dismisses Roskill ' s apocalyptic statement that
"defeat...s tared [the Allies ] in the face." Indeed, American shipyards were
produ cing more than enough Liberty ships to replace the losses, and ninety percent
of all ships in convoys attacked by U-boats dur ing this period arrived safe ly. Even
the hard hit HX-228/229 and SC- 121/122 safe ly arrived with eighty-two percent of
their ships.112 Roger Winn and Patrick Beesly of the Special Branch of the
Admiralty's Oper ation Intelligence Centre were actually convinced that the battle
was going Britain 's way. During the period heralded as the "darkest hour" of the
Battl e of the Atlantic, 270 more merchant ships arrived safely in port than in the
previous three month s, more U-boats were sunk in February than in any previous
1091bid.
110 By this time all the St. John ' s-based C Groups had been transferred to the eastern
Atlantic for trainin g.
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112Michae i Gan non, Black May: The Epic Story ofthe Allies' Def eat of the German U-boats
ill May 1943 (New York : Harper Collins, 1998), xx-xxi i.
month of the war, and during the "March Cris is," ship construction exceede d
sinkings by over 300,000 tons.113
Canadian historians quite rightly have a special interest in the "crisis myth."
By March , the four Canadian esco rt groups were no longer in the North Atlantic.
Accused of being poorly trained and led, the C Groups were undergoing training in
Londonderry , Northern Ireland, and Tobermorry, Scotland, and escorting Gibraltar
and African convoys. That the superior British escort groups experienced similar
difficulti es as had the RCN in 1942 demonstrates the unfairness of the British
attitud e towards the RCN . Indeed, Marc Milner suggests that the only way the
Germans could have won the Battle of the Atlantic was if the Allies had made such
"colossal errors as to defeat them selves." Thanks to a correct defensive strategy at
the beginnin g of the war, which included the RCN "holding the line" from May
194 I to early 1943, the British had the time needed to marshal their avai lable
resourc es. Furth erm ore, the Germans greatly underestim ated the industrial power of
the United States which , as previously noted, was replacing shipping faster than the
Germans could sink it. Milner claims that the Allies won the Battle of the Atlantic
on all fronts - industrial produ ction, intelligence, research and comm and and control
- and while Donit z ' s U-boat campaign greatly complicated the Allied war effort, in
the end it had no major influence on the Allies' ultim ate victory over the Third
Reich .114
113/bid.
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British histor ian Geoffrey Till doubts whether the Germans ever cou ld have
won the Battle of the Atlantic . He suggests that the cam paign has to be viewed on
three levels: the macro -indu stria l, the grand strate gic and operati onal-and-tactical
levels. From the macro-ind ustria l point of view, there are severa l reasons why the
Germans co uld not have won the Battle of the Atlantic . The Brit ish reduc tion of
imports from sixty to twenty-six million tons a year and the effec tive management
of shipping were two factor s, but it was the industrial capacity of the United States
that really made the biggest differe nce. Between 1940 and 1945, the US built twice
as much shipping as the Germans sank. Even accounting for the "c risis" of early
1943, by that summer the Allies had a "generous amount of shipping."!"
At the grand strategic level, a number of reasons explain why the Germans
could not have won in the Atlantic . First, they did not concentrate on If-boats early
enough in the war - up until the spring of 1941, there were never more than a dozen
U-boats in the Atlantic at any one time. As a result, Donitz 's wolfpack attacks
"developed slowly enough for the British to take effec tive countermeasures.v'"
This was compound ed by Donitz' s error in emp hasizing quant ity rather than quality
when it came to his V-boats. As a numb er of historians have pointed out, Second
World War V-boats "were only marginally better than their World War [
116Marc Milner, as quoted in Till, "Battle of the Atlantic," 589. See also Marc Milner, "The
Battle of the Atlantic," Journal of Strategic Studies, XIII, No. I (1990), 450-466.
predecesso rs.v'! " German strategy was also too continental. U-boat construction did
not become a priorit y until Donit z became head of the Kriegsmari ne in 1943.
Furthermore , Hitler continually diverted If- boats from what Donit z correctly
considered the main battleground - the North Atlantic - to support army operations
in other thea tres . As a maritime power , Britain recogn ized that the North Atlantic
batt le was vital to the war effort and acknowled ged its " fundamental strategic
vulnerability." The German command , other than perhaps Douitz, did not seem to
realize that it was the sea that tied the Allied powers together, and if they could keep
the sea lanes open, they would win the war. lI8
The final mistake the Germans made was that they buil t the wrong kind of
navy, relying too much on a single weapo ns system - the Uvboat. On the other hand,
Till argues that the Germans probably would not have had any better luck with the
balanced fleet envisioned in Admiral Eric Raeder ' s pre-war Z-Plan. Even early in
the battle, when the RN was scrambling to maintain all its commi tments and the
Kriegsmarine roamed both the North and South At lantic, German surface forces
were not handl ed aggress ively, often avoiding eneountcrs even with inferior forces.
It was this timidi ty that led to Raeder ' s resignation as head of the German Navy in
1943. As it turn ed out, mines were actually a bigger threat than the surface fleet and,
in fact, sank more ships than did Donitz' s V_boats.119
II7Mallm ann Showe ll, Ui-Boats under the Swastika , 98. Sec also David Syrett, The Defeat of
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Whether or not the Germans came close to winning the Atlantic war or not,
March 1943 was a difli cult month for the Allies in genera l and the Newfound land
command in par ticular. U-boats sank thirty-one ships in six MOEF convoys, not
includin g HMS Harvester, an almost thirty percent increase in losses over February.
Three U'-boats were claim ed in return. The worst hit convoy was HX-229, escorted
by B.4, which lost thirteen ships. There were a number of mitigating factors
involved with this catastrophe, all of which demonstrate that the British and
American escor t groups suffered the same difficulti es as their Canadian brethren
resultin g in similar result s. The group arrived late from esco rting ON-169 and had a
very short turn around before rendezvousing with I-IX-229. The senior officer in
HMS Highland er was delayed for two days with defects and was unable to catch up
with the convoy until after the engagement. In addition, three more escor ts were
held up, which left a gap of four ships in the group. I-IMS Volunteer was transferred
from B.4 to help out, but this left a hole in that group's ranks, resul ting in SC-122
losing five ships to U-boats. HX-228 was also heavily attacked, losing seven ships
plus Harvester , despit e the presence of the new Amer ican esco rt carrier USS
Bogue.120 With the battl es raging in the Atlantic, a steady stream of survivors were
landed in St. John ' s during the month. Over three hundr ed arrived in various
conditi ons, includin g five German POWs on board the severely damaged USGC
Campbell that limped into harbour early in the month. 121
120LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,505, FONF, monthly report, March 1943.
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As disastrou s as March was, Winn and Bccsly 's optimism was not off the
mark. Despit e Donit z ' s V-boats being "ex tremely active" in the Atlantic in April,
losses in con voys were relatively small. V-boats torpedoed fifteen ships, including
I-IMS Beverley , in eight convoys but Allied forces destroyed seven V-boats in
return. 122 This resulted in 203 survivors landing at St. John' s, includin g forty-three
German U'-boat POWs.123 Reid attribute d this chan ge in fortunes to C-in-C WA' s
forma tion of five new support groups which had "saved convo y after convoy "
during the month and the basing of fifteen VSAF Liberators at Gander . Maintaining
group streng th remained a problem as weather damage and defec ts caused delays
and substitutions, both of which affected group cohesion. HX-233 illustrates the
difficulties faced by the FONF . The convoy was escorted by the Amer ican A.3,
which arrived in St. John ' s three days late afte r esco rting ON- 175. Of the six
escorts, three were remove d for refit and replaced by one Ame rican and two
Canadian ships. Of the three remaining, two had defec ts which cou ld not be repaired
in the forty-eig ht-hour turnaround , and Reid was forced to reassign HMCS Skeena
en route to jo in C.3 in the VK, and he took two ships from I3.4 to make up the
numb ers. Conseque ntly, A] basica lly constitut ed a comp letely new group that had
never worked together. Luckily, only one ship was sunk - in exchange for one V-
boat destroyed by VSCG Spencer - before EG.3 joined the convoy and the V-boats
backed off.124
122Tarrant, Ui-Boat Offensive, 118-119.
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With over 300 naval vessels passing through St. John 's dur ing the month, it
is no wonder that expa nsion plans were under consideration.if Sub-Lieutenant
W.A. Ramsay, RCN, had visited St. John' s in early January to survey poss ible sites
on the south side of the harbour , as well as at Buckmasters' Field, and NOIC Capt.
Hope had travelled to Ottawa in March to meet with senior officers at NSHQ.
During Apri l a number of high- ranking officials arrived to inspect the facilities at
St. John 's and to meet with Reid and other base officers. W.G. Mills, Deputy
Mini ster of Nav al Serv ice, and Capt. E. Johnston, RCN, Director of Organizatio n
(000), arrived on I April , follow ed shortly thereafter by Engineering Commander
r.w. Keohan e, RCN, Surgeo n Lt-Comm ander J.E. DcBolle, RCNVR , Sub-Lt.
Ramsay and E.A. Sea l and R. Hunt er of the Briti sh Admiralty Delegation (BAD) to
Washin gton . The Chief of Nava l Equipment and Supply (CNES ), Captain G.M.
Hibbard, RCN, arrived last, and a series of conferences produced plans to greatly
expand existing facilities.126 To maintain the build -up of forces in Britain for an
invasion of Fortress Europe, St. John ' s needed to be able to service the maximum
number of escorts with minimal turnaround time. This figure was set at fifty and
required "majo r new construction and reorganization of the base repair capacity." In
his report, Seal recomm ended that a new machin e shop complex be constructed on
the south side of the harbour to provide heavy engineering plant , smithy and
foundry facilitie s, and that a new naval stores build ing be installed on an adjacent
piece of land . The current dockyard storehouse would then be converted to a light
125/b id., Report of Proceedin gs by NOIC, Administrative War Diaries, 1445-102-3, sub. I,
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engineerin g/electronic shop to handle electronic, navigation al and A/SW equipm ent
repairs. The plan also called for a new, 11,000 square foot harbour craft/boat repair
shop with haul-out , plus an eighty-vehicle garage for the existing barracks
compl ex.v" Sea l's report estimat ed that the new facilitie s necessitated increasing
personne l at St. John' s to 5000 by adding 1500 rating s (mainly tradesmen) and 850
servicewomen. This increase prompted the inclusion of a new 250-bed hospital and
new barracks on the south side of the harbour in the plan.128
Training was also on the agenda. HMCS Avalon provided for the working-
up and refresher training of many of the RCN's recently commi ssioned ships.129
From the summer of 1941, Mobile Anti-Submarine Tra ining Unit No. II , under the
direct ion of Commander G.A. Harrison, RN, provided almos t all onshore training.
In its first yea r of opera tion, 120 ships receive d 496 periods of trainin g tota lling
1144 hours and forty-five minutes. l3o The 1943 plans envisioned a considerab le
expansio n of trainin g facilities including DEMS (Defe nsive ly Equipped Merchant
Ship) trainin g at Cape Spear, and anti-submar ine and signa l train ing space prov ided
by an annex to the Southside barracks. Elaborate simulator trainers, including an
anti-aircraft dom e teacher and tactical anti-submarine attack teacher, would also be
127Canada, Department of National Defence (OND), Directorate of History and Heritage
(DHH) 81/52 0/ 1440- 166/25, II ( I), E.A. Seal to Admiralty, Report on Repair Facilities, 7 April
1943. See also TNA/PRO, DO 35/1368 , FONF to Admiralty, 14 April 1943.
128DND, DHH 81/520/1440 -166/25 II (I ), Seal to Admiralty, Report on Repair Facilities, 7
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installed on an adjace nt site. ':" By the end of hostil ities, the Tact ica l Tra ining
Centre (TIC) in St. John ' s conta ined the Anti-Submarine, Gunnery , Radar and
Lora nI32 schoo ls, plus a Night Escort Teacher (NET). A report issued in mid-1945
indicates that on one day alone, fifty-o ne classes were taught between 0900 and
1730. These consisted of thirty-five Gunnery, eleve n A/S, one Radar, two Loran and
two NET classes , which incl uded the use of the Depth Charge Driller (OCO). The
OEM S trainin g range on the cl iffs at Cape Spear mounted both anti-aircraft and
larger ca libre pra ctice artillery pieces .l"
Harbour defences were also beefed up, with the contro lled minefield in the
Narrow s upgrad ed and enlarged and a fully-equipped boom defence depot built at
the Admiralty's wharfage on the Southside .134 The cost of the expansion program
was $7 milli on , which brou ght the total Canadian investm ent in the base, albeit on
Britain ' s acco unt, to $ 16 mill ion .135
The plan also prov ided for a floatin g dock. The latter had been under
discussion long before the meetin gs in April, but the BAD had littl e luck in findin g
a floatin g dock in Canada th roughout 1942. The closest they came was the smaller
section of the Vickers Mont real Dock , which they felt wo uld be better utili zed at St.
1310 NO, OHH 81/520/1440-1 66/25 II ( I) , Seal to Admiralty, Report on Repair Facilities, 7
April 1943. See also TNA , Kew, UK, 0 0 35/1368, FONF to Admiralty, 14 Apr il 1943.
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John 's.136 Neve rtheless, NSHQ considered new construction the overriding
priorityl37and did not think there was enough room for it at St. John 's anywayY s
The Admiralty Delegation was also hesitant to ask the Americans for one without
assurances that the Newfoundland Dockyard was working on a twenty-four-hour
basis.139 The High Commissioner for Canada, Charles Burchell , complained that the
dockyard was only work ing one shift per day and was closed on Sundays and
holidays. He point ed out that despite the extreme pressure on repair facilities at St.
John ' s, the dock yard was actually "idle" for a total of ninety-five days per year.
Burche ll argued that it should operate two, if not three, shifts per day during the
entire year and work all except a few holidays.l'" Unfortunately, there was a severe
shortage of skilled labour in Newfoundland despite the dockyard hiring 170
apprentice mec hanic s in the fall of 1941.141 These were fully employed , and
Governor Walwyn felt that the only way to increase usage to twenty-four hours was
to import men from the UK. At a minimum, Walwyn figured that the dockyard
needed sixty-six fully trained and experie nced craftsmen. He also warned that, even
with these extra men, twenty-four-hour operation was dependent upon getting a
136pANL, GN 38, S4-2- 1.1, file 9, 578-42, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to
Governor of Newfo und land, 16 October 1942. See also TNA/PRO, ADM 116/4540, minu te series M
12672/42.
137TNAIPRO ADM 116/4540 , Minute Series M 12672/42.
13B1bid., ADM 116/4941 , British Merchant Shipping Mission, Washington, to Shipminder,
London , 18 Febru ary 1943.
139pANL, GN 38, S4-2-4, file 2, Governor of Newfound land to Secretary of State for
Dominion Affairs, 28 April 1943.
140LAC, RG 25, Series 62, Vol. 3 198, file 5206-40, C.J. Burchell , High Commissioner for
Canada, St. John' s, to Scott MacDonald, Department of Externa l Affairs, Ottawa , 16 Apr il 1943.
141"Mechanics to Train at Loca l Dockyards," Evening Telegram (St. John' s), 22 August
float ing dock because the delays caused by dockin g and undockin g naval vesse ls
meant these extra men could not be fully employed.V In the end, it was not until
September 1943 that the USN was able to provide an 1800-ton lifting capacity
floatin g dock from Perth Ambo y, New Jersey.143 In the meantime, Bay Bulls was
being deve loped as an overflow facility. Engineer-in-Chief Captain G.L. Stephen s'
original nominee for an overflow site, Harbour Grace, was rejected by NSI-IQ as
being too cos tly to develop.l'" In its stead, Bay Bulls was chosen, and in July 1942
the Canadian War Cab inet approved the project at a total cost of $3 million do llars.
($2 milli on for the haul-out and support facilities and $ 1 million for harbour
protectionj .!" The Newfound land Commiss ion of Gove rnment committed to a
contribution of $300,000, part of which was the acquisition cost of the site itself.
General constru ction contracts were let in the fall of 1942, but final comp letion was
not anticipated before the end of 1943.146
Meanwhil e, most of the remaining work at HMCS Avalon was comp leting.
The hospital was finally getting permanent electrical servi ce, but the dockyard sti ll
142pANL, GN 38, S4-2-4 , file 2, Governo r of Newfou ndland to Secretary of State for
Domin ion Affai rs, 28 April 1943.
143TNAIPRO, DO 35/1368, FONF to Admiralty, 14 April 1943; and ADM 116/470 1, BAD
to Admiralty, II August 1943. See also LAC, RG 24 , FONF, Vol. 11,505, Administrative War
Diaries, NO tC, monthly report, September 1943; and TNAi PRO, ADM 116/4941 , Naval Service
Headqu arters, Ottawa (NSHQ) to Admiralty, 27 July 1943; and Ministry of War Transport
Representative to Shipminder, London (Ministry of War Transport),1 4 SeplcmbcrI 943.
144DND, DHH, FOMR, NSS- 1000-5-20, vol. I., Commodore Commanding Newfo undland
Force (CCNF) to NSHQ, 30 June 1941 .
145High Comm issioner in Newfoundland to Com missioner for Public Utilities, 18 August
1942, in Bridle(e d.),Do cuments onR elatiol1s,11, 603-604.
146High Commissioner in Newfou ndland to Commissioner for Public Utilities, 18 August
1942 in Bridle (ed .), Documents on Relations, II, 606. Sce also TNA/PRO , ADM 116/494 1,
Comments on ext ract from letter from Sir Wilfred Woods to Mr. Cluttcrbuck , Dominion s Office,
August 1943.
had to rely on a temporary generator as the diesel generator and DC rect ifiers for the
standby power plant had not arrived. The magazines were mostly comp lete and in
use, as were most o f the fuel tanks, but only Tank No. I was operational. The
newly re-designated Commander-in-Chief, Canadian Northwest Atlantic (CNC,
CNA),147Admiral Murray, was probably reasonably please d with the situation when
he and Commander P. Bliss, RCN, Staff Office r, Anti-Submar ine (SO (A/S)) ,
arrived at St. John' s for a short inspection tOUL I48 The situation at sea must also
have given him some satisfac tion.
Most historians point to May 1943 as the turning poin t in the Battle of the
Atlantic. Durin g the month , no fewer than thirty-eight Ll-boats were sunk by Allied
forces, bringing the total number of losses since September 1939 to 25 1, with 150 of
those from August 1942.149 The Allies' innovations in tact ics and technology -
radar, asdic, Leigh Lights, ahead-throwi ng depth charges, escort carriers and support
groups, to name but a few - finally intersected with resources and spelled the long
but irreversible decl ine of Donitz' s war in the Atlantic. One other major factor was
signals intelligence, and the New foundland Command both contributed and
benefited from its success. 150
147The change of jur isd iction from the USN to RCN and Murray ' s assumption of the
position ofC -in-C CNA became effect ive I April 1943, but Murray did not take over from US Task
Force 24 until 30 April 1943.
148LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,505, Report of Procee dings by NOIC, Adm inistrative War
Diaries, 1445- 102-3, sub. I, vol. I, April 1943.
149Tarrant, U-Boat OjJensive,11 9.
150For a detailed acco unt of how Siglnt was acquired and used by the Gove mmen t Code and
Cipher School at Bletch ley Park, London, sce F.H. Hinsley, et 01., British Intelligence in the Second
World War: Its Infl uence on Strategy and Operations (4 vols., London: HMSO, 1970-( 990).
The Allies used several methods to gather signals intelligence durin g the
Battle of the Atlantic. The main two were passive monit oring of radio transmissio ns
and Ultra. With passive monitoring, the Allies ascertained as much information as
they could from the transmissions themselves without actually readin g them. Donitz
orchestrated his U-boat batt les from his headq uarters in France and eventually
Berlin . He arranged patrol lines straddling known shipping lanes hoping that a U-
boat would detect a convo y. That boat then informed Donitz by radio and started to
trail the conv oy, sending out a regular radio beacon for the rest of the U-boats to
home in on. U-boat headquarter s also sent signals to all the U-boa ts in the vicinity
that a convoy had been spotted at a certain grid-square on the specially prepared
plotting map all U-boats carried. All those boats acknowledged that they had
received the message and were on their way. Once they arrived at the convoy they
all radioed Donit z aga in that they were in contact and then waited for the order to
attack. Donit z wait ed unt il the maximum numb er of U-boats was in contact before
he gave the order. When he did, all boats acknowledged receipt and went in on the
convoy at the same time on the surface from different directions and overwhelmed
the convo y escort s. All of this radio traffic was picked up by shore stations that
determined that a convoy had been sighted and was in danger, but with dozens of
convoys travell ing in several directions at the same time, the problem was
identifying which convoy was threatened.
The so lution was Huff Duff - High Frequency Direction Findin g. Both just
before and durin g the war, the Allies set up radio receiving sta tions, includin g in
Newfoundland (Cape Spear, the most easterly point in North America), that ringed
the North Atlantic, and these stations determined the location of a transmitting V-
boat by triangulating the location and strength of its transmission with other
statio ns. This information was sent to the Operat ional Intelligence Cent re (OIC) at
the Admiralty, and if a convoy was in the vicinity it altered its course to try to avoid
the Ll-boat. The same was true for a wolfpack attack . If radio signals were
intercepted all in the same area at roughly the same time, the intelligence people
knew that a wolfpack was gathering around a convoy and j ust how big it was . As a
result , they alerted the eonvoy escort and either sent reinfor cements or diverted
escorts from a convoy that was not threatened. I-luff Duff was also useful on a
smaller scale. As the war progressed, Huff Duff equipment, like radar, became
much more portable, and as a result more of the esco rt ships carried direction-
findin g equipm ent. Consequently, when a signal was picked up by one of the
escorts, it was triangulated by using two or three of the other escor ts, thus giving the
Senior Offic e, Escort (SOE) the location of the transmitter. If this was the
shadowing U-boat, using the co-ordinates obtained by Huff Duff an escort "ran
down the track of the U'-boat" - meaning it headed towards the spot where Huff
Duff indicated the U-boat to be - and attacked it, while the convoy performed
evasive manoeu vres. I-luff Duff proved to be very useful durin g the Battle of the
Atlantic because it could not only tell which convoys were in danger but also the
ones that were not , so that their escorts could be diverted to help the threatened
convoys. Y'
IS' Gannon, Black May , 64-68.
The other way the Allies used signals intelligence was Ultra.152 Ultra stood
for Ultra-Secret and was the information that was obtained from the decrypt ion of
actual signals. It was so secret that it was not revealed to the public until the 1970s.
In the early [930s, the Germans had developed the Enigma machine mainly to
prevent indu str ial espionage, but it was so compl ex it was thought to be
impenetrable. The Enigma machine basically cons isted of a typewrit er and several
rotors . When an operato r pressed a key, the rotors turned a set number of times and
a letter would light up on top of the machine. To decode a messa ge, the person
receiving it had to know the setting of the rotor, otherwise the message would just
come out as gibber ish. Because there were mill ions of poss ibilities, dependin g on
the numb er of rotors and the num ber of times they were set to turn, breaki ng the
code was thought to be impossible. It may well have been except for a number of
fortuit ous eve nts. The first occurred with the fall of Poland in September [939. Just
before Po[and surre ndered, that country's intelligence service managed to smuggle
an Enigma machin e out of the country. However, British intelligence needed the
codes and rotors before they could read the German coded transmis sions .
Consequently, the British set out to capture everyt hing they could on the Enigma
machines . In February [940, some rotors were recovered from the U-33, which was
sunk while on a mine-laying mission, with further material being recovere d from U-
13 in May. The follow ing March, further intelligence was obtained from a captured
German trawler, with more taken from a weat her ship boarded the same month and
another captured in June. But the real break came with the seizure of a full naval
IS2For a detai led account of how Ultra directl y impacted on the Battl e of the Atlantic, see
Syrett , Def eat of the German U-Boats.
Enigma machine, including rotors and codebooks, from V-I I O in June 1941. Prom
then until January 1942, the Allies were able to read German naval transmissions.
Unfortunately , in February the German navy added a fourth rotor called "Triton"
(codenamed "Shark" by the British), and for the next year - the most disastrous for
Allied shipping in the Atlantic - German transmissions were unreadable. This Ultra
blackout was particularly catastrophic for the St. John ' s-based MOEP, as without
this intelligence, the Admiralty could not divert the slow RCN-escorted SC convoys
around U-boat concentrations or call in re-enforcements before the U-boats set upon
them. As a result, the MOEF faced the full force of Donitz' s U-boat arm. This forth
rotor was finally broken in December 1942, and for the rest of the war, the Allies
knew everything that went into every naval transmission, but by then the decision
had been made to pull the RCN out of the Atlantic.153
All of this code breaking was done in Hut 8 at the Government Code and
Cipher School at Bletchley Park, just outside London, using large computers called
"Bombes" developed by mathematici an Alan Turing. After the messages had been
decoded , the information was teletyped to the Submarine Tracking Room (STR) at
the OIC in London where Commander Roger Winn, RN, and his staff combined it
with all the other intelligenc e - Huff Duff, spy reports, sightings, attacks, etc. - to
produce the whole picture of the Battle of the Atlantic. As a result of this, convoys
were re-routed or re-enforced, and escorts warned of the immin ence of an attack.
IS3Signais Intelligence also played a cruc ial role in the early operations of the NEF. By
being able to pinpoint possible areas of U-boat concentrations in 1941 , the Admiralty could detour
threatened NEF-escorted convoys out of danger which helped comp ensate for the inferior numbers,
training and equipment of the Canadian escort s. Jilrgen Rohwer, "The Wireless War," in Howarth
and Law (eds .), Battle of the Atlantic, 408-417. See also Type IX U-Boats: German Type IX
Submarine, German Submarine U-I IO, German Submarine U-155, German Submarine U-505,
German Submarine U-862 (Memphis, TN : Books LLC, 2010).
This information was also dissemin ated to similar submarine tracking rooms in
Ottawa and Washington and then on to the various local commands, including
I-IMCS Avalon. 1 5~
The Germans never seriously entertained the idea that the Enigma code
could be broken, and investigation after investigation sugges ted no reason why the
Allies were so uncanny in tracking down and killing U-boats while convoys
successfully avo ided them. The authorities suspected spies at U-Boat headquarters,
infra-red detection, equipment emissions, every thing other than that the Enigma
code had been broken. Som e historians sugges t that breakin g the Enigma codes won
the Battle of the Atlanti c for the Allies, but realistically it was ju st one of many
factors that turned the tide against the Germans in May 1943.
That May 1943 was the turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic was not
lost on those in the front lines. Commodore Reid made j ust such an observat ion in
his Operation al War Diary for the month. He pointed to two actions in particular
which illustrated the change in fortunes. Early in the month , ON-5 lost nine ships
(plus one stragg ler) but at a cost to the Germans of eight U-boat s plus several others
seve rely dama ged. SC-130, on the other hand, fought a three-day battle with a large
concentration of U-boats without losing a single vesse l. Reid attributed this reversal
of fortunes to the introduction of support groups, escort carriers and the "steadily
increasing effici ency of the men and material in Mid-Ocean Escor ts." 155
Unfortunatel y, all credit for this success went to Briti sh rather than Canadian
154 /bid.
155LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,505, FONF, monthly report, May 1943. See also Harrison
Salisbury, "V-Boats ' Defeat Total This Month - Churchill," New York World-Telegram, 30 June
1943_
groups, even though most of the RCN ships were baek in the North Atlantic by
May . Althou gh fresh from training cruises, they were used only as "close escor ts"
and were alwa ys accomp anied by support groups and, thus, did not participate in the
carna ge . The one exception was I-lMCS Drumheller, which, as a member of the
predominantl y Briti sh C.2 Group, shared a kill with HM ships Broadway and
Lagan.156 Reid did not note it, but the arrival of Very Long Range (VLR ) Liberator
bomber s in Newfo undland and Iceland at the end of Apri l also played a major role
in the defeat of the wolfpacks in May.
On average , there were twenty-three merchant vessels and thirty-seven
wars hips in St. John 's harbour on a daily basis duri ng the month, and despite the
victory, survivors sti ll arrived in a steady stream. In tota l, 6 19 peop le were landed in
St. John ' s in May, includin g twenty-five German POWs who arrived on board
HMCS St. Laurent. Waitin g on the wharf for the latter was Lieutenant J.P . Lunger,
sent from NSHQ to interrogate them. He must not have had too much luck with
them because all except one wounded prisoner left with him the next day for Boston
on board HMCS St. Francis. All the same, things were fairly qu iet at HMCS
Avalon. There was some reshuffling of office acco mmodat ion dur ing the month as
the offices of the Nava l Contro l Service Officer (NCSO) and the MWT moved to
the office rs ' accommodation build ing at Fort William, and those of Captain (D)
were relocated to the Administration Building in their stead . Nav al Laundry finally
opened at the RCN barracks, and the anti-torpedo net at Wabana was comp leted.
Really, the most notable event at the base during May was the first large dance held
156Milner, North Atlantic Run, 240.
at the drill hall of the barracks. It was sponsored by the St. John' s Nava l Canteen
Committee and attract ed approximately 2500 attcndees.l '"
If 1942 was a rough year for HMCS Avalon, the first month of 1943 seemed
to promise more of the same. While the enemy was conspicuous by his absence, the
atrocio us weather put an incredible strain on the men and ships of the MO EF. Many
suffered severe storm damage, and the FONF was hard put to meet all his
commitments. While monstrous seas and high winds played their parts, some of his
difficult y lay with the departu re of the first of the C Gro ups for the UK. This
became even more of a problem as enemy activity increased dramatically over the
next couple of months and the Americ an A Group s and the Briti sh B Groups tried to
pick up the slack whil e suffering the same difficulti es as the Canadian Groups the
year before . Breakd owns , late arrivals, weather and storm dama ge, and crew
exhaustion due to short turnarounds in port all contribut ed to the March crisis in
which thirty-tw o ships, includin g an escort, were sunk in six MO EF-escorted
convoys, a thirt y percent increase over the previous month. Fortunately, the tide was
starting to turn as support groups appeared to bolster threaten ed convoys and Very
Long Range (VLR ) aircra ft began closin g the mid-Atl antic air gap. May 1943
turned out to the month where all of these factors came together and the initiative in
the Atlantic war passed to Allied forces.
At the same time, plans were in the works to expand the base at St. John ' s,
including the addi tion of a floating dock , improved trainin g faciliti es and expansion
of the dockyard workforce. Existing work was being completed, although some
157LAC, RG 24, FONF , Vol. 11,505, War Diary of NOIC, Administrative War Diaries,
1445-1023, sub. t , vol. I,M ay 1943.
areas, such as the dockyard, were sti ll waiting for needed equi pment. Nevert heless,
with the imp roved spring weather and the war at sea reaching a new phase , I-IMCS
Avalon continued its pivota l role as all the C Groups returned from the eastern
Atlantic, and Support and Hunter-Kill er Groups used the facilities at I-IMCS Avalon
for turnaround .
Unfortunate ly, while the spring of 1943 was a triumph for the Allies, it was a
humili ation for the RCN. After two years of "holding the line" in the Atlantic, it was
denied participati on in the climax of the battle. Although so ld to the Canadian
government as part of a larger effort to ready convoy escorts for the planned
offensive again st the U-boats, the withdrawal of the C Groups from the Atlantic in
January and Febru ary was felt by many Canadian naval offic ers to be a betrayal. To
add insult to injury , even when it returned to the fray in April , the RCN was
relegated to its old role of close escort, a vital albeit inglorious responsibilit y, while
the RN and USN Supp ort and Hunter-Killer Groups racked up U-boat kills. This
would have serious repercussions for the RCN and in particul ar for the CNS, Percy
Ne lles.
Chapte r 6
A ll Over but the Shouting - Ju ne 1943 to May 1945
Thinking that the reversal at sea was only a temp orary setback, Donitz
suspended operations against North Atlanti c conv oys on 24 May. He moved his
surviving boats to the Caribbean and West African coasts where he felt they would be
less vulnerable to air attack but still capabl e of successes . Single boats were left in the
North Atlantic so the Allies would not catch on, at least for a time, to this change in
stra tegy, but it soo n beca me obvious to all that the "U-boats had nearly all abandone d
the Nort h Atlantic convoy routes ." Convoy cycles were opene d up, and flotillas of up
to ninety vesse ls sailed between Nor th America and the United Kingdom.' At the
same time, U-boat losses soared, averaging thirty a month worldwide over the
summer of 1943.2 Many of these were in the Bay of Biscay, and with the lull in the
North Atlantic, mid-ocean groups were reduced to six ships with the surp lus being
sent to the eas tern Atlantic to form support groups.' One of these was Canadian
Escort Group 9, which unfortunately gained the distinction of being the only support
group destroyed by If-boats ."
Meanwhil e, work on the expansion of HMCS Avalon commenced. As with
the initial base developm ent , the question of pos t-war ownership was raised again .
'Library and Archives Canada (LAC) , Record Group (RG) 24, Flag Office r Newfo undland
Force (FON F), Vo l. 11,505, FONF, monthly reports, June and July 1943.
2Y.E. Tarran t, The V-Boat Offensive, 1914-1945 (Annapolis: Nava l Institute Press, 1989),
123-124.
lLAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,505, FONF, monthly report s, August 1943.
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(Toro nto: Unive rsity of Toro nto Press, 1985),272-274. See also Fraser McKee and Robert Darlington,
The Canadian Naval Chronicle, 1939-1945 (St. Catharine s: Vanwcll Publi shing, 1996), 102-105.
The Cana dians worr ied that the Brit ish might turn the facil ities over to the Americans
after the end of hostil ities' and the Newfoundland government feared that further
Canadian encroac hmen t wou ld give that country into lerab le contro l over St. John 's
harbour and henc e the fisheries.6 Ow nership of the faci lities wo uld agai n have to rest
with the Ad mira lty , but as the funds for further development would com e from the
Canadian Mutua l Aid Fund, and since the Canadia ns felt that the future defence of
Newfo undland was a Ca nadian responsibili ty, both the Admira lty and the
Newfoundland gove rnme nt fretted that this would provide Canada with a case for
claiming the faciliti es at war ' s end. ' The Commission of Gov ernment was already
troubled about the "ultimate effect on New foundland's politi cal and eco nomic
independ ence [as a result] of the Canadian (and Amer ican) ' invas ion.'" Moreov er, it
worri ed that the publi c might not remember how happ y they were about the arrival of
the force s from both countries dur ing "the hour of danger" should there be further
encroa chments by either country," Ultimately, the Briti sh provid ed ass ura nces that no
determination would be made about the disp osal of the faciliti es at 81. John ' s without
full consultation with both the Canadian and Newfoundland governme nts."
SGreat Britain, National Archives (TNA/PRO), Domini ons Office (DO) 35/1369 , DO
memorandum , August 1943. Indeed, Adm iral Murray felt that the British would "sell [the Canadians]
down the river" to the Americans if it would keep the latter in the Western Atlantic. Canada, FONF,
RG 24, Vol. I I, 979/5 1-15, Murr ay to Reid, 15 October 194 1.
"tbid., Admiralty (AD M) 116/4941, British Admi ralty Delegation, Washington (BA D) to
Admiralty,2 IApriI 1943.
7Ibid., DO 35/ 1369, Treasury to Clutterbuck, Dominions Offic e, 7 August 1943.
'tu«, DO 35/ 1369, Woods to Clutterbuck, 17 August 1943.
9Ibid., ADMI16/494 1, Comments on extract from letter from Sir Wilfred Woods to
Clutterbuck,August 1943.
While these negotiations were taking place, the authorities were also trying to
remedy the repair situation not only at St. John 's but throughout eastern Canada. In
April, Malcolm Mac Donald, the British High Comm iss ioner to Ottawa , suggeste d the
establishment of a comb ined Canadian, British and American committee "to examine
repair problems for warships and merchant ships" in the northwest Atlantic.
Recognizing Newfoundland's importance, MacDonald recommended that
repre sentatives of the Newfo undland government be included.1o To this end, the
principal memb ers of the Allied Anti-Submar ine Survey Board - Rear Admiral J.M.
Mansfield , RN (former Chief o f Staff [COS] to the Commander-in-C hief Western
Approaches [C-in-C, WAD and Rear Admiral J.L. Kaufman, USN (former
Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier) - arrived in St. John 's to meet with senior RCN
staff and to inspect repair facilities.I I In their report to the Chief of the Naval Staff
(CNS), the board pointed out that the RCN 's maintenance faci lities at St. 101m's (and
at Halifax) had long "passed the saturation point" and that all of the repair facilities
on the east coas t of Canada needed extensive upgrading, including a much enlarged
workforce . Of particular urgency, escorts needed to be given priori ty over merchant
ship repair or new co nstruction, and in agreement with the report of the British
Admiralty Delegation (BAD), the board recomm ended a floating dock at St. John 's
for the exclu sive use of the escorts.12 During the summer, on average there were
IOLAC, RG 25, Series 62, Vol. 3 198, file 5206-40 , Malco lm MacDonald, High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom to A. Robertson, Under-Secretary for Externa l Affai rs, Ottawa, 12 April 1943.
See also TNAiPRO, ADM 116/494 1, MacDonald to Robertson, 12 April 1942.
liLAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,505, War Diary ofNOIC, Administrative War Diaries, 1445-
102-3, 5ub.1 ,v oI. 1, MayI 943.
12Milner, North Atlantic Run, 250-251.
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thirty-five warships and sixteen merchant vessels moored in St. John 's harbour at any
one time , and 1100 men were accommodated at the naval barracks durin g July and
August. '3
The Combined Canadian, United Kingdom and United States Committee to
Examine Repair Problems for Warships and Merc hant Vesse ls on the East Coast of
Canada and Newfou ndland met in Ottawa in August under the chairmanship of (now)
Rear-Admiral G.L. Stephens, with Sir Wilfred Woods represen ting the governm ent of
Newfo undland. During the discussions, Woods stressed the necessity of reservin g the
New foundland Dockyard for the repair of merchant vesse ls because its close
proximit y to the convoy routes made it "the natural port of refuge for damaged and
defective ships ." Despite this argument, the committee reiterated the posit ion of the
Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board that naval vesse ls had to take precede nce. As it
was, only runnin g repairs could be completed, and refit s of warships had to be
undertaken in British or American ports. The committe e also recomm ended that a
new floating dock of at least 3000 tons, capable of handlin g the largest escort vessel,
replace the recently acquired 1800-ton facility at St. John ' s as soon as possible. At the
same time , plann ed improve ments to the naval facilities needed to be "co mpleted and
manned as quickl y as possible" and the labour force at the Newfo undland Dockyard
augmented with skilled labour from Britain "w ithout delay.,,14
13LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,505, War Diary ofNO IC, Admin istrative War Diaries, 1445-
102-3, sub. l ,vol. I ,June, July and August 1943.
"Ibid., RG 28, Vol. 129, File C-3-2 1, Minutes of Com bined Canadian, United Kingdom and
United States Commi ttee to Examine Repair Problem for Warships and Merchant Vessels on the East
Coast of Canada and Newfo und land, 12 Augu st 1943. See also TNAfPRO , ADM 116/494 1, Minutes
of Combined Canadian, United Kingdom and United States Committee to Examine Repair Problem for
Warships and Me rchant Vesse ls on the East Coast of Canada and Newfound land, 12 August 1943 .
Unfor tunately, the committee 's findings did nothing to dissipate the storm that
was brewing in Ottawa between CNS Percy Nelles and his minister, Angus
Macdonald. The discontent both at sea and ashore concerning the equipment crisis on
RCN ships had reached the minister in August. The month before, the Assistant
Director of Naval Intell igence, Captain W. Strange, had sailed to Britain aboard HMS
Duncan under the command of Commander Peter Gretton, RN, one of the Royal
Navy 's most success ful escort commanders. During his conversations with Strange
about the state of equipment on RCN ships, Gretton suggested that Strange talk to
Commodore G.W .G. Simpson, Commodore (D) at Londonderry. Frustrated with the
. situation on Canadian ships, the irascible Simpson was frank in his criticisms of
Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ). Upon returnin g to Newfoundland, Strange
prepared a confid ential report for Macdonald which the Minister received shortly
after the Allied Repair Committee conference. Based on Strange' s findings,
Macdonald ordered Nelles to report on the state of equipment on RCN ships
compar ed to the situation on RN warships. Nelles was not alarmed by the request
because he felt many of the outstanding issues had been addressed, so he sent
Macdonald a general overview of the situation. But since this report did not answer
many of the minister 's specific queries, Macdonald immedi ately suspected a cover-up
of some kind at NSHQ . The minister thus dispatched his executive assistant, J.1.
Connolly, on a fact-findin g mission to Britain, where Connolly interviewed several
RCN and RN officers, including Simpson. Connolly returned in October with a
somewhat lopsided , but still serious, critique of the state of RCN ships in particular
and NSHQ in general. A series of increasingly acrimonious memoranda passed
between the minister and the CNS over the next several months during which
Macdonald downloaded all onus for the situation onto Nelles and the staff at NSHQ.15
At the same time, Donitz's U-boats returned to the fray in Septemb er with
new weapons and tactics. While the basic goal was still to sink merchant ships,
Donitz's tactic s now included eliminating rather than avoiding the convoy's
protection. Heavier anti-aircraft guns were mounted , and crews were admonished to
stay on the surface and fight it out with attacking aircraft. To give warning of
approaching planes, the radar warning device Wanze was installed on all boats; this
sounded an alarm when ten-centimetre radar waves were detected. The Zaunkonig
(Wren) homin g torpedo, called GNAT (German Naval Acoustic Torpedo) by the
Allies, was introduced as a defence against escort vessels. The torpedo was designed
to follow the acoustic signature of an escort ship and to detonate against its stern. It
was a GNAT that destroyed the Canadian EG.9 mentioned earlier.l" Some successes
were achieved, but because these torpedoes had to be launched while submerged , U-
boat commanders could not confirm them. Consequently, claims in no way reflected
actual successes. Air defence tactics also proved ineffective, especia lly in the Bay of
Biscay. After the first few confrontations with heavily armed U-boats in the bay,
Coastal Command changed its tactics so that the spotting aircraft would call up
ISMilner, North Atlantic Run, 252-258; and Marc Milner, The V-Boat Hunters: The Royal
Canadian Navy and the Offensive against Germany's Submarines (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
1994),49-52. For an extensive account of the equipment crisis and the back channels used to bring the
issue to a head in the fall of 1943, see Richard O. Mayne, Betrayed: Scandal, Politics and Canadian
Naval Leadership (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006); and David Zimmerman, The Great Naval Bailie of
Ottawa: How Admirals, Scientists, and Politicians Impeded the Development of High Technology in
Canada's Wartime Navy (Toro nto: University of Toro nto Press, 1989).
16HMCS St. Croix was first hit by a GNAT , and her survivors were rescued by her group
mate, HMS Itchen. Unfortu nately, Itchen was hit two days later and only one man from each crew
survived.
reinforcements before going in for an attack. Even Donitzs grouping of U-boats for
mutual protection did not help, and eventually If-boat commanders were told to
submerge at the first sign of aircraft . In Januar y 1944, as monthl y U'-boat losses
continued to soar, Donit z abandoned pack tactics alto gether, and the V-boats reverted
to individual attacks. Whether he recognized it or not, this is when Donitz changed
the overall strategy of the Atlantic war. No longer was the priority to sever the lines
of communication between the New World and the Old but rather to tie down naval
forces until the new Type XXI "electro-boats" arrived from the builders.
Meanwh ile, the Flag Officer Newfo undland Force (FONF) noted the
September renewa l in the Batt le of the Atla ntic and disbanded the ill-fated Escort
Group 9 to reinforce the C Group s. The floating dock also arrived durin g the month
along with its comm ande r, Engineering Lieutenant-Commander F. Burton , RCNR.
Actually, a number of noteworthy peop le passed through the comm and during
Septe mber. Cap t. R.N. Wood , the Director of Nava l Ordinance , arrived to discuss
ordinance problems; Rear-Adm iral Sir Francis Austin, RN, and Commander c.A.
Moore , RN, held mee tings in St. John's about the propo sed Defensively Equipped
Merc hant Ships (OEMS) training facility; and the Director of Trade , Captain E.S.
Brand , made a short visit towards the end of the month . At the same time , renovations
began on the drill hall and the officer s' wardroom at the nava l barrack s, which also
accommodated I 170 men during this time. The dai ly average of wars hips alongside
during the month decrea sed to thirty-two, with roughly fourteen merchant vessels in
the harbo ur at the same time. Nineteen convo ys were sailed , and 140 survivors were
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landed.17 Despite the renewed U-boat offensive, on balance September turned out to
be fairly uneventful for the Newfoundland Force.
This trend continu ed to the end of the year. After something of a lull in
Octo ber, when the daily average of warships at St. John ' s was only twenty-nine, this
figure rose in No vember and Decembe r to thirty-nine. As a resul t, more than 1200
men were accommodated monthly at the barracks dur ing the fall, decreasing to a little
ove r 1000 in December. Mines also became a prob lem during the fall, and U-boats
were suspected off St. John ' s when a field of thirty-one German mines was
discovered in the approaches to the port in October. Thi s concern persisted
throughout the next two month s, although no casualties were reported, and mine-
clearing swee ps were eventually discontinu ed. Vice Chief of Naval Staff (YCNS)
Rear Admiral C.G. Jones, and Murray' s COS, Captain R.E.S. Bidwell, arrive d in St.
John ' s for separate meetings with base staff . Their appearance no doubt had
something to do with the ongoing feud between Macdon ald and Nelles, a dispute in
which Jone s was hardly an innocent bystander.V Commodore Reid had been one of
the many critic s of the state of equipment of RCN forces in the spring and summer
which may have precipit ated a change in comm and in the New foundland Force , with
Commodore C.R.H. Taylor replacing Reid , who departed for Ottawa in early
November.19
17LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,505, Naval Conlrol Staff Officer, report, October, November
and Decemb er 1943; and War Diary of NO IC, Admini strative War Diaries, 1445-102-3, sub. I, vol. I,
October, Nove mber and Decemb erl 943.
18Mayne, Betraye d, 204-205.
'9LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,505, Naval Control Staff Offic er, report, October, November
and Decembe r 1943; and War Diary of NOIC, Administrative War Diaries, 1445-102-3, sub. I, vol. I,
October, Novemb er and Decemb er 1943.
The year ended as quietly as it had begun, althou gh like the previou s
December, not without tragedy when on the night of 16 Decemb er a naval sentry on
duty at the Naval Armam ent Depot on the south side of the harbour mistakenly shot
and killed an emp loyee of E.G.M. Cape and Comp any.i" Regardle ss, the
transformation of the Battle of the Atlantic had been as swift as it was monum ental.
The transition from the disastro us mid-win ter mon ths when serious doubts arose
about the effect iveness of the convoy system to the collapse of Donitz's entire North
Atlantic stra tegy had taken only three months. After May 1943, the Germans never
regained the offensive in the Atlantic, and the initiative passed to the Allies . The U-
boats became the hunted as esco rt groups were denuded of destroyers to form support
and hunter/kill er groups that exacted a terribl e toll. Yet this change in fortune did not
dimini sh S1. John ' s' importance as a naval base. Indeed, plans were initiated to
improve and expand HMCS Avalon as both a repair and maintenance facility and
training centre. Although lingering suspicions among the various parties again caused
some problems, the spirit of co-operation and compromise allayed the fears . The
same could not be said, however, about relations in Ottawa, where a blame game and
behind -the- scenes power strugg le was being played out between senior RCN officers
and the naval mini ster.
Percy Ne lles had been one of the count ry' s first naval cadets and had spent
much of his career in shore postings. Appointed CNS in 1934, he was a reasonably
competent, if unin spired, officer and more a "senior publi c servant than [a]
"tu«, War Diary of NOte , Admini strative War Diaries, 1445-102- 3, sub. I, vol. I,
December 1943.
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professiona l seado g.,,21 Con sequently , when Macdona ld requested the equipment
comparison between RCN and RN ships in the summer of 1943, Nelles seriously
misjudged the situation. He thought that the majority of the compl aints voiced about
the RCN ' s equipment and trainin g standards had been addre ssed . The paucity of RCN
U-boat kills during the spring, a period when the RN and USN were racking up
victory after victory , was an embarrassment to the Canadi an government, and the
minister was under tremendous pressure from his Cab inet co lleagues to exp lain it. If
Nelles was out of his depth, the same certainly applied to Angus Macdona ld. The
former premier of Nova Scot ia had been happ y enough to leave the runnin g of the
navy to NSHQ and took little interest in the RCN aside from routine administrative
and intergove rnmental matters. But as the year wore on, Macdonald ' s suspicions of
incompetence at NS HQ were reinforced by Connolly 's report on his mission to the
UK and a whisperi ng campaign by Nelles' VCNS, Vice-Admi ral Jones.22 Ultimately,
Ne lles was relieved of his duties in early 1944 and, afte r being replaced by Jones, was
transferred to Londo n as Senio r Nava l Officer, which really was a face-saving
appo intment. Disillu sioned and ju stifiably bitter, Nelles retired from the RCN at the
end of 1944. While defici ent in planning and slow to react to the changi ng face of the
Atlantic war, Nelles and the staff at NSHQ were unfairly blamed for a situation that
21Tony German, The Sea is at Our Gates: The History of the Canadian Navy (To ronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1990), 6 1. See also Roger Sarty, "A dmira l Percy W. Nelles: Diligent
Guardian of the Vision," in Michael Whitby, Richard H. Gimblett and Peter Haydo n (eds.), The
Admirals: Canada 's Senior Naval Leadership in the Twentieth Century (Toro nto: Dundurn Press,
2006); Mac John ston, Corvettes Canada: Convoy Veterans of WWlI Tell Their True Stories (Toronto :
McGraw- Hill Pyerson, 1994; reprint, Toron to: John Wiley and Sons, 2008), 23 1-233; and Joseph
Schu ll, Far Distant Ships: An Official Account of Canadian Naval Operations in World War 1I
(Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1950; 2"ded., Toron to: Stoddart Publis hing, 1987), 2-3.
22Milner, U-Boat Hunters, 51-52.
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was not their faull alone. Both the Canadian government and the British Admiralty
contributed significantly to the crisis which eventually led to Nelles' removal.
The Liberal Government of Prime Minister Mackenzie King decided early in
the conflict that if Canada was to participate, it was going to benefit the country's
industria l base. Citing vulnerability and a scarcity of skilled labour in the Maritimes,
the Minister of Munitions and Supp ly, C.D. Howe, concentrated the country' s
shipbuilding and repair facilities in Ontario and Quebec.r' Unfortunately, putting all
these eggs in one baske t created a number of difficulties. The first was that most of
these yards were inaccessible for months at a time due to winter ice in the St.
Lawrence River, which often resulted in warships being released before the winter
freeze up whether fully comp leted or not. These ships were often plagued by defects
which had to be rectified in east coast shipyards, includin g the Newfoundland
Doickyard. This situation was further exacerbated by the closures of the St. Lawrence
in 1942 and 1944 due to enemy action. The other difficulty was that with all these
yards occupied with new construction, there was little space available for repairs or
upgrading. Not wanting to delay production, NSHQ decided to incorporate
improvements in new construction rather than modernize current ships as
circumstances warranted.i" Unhappily, due to the aforementioned hazards in the St.
Lawrence, as well as unforeseen difficulties at a number of yards, events at sea
23Ernest R. Forbes, "Consolidating Disparity: The Maritim es and the Industrialization of
Canada during the Second World War," Acadiensis, XV, No. 2 (Spr ing 1986), 3-27, argues that this
was a purely partisan decision based more on politics and close personal friendships with leading
centra l Canadian industrialists than on practica l or military considerat ions.
24W.A.B. Douglas, et 01.,A Blue Water Navy: The Official Operational History of the Royal
Canadian Navy in the Second World War, 1943-1945, Volume 11, Part 2 (St. Catharines: Vanwell
Publishing., 2007), 4 1. Indeed, it was that the smaller sect ion 0 ft he Vickers floating dock in Montreal
was needed for new construction that NSIIQ denied the BAD' s request that it be scnt to St. John ' s to
help relieve repair problems there.
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deve loped faster than these newer warships could be construc ted. Had Ottawa
develo ped shipbuilding and repair facilities on the east coas t of the country as well as
in centra l Canada, this may not have become the crisis that it did.25 But with Ottawa's
attention focussed on providing a spur to industr ial developm ent in cent ral Canada,
facilities in the Mar itimes were neglected until it was too late . The result was that,
when needed, repair facilities on the St. Lawrence were inaccessible or fully occupied
with naval construction, and those on the cast coast simply did not have the capacity
or manpower to compensate. The only option available to the RCN was to send its
ships to the UK or USA for upgradin g, but these yards were also fully occupied. If the
naval mini ster really wanted to get to the root of the equipment crisis, he should have
started at his own gove rnment's door.
The Briti sh Admiralt y, the RCN 's most vociferous critic, also bore
substantial responsibilit y for the shortcomings of the RCN . The protection of the
trans-Atlantic lines of communication aga inst Ll-boat attacks was the single most
important responsibility in the Battle of the Atlantic. Before the war, confident that
any submarine threat had been null ified by the developm ent of ASDIC, the RN
thought that the major threat would come from surface raiders. Yet within the first
few month s of the war it became evident that German U-boats were more than just a
mere nuisance.i '' The RN was woefully short of escort craft, and Prime Mini ster
Mackenzie King saw this as an area where Canada could make a major contribution
to the war effort. To this end, NSHQ chose the corvette, which could be built to
25Forbes, "Conso lidating Disparity," 3-27.
26During the first four month s of the war (September-December 1939), If- boats sank over a
half million tonnes of British shipping, including the aircraft ca rrie r HMS Courageo us and the
batt leship Royal Oak, the latter at anchor at Scapa Flow. See Tarrant, V- Boat Offensive, 84.
mercantile standards in Canadian shipyards. The first program , initiated in early 1940,
called for twenty-eight corvet tes by the end of the navigation seaso n. This was soon
followed by another order of thirty-six, bringing the total to sixty-four by the end of
1941 .27 With such a rapid production of vesse ls, mannin g became an issue.
When war was declared, the RCN consisted of 1719 officers and men, plus
approximately 3700 retired officers and reserves. NS HQ quick ly adopted a set of
mobilizat ion plans calling for 12,500 individuals in all ranks by the end of 194 1.28
NSHQ soon revised this estimate to a compliment after three years of 1500 officers
and 15,000 men. But when , by the end of 1940, the ships of the first buildin g program
were coming off the ways in rapid succession, the RCN was faced with the need to
crew seventy-nine warships, includin g six vintage American destroyers, and an
assortment of motor launches. As well, it was expected to find personnel to operate
new shore establishments throughout eastern Canada and New foundland.29 Although
NSHQ thought that some relief would come when the Americans finally joined the
hostilities, quit e the opposite occurred.
When the RCN established the Newfoundland Escort Force (NEF) in May
1941, it was to be a temporary measure until the Americans entered the war and took
over all convoy escort dut ies in the western Atlantic as specified in the ABC I
agreement. However, when it declared war in Decemb er the US withdr ew all but two
of its escorts from the Atlantic , and the RCN was forced to take up the slack. At the
same time, with the U-boat onslaught along the eastern seaboard of the United States
27Johnston, Corvettes Canada, 3.
28M ilner, North Atlantic Run, 14.
29/bid., 27.
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durin g the first six months of 1942, the RCN was ob liged to initiate convoys to the
Caribbean and between Halifax, Boston and the Western Ocean Meeting Point
(WESTO MP) west of Iceland - the famous "T riangle Run ." Sugges tions as to what
would have happened had the RCN not taken over these duties were not forthcoming,
then or now. The RN did not have the resources to do it, and NSHQ rightly
considered that any escorts were better than none. All the same, the result was that
many Canadian ships and men went to war with minimal training. This was also
partly the Admiralty ' s fault. In the case of radar, the RN initially agreed to send
instruct ors to Canada to train personnel if the RCN seconded every qualifi ed physics,
mathematics, and engineering student it could enlist to train as radar officers. The
RN, however, refused to return these men when reque sted, regardless of the severe
shortage of such officers in Canadian ships and trainin g facilities.3o
In late 1942, NS HQ correctly argued that the lack of up-to-date equipment
was the main culprit for the disprop ortionate losses in convoys escorted by the RCN.
As with the trainin g diffi culti es, the Admiralty was part of the problem, affording
RCN ships a low priority in the allocation of equipment. Indeed, Nelles complained
to Macdon ald in 1943 that the RN had modernized its fleet " to the detriment of the
RCN.,,3) Macd onald may have boasted that he would have pull ed the RCN out of the
Atlantic if he had been informed of the equipm ent crisis, but this clearly would not
have been an option in 1942.32 Again using radar as an example, by December 1942,
]OZimmerman, Great Naval Bailie, 34 and 42.
" Marc Milner, "Squaring Some of the Comers," in Timothy J. Runyan and Jan M. Copes
(eds.), To Die Gallantly: The Bailie of the Atlantic (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 135.
]2 Milner, V- Boat Hunters, 80-82. See also Marc Milner, Canada's Navy: The First Century
(Toronto: Univer sity of Toronto Press, 1999), 136.
of the fifty-seve n Allied warships in the Nort h Atlantic that still required this essential
equipment, forty-five (eighty percent) were Ca nadian.3J Thi s went further than ju st
the supply of the var ious weap ons and sensing system s to includ e the specifications
for such systems as we l1.34 Con sequently, if the RCN wanted this vital equipment, it
not only had to man ufacture but also design it.35 Moreov er , on the occasions that the
Admiral ty did supply specifications or prototypes to NSI-IQ, they were often a
generation or two behind what was being used by RN vesse ls in the Battle of the
Atlantic .l" Exace rbating the situation, London ' s continued demand s on the RCN for
men and ships meant there was littl e opportunity for RCN ships to undergo refits to
install the latest equipment eve n when it was available. Indeed , when the C Goups
were pulled out of the Atlantic in early 1943 for trainin g and upgrad ing, only twenty-
three RCN corve ttes were actually modernized."
The Admira lty pointed to the heavy losses in RCN-escorted convoys in 1942
as j ustifica tion for pullin g the Canadians out of the North At lantic in the winter of
1943. Yet it did not acknow ledge that the St. John ' s-based Ca nadian forces escorte d
the slow SC convoys, which took longer to cross the At lantic . Na tura lly, the enemy
was ab le to find and rem ain in contac t with these convoys much more easi ly than the
faster convoys esco rted by British and Amer ican escor t gro ups. Indeed, C Groups
33Zimmenn an, Great Nava l Battle, 84.
34It took the person al interventi on of C.D. Howe, Canada 's Minister of Mun itions and Supply,
with Lord Beaverbro ok to obta in prototyp es of the air-to-sur face vesse l radar being developed by the
British Mini stry of Aircraft Pro duction. Ibid., 66 .
35Thanks to the lack of co-o peration from the British, Canadian scientists had to practically
"reinvent rada r, using civ ilian tubes and circuitry." lbid ., 33.
36lbid., 4 1, 69 and 73.
37Milner, U-Boat HlInters, 43.
were actually intercepted at twice the rate of the 13 Groups" Furthermore, as has
been prev iously mention ed, with the German ' s introdu ction of the "Triton" rotor to
the Kriegsmarine Enigma machi ne in early 1942, there was a blackou t in Ultra
intelligence for most of the year which prevented RCN-escorted convoys from by-
passing known U-boat concent rations . In January 1943, the Admiralt y ' s Monthly
Anti-Submarine Report pointed out that in the previous six month s the RCN had born
the brunt of attacks in the Atlanti c.39 It is tell ing that after the RCN was pulled out of
the Nort h Atlanti c, and Briti sh and American Groups took over the full burden, they
fared no better than the Canadia n Groups . As a matter of fact, the four hardest hit
convoys durin g the "March Crisi s" - when the Allies supposedly came closest to
losing the Battl e of the Atlantic - were all under British escort."
While Ne lles and the NSHQ deserve criticism for failing to provid e proper
trainin g and equipment to the forces at sea, they should also be acknow ledged for
what they did acco mplish. Canada was an insignificant nava l power at the start of the
war, but in the space of five years it built the third largest navy in the world . This
unprecedented expansio n could only be achieved by sacr ificing quality for quantity
since that was what was needed in the North Atla ntic in 1941-1942. As Marc Milner
has noted , "[t]he significance of the RCN's contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic
lay in its succe ssful efforts to hold the line unti l the Allies could assume the
38Milncr, North Atlanti c Run, 190. One other prob lem was that the Germ an Intelligence
service B-Dienst had broken the Admir alty' s Naval Cipher 3, used by all Canadian, British and
American conv oy escort forces. Some have suggested that this lapse " very nearlycost [the Allies] the
war." Andr ew Williams, The Battle of the Atlantic: The Allies' Submarine Fight agains t Hitler 's Gray
IVolves of the Sea (London: BBC Worldwid e, 2002), 186.
39Milner, "Squaring Some of the Corners," 132
4°0 ouglas,e t al., Blue IVater Navy, 30.
offensive.,,41 Unfortunately, the RCN could not do this and properly train and equip
its ships, but Nelles and the staff at NSHQ did what they could with what they had. It
is unfortunate that the British reaped the benefits of this effort without acknowledging
from whence they came.
The Newfoundland Force continued to bear the brunt of the Atlantic war in
the new year even though the enemy was an elusive foe. Throughout the winter
months, the Force suffered through poor weather and short turnarounds, both of
which took a toll on ships and men.42 During the first five months of 1944, more than
300 naval vessels rotated through St. John' s each month, and the naval barracks
billeted a monthly average of approximately 1200 men. The FONF requested that
layovers be increased, but this was not deemed possible by the ever-demanding
Admiralty. When ice closed S1.John's to traffic, escorts were diverted to Argentia.t '
Merchant vessels also suffered with the winter weather, especially the prefabricated
Liberty ships, or "Kaiser's Coffins," as German propaganda labelled them.44 Dr.
Goebbels was probably not far off the mark in this characterization since these ships
had a propensity to develop stress fractures in bad weather. In February, the Liberty
ship SS William Prescott arrived in S1.John's with a three-inch crack bisecting the
ship behind the number two hold. Governor Walwyn was amazed that the ship had
not simply broken in two. Nevertheless, the Newfoundland Dockyard welded the
4lMilner, North Atlanti c RIIIl , 277 .
42LAC, RG 24, FONF , Vol. 11,505, file 1445-10 2-3 , vol. I , Staff Offic er (Operations) ,
month ly report s, January, February and March 1944 .
43/bid., monthl y reports, Admini strati ve War Diaries, January-May 1944 .
44/b id. , monthl y reports, Operat ional War Diaries, March 1944 .
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crack and the sent the ship on her way .45 Regardless of such defec ts, approxim ately
400 of these "cooki e-cutter" vessels were successfully escorte d acro ss the Atlantic in
March.46
During the winter, the U-boats remained more a "fleet in being" than an actual
threat. Donitz felt that the Atlantic war had to continue desp ite the losses because "an
ext raordinarily large numb er of [enemy] forces [were] being tied up in this way,,47To
this end , seve ral V-boats were posted in mid-Atlantic so lely for the purpose of
sending regular weath er reports." Their presence was revealed by sporadic wireless
traffic, but their command ers demon strated a marked reluctance to show their heads
above water, so to speak, let alone to launch any attacks. Yet as Lt.-Commander
A.G.S. Griffin , RCNVR , lIM CS Avalon's Staff Officer (Operations), noted in his
monthl y report , Donit z still had "considerable sting in his U-boat arm.,,49This was
amply shown when U-538 sank the frigate HMS Gould of the British Supp ort Group
I with an acou stic torpedo during the month .50British and American forces continued
to make kills in mid-ocean , but unsuccessful hunts off Newfoundland and Halifax by
the RCN in April for known contacts clearly showed that a "higher degree of skill
4STNA/PRO, DO 35/ 1357, Governor's Quarterly Report, 1 April 1944 .
46LAC, RG 24, FON F, Vol. 11,505, File 1445-102-3, Sub. I, Vol. I, monthly reports ,
Operational War Diaries, March 1944.
47Minutes of the Conference of the C-in-C, Navy and the Fuehrer at Headqu arters, Berghof,
on April 12 and 13, 1944, in Fuehrer Confe rences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945 (Ann apolis: Nava l
InstitutePress,1990), 390.
<SF.H. Hinsley, et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War (3 vols., London : HMSO,
1970-1 990) ,III,part 2, 238.
49LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,505, file 1445-102/3, vol. I, Staff Officer (Operations),
monthly reports, Janu ary-April 1944.
SOlbid., Staff Officer (Operations), monthly reports, March 1944. See also Clay Blair, Hitler's
V-B oat War: The Hunted, 1942-1945 (New York: Random House, 1998), 502.
than ever before" was needed for a succe ssfu l conclu sion ." Even when properly
constituted and trained groups were invo lved, success still eluded the RCN. This was
demon strated in May with the torpedoing of HMCS Valleyji e/d and the failure to
destroy the cu lprit off the south coast of Newfoundland.52
On I May 1944, a Liberator aircraft from No. 10 Squadron sighted U-548
under Kaptanl eutnant Heinr ich Zimmermann east of Conception Bay. Zimmerman,
thinking he had not been detected, dived and continued south. But a Salmon alert was
broadcast.r' ancl when U-548 surfaced off Cape Broyle on the southern shore of the
Ava lon Penin sula late in the evening a couple of days later, the American-built
destroyer/escort HMS Hargood was waiting. Zimmermann fired an acoustic torpedo
at Hargood ju st as a Libera tor aircraft from No. 10 Squadron arrived, and mistaking
the aircraft's identification flare for an attack, Zimmermann fired at the plane. The
Liberator thought that Hargood was attacking it and departed. Mea nwhile, the U-boat
took refuge close to the cli ffs of Cape Broyle while the British wars hip tried to figure
5ILAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,505, file 1445-102/3, vol. I, Staff Office r (Ope rations),
monthly reports, February-Apr il 1944.
52/bid., May 1944. See a lso Marc Milner, " Inshore ASW: The Canad ian Exper ience in Home
Waters," in W.A.B. Douglas (ed.), The RCN in Transition / 9/0 -/ 985 (Vanco uver : University of
I3ritish Co lumbia Press, 1988), 143-158; and Michael L. lIadley, "Inshore ASW in the Second World
War: The U-boat Experience," in Douglas (ed.), RCN in Transition , 127-142.
53During the war, the RN deve loped a numb er of search strateg ies for finding and destroying
U-boats after they had been initially detected either through sightings, intelligence or a " nami ng
datum" (a torpedoed ship). The patterns varied depending upon factors such as bottom conditionsbut
werepredicate don thefact thatasubmergedU-boatcouldonlyt rave I so far for so long. Consequent ly,
the search pattern wou ld expand outward from the starting point and continue until the U-boat was
destroyed or reached "the point of exhaustion" when it wou ld have to surface and fight or make a run
for it on the surface .
out who was friend or foe, staying bottom ed until Hargood moved off about an hour
later trai ling her anti-torp edo, or CAT, gem·.54
A couple of days later, Zimmermann encountered Esco rt Group C I with the
Senior Offic er Commander J. Byron RNR on board HMCS Val/eyfi eld off the south
coast on their way to Hali fax after having escorted a convoy. Byron ordered the group
to cease zigzagg ing shortly before midnight because ice condition presented a danger
of collision if a ship had to zig to avoid a growler at the same time that a neighbour
zagged in the order ed zigzag pattern. While understandable, this decision was
unfortun ate because shortly thereafter U-548 hit Val/eyfi eld with an acoustic torpedo,
breakin g her in two. Contrary to the Staff Office r (Opera tions) ' s monthl y report for
May, C I did not institut e the Salmon operation "immediately followin g the sinking of
HMCS Val/eyfi eld." Confusion reigned as the Officer of the Watch (OOW) of the
next senior ship , HMCS Edmundston, tried to determine what had happened. As it
was, HM CS Giffard was first on the scene and took over tactical command. The ships
of C I streamed their CAT gear and started to conduct their search for U-548, often
passing over the U'-boat's position as she lay on the seafloor. Meanwhile,
Val/eyfi eld's survivo rs were in the frigid water for almost an hour before Giffard
broke off from the search to piek them up, and only thirty-e ight of Val/eyfi eld' s 165-
man crew were still alive; most had died of exposure. After waiting three hours on the
bottom , Zimmerman surfaced to find an empty ocean and moved off toward s
54CAT stood for Ca nadian Anti-Torpedo gea r which basically consisted of three pipes on an
A-shape d frame. When towed beh ind a ship, its loud rattl e attracted Germ an acoustic torpedoes rather
than the ship's propellers. Dou glas, et al., Blue Water Navy, 421 See also W.A .B. Douglas, The
Creation of a National Air Force: The Officia l History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Volume /I
(To ronto : Univer sity of Toronto Press, 1986.), 579; and Michael L. Hadley, V-Boats against Canada:
German Submarines in Canadian Waters (Kingston: McGill-Queen ' s University Press, 1985), 209.
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Halifax .55 IIMCS Giffard conveyed Valleyjield' s survivors and five bodies to St.
John's , bringing the total number of distre ssed seamen land ed at the port durin g the
first five months of 1944 to 168, includin g fourte en German POW s. Funerals were
held at the naval barracks for the five Valleyjield dead who were buried at the Joint
Services Cemetery on Blackmarsh Road. 56
With the upgradi ng of the Tactical Train ing Centre (TIC) under the 1943
expa ns ion plan, training and advance ment prospec ts improved at HMCS Avalon , and
from Februa ry to the end of April twenty-two officers and more than 100 men of
other ranks attended anti-submarine (A/S) tra ining courses . In addition, a pair of two-
week cour ses wer e run for petty officer and leadin g sea men candida tes eac h month ,
resultin g in eighty-three petty officer candidates and almos t 250 leading sea man
candida tes bein g exa mined for adva ncement. Unfort unate ly, due to a shortage of
staff, trainin g for office rs beyond the AlS courses was not poss ible.V
About this time, someone at NS HQ decided to ask that the British government
pay Ca nada an ageney fee for supervising the design and construc tion of the base at •
St. John ' S.58 This was an odd request give n that the British were already footing the
bill for a faci lity that was exclusively Canadian. Furthermore , if the Canadia ns
wanted to have any leverage for retain ing the base after the war , such payments
55McKee and Darlin gton , Canad ian Naval Chronicle, 147-158. See also Douglas, et al., Blue
Water Navy, 421-4 25; and Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, 579·580 .
56Hadley, UiBoats against Canada, 2 17-2 18; and LAC , RG 24 , FONF , Vol. 11,505,
Command ing Office r HMCS Avalon, monthly report, May 1944.
57LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,505, file 1445-102/3, vo l. I , Training Officer, HMCS Avalon,
mont hly reports, February-April 1944.
58TN AIPRO, ADM 116/4941 , Admiralty to BAD, 24 July 1944.
would in fact weaken their claim.59 Considering NSHQ's initial o ffer to underwrite
the base, and the Canadian government's fears of Americ an entrenchment in
Newfo undland, it is perp lexing why the Canadians tried to down load as much of the
cost of the base as possible on the Admiralty, including furnitur e and household
equipment.t" Indeed, the Admiralty comp lained how diffi cult it was to get "a
reasonable contribution from the Canadians.,,61 The Admira lty ultim ately told the
Canadian government that, as far as it was concerned, Britain would be responsib le
for the major cap ital cos ts of the base, but the RCN would have to supply the norma l
"tenants ' fittin gs which would presumably be standard items normally supplied for
the Canadian Services." After all, the RCN was using the base rent-free for the
durat ion.62 The Admiralty used the same rationale when it came to refusing to pay an
agency fee, notin g that while Britain owned the St. John ' s base, it was always
considered a Canadian base and Canada' s contribution to the Battl e of the Atlanti c.
Consequently , it felt that it was "inappropriate that [the Admiralty] should be charged
an agency fee in respect to a base which is being operated entirely by the R.C.N., and
without which the Canadian contributi on could not have been made at all." Even
more bluntly , if the Canadians wanted an agency fee, the Admir alty would start
S9lbid.
6Olbid., AD M 116/4540, memo randum , financ ial responsibility, division between Admira lty
and Canada, 8 December 194 1.
61lbid., Morrison to Seal, 17 December, 1941.
62lbid., memorandum , financia l responsibility, div ision between Adm iralty and Canada, 8
Dece mber 1941 .
charging rent.63 In the end , the matter was quiet ly dropp ed . After all, there were far
more important event s unfoldin g on the other side of the Atlantic.
When the Allies invaded Normandy in the early hou rs of GJune 1944, Diinitz
was on holid ay at a hillside resor t in the I3lack Forest. But the head of the V-l3oat
Arm was not caught unprepared. By the time he arrived at his headqu arters ju st
outside Berlin later that mornin g, his staff had already order ed the thirty-six V-boats
at the Biscay bases (Bre st, Lorient , St-Nazair e and La Pallice) and the twenty-tw o in
Norway to prepare for immediate departure. A further seve n stationed off Iceland
were recalled, and those west of Nor way were told to mark time until they rece ived
further orders . Only the eight schnorke l-equippcd boats at Brest had any real prospect
of getti ng to the invasion area , but Donitz knew that their chances improved if they
sortied with the other nine non-schnorkel boats ." In the meantime, the remainin g
Biscay boats formed a patrol line in the Bay to intercept any invasion fleet aimed at
the French Atlantic coast.65 Enigma decrypts kept the Admira lty ' s Operational
Intelligence Centre (OIC) apprised of Donitz' s plans, and an almos t unimaginable
armada of naval and air forces were arrayed aga inst the U-boats, includin g escort
carriers, 286 destroyers, frigates and smaller A/S vesse ls, plus twenty-one squadrons
of aircraft that flew continuous patrols over the Bay of Biscay.66 Over the month, and
"tu«, ADM 116/4941, Admira lty to BAD, 26 Septe mber 1944.
64A schnorkel was a valved tube which co uld be raised whil e a U-boa t was submerged at
periscope de pth enabling the diesel eng ines to be run for propul sion rather than the batteries which had
a limited life before requirin g recharging. While running this way grea tly reduced the boat s radiu s of
action, it providedsomesafety against Allied detection.
65V.E. Tarr ant , The Last Year of the Kriegsmarine, May 1944-May 1945 (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1994) , 71-80 .SeealsoTarrant , U-Boat OfJensive, 131-132.
66Tarrant, Last Year of the Kriegsmarine, 53.
despite severa l dar ing attempts, ju st one frigate, four freighters and a landing ship
tank (LST) were sunk, and one frigate and one freighter damaged, at a cost of ten V-
boats sunk and damage to j ust about every other If-boat involved in the month-long
operation."
Some on Donitz' s staff wanted to send the surviving Biscay boats into the
Atlantic even though their prospects of finding and attacking convoys were remote.
They argued that the appearance of German submarines in those wate rs might induce
the enemy to withdraw forces from the Channel to deal with them . Donitz quite
rightly disagreed, saying that such a move would only result in more losses without
any result s becau se he believ ed that the Allies had more than enough AlS forces
ava ilable to deal with the additional threat without reducing their Channel assets. He
also still feared a landin g on the Biscay coast and preferred to keep the eighteen
surviving boats in their pens while schnorkels were installed. Yet over the summer, as
British, Canadian and American forces consolidated their gains and pushed the
Wehrmacht out of Normand y, the Biscay bases were cut off , and the boats that
survived the summer slaughter retreated to Norway with or without schnorkels.68
With all the activity on the other side of the Atlantic, the summer was quiet
for the Newfoundland Command. The Staff Officer (Operations) noted in his monthly
report that the "outstanding feature of the month of June was its tranqu illity."
Scattered D/F readin gs indicated one or two V-boats were in the area, but these were
67Ibid., 80.
6' lbid., 8 1-82. From D-Day to the end of the summer, the Admiralty estim ated that forty-four
U-boats took part in operations in the Channel. Of that number, twenty-five were sunk and three
probab ly sunk, fora retumoften merchant ships, four escorts and three other commissioned ships
sunk, and seven merchant ships and six naval vessels damaged . See Hinsley, et al., Brit ish Intelligence,
III, part 2, 463-466 .
"quite inoffensive and very prude nt." Offens ive operatio ns aga inst these submarine s
were limited to barrier patro ls by aircraft, a strategy which unfortunately resulted in a
few casualties among the pilots from three Merchant Aircraft Carriers (MAC) on the
Gran d Banks, demonstrating that the enemy was not the only danger in the North
Atla ntic . During the month, 267 warships passed throug h St. John 's, and almost 1200
men were acco mmodate d at the barracks. These figures remained fairly const ant over
the summer, with 248 wars hips and 1279 men in July and 276 ships and 1286 men in
August. In June the first large draft of Women ' s Royal Canadian Nava l Service
(WReNS) personnel arrived in St. John' s, which certainly helped facilitate the
comp letion of a petty offic er and leading seaman course with fourteen ratings, and
five Seamanship Board s resultin g in sixteen men being promoted to petty officer and
forty-five to leadin g seamen.69 In additi on, one officer attended a one-week course at
the TIC. Training cont inued throughout the summer, with sixty-e ight petty officers
and leading seamen advancing in July. Unfortunately, a lack of ava ilable officers both
to teach and attend curtai led officer train ing for the summer. Meanwhile, work on the
1943 expansion plan was nearing compl etion by the end of September, with most
69The Women in Royal Canadian Naval Service (WRCNS), com monly referred to by their
Briti sh monik er (WRENS), were forme d in July 1942, and were in ma ny ways the grease that kept
Canadian naval operations moving. Modelled after their British counterparts, the Canadian WRENS
took over many of the everyday dut ies that allowed HMCS Avalon to funct ion smoo thly under trying
co nditions. Theydrove staff cars andtrucksthroughSt.John ' s'narrow streets; coded,decoded or sent
messages; made sure sa ilors we re paid ; and ran most of the trainin g equipment at the Tac tica l Tra ining
Centre (TIC). By the end of the war, Wrens were working in forty-eight trades, and the WRCNS
establishment at HM CS Avalon was seco nd in size only to HMCS Stadacona. By the end of the war
568 WRCNS had served with HMCS Avalon. See Lisa Banister (ed.), Equal to the Challenge: An
Anthology 0/ Women 's Experiences during WW II (Ottawa: Departm ent of Nationa l Defence, 200 1),
xvi.; Barbara Winters, "The Wrens of the Seco nd World War : The ir Place in the History of Canadian
Service Wom en ," in Michael L. Hadley, Rob Huebert and Fred W. Crickard (eds.), A Nation 's Navy:
In Quest a/ Canadian Naval Identity (Mo ntrea l: McG ill-Queen's Unive rsity Press, 1996), 280-296;
" Wren Estab lishme nt Here Second Largest in the R.C.N. ," Evening Telegram (S t. John ' s), 8 August
1944; and Gilbert Tucker, The Naval Service a/Canada (2 vo ls., Ottawa : King' s Printer , 1952), II,
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delays being due to the non-arriva l of essentia l equipment or mater ials. The Southside
barracks and associated buildings were either comp lete or nearly so, awaiting the
arrival of the aforementioned equipment and materials, and the improvements to the
dockyard, includi ng the various naval stores, were similarly almost complete,
although again awaiting various items. The shore facilities for the floating dock were
only half completed. i" but the marine slipway at Bay Bulls had opened in April and
had the advantage of being able to handle warships the size of a destroyer." The
Night ESCOli Teac her (NET) building was complete with the installation of the
service equipment well in hand, and the new hospital on Topsail Road had been
accepted from the contractors.f
Despite the lull in action, the summer was not totally uneventful. A potentially
serious fire started at the Imperial Oil facility on the Southside, which was contained
fairly quickly using both naval personnel and vessels. This turned out to be a practice
drill for an even more serious fire in Harbour Grace in August which was also quelled
with the help of the navy.73Regardless, Enigma warnings, D/Fs, false sightings and
contacts, and the apprehension that Donitz' s forces were rallying for another
offensive kept Canadian forces tense." No one thought that the Germans were
avoiding battle because of cowardice, since they knew that " lack of courage [was] by
70TNA/PRO, ADM 116/4941, HMC Naval Base, St, John ' s, Newfo und land, prog ress report
for the period 1 September to 3 1 September 1944.
" Ibid., DO 35/ 1357, Governor's quarterly report end ing 30 June 1944. See also Governor' s
quarte rly report ending 30 September 1944.
72lbid., ADM 116/4941, HMC Nava l Base, St, John' s, New foundland, progress report for the
period 1 Septembcr to3 1 Septcmbe r l944.
73LAC, RG 24, FONF, Vol. 11,505, file 1445-102-3, sub. I, vol. I, monthly reports,
Administrative War Diary , August 1944.
74Hadley, U-Boats against Canada, 225.
no means an ingredient of the German characte r." Local commanders assumed that
the Germa ns had accepted the power of Allied AlS measures and were simply biding
their time before they once again engaged Allied forces with new weapons and
tactics.75 Intelligence showed that the Kriegsma rine had upgraded almost all its
ex isting boats with schnorkels by the end of the summer; while slowing the rate of
advance, this gave the U-boats back some of their invisibility. Furthermore, decrypts
of both German and Japan ese comm unications kept the orc up to date on the fast
electro-boa ts being built in German yards.76 Loca l commanders recognized an
"awakening interest" in local waters by the enemy and anticipated some sort of
offensive in the fall.77 The tension, however, was taking its toll, and it was really not
that surprising when aircraft from two merchant aircraft carr iers accompanying
ONM -243 attac ked the Free French submarine La Perle by mistake in July on her
way from St. John' s for refit in the United States .78 SS Empir e Ma cColI and SS
Empire Ma cCallum were part of C.S under the comm and of Commander George
Stephen in HMCS Dunv er as escort to ONM-243 . Despite being in a safe lane and
giving the correct recognition signals, the submarine was sunk with only one
survivor.79
75LAC, RG 24 , FONF, Vol. 11,505, monthly reports, Operationa l War Diary , July 1944.
76Hinsley, et al., British Intelligence, III, part 2, 473-487. See a lso Douglas, et al., Blue Water
Navy, 446-447 .
77LAC, RG 24, FON F, Vol. 11,505, monthly report s, Operational War Diary , August 1944.
7' /bid., monthly Reports, Operational War Diary, July 1944.
79paul Kemp , Submarine Action (Stroud: Sulton Publi shing, 1999; reprint, London:
Chance llor Press, 2000) 141-143. See also Douglas, et al., Blue Water Navy , 426-428.
The expec ted return of U-boats to Canadian waters happened quietly in late
August when V-802 under Kaptiinleutnant Helmut Schmoecke l surface d 250 miles
south of the Burin Peninsula, followed closely by V-54! under Kaptanleutnant Kurt
Petersen, In the new host ile environment of the North Atlantic, neither knew where
the other was nor did they want to. Schmoecke l skirted St. Pierre and Miquelon and
entered the Ca bot Strait on the Newfoundland side . Despite findin g patrols
"extraordinarily light," the submarine was detected off Sab le Island, and Canadian
authorities suspected that this was not the only Ll-boat entering Canadian waters. This
was confirmed when Petersen in V-54! broke the St. John ' s-bound tanker SS
Livingston in two with a GNA T 60 miles cast of Scatarie Island Light in the first
week of September. RCAF aircraft initiated a barrie r patro l immediat ely, and Escort
Group C6 commenced a spiralling search outward from the flaming datum . By this
time, however, Petersen was well inside the Gulf.sO
Meanwhil e, Schmoe ckel penetrated the mouth of the St. Lawrence River by
Bagot I3Iuff on Antico sti Island where, sitting on a thermal layer at periscope depth,
he waited for prey. Unfortunately for Schm oeckel, the summer convoy cycle had
ended, and coastal convoys sailed with full knowledge that If-boats were in the Gulf.
To make matters worse, V-80l's hydrophones were inoperab le, so all Schmoeckel
could do was to sit in the hope that something passed by. Petersen, on the other hand,
encountered a caco phony of alarms from his radar warning sets when he surfaced 28
miles south of South Point , Anticosti . Mistaking the shadow a few miles distant for an
auxiliary aircraft carrier and the source of the alarms, Petersen headed for his target at
full speed. Unbeknownst to the U-boat skipper, the aircraft carrier was actually the
8°Hadley, Usboats against Canada, 226-234 .
corve tte HMCS Nordsyd, headed straight for the V-boa t with a bone in her teeth and
her four-inch forward gun, two-pound pompom, two twent y-rum oerlikons and depth
charges and Hedgehogs all ready for action. 8\ Alerted as to the true nature of her
opponent by the flash of her four-inch gun and the firing of star shells, Petersen dived
while firing a GNAT. The GNAT' s powerful end-of-run explosion misled Petersen
into thinkin g he had sunk Norsyd, but this was not the case. An extensive searc h
ensued, includin g EG.16, Group W- 13, ships from the 7l st and 79th MIL Flotillas as
well as aircra ft and l-IMCS Magog from Hali fax. Petersen escaped undetected,
passing throu gh the middl e of the Cabot Strait and after a few days patroll ing south of
Newfoundland, durin g which time he failed to intercept a large freighter, headed back
to Norway/"
Meanwhil e, in the course of a normal patrol , the frigates of Group W-13
stumbled across U-802' s hiding place. Think ing a convoy was coming up astern,
Schmoecke l tried to slip through the screen only to be detect ed by HMCS Stettler.
Schmoeckel fired a GNAT and upon hearin g its detonation in Stettin's wake, assumed
he had made a kill. The U-boat safely avoided the expected counterattack by lying
under a prot ective water layer at 170 metres and let the boat drift eastward with the
Gaspe Current. Schmoe ckel followed U-541 throu gh the Strait and into the deep
81Pompoms and oer likons were rapid-firing weapons that could be used for anti-aircraft
defence or in surface- to-surface confrontat ions, such as againsta surfaced submarine. Hedgehog fired a
cluster of mortars ahead of an attacking warship which only detonated when they struck the submerged
U-boa t's hull.
820 ouglas,e t al., Blue lVater Navy, 429-431.
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Laurentian Channel, maintainin g radio silence all the way, a tactic which caused U-
Boat Headq uarters to fear for its sa fety.83
The renewal of U-boa t activity in the Canadian North West Atlantic
Command was actually more of an embarra ssment than a threat to shipping. Contrary
to the U-boat captains ' claims , only one ship had actua lly been lost, and in the overall
scheme, this was minor. What was more seriou s, however , was that even though the
Canadian authoriti es knew there were at least two U-boats in the Gulf of St Lawrence
and had dep loyed considera ble resources against them, they were not able to find and
sink them. This chagrin turned into more of a scandal as the fall wore on with the
torpedoing of HMCS Magog in Octobe r and the gra in carrier Fort Thompson in
November, both victim s of V- I22 3, and the sudden disappearance later in the month
of HMCS Shawinigan, which was destroyed by a GNAT fired from V-I 228. There
were no survivo rs, and only six bodies were recovere d.t"
In the Nor th Atlantic, winter weather appeared in October, scattering a
numb er of convoys and forcing several vesse ls to seek the ass istance of HMRT
Tenacity . It soon became apparent that the five-ship, close-escort plan adopted for the
summer months would not work dur ing the winter because any casualt ies would leave
the escort short-ha nded . As a result, Commodo re Tay lor, the FONF, and his staff
decided to aug ment the C Groups with at least one frigate. This had the added
adva ntage of giving each group an additional fast ship other than the Senior Officer,
Escorts (SOE), for offensive action within the close escort. The local command also
8JHadley, V-boats against Canada, 232-234.
8'Nathan M. Greenfield, The Bailie of the St. Lawrence: The Second World War in Canada
(Toronto: Harper Collins, 2005 ), 229-234, see also McKee and Darlington, Canadian Naval
Chronicles 193-195 ; Had ley, " Inshore ASW in the Second World War," 127-142; and Milner,
" Inshore ASW , 143-158.
noticed that the enemy was experimenting not only with new weapons and
equipment, parti cularly the GNAT and the schnorkel, but also with tactics. The U-
boats had enjoyed tremendous success in UK waters by "bottoming," a tactic in
which the submarine used wreckage and/or the contours of the seabed to disguise its
presence from huntin g warships and could simply lay in wait for its targets. Previous
experience showed that Canadian inshore waters were particul arly well suited for this
tactic becau se therm al layers greatly inhibited ASDlC , and the various choke points
were well know n to the German s. Conseque ntly, the authorit ies had to consider this
danger when routi ng convoys through shallow waters, particularly at the approac hes
to major ports. The authori ties felt that the best defence was to conduct harassing
patro ls continually whethe r a target was confirmed or not. To this end three frigate
Escort Groups - EG.16, 25 and 27 - carried out offensive operations with the co-
operat ion of air patrols dur ing Octo ber. With this close air/sea co-operation in mind,
spec ial classes were inaugurated in September for approx imately 200 RCAI'
personnel in sailing and elementary seamanship in the event that they were forced
dow n ove r open water. Regular seamanship and adva ncement courses were also
scheduled at the TIC all through the fal1.85
Poor weat her continue d to hamper operations in November with many
convoys delayed or sca ttered, and coas tal movements were contin ually restr icted
during the latter part of the month by strong winds. Shipping was generally not
molested, but author ities were cognizant of the shallow water threat on both sides of
8SLAC, RG 24, FONF , Vol. 11,505, monthly reports, Operational War Diary, September-
October 1944. For a discussion of RAF/RCAF survival trainin g and equipment, see Graham Pitchfork,
Shot Down and In the Drink: RAF and Commonwealth Aircrews Save d fro m the Sea, 1939-1945 (Kew:
National Archive s, 2005).
the Atlantic. Local forces kept up offensive patrols, especially EO-16 and EO-n, and
while no concrete results were forthcoming, the local command felt that the constant
harassment had a detrimental effect on the crews of any U-boats in Canadian coastal
waters. That a coastal offensive was imminent seemed obvio us to senior officers, who
felt that coastal or feeder convoys would bear the brunt. As a result, "a high degree of
fluidity in the allocation of escorts" would be necessary to address it. To this end,
NSI-IQ proposed to shift the emphasis on the allocation of resources from the Mid-
Ocean Escort Force (MOEF) to the Western Ocean Escort Force (WOEF).86
Ashore, Commander I-I. Kingsley, RCN, arrived in St. John 's to take up his
appointment as Commander of the Port (COP) from Commander I-I.W. Balfour, who
left for Halifax to assume his new position as Commanding Officer of I-IMCS
Stadacona, something of a dubious appointment as future events would prove. In the
meantime, 299 naval vessels rotated through St. John ' s during the month, and almost
1600 men were accommodated at the naval barracks. It was probably fortunate that
the Southside Barracks were accepted from the contractors later in the month.
Training continu ed apace, despite the bad weather. To acquaint RCAF aircrew
undergoing RCN seamanship instruct ion with the condition s they would encounter if
forced to ditch in the ocean, a dingy was put in place in Quidi Vidi Lake. Sixteen
candidates for leading seaman or petty officer attended a two-week advancement
course, and two qualification boards were held which advanced seventeen to the rank
of petty officer and twenty to leading seaman . Three ratings were drafted for radar
courses and two for torpedo courses, while thirteen gunnery ratings were drafted for
higher training. In addition, a three-week course comm enced for harbour craft
86lbid., monthly reports, Operational War Diary , November 1944.
personnel who wanted to advance to the rating of harbour craft coxswa in.
Unfortunately, the course had a twenty-five percent failure rate. While off-duty, RCN
personnel enjoyed a usa show at the barracks drill hall in early Nove mber, the
locally produ ced "Up Spirits" variety show in mid-month which was attended by
12,000 people, and the Massey Harris "Combines" Musical Revue at month' s end.
The Thanksgivin g Day parade to the Church of England Cathedral was cancelled due
to inclement weather.87
The Submar ine Trackin g Room (STR) at NSHQ placed four U-Boats in
Canadian waters by the first of December. Friedrich Marien feld ' s U-1228 was
patrollin g the Cabot Strait after sinking Shawinigan; Hermann Lessing in U-1231 was
off Gaspe; U-1230 under the command of Kaptan leutnant Hans Hilbi g was southeast
of Nova Scotia after having landed agents in Maine; and Klaus Hornb ostel,
conducting his first and only cruise in U-806, was headed towards Halifax. Hilbig
scored the first kill of the month when he torpedoed the Canadian National
Steamship's SS Cornwallis shortly after landin g his passengers in the Gulf of Maine.
But it was Hornb ostel in U-806 who enjoyed the most spectacular, and for Canadians
the most frustrating, exploits. U-806 arrived off Halifax at mid-month but did not
strike unt il a week later when Hornb ostel tracked the four-ship HHX-327 form ing up
for departur e. His first shot missed its target, but the second hit SS Samtuky, which
lost headway and started to settle by the stern . Hornbo stel fired another torpedo which
aga in hit its target but still did not sink it (indeed, it was eventually put back in
service). Three days later, U-806 was again off Halifax when the Halifax-to-Boston
.7Ibid., Vol. 11,505, monthly reports, Administrative War Diary, Commanding Officer and
Training Offic er, HMCS Avalon, monthly reports, Novemb er 1944.
convoy XB-139 steamed out of port accompanied by the frigate HMCS Kirkland
Lake and two Bangor minesweepers, Clayoquot and Transcona . Mistakin g
Clayoquot's positioni ng manoeuvre as an attack run, Hornbostel fired a GNAT in the
direction of the minesweepe r and dove to fifty metres. Shortly thereafter, the
minesweeper was hit astern and sank, taking eight men down with her. Following the
attack , a massive hunt for the U-boat ensued ; this ultimately consisted of a task force
of twenty-one ships. Mea nwhile, Hornboste l headed close to shore where he figured
the Cana dians would not expect him and bottome d his boat. After sitting quietly for
ten hours, the If-boat lifted off and headed southwa rd for deeper water. But instead of
raising his schnorkcl to replenish the air in the boat once the searching warships were
far enough astern, Hornbostel waited another twenty-one hours before raising his
schnorkel mast.88
Such U-boat activ ity off the mainland led the local comm and to fear that the
same tactic s would soon comm ence in Newfoundland coastal waters, particularly in
the harbour approa ches. Senior officers figured that after the "unpunished successes"
off Halifa x it was only be a matter of time before St. John ' s was targeted. As long as
this threat remai ned, the authorities felt that ser ious thought should be given to
shifting esco rts from the MOEF to the Local Defence Force. They also noted that , as
evide nced by the sinkings of HMCS Clayoquot and Shawinigan, the enemy no longer
shied away from targeting escort vesse ls themselves in addition to the merchantm en
they were protecting. Despite this, several offensive actions were taken during
88McKce and Darlington, Canadian Naval Chronicles, 196- 199. See also Doug M. Mcl. ean,
"Muddling Throu gh: Canadia n Anti-Submarine Doctri ne and Practic e, 1942-1945," in Hadley,
lIu ebert and Crick ard (eds.), A Nation's Navy, 173-189; and Hadley, U-boats against Canada, 232-
234 and 249-271.
Decemb er, as C.5 hunted for a suspected U-boat around ONS- 38 , and HMCS Swift
Current investigat ed a peri scope sighting by an American warship . Neither hunt was
fruitfu l. Other than that, the Newfo undla nd Force remained on the defe nsive as EG. IG
and EG.27 were employed as support for vario us convoys .t"
Training continued to be a priority at IIMCS Avalon . A furt her twent y-two
ratin gs attend ed instructional classes, and three examination board s were held for
fifty-four candid ates (twenty -five petty officers and twenty-nine leadin g seamen)
durin g December. Unfortu na tely, the failure rate for both ranks was fifty percent.
Regardless, another twelve ratin gs were drafted for substant ive and non-sub stantive
training (radar , radio opera tors, leadin g torpedomen), and a seco nd three-week
Harbour Craft Coxswain's co urse was run with eig ht ratings. A dai ly averag e of
thirteen merc hant vessels share d the harbour with the more than 400 nava l vesse ls
that arr ived or departed dur ing the last month of 1944. The barracks acco mmodated a
record 1616men .89
By the end of 1944, the battl e of the Atlantic was really all over but the
shouting. Indeed , U-boa t headqu arters stopped makin g entries in its War Dairy after
15 January 1945.90 Nevert he less, Donitz steadfas tly stuck to his stra tegy of sending
boats into the Atlant ic, part icularly into coasta l waters, to tie dow n Allied forces .
Indeed, one of the last major successes in the U-boa t war occurre d in Canadian
coastal waters when U-1232 under the command of Kapitan sur See Kurt Dobratz
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sank three ships out of the nineteen- vessel BX-14 as it entered Halifax. Despite the
efforts of EG.27 , Dobratz escaped and was awarded the Knight' s Cross when he
returned to Germany." Still, this was essentially a pointless exercise since the Allies
had overwhelm ing superiority on all fronts, and the forces the U-boats were tying
down were essentially only employed in killing them. During the last four months of
the war approximatel y 150 l.I-boats were lost to enemy action , a useless waste of life.
Some of these were sent to Canadian waters. Indeed, one of the last casualties of the
war was U-88 1, which USS Farquar destroyed southeast of Cape Race on 6 May
1945.92 On the Canadian side, the last RCN warship sunk by a U-boat during the war
was HMCS Esquimalt, torpedoed by U-190 off Halifax less than a month before the
end of the war.93 Actua lly, there were three U-Boats in Canadian waters when
Germany finally surrendered on 8 May 1945 - U-190, U-889 and U-805. The first
two surrendered to Canadian forces; U-190 was taken to Bay Bulls and U-889 to
Shelburne, NS . Even though U-805 surrendered less than fifteen miles south of Cape
Race, USN forces from Argentia took it to Casco Bay, Maine.94
By January, the Newfoundland Force also felt that the Atlantic war was
slowly dragging its way to conelusion. Senior officers acknow ledged that if the U-
boats continued to have success in Canadian inshore waters, it was only a matter of
time before they tested the defences of St. John's. They also recognized, however,
9lGennan, Sea is at Our Gates, 179, See also Marc Milner, The Battle of the Atlantic (St.
Catharincs: Vanwell Publishing, 2003) ,220-221, and McLean, " Muddling Through," 173-189.
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9JGreenfield, Battle of the St. Lawrence, 238-240 , See also McKe e and Darlington, Canadian
NavaIC hronicle,2 20-223.
9' Hadley, U-boats against Canada, 289-296.
that with the relatively clear bottom along the approaches to St. John ' s and the
minimal volume of merchant shipping movin g in and out , it was unlikely that the port
was subject to "as extensive a threat" as elsewhere. Consequently, aside from brief
searches by TO 22.1 and WA, no offensive operations were carr ied out in
Newfoundland waters durin g the month . A false alarm in March did give the N S
organizat ion a practice drill , though, when an RCAF aircraft reported sighting a U-
boat in the vicinity of St. John 's. Captain (D) despatched all available ships, and even
though there were no results , the Newfo undland Comma nd nevertheless felt that it
was a beneficia l exerc ise for both the ships involved and the opera tiona l and
com munications staffs ashore . This was especia lly so for the new communications
orga nization which had been set up next to the Opera tions Room at headquar ters.
Deficiencies had come to light in Operation Shamb les, a combined exercise invo lving
both offe nsive forces and shore staffs, held in January. The false alarm in March
indicated that these problems had been rectified. Actually, weather and pack ice
seemed to be the main enemies durin g the winter month s, and both caused delays
which in turn shorte ned turnarounds for the escorts." On average, 300 warships per
mont h rotated throug h St. John's during the winter month s, and over 1800 men were
accommodated monthly at the naval barracka." The short layovers also strained the
base maintenance staff, which still manage d to sai l all mid-ocean groups on time to
meet their charges durin g daylight hours. In an effort to prevent the complete sealing
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of St. John 's harbour by ice, the icebreaker Sal/rei was kept on standby to sail for St.
John' s to open up the entrance if necessary."
The Commander of US TO 22. 1 and his staff and ships' comm andin g officers
met with the FONF and his staff in April to see how RCN operations were conducted
in St. John ' s and to exch ange ideas on A/S warfare . The main topic s of discussion
were communications, air cover and the differing methods of operational contro l
between RCN esco rt groups and US task forces . Com modore Tay lor, who was
surprised to learn from the TO commander that American forces had destroyed three
U-boats durin g the month without his knowledge, complained that US operational
author ities were not as forth comin g with reports of their sinkings as were
Canadia ns.98 Considering the RCN's lack of success in this area, however, this might
have been ju st sour grapes .
With little more than false alarms and exercises to keep the Newfo undland
Force occupied, training seemed to be a priority during the winter. Adva ncement
courses for petty officers and leading seamen resumed, but the failure rate continued
to be high at the seamanship boards. As only twenty-four of the forty-six men
examined had attende d the month ' s course, the base trainin g officer felt that many
candid ates would benefit from the training, espec ially in the art of "taking charge of
men," and that result s would improve if they did so. Unfortunately, February's boards
did not show any improve ment. The three-week Harbour Craft Coxs wain's course
was more successfu l, and a large numb er of ratings were drafted for more advanced
97/bid., sub 2, vo l. 2, monthly reports, Operationa l War Diary, January-March 1945.
"tu«;month ly report s, Operational War Diary, April 1945.
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trainin g in variou s tcchnolo gics. At thc same time, a large numb er of sub-lieutenants
had becn posted to HMCS Avalon, and arrangements were mad e to offer instructi on
in Extended Defenc e (XD) , Commercial Vessel Defe nce (CVD) and Nava l Store s in
add ition to the regular classes at the TTC .99
The end of the war was almost anti-cl imac tic for the base at St. John's. There
were the usua l parties and ceremonies markin g the defeat of German y, but unlike in
Halifax , VE Day passed fairly qu ietly. Whereas all the tension s and resentm ents
betw een city residents and nava l perso nnel exp lode d in an orgy of riotin g and looting
in thc Nova Sco tia port , the people in St. John ' s merely breath ed a sig h ofrc lief that it
was finally ove r and thin gs could gct back to norm al.
The last twent y-four months of the war had been a period of growt h at HMCS
Avalon. Afte r the climatic defeat of Donitz' s U-boa ts in May 1943, things were quie t
as the mid- ocean gro ups were raided for ships to form support and hunter/killer
gro ups in the eas tern Atlantic , and the convoy cycle was opened up. By this time, the
RCN was almo st exclus ively responsible for their safety; on average, some 300 naval
vesse ls rotated through St. John 's monthly. Fortun ately, the expansio n plans from the
yea r before were prog ress ing, parti cularly at Bay Bull s which could now hand le
larger warship s than the floatin g dock at St. John 's. However, the U-boa ts were still a
threat as was amply demonstrated in the spring of 1944 with the sinking of HMCS
Valleyfie ld by U-548 off the south coast of Newfoundland.
D-Day brought another lullas Donit z once aga in recall ed his forces to the
eas tern Atlan tic , but this gave naval authorities time to complete the add itional
99/bid. , vol. I, HMCS Avalon Trainin g Officer , month ly report s , January-February 194 5.
faciliti es at Avalon in time for the next onslaugh t. Recognizing that the Gulf of St.
Lawrence was a hub of shipp ing and that its difficult ASDIC conditions gave V-boa ts
some immu nity from attack, Donitz sent some of his best young comma nders to the
east coast of Cana da where they were particularly success ful aga inst esco rt vesse ls,
sinking fou r by the end of hostilities. The V-boats also developed new tactics and
chose to lay in wait for vessels going in or out of port, sinking a numb er off Halifax.
Local naval author ities feared that the waters off St. John ' s were next and fine-tuned
the combi ned operati ons apparatus. Yet aside from a few false alarms, the
Newfoundland zone was quiet and remained so until the U-boats hoisted their black
flags and radio ed their positions in May 1945. It was somewhat appropriate that U-
190, which sank the last RCN casualty of the war, was brought to St. John ' s after its
surrender.
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Conclusion
Newfoundland automatica lly found itse lf at war with Germany in September
1939 as did most of the British Empire. Unfortunate ly, the colony was tota lly
unprotected, and whil e pleas were made for air and sea defences, London felt that any
threat was min imal and directed its attention to other mat ters. The main concern of
the Commiss ion of Governm ent was the two airports, and it attempted to form a
defence force to protect them. The Commission also looked to its neighbour to the
west for help . Even before the onset of hostiliti es, Canada vowed to protect
Newfoundland, mainly because the colony had a numb er of assets that it deemed
important. Yet other than placing guns on Bell Island, a vital source of ore for the
steel mill s of the Maritim es, Canada did not act on its commitment until the spring of
1940 when the German ju ggernaut moved through Western Europe, cowin g all in its
path. In May, Canada sent forces to Gander and Botwood to protect the air facilit ies,
and by the end of the year it had established Force W, headqu artered at St. John 's.
The Royal Canadian Navy was also present in Newfoundland by then in the
form of an Examination Service. The Newfoundland Defence Force soon followed,
also under the command of the Nava l Officer in Charge (NOIC) at St. John ' s, Captain
C.M.R. Schw erdt , RN, the governor 's former secretary. At the same time , the Battle
of the Atlantic entered a new phase. With the strengthening of anti-submarine
measures in the eas tern Atlantic, the head of the U-boat Arm , Admi ral Karl Donitz,
sent his submarines further afie ld. Concentrating in the central Atlantic , at the limits
of escort prot ection and air coverage , the U-boats ravaged the vital trans-Atlantic
convoys . Convoys needed protection for the entire crossi ng, and to this end the
British occupied Iceland as a mid-Atlantic escort base and looked to Newfoundland
as the western terminu s. When the Admiralt y asked Naval Service Headquarters
(NSHQ) how many of its new corvettes could be ass igned for duty at such an
installation, Ottawa surprised London by offering not only to supply the required
forces but also to establish the base itself. The Canadians had a number of reasons for
being so enthusiastic. Such a move would keep Canadian naval forces in traditionally
Canadian waters while at the same time promoting the RCN's contribution to the war
effort. Possibly even more important was that such an enterprise would assert
Canada's "special interest" in Newfoundland in contrast to the Americans.
In the fall of 1940, London and Washington agreed in principle on an
exchange of leases on bases in British territory in the Western Hemisphere in return
for fifty surplus WWI American destroyers. The right to establish bases in
Newfoundl and was included in the deal as a bonus. US military forces arrived at St.
Jolm's in January 1941 and were soon fully established throughout Newfoundland,
most particularly in St. John' s and Argentia, but also in Gander, Stephenville, and
eventually Goose Bay, Labrador. Canadians were quite worried that their nation
could end up being squeezed between two American bookends: Alaska in the west
and a US-dominated Newfoundland in the east. One further incentive for Canadians
was that under an Anglo-American agreement signed in 1940 Canadian naval forces
in the western Atlantic would fall under American control once the US entered the
war. Establishing a large Canadian naval base at St. John ' s under Canadian command
would help the RCN control its own forces as well as stake Canada' s claim on
Newfoundl and. On the other hand, the Newfoundland government was not terribly
keen on either the Canad ians or America ns having a larger interest in Newfoundland
and insisted that any naval base be owned and operated by the Admiralty.
The British, Canadian and Newfoundland gove rnments eventually reached a
compromise whereby the base would be developed by the Admiralty, owned by either
the British or New foundland governments, and operated by the RCN. The
Newfoundland Escort Force (NEF) under the command of Commodore Leonard
Murray, RCN, commenced operations in June 1941. The British Admiralty
Delegat ion (BAD) headed by E.A. Seal arrived from Washin gton shortly thereafter to
assess requir ements for the base and were somewhat dismayed by what they found .
The harbour was small and conges ted, the wharves old and decrepit , and it was
patently clear that the Admiralty would have to greatly improve the facilities at S1.
John ' s ifit wanted the base to function.
In the summer of 194I, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill
met in Placenti a Bay to sign the Atlantic Charter. This resulted in the RCN's
immediate transfer to American control who assigned it to protect the slow and
vulnerable SC convoys while the USN took over escort of the faster HX convoys. In
September the NEF scored its first victory over the U-boats when I-IMC Ships
Chamby and Moose Jaw sank V-50l eas t of Greenland .
In the meantim e, poor weather, local labour trouble s, and developin g tensions
between the Newfoundl and government and senior naval offic ers in S1. John ' s and
Ottawa slowed the construction of the base.One of the problems at S1. John' s was that
ships were unable to unload their cargoes due to lack of warehouses. Local
merch ants, anticipating shipping delays , were hoardin g stock which occupied much-
needed space. The Newfoundland government's attempts to solve this prob lem were
unsuccessfu l, and congestion continued to be a problem well into 1943.
The American entry into the war in Decemb er 194 1 had some serious
consequences for the NEF , as well, and compounded the already convoluted
comm and structure . Even more serious, and more infuri ating to the Canadians, was
that early in 1942 the USN hauled almost all of its forces out of the Atlantic for duty
in the Pacific theatre while still retaining jurisdic tion in the western Atlantic . At the
same time, Donit z unleashed his V-boat force against the now undefended American
eastern sea board. As a result, Murray was forced to release valuab le assets to escort
tanker convoy s to and from the Caribbean at a time that he needed them for local
escort as the U-boats moved into Canadian coastal waters.
With the naval focus shifted to the western Atlantic, and Newfoundl and ' s new
importa nce in both trans-Atlantic trade protection and hemispheric defence, local
commanders once again became anxious over the possibil ity of an attack on the
various milit ary faciliti es, especially those in and around St. John ' s. Comprehensive
air raid measures were institut ed, and plans were made to deal with the aftermath of
such an emergency . Furthermore, large-scale denial plans were formul ated to prevent
the numerous mil itary facilities on the island from falling into German hands.
Regardl ess of the difficulties, by the summer of 1942, much of the base was
nearing completion. The naval hospital was fully functional, the administration
build ing was almost finished, and the attached office rs ' quarters were ready to be
furnished. Progress at the Nava l Dockyar d was also satisfactory with most of new
buildings half-completed and a large part of the berthing space usable. In that first
year, lIMCS Avalon had made great progress.
With the concentratio n of V-boa t attacks now further west , and the threat to
mid-ocean shipping dimini shed, Murray opened up the convoy cycle and reduced the
number Mid-Ocea n Escor t Force (MOEF) Groups. At the same time, the Americans
managed to staunch the haemorrha ge of shipping along their coast with the institution
of an integra ted convoy system. Unfort unately, this had the unintended effect of
moving the U-boats south into the Caribbea n and north into Canadian waters. As a
result , at a meetin g in Washin gton Allied naval authorities decided - prematurely it
turned out - that the Mid-Oc ean Groups would be further reduc ed to six vesse ls, thus
releasing eight corvettes for duty in the Caribbea n.
The U-boats return ed to the North Atlantic over the summer, evidenced by an
increase in sightings and the destruction of several submarines . Ashore, headqu arters
- with a combin ed RCN/RCAF operation s room - was relocated from the
Newfoundland Hotel to the newly-compl eted administration buildin g. Murra y also
met with senior RCN officers who were in town to consult with their American
counterparts . These meet ings produced a new convoy schedule which proposed a
balanced timetable for all MOEF Groups, and afforded the B Groups a more efficie nt
repair service at Argentia by stagge ring their arrivals.
By the fall of 1942, the constructi on at HMCS Avalon was pretty well
completed with most of the administration, medical , accommod ation and mess
buildings occupied and much of the dockya rd faciliti es in naval hands. Admiral
Murray left in September to take up the post of Commanding Officer, Atlantic Coast
(COAC) from Admiral Jones in Halifax ami Captain (D), Captain E.R. Mainguy,
wore both hats unti l Murray' s replacement arrived in October .
U-boats continued to operate in northern waters, includ ing those around
Newfo undland. One of their targets was the anchorage at Waba na on Bell Island. In
broad daylight on 5 Septemb er, U-513 sank two ore carriers, killing twenty-nine men
in the process. Defenc es improved later in the month and Mainguy established a
perman ent patro l at Wabana and regular convoys between Wabana and Sydney.
Perhaps prompted by this attack, the RCN, RCAF, US Army and Air Corps
conducted joint manoeuvres in September which also included the local Air Raid
Precautions (AR P) orga nization. Senior officers deemed these a success, but in early
Nove mber Wabana was again attacked, to the outrage of the Governo r, with the loss
of two additional ore carrier s. The worst loss to the Ll-boats, at least on the local
level, was the torpedoing in the Gulf of St. Lawrence of the Syd ney to Port-aux-
Basques passenger ferry Caribou in October 1942 with the loss of 136 lives,
including twenty-two naval personnel. The year was capped of f with a fire at the
Knights of Columbus hostel in St. John 's shortly before Chris tmas which killed
ninety-nine peo ple, includin g twenty-five nava l personnel. New ly appointed Flag
Office r Newfo undland Forces (FONF), Commodo re Reid, had a lot to contend with
in a very shor t period of time.
To combat the increase in U-boat activity, senior Allied authorities met in
Ottawa and decided to form the Western Support Force (WSF) by withdrawi ng all the
destroyers from the Western Escort Force (WEF) and form ing them into group s to
support threaten ed eastbound and westbound convoys . The force was based in St.
John ' s and consisted of four groups of two des troye rs. At the same time, the
Commander of TF.24, under whose authority the MOEF operated, decided that all
mid-ocean groups would depart from St. John ' s rather than Argentia, which was the
case for the A and 13Groups . Despite this added pressure on facilities, HMCS Avalon
did its utmost to acco mmodate these new measures, but unfor tunately a time of
reckonin g was coming for the RCN
The winter of 1943 was a watershed for the Royal Canadian Navy. l3y the end
of the previous year, the RCN provided less than half of the escort groups in the
North Atlantic but suffered fully eighty percent of U-boat losses. The Admiralty
accused the RCN of poor training and leadership , whil e NS HQ blamed it on outdated
equipment and continually increasing responsibilities. Regardless, Ottawa eventually
bowed to Admiralty pressure and transferred the C Groups at St. John ' s to Western
Approaches Command starting in early 1943. Ostensibly, this was to fill the vacuum
left by the deployment of RN escorts to the newly formed tanker convoys in the
central Atlantic but it was really to put Canadian esco rts back under Admira lty
control for train ing. Senior Canadian officers, not without reason, felt let down by the
Admiralty .
As it turn ed out, the remaining A and 13 Groups fared no better than their
Canadian count erparts. Twenty-four merchantm en were lost in January 1943, eleven
of them from the American-escorted ON-166. To be fair, weather played havoc with
both naval and merchant vessels alike, and with the loss of the C Groups,
Commodore Reid was hard-pr essed to maintain his responsibil ities. Often Groups left
St. John ' s under-strength or comprised of ships that had been culled together from
other gGoups at the last minute . These diffieulti es culminated in the "March Crisis"
which has often been cited - erroneously - as being the time when the Allies came
closest to losing the Battle of the Atlantic . During that month, thirty -one ships in six
convoy s, all escorted by British or American Groups (the C Groups were now on duty
in the Gibraltar area) were lost, with the worst hit being HX-229, escorted by B.4,
which lost thirteen ships.
With over 300 nava l vesse ls passing through St. John's per mont h by this
time, not to mention the hundr ed-odd weather- and battle-da mage d merchant vessels
that arrived in the same period, it became increasingly pressing that facilities at St.
John's be enlarged. A numb er of high-rankin g officials, led by BAD head E.A. Seal,
arrived in April 1943 to determine the upgrading needed to maintain the maximum
numb er of esco rts at the port. They recommended major new improvements for
HMCS Avalon, includin g a new machine shop complex, naval stores, a new hospital
and barracks. The committee also recommended an enlarge d training estab lishment
which was to include Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships (OEMS) facilities at
Cape Spear and expansion of the Tac tical Training Centre (TIC). Harbour defences
would also be improved. Seal sugges ted that to facilitate this upgrading, the number
of naval personnel at St. John ' s should be increased to 5000, including 850
serv icewo men.
One of Sea l's most important recommendations was the provision of a
floating dock for St. John 's. The BAD tried throughout 1942 to obtain one in Canada,
but the closest it came was the smaller section of the Vickers Dock in Montreal.
NS I-IQ refuse d to rea llocate it to HMCS Avalon and ultimately, a floating dock was
obtained from the Americans in September 1943. This, however , did nothing to
allev iate the shortage of skilled labour in St. John' s. Canada' s lI igh Commiss ioner to
Newfo undland, Charles Burchell, comp lained that the Newfou ndland Dockyard was
not working enough shifts and insisted that it should operate at least two per day. The
problem was that there were not enoug h skilled trades men to meet that capac ity even
though 170 appre ntice mecha nics had been hired. Governor Walwyn felt that to keep
the dockyard work ing full-time , it needed an add itiona l sixty-six fully trained and
experienced crafts men. These would have to come from Britain.
In the meantim e, events at sea took a dram atic turn. In contrast to the Allied
defeats of March 1943, May brought Don itz 's U-boats to their knees. During that
month , no fewer than thirty-eight U-boa ts were lost to enemy action, a kill rate that
the U-bootewafJe co uld not long sustain. Thinking that this was just a temporary
setback, Don itz withdrew his forces from the No rth Atlantic for less dangerous waters
while his boat s were re-equ ipped with new weapons and sensors . Yet when they
returned in September their fortunes were no better , and losses continued to mount
while successes were few.
By this time, the proposed expansio n to HMCS Ava lon had begun. Agai n, the
nagg ing question of post-war ownership was raised. The Canadians feared that the
British might turn the base over to the Americans, and the Newfoundl and gove rnment
worried that furth er Canadian encroachment would give that country intolerable
control of the harbour which in turn would enable them to control the fisheries.
Ultimately, assura nces were given to all parties that no decision would be made
without full consu ltat ion.
Regardl ess of the plans for St. John ' s, the repair problem on the entire east
coas t of Canada reached the crisis point by this time. The Anglo-American Allied
Anti-Submarine Survey Board found that the maintenance facil ities at both St. John ' s
and Halifax had long passed the saturation point. Britain ' s High Commissioner to
Canada suggested that a combined British, American and Canadian committee
convene in Ottawa to examine the ship repair problem. The committee agreed on a
number of recomm endat ions, includ ing a new floating dock and an enlarged
workforce at St. John 's. At the same time, a storm was brewi ng in Ottawa between
the Nava l Mini ster and the Chief of Nava l Staff (CNS) . The long-standin g disparity
between RN and RCN ships and the embarrassment of being pulled out of the batt le
that winter left many in the RCN doubting the compe tence of senior staff at NS HQ.
These grumblings eventually made their way to the Naval Mini ster, Angus
MacDonald . A fact-finding mission - albeit strongly biased - by his exec utive
ass istant confirm ed these rumours, and the Mini ster, side-stepping his own
culpability, laid the blame squarely at the door of NSHQ . In a rare show of pluck,
CNS Percy Nelles threw the allegations back at the Minster and vigorously defended
his staff, but ultim ately had to fall on his sword, so to speak, and step down as CNS in
1944.
Regardless, the fall of 1943 was fairly quiet for the Newfo undland Force even
though the escorts alongside per day rose from twenty-nine in October to thirty-nine
in Decemb er. Fortun ately, the floating dock arrived in Septemb er to help service the
force, and improvements to the base included enlarged barracks which
accommodated over 1000 men daily. The Force also experienced a change of
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command when Comm odore Reid len for new du ties at NSHQ and Commod ore
Taylor took over as FONF .
Durin g the next few months, weather was the biggest enemy eve n though the
FONF knew that there were U-boats out there. Don itz always kept a few on station in
the mid -At lanti c, but they seldom launched an attack . Th is made them an elusive
enemy , but one that still presented a threat to the vital cargoes cros sing the Atlantic in
prepar ation for D-Da y. To th is end , ove r 300 naval vesse ls rotated throu gh St. John ' s
monthly. Even though Taylor pressed for longer layovers to repair weather dama ge
and give the crews a break, the Admiralty insisted that the schedule had to continue,
dive rting escor ts to Arge ntia when St. John ' s was icebound.
The D-Day landings brought another dra matic shift in the Batt le of the
Atlantic as Doni tz pull ed almost all of his forces out of the mid -Atlantic to attack the
Norma ndy invasion forces and protect his Biscay Ll-boat bases. Despit e these ef forts,
the U-boat chief was forced to send his surv iving boats to Norwa y by the fall as the
Allies ove rran Lorie nt, St. Naza ire, and his other French Atlantic bases . With all the
action on the other side of the At lantic , this period was very quiet for the
Newfo undland Command. Sca ttered DfF read ings indicated that there was still the
odd If-boat in the Atlant ic, but these prudently kept thei r heads down. At the same
time, the repair faci lities at Bay Bulls ope ned in Ap ril and the enlarged barrack s
complex at St. John 's acco mmodate d the more than 1200 men who stayed there daily
dur ing the mo nth. Whi le most of the 1943 expa nsio n plans were comp leted, de lays of
some essential eq uipment held up comp letio n of eve rything .
The local command expected the If-boats to return to the western Atlantic but
did not quite know when. The actual return of the U-boats to Newfoundland waters
did not happ en unti l late August 1944 when U-802 and U-541 penetrated the Cabot
Strait. Over the next several months, the U'-boats claimed several victims, including
two Canadian warship s, but they were all off the east coast of Canada. Actually, the
renewal of Ll-boat act ivity in Canadian waters was really more of an emba rrassment
than a real threat to the war effort, While the loss of life was tragic, the real story was
why the RCN could not find anclsink If-boats in its own coastal waters.
By Octob er 1944, winter weather was starting to set in, and a numb er of
convoys were scattered by gale force winds in the North At lantic. It soon became
apparent that the five-ship escort groups formed for the summer would not suffice,
the C Groups were augmented with a least one frigate. Local commanders also noted
the V-boats ' new tactic whereby they bottomed by wrecka ge or rock outcroppings
and waited for targets to pass using the obstructio n to shie ld their presence.
Authori ties now had to take this into acco unt when routing vesse ls in shallow waters,
especia lly in the approaches to ports. To this end, continuous harassing patrols were
undertaken by both surface and air asse ts.
Ashore, training continued to be promot ed and cour ses were scheduled at the
Tactica l Training Centr e throughout the fall. With the continued bad weath er and an
increase in RCAF patro ls over longer distances, basic seamanship course s were
introduced for air crews , with about 200 men participating. With more warships and
their crews in St. John ' s (1600 men were accomm odated daily at the naval barrack s
durin g November) enterta inme nt became a significant consideratio n. To this end, a
number of shows were presented, some attended by as many as 12,000 people.
The Battle of the Atlantic was really in its final throes by the end of 1944.
Donit z co ntinued to send his boats out to harass the enemy, but many of these patrols
ended with the loss of the submarine. But some were success ful, particularly in
Canadian coas tal waters, and unt il the end of the war V-boats caused Canadia n
authorities much trouble and highlighted the RCN' s inabilit y to protect its own
waters. Whil e Canadian forces were experiencing success in British waters, they
could not even destroy one off the Canadian coast. It was somewhat apropos that the
last RCN casua lty of the war was HMCS Esquimalt, sunk by U-J90 in the Halifax
approaches in April 1945.
As can be seen, HMCS Avalon faced and overcame a num ber of enormous
challenges. Most of them were due to one important factor. Considering that it
became the RCN 's most important overseas commitment, and ultimately one of the
most important escort bases in the North Atlantic , there was a complete lack of initial
plannin g. Indeed , from the Admiralty's first queries to the arrival of the first ships of
the NEF and the start of operation took less than two week s. This is really not
surprising for a numb er of reasons. First, the base was borne out of crisis. It was the
westerly adva nce of Donit z' s If-boats, necessitating continu ous convoy protection,
that prompted the Admiralty 's establishment of the base at St. John ' s. Even then, it
was to be only a temporary measure until the Americans entered the war and took
over all escor t responsibiliti es in the western Atlantic. In addition, the Admiralty was
considering ju st a small force whic h wou ld have found only a dozen ships alongside
at anyone time . The Admira lty orig ina lly had proposed to run a sort of shuttle serviee
between Newfo undland and Iceland. The Newfo undland Escort Force (NEF) would
escort a convoy to a meeting point west of Iceland (WESTOMP); from there an
Iceland-based force would escor t it to the Eastern Ocea n Meeting Poin t (EASTOMP)
where it would be passed to the Royal Navy (RN) .
This plan was shelved when the Admi ralty decided that it was a more
effective use of scarce resources to extend both the WESTOMP and EASTOMP into
a Mid-Ocean Meeting Point (MOMP) and to use Iceland only for refuell ing. To
facilitate this, the strength of the NEF was increased to thirty destroyers, twenty-four
corvettes and nine sloops; of this numb er, it was estimated that only sixteen would be
in St. John' s at anyone time, but as events unfolded, it was not unusual to find more
than thirty esco rts alongside daily.
As has been pointed out elsewhere, St. John' s had the leanest of facilities to
offer the Newfo undland Escort Force in May 1941. Initially, both administrative and
personnel accommodation were afloat or in rental space, and repair facilities were
supplied by a depot ship and the New foundland Dockyard. Thus, the base was
actually designed and built while operations were carrie d out. This was a tall order.
Unlike the Am erican s and the Canadian Army and Air Force, who built their facilities
in the sparsely populat ed outskirts of St. John ' s, the RCN had to develop its facilities
in the centre of Newfoundl and ' s capital city and major seaport. The harbour was
already heavily congested with mercantil e shipping and there were no vacant harbour
front properties readily at hand . The RCN had to acquire land from property owners,
most of whom j ust wanted to be left alone. In addit ion, negotiations were carried out
through the auspices of the Newfoundland Govern ment. Cons idering the state of
Canada/Ne wfoundland relations, this was not easy. There were tensions between
Canadian authori ties and Newfoundland Gove rnme nt and city of St. John ' s offic ials,
and regularly the Canadians bypassed the Newfoundland Gove rnment representatives
altoge ther and dealt direct ly with the British. Neve rtheless, deals were made and land
purchased or leased . Often, the RCN upgraded and shared a waterfront property with
its mercantil e owner. Even after the land was acquired, the fac ilities themselves had
to be built from scratch, and most of the materials and skilled labour to build them
had to be imported from Canada, and this led to further prob lems .
Throughout its construc tion, and the expansion program in 1943, the base
suffered from the non-arriv al of necessary equipment. The naval hospital had to
opera te for several month s durin g the winter of 1942 without a proper heating system
which did not arrived unt il June . The problem had a numb er of causes. Of course, the
most obviou s is that mo stly all materials and equipment had to come from Canada or
the United States throu gh waters that, from the latter ' s entry into the war in December
1941, became the prime huntin g ground for Hitler ' s V-boats . Starting in January
1942, V-boats ranged from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the Gulf of Mexico. During
the first six month s, hundr ed of ships were sunk, all carrying valuable war supplies.
In reacti on to this ons laught, coas tal shipping was formed into convoys which slowed
shipments, and the Canadian Government was forced to close the St. Lawrence River.
This in turn , meant that vital build ing materials and equipmen t earmarked for l-IMCS
Ava lon had to travel ove rland from Quebec or Ontario to the already overwo rked
ports of St. John , New Brunswic k, or Sydney and Halifax for shipment to St. John ' s.
Even when they arrived at St. John' s, the cargoes could languish in the harbour
awaiti ng warehou se space ashore; that is if the local long shoremen were not causing
probl ems.
As has been noted, events at sea had a drastic impact on the developm ent of
HMCS Avalon. With the arrival of the Ll-boat s in Newfoundl and waters, Admiral
Murray had to insti tute local convo ys even though he was already short on escorts
due to their diversion to the Mediterra nean for the Torc h Invasion of Nort h Africa and
to esco rt tanker convoys to the Car ibbean. Murray had to make due with what he had
ava ilable: minesweepers, motor launches, rescue tugs and even Royal Navy Anti-
submarine trawlers in transit to the United States . This put tremendous strain on these
ships and their crews which in turn over- burdened the repair and replenishment
facilities at St. John ' s.
One of the other complicating factors affec ting HMCS Avalon was the
convo luted command structure. Thanks the Anglo-American ABC I Agreement, the
western Atlantic was under the juri sdiction of the United States. Consequently , the
NEF was under the overa ll command of the American adm iral in Argentia, Admiral
Bristol. What is really confounding about this is that the United States really had few
asse ts in the No rth Atlantic. Thus, you had a Canadian naval force of some 70
warships, under a Canadian Admiral, opera ting in traditionally Canadian waters
takin g direction from an American admiral who had very few of his own forces. The
difficulty of this situation was more than demonstrated when, after the Japanese
attac k on Pearl Harbor, Bristol ordered the RCN to commence hostilities against
Japan even before the Canad ian Govern ment had declared war on that country . It is
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indeed fortu nate that Admiral Bristol was a consummate diplomat and relations
between his comm and and the New foundland Command were always cordial.
However, this situation demonstrates that many of the factors affecting the
development and operation of I-lMCS Avalon were really out of FONF's control.
Often, FON F had to implement decisions that were made in Argentia, Ottawa,
London, or Washington, somet imes without any consultat ion. The effec ts of the
closure of the St. Lawrence River on base construction has already been mentioned,
but there were many others. For instance, despite Murray' s complaints as to the short
turnaround times in harbour being experience by the WEF, in March 1942, NS HQ
still decided to push WOMP further east, thus extending the WEF's time at sea and
further reducing its turnaround in port. Similarly, in May 1942, Murray was forced to
reduce the MO EF Groups from 14 to 12 Groups to release seve n corve ttes for duty
escorting the newly formed tanker convoys to the Caribbean. At the same time, the
Admiralty decided to redu ce the numb er of Groups even further to eleven so as to
release one of the Brit ish B Groups for the same purpose. Unfortunately, this
shortened the layover time for the remaining Groups which led to crew fatigue, and
congestion and repair probl ems at St. John 's. To help relieve the pressure, Murray
was forced to stagger the A, B and C Group s. This effort proved unsuccessful as there
were still times that St. John ' s Harbour was overcrowded and others when it was
empty. Of cour se, the most significant decision which impacted on HMCS Avalon
was the Admiralty ' s move to recall all of FONF Canadia n escorts to the eastern
Atlantic for trainin g in early 1943. Supposedly, the better equipped and trained RN
and USN ships would take up the strain, but unfortunately, these forces experienced
the same prob lems of short turnaround times, damaged equi pmen t, crew fatigue , and
last minute group substitution as the RCN Groups with similar results.
As has been shown, a multitude of factors determined how IIM CS Avalon was
developed and operated. Right from the beginnin g, its evolution was determined by
events at sea and decisions ashore, many out of the contro l of the FONF. Yet, despite
these challenges, the base managed to keep the forces afloa t in a reaso nable state of
readin ess. Contra ry to the derision and condescension of the British, the RCN
acco mplished exac tly what it was supposed to. It held the line aga inst the U'-boats
under difficult conditio ns when to do otherwi se would have dramatica lly altered the
course of the war. The fact that the better trained and equ ipped RN suffered a similar
loss rate when it took over the duty in the winter of 1943 illustrates the challenges the
RCN had faced . Nobody disputed that Canadi an trainin g and equipment lagged
behind the RN, but the RCN persevered and deserves an important place in the
history of the Battle of the Atlantic.
If the RCN "so lved the problem of the Atlantic convoys," then HMCS Avalon
solved the prob lem of the RCN's trans-Atlantic escort s. The transform ation from a
poorly defended harbour in 1939 to one of the most import ant escort bases in the
North Atlantic at war 's end was quite an accomplishment for both Canada and its
Newfoundland hosts. Over the course of the war, over 500 warship s, not to mention
the ubiqui tous motor launches, tugs and harbour craft, were posted at St. John ' s. The
number of personnel rose from less than 1000 in 194 1 to over 5000 four years later,
not includin g the thousands of men who crewed the ships of the New foundland Force
and were accomm odated at the naval barracks of J-IMCS Avalon.
This was not accomplished in isolation from the residents of St. John' s, who
also had to co ntend with other Canadian and American armed forces. Despi te
susp icion s and tensions between the various gove rnment and milit ary authorities,
concessions were offered and acco mmodations made for the sake of the war etTort.
The general public opened their homes, arranged activities, and volunteered at the
various hostel s that appeared in St. John' s to take care of the visiting forces , many
away from home for the first time. Overa ll, I-IMCS Avalo n offers a unique case study
in Allied "hos tilities-only" naval base develo pment during the Second World War.
Hundr eds of such bases ringed the North Atlantic durin g the war, and some survived
to the end of the Cold War. No doubt all required the co-operation of local
gove rnments and civ ilian populations. But in the case of HMCS Ava lon, the base was
developed in a small, fully utilized harbour, surrounded by a city already occupied by
two armed force s, where most of the materials and skilled labour had to be imported
throu gh the co-operation of the Briti sh, Canadian, Americ an and Newfoundl and
governments, all of whom had their own agenda s. That the base was develop ed at all ,
to say nothing of reaching the operational level it did , is a truly remark able story .
Thi s thesis provides the foundation narrative for understandin g the
developm ent of St. John 's as a major naval facility durin g the Seco nd World War.
This has been accomplished in two ways. First, it chronicle s the evo lution of the port
from a mere defend ed harbour in 1939 through the arriva l of the NE F and the creation
of HMCS Avalon as a forw ard operatin g base in 1941 and ultim ately the centre of the
RCN's camp aign in the Atlantic with the MOEF a year later. It was further enlarged
and upgraded in 1943 as the Allies planned the invasion of Hitler' s Fortress Europe
and the RCN assumed sole responsibility for trans-Atlantic escort. Second ly, the
thes is examines how extern al and internal factors determin ed the development and
operation of HM CS Avalo n.
Overall , there are several conclusio ns that need to be stressed. Canada
developed I-lMCS Ava /on as much to enhance its internat ional stature and stake out
its special interest in Ne wfoundland as to aid in the Allied war effort ;
intergovern mental suspicions and tensions, labour difficul ties, events at sea, decisions
ashore, and even the wea ther all conspired to hamper the development and/or
operation of the base; and finally , despi te its many diffi culti es, HMCS Avalon
contributed signifi cantly towards the RCN' s success in ensuring the "safe and timely"
arriva l of the all-important Nor th Atlantic convoys of the Seco nd World War.
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